

WIDJANARKO PUSPOYO

From Soekarno to Yudhoyono

**A History of Elections
in Indonesia,
1955 – 2009**

Forewords:

**Sukardi Rinakit, Ph.D
Dr. Akbar Tandjung**

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Editors:

**FS Swantoro
Eko Suksmantri**

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PREFACE

Two reasons have encouraged me to write this book. First, almost all countries in the world, including Indonesia, have utilized general election as one of democratic pillar in the succession of authority.

Second, this work represents my concern toward political practices in Indonesia, which are not only messy but in fact often victimize the innocents as well. The elected person tends to transform into hegemonic ruler, neglecting the people and those who had worked under him.

Therefore, in this occasion I would like to say grace from the deep of my heart toward Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala upon this book being published. Also, to friends and family who have helped encouraging me and keeping my spirit high until I have finished writing this book. For them, it is my duty to be eternally thankful.

First of all, I would like to thank FS Swantoro, a senior researcher at Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate and Eko Suksmantri, a senior journalist, both of whom have continuously supported me, accompanied me in precious discussions, researched the sources and references and given me important notes which have been more than useful to me in writing this book.

I am equally grateful to Dr. Sukardi Rinakit, Dr. Akbar Tandjung, Dr. J. Kristiadi, Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro, Prof. Dr. Bomer Pasaribu, SE, SH, MS, and the current Secretary General of DPP-PDI Perjuangan and Faction Leader of PDIP in the DPR, Tjahyo Kumolo SH, all of whom have given me the honor by giving their forewords and comments, much to the delight of me and my family.

Lastly, I profess that I am very lucky to have such an understanding and loving family. I am very grateful to the big family of Warsito Puspoyo, my wife, children, and grandchildren, with whom sometimes I have shared my heavy burden. Thankfully, with harmonious spirit, mutual understanding and will to sacrifice, everything that is heavy is bearable. From my family, I drew the inspiration I needed to write this book. May the All Loving and All Caring God, bless us all.

Class I Penitentiary Institution,
Cipinang – Jakarta, April 22, 2010.

Widjanarko Puspoyo

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Widjanarko Puspoyo was born in Yogyakarta on April 22, 1949. He graduated as Master of Art from New York University, United States. He worked as an economical staff in United Nation's Headquarter in New York when he was living in the United States.

He had been active in organizations since high school, in which he held the position of Secretary General of central *Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Indonesia* or Indonesian Students United Actions (KAPI) in 1967-1968. Then, in 1970-1971, he was the Head of the Senate of Economy Faculty in *Trisakti* University, Jakarta. In the period of 1971-1973, he held the position of Assistant Secretary of Spiritual and Culture Department in Golkar's Central Executive Council.

During his stay in the United States, he held the position of administrator of *Persatuan Mahasiswa Indonesia di Amerika Serikat* (Permias) or the Organization of the Indonesian Students in the United States of New York area (1976-1978). After he returned to Indonesia, he became the Vice Chairman of National Committee of Indonesian Youth (*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia-KNPI*) of DKI Jakarta (1979-1982); member of *Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia* (AMPI) or Young Generation of Indonesian Reform in 1980-1985; Chairman of AMPI during 1989-1994; and led DPP-AMPI as Secretary General together with Agung Laksono, the Chairman.

As the Chairman of AMPI, in the opening of the year speech in January 1990, he gave suggestion to Soeharto not to re-nominate as President. At that time, he maintained, "Pak Harto has to realize that the longer he holds the position as the single ruler of the Republic without leaving a legacy of structured regeneration is similar to passing down a ticking bomb." It was a suggestion given under presumption that "a healthy man will most certainly accept a constructive suggestion."

Already familiar with politics, he became a member of Golkar's Faction (*Fraksi Partai Karya Pembangunan*) and held position in the Commission VII of DPR-RI, which was responsible in the matters of finance and everything

related to Bank Indonesia (Central Bank), trade and industry, cooperation and Bureau of Logistics (1992-1997).

In reformation era, he joined Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri. In the white-nosed bull party, he was entrusted the position of the Secretary of the Research and Development Department together with Kwik Kian Gie. Following the 1999 general election, he was elected as an MP in DPR and entrusted the position of Vice-Chairman of PDI-P Faction and Working Committee of MPR. He also held the position of Vice-Chairman of Commission III in DPR which responsible in the matter of cooperative, Bureau of Logistics, and Farming and Fishery.

In 2001, by the presidential decree of Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, he was appointed as the Chief of Bureau of Logistics.

GLOSSARY

A

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
ACOMA	<i>Angkatan Communist Muda</i> Youth Communist Group
AKABRI	<i>Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia
AMN	<i>Akademi Militer Nasional</i> National Military Academy
AMPI	<i>Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia</i> Young Generation for Indonesian Reform
Ansor	<i>Pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama</i> Nahdlatul Ulama's Youth Rank

B

Babinsa	<i>Badan Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa</i> Non-Commissioned Officers
Baperki	<i>Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia</i> Indonesian Nationality Consultative Body
Barnas	<i>Barisan Nasional</i> National Front
BPK	<i>Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan</i> Supreme Auditor
BP-KNIP	<i>Badan Pekerja-Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat</i> Working Committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee
BUMD	<i>Badan Usaha Milik Daerah</i> Provincial Enterprises
BUMN	<i>Badan Usaha Milik Negara</i> State Enterprises

D

DI/TII	<i>Darul Islam-Tentara Islam Indonesia</i> The House of Islam-Indonesian Islamic Armed Forces
Dirjen	<i>Direktorat Jenderal</i> Directorate General
DPA	<i>Dewan Penasihat Agung</i> Supreme Advisory Council

DPC	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Tingkat Kabupaten/Kota)</i> Party's Branch Executive Council (Regency/City Level)
DPD	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (Tingkat Provinsi)</i> Party's Regional Executive Council (Provincial Level)
DPD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i> Regional Representatives Council (4 representatives for each province)
DPP	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Tingkat Nasional)</i> Party's Central Executive Council (National Level)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> People's Representative Council or House of Representatives
DPRD I	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Provinsi)</i> Provincial House of Representatives
DPRD II	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Kabupaten/Kota)</i> Regency/City Level House of Representatives
DPR-GR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong</i> Mutual-Cooperation People's Representative Council
DPRS	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Sementara</i> Provisional House of Representative
DPS	<i>Daftar Pemilih Sementara</i> Temporary Voters List
DPT	<i>Daftar Pemilih Tetap</i> Fixed Voters List
E	
ET	Electoral Threshold
F	
FKPPI	<i>Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia</i> Communication Forum of Indonesian Veterans' Children
G	
Gakari	<i>Gerakan Karya Republik Indonesia</i> Functional Movement of Republic of Indonesia
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> Free Aceh Movement

GBHN	<i>Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara</i> State Policy Guidelines
Gerwani	<i>Gerakan Wanita Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian Women's Movement
GMNI	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian Undergraduates' Movement
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i> Functional Groups, later Party of Functional Groups (<i>Partai Golkar</i>)
Golput	<i>Golongan Putih</i> White Group, a gimmick for abstain voters
GPK	<i>Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan</i> Security Disturbance Movement
GTII	<i>Gerakan Tani Islam Indonesia</i> Indonesian Muslim Farmers Movement

I

ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia</i> Pan-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals
IPKI	<i>Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence
Irjen	<i>Inspektorat Jenderal</i> Inspectorate General

J

Jabar	<i>Jawa Barat</i> West Java
Jateng	<i>Jawa Tengah</i> Central Java
Jatim	<i>Jawa Timur</i> East Java

K

Kalbar	<i>Kalimantan Barat</i> West Kalimantan
Kalsel	<i>Kalimantan Selatan</i> South Kalimantan
Kalteng	<i>Kalimantan Tengah</i> Central Kalimantan
Kaltim	<i>Kalimantan Timur</i> East Kalimantan
Kapolri	<i>Kepala Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> Chief of Indonesian Police Force
Kassospol	<i>Kepala Sosial Politik</i>

KINO	ABRI's Socio-Political Chief of Staff <i>Kelompok Induk Organisasi</i>
KKO-AL	Golkar's Group of Core Organizations <i>Korps Komando Angkatan Laut</i>
KMB	Command Corps of the Navy <i>Konferensi Meja Bundar</i>
KNPI	Round Table Conference <i>Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia</i>
Kodam	National Committee of Indonesian Youth <i>Komando Daerah Militer</i>
Kodim	Regional Military Command <i>Komando Distrik Militer</i>
Kopkamtib	District Military Command <i>Komando Pemulihian Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i>
Kopassus	Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order <i>Komando Pasukan Khusus</i>
Koramil	Special Forces Command <i>Komando Rayon Militer</i>
Korem	Rayon Military Command <i>Komando Resort Militer</i>
Kosgoro	Regency-level Military Command <i>Koperasi Gotong Royong</i>
Kostrad	Mutual-Cooperation Cooperative <i>Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat</i>
Kowilhan	Army Strategic Reserve Command <i>Komando Wilayah Pertahanan (Komando Wehrkreise)</i>
KPK	Defense Area Military Command <i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i>
KPU	Corruption Eradication Commission <i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i>
KSAD	National Elections Commission <i>Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat</i>
KSAL	Army Chief of Staff <i>Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut</i>
KSAU	Navy Chief of Staff <i>Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara</i>
KTN	Air-Force Chief of Staff <i>Komisi Tiga Negara</i>
	Good Offices Committee/Commission

L

LEKRA	<i>Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat</i> People's Cultural Body
LPU	<i>Lembaga Pemilihan Umum</i> General Election Board

Lurah	<i>Pejabat Pemerintah di tingkat paling bawah (Kelurahan)</i> Government Official, Head of Neighborhood
M	
MA	<i>Mahkamah Agung</i> Supreme Court
Masyumi	<i>Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</i> Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations
MI	<i>Muslimin Indonesia</i> Indonesian Muslims Front
MK	<i>Mahkamah Konstitusi</i> Constitutional Court
MKGR	<i>Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong</i> Organization of Mutual-Cooperation and Familial Consensus
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> People's Consultative Assembly
MPRS	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara</i> Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
Muktamar	Congress
Munas	<i>Musyawarah Nasional</i> National Consensus/Conference
Munaslub	Extraordinary National Conference
N	
Nasakom	<i>Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis</i> Threefold ideology of Nationalist, Religion, and Communists
NKRI	<i>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</i> Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
NTB	<i>Nusa Tenggara Barat</i> West Nusa Tenggara
NTT	<i>Nusa Tenggara Timur</i> East Nusa Tenggara
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> The Awakening of Religious Teachers, world's biggest rural-based Islamic organization
O	
Opsus	<i>Operasi Khusus</i> Special Operation
P	

P-4	<i>Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila</i> Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila
PA	<i>Partai Aceh</i> Aceh Party
PAAS	<i>Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera</i> Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> National Mandate Party
Pangab	<i>Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata</i> Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief
Pangkopkamtib	<i>Panglima Komando Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> Commander of Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
Parkindo	<i>Partai Kristen Indonesia</i> Indonesian Christian Party
Parmusi	<i>Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia</i> United Front of Indonesian Muslims
Partai Buruh	Labor Party
PB	<i>Partai Buruh</i> Labor Party
PBA	<i>Partai Bersatu Atjeh</i> Aceh Unity Party
PBB	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> Crescent and Star Party
PBN	<i>Partai Barisan Nasional</i> National Front Party
PBR	<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> Star Reform Party
PBSD	<i>Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat</i> Social Democrat Labor Party
PD	<i>Partai Demokrat</i> Democrat Party
PDA	<i>Partai Daulat Aceh</i> Aceh Sovereignty Party
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> Indonesian Democratic Party
PDIP	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PDK	<i>Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> National Democratic Party
PDKB	<i>Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa</i> National Democratic Compassionate Party
PDP	<i>Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan</i> Democratic Reform Party
PDS	<i>Partai Damai Sejahtera</i> Prosperous Peace Party

Permai	<i>Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia</i> Indonesian Marhaen United Front
Permesta	<i>Piagam Perjuangan Semesta</i> Charter of Universal Struggle
Perpu	<i>Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang</i> Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
Pertani	<i>Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian National Farmers Union
Pertanu	<i>Persatuan Tani Nahdlatul Ulama</i> Nahdlatul Ulama Farmers Union
Perti	<i>Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islamiyah</i> Tarbiyah Islamiah (Islamic Education) Association
PGRI	<i>Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia</i> Indonesian Teachers Union
PIB	<i>Partai Indonesia Baru</i> New Indonesian Party
PIS	<i>Partai Indonesia Sejahtera</i> Prosperous Indonesia Party
PK	<i>Partai Katholik</i> Catholic Party
PK	<i>Partai Keadilan</i> Justice Party
PK	<i>Partai Kedaulatan</i> Sovereignty Party
PKB	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> National Awakening Party
PKD	<i>Partai Kesatuan Demokrasi</i> United Democracy Party
PKDI	<i>Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia</i> Indonesian Democratic Compassionate Party
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> Indonesian Communist Party
PKNU	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ummah</i> Nahdlatul Ummah Awakening Party
PKP	<i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan</i> Justice and Unity Party
PKPB	<i>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa</i> Concern for the Nation Functional Party
PKPI	<i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</i> Indonesian Justice and Unity Party
PKS	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> Prosperous Justice Party
PKU	<i>Partai Kesatuan Umat</i> United Devotee Party
PM	<i>Partai Merdeka</i> Independence Party
PMB	<i>Partai Matahari Bangsa</i> Sun of the Nation Party

PNBKI	<i>Partai Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party
PNI Front Marhaen	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaen</i> Marhaen Front of Indonesian Nationalist Party
PNI Marhaenisme	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme</i> Indonesian Marhaenism Nationalist Party
PNI Massa Marhaen	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen</i> Indonesian Nationalist Party of Marhaen's People
PNI Supeni	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Supeni</i> Supeni's Indonesian Nationalist Party
PNI	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian Nationalist Party
PNIM	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme</i> Indonesian Marhaenism Nationalist Party
PNU	<i>Partai Nahdlatul Ummah</i> Nahdlatul Ummah Party
Polri	<i>Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> Police Force of Republic of Indonesia
PP	<i>Partai Pelopor</i> Pioneers Party
PP	<i>Partai Persatuan</i> United Party
PPD	<i>Partai Persatuan Daerah</i> Regional Unity Party
PPDI	<i>Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia</i> Indonesian Democratic Enforcer Party
PPDK	<i>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> United Democratic Nationhood Party
PPI	<i>Partai Pemuda Indonesia</i> Indonesian Youth Party
PPIB	<i>Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru</i> New Indonesia Association Party
PRA	<i>Partai Rakyat Aceh</i> Aceh People's Party
PPNU	<i>Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia</i> Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> United Development Party
PPRMI	<i>Partai Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia</i> United Indonesian Marhaen People's Party
PPRN	<i>Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional</i> National People's Concern Party
PRA	<i>Partai Rakyat Aceh</i> Aceh People's Party
PRD	<i>Partai Rakyat Demokratik</i> Democratic People's Party
PRN	<i>Partai Republik Nusantara</i> Archipelago Republic Party

PRN	<i>Partai Rakyat Nasional</i> National People's Party
PRRI/Permesta	<i>Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Piagam Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta</i> Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia/Charter of Universal Struggle
PSI	<i>Partai Serikat Indonesia</i> Indonesian Union Party
PSI	<i>Partai Sosial Indonesia</i> Indonesian Socialist Party
PSII 1905	<i>Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia 1905</i> Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1905
PSII	<i>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia</i> Indonesian Islamic Union Party
PT	Parliamentary Threshold
PUDI	<i>Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia</i> Indonesian Democratic Union Party
PUI	<i>Partai Umat Islam</i> Islamic Community Party
PUMI	<i>Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia</i> Indonesian Muslims Party
PWR	<i>Partai Wanita Rakyat</i> Laywomen Party

R

RIS	<i>Republik Indonesia Serikat</i> United States of the Republic of Indonesia
RPKAD	<i>Resimen Komando Khusus Angkatan Darat</i> Army Para Commandos Regiment
RUU	<i>Rancangan Undang-Undang</i> Draft Law/Bills

S

Sekjen	<i>Sekretaris Jenderal</i> Secretary General
SI-MPR	<i>Sidang Istimewa MPR</i> MPR's Extraordinary Session
SOKSI	<i>Sentra Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia</i> Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Workers
SPSI	<i>Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia</i> Pan-Indonesian Workers' Union
SU-MPR	<i>Sidang Umum MPR</i> MPR's General Session
Sulsel	<i>Sulawesi Selatan</i> South Sulawesi

Sulteng	<i>Sulawesi Tengah</i> Central Sulawesi
Sulut	<i>Sulawesi Utara</i> North Sulawesi
Sumbar	<i>Sumatera Barat</i> West Sulawesi
Sumsel	<i>Sumatera Selatan</i> South Sulawesi
Sumut	<i>Sumatera Utara</i> North Sulawesi


T

TAP-MPR	<i>Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> Regulation of People's Consultative Assembly
TKR	<i>Tentara Keamanan Rakyat</i> People's Security Force
TNI AD	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat</i> Indonesian Army
TNI AL	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut</i> Indonesian Navy
TNI AU	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara</i> Indonesian Air Force
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian National Armed Forces

U

<i>Ummah</i>	Islamic Community
UU	<i>Undang-Undang</i> Law
UUD 1945	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar 1945</i> 1945 Constitution
UUDS, 1950	<i>Undang Undang Dasar Sementara 1950</i> 1950 Provisional Constitution

INDONESIA PHYSICAL DATA



Map of Indonesia

Indonesian Provinces and their capitals:

Sumatera

1. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam - Banda Aceh
2. North Sumatra (*Sumatera Utara*) - Medan
3. West Sumatra (*Sumatera Barat*) - Padang
4. Riau - Pekanbaru
5. Riau Islands (*Kepulauan Riau*) - Tanjung Pinang
6. Jambi - Jambi
7. South Sumatera *Sumatera Selatan* - Palembang
8. Bangka-Belitung Islands (*Kepulauan Bangka Belitung*) - Pangkal Pinang
9. Bengkulu - Bengkulu
10. Lampung - Bandar Lampung

Java

11. Special Capital Districts of Jakarta (*Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta*) - Jakarta
12. Banten - Serang
13. West Java (*Jawa Barat*) - Bandung
14. Central Java (*Jawa Tengah*) - Semarang

15. Special Region of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*) - Yogyakarta
16. East Java (*Jawa Timur*) - Surabaya

Lesser Sunda Islands

17. Bali - Denpasar
18. West Nusa Tenggara (*Nusa Tenggara Barat*) - Mataram
19. East Nusa Tenggara (*Nusa Tenggara Timur*) - Kupang

Kalimantan

20. West Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Barat*) - Pontianak
21. Central Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Tengah*) - Palangka Raya
22. South Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Selatan*) - Banjarmasin
23. East Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Timur*) - Samarinda

Sulawesi

24. North Sulawesi (*Sulawesi Utara*) - Manado
25. Gorontalo - Gorontalo
26. Central Sulawesi (*Sulawesi Tengah*) - Palu
27. West Sulawesi (*Sulawesi Barat*) - Mamuju
28. South Sulawesi (*Sulawesi Selatan*) - Makassar
29. Southeast Sulawesi (*Sulawesi Tenggara*) - Kendari

Maluku Islands

30. Maluku - Ambon
31. North Maluku (*Maluku Utara*) - Sofifi

Papua

32. West Papua (*Papua Barat*) - Manokwari
33. Papua - Jayapura

Indonesia comprises 17,054 islands and lesser islands, of which about 6000 islands are uninhabited. It is located between latitudes 11°S and 6°N and longitudes 95°E and 141°E, between two continents of Asia and Australia.

It spans for 3,977 miles between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean with 1.922.570 km² of land area and 3.257.483 km² of water mass. It consists of five major islands, namely: Java with area of 132.107 km²,

Sumatra 473.606 km², Kalimantan 539.460 km², Sulawesi 189.216 km² and Papua 421.981 km².

The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago whose islands line up east to west in a span that covers the distance between London and Siberia and north to south that span for approximately 1500 miles. The outermost lines that encircle Indonesia stretch for 81,000 km, with seas comprise 80% of its territory. It has 2.7 million km² of Exclusive Economic Zone.

The Republic of Indonesia is an island country whose people belong to various tribes, languages and cultures. Physically, such varieties are divided by seas, but in maritime view, such division is never existed because the large mass of water is truly a bond that unites and integrates the islands together. Due to the geographical difference, however, the integration rate of each area might differ in terms of political, economical, social and cultural development.

Djuanda Declaration (December, 13 1957) advanced the concept of archipelagic state the nation and state have to uphold. It is the structural as well as legal base for the integration of Indonesia as a maritime country.

According to Central Statistic Bureau (*Biro Pusat Statistik*, BPS: 2010) the population of Indonesia is 237,556,363 people, divided into 119,507,580 of male population and 118,048,783 of female population with population growth of 1.49 per cent/year.

Population Distribution:

Islands	Percentage
Java	58
Sumatra	21
Sulawesi	7
Kalimantan	6
Bali and Nusa Tenggara	6
Papua and Maluku	3

The Provinces of West, Central and East Java are the most populous area with 43.021.826, 37.476.011, and 32.380.687 people, respectively. With

12,985,075 people, the Province of North Sumatra is the most populous area outside Java. The average population density of Indonesia is 124/ km². Jakarta is the densest area with 14.440 people per km², while West Papua has the lowest density with 8 people/ km².

Islam is majority religion whose adherents comprise 85.20% of the population, making Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The rest of population divided into Protestant 8.9%, Catholic 3%, Hindu 1.8%, Buddhism 0.8% and Confucianism 0.03%.

Indonesia comprises 300 ethnic groups, each of which has been influenced by some mix of Indian, Arabian, Chinese, European and Malayan cultures. (*wikipedia.org* : 2010).

Foreword

FROM AN ELECTION TO ANOTHER: A CONTESTATION OF ALIRAN POLITICS

When I found a stack of manuscripts on my desk concerning the journey of general election of Indonesia Widjanarko Puspoyo had written, I immediately agreed to write a short foreword. I always believe that such work, a documentation of electoral history of Indonesia, can bring much wisdom to whoever reads it, even if it is just one person.

Looking closely at the elections of the Republic in the period of 1955-2009, one can easily identify the gradual weakening of ideology in political institutions (political parties) and actors (politicians). As the logical consequences, laterally speaking, ideological contestations between political parties have waned to the point where their political platforms have become similar to one another and pragmatism has influenced politicians predominantly.

If such immediate conclusion is secluded within a particular time sequence, the election of the Old Order era was the only one laden with ideological rivalries. It strongly reflected the fervor of political parties to hold fast to their ideological beliefs. The 1955 general election, as Herbert Feith points out (1970), was a battleground for four ideological *alirans*, namely nationalist-traditionalist (PNI), Islamic social-democrat (Masyumi), nationalist-communist (PKI) and Islamic-traditionalist (NU). Until the last day of Soekarno's administration, these ideological contestations were obviously present. Not only did major parties, but even minor parties like *Partai Katholik* consistently hoist up their ideology.

The fusion of political parties stipulated by the New Order ended such contestations. The fusion of parties under loose ideological structures was stipulated following the ban of PKI. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was established to house the nationalist politicians, while the Islamic ones was sheltered by the United Development Party (PPP). The Functional Groups or *Golongan Karya* (Golkar), meanwhile, became the abode of civil and

military elites as well as various functional groups from which it owed its name. With such demarcations, many analysts have classified the resulting political parties into *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi* political *alirans* as formulated in Clifford Geertz's tricothomy (1960, 1965). Whereas PPP represented *santri*, PDI was for *abangan* and Golkar *priyayi* (civil and military). Surely, as the political vessel of the government, Golkar always won every election held during Soeharto's administration, although not without the fluctuation on the percentage of votes representing the political dynamics in each election.

Entering the era of *Reformasi*, ideological contestations have deflated even further. *Aliran* politics has become more obscure and difficult to identify. The amount of political parties has become ridiculously high. The only apparent phenomenon is political pragmatism. So obvious, one can say that pragmatism is the only political ideology nowadays. Politics that should have served people's interest has bent into bargaining games to pursue power and money for the sake of individuals, groups and parties. People's voices only matter during the election and not anytime else.

Nonetheless, the author believes that such political pragmatism is not here to stay. One day, in the current democratic era, a new generation will emerge, young politicians who kindle the spirit of *mapras barang kang mbrenjol, nguruk kang ledhok* (cut down the mountains, fill up the valleys), willing to act justly for the well-being of the nation.

Despite the numerous crooked politicians, each political party still hoists its political platform organizationally. As this book points out, political platform has become one of many tools of political parties to gather the votes. It is allowed to regard such platform as mere lip service on the parties' part. However, I believe there are enough sincere politicians who work sincerely and relentlessly to implement the platform.

The first decade of the 2000s saw Indonesian politics have become more pragmatic and less ideological. However, in the near future, these all are going to pass and all parties will once again assume their ideological colors. People will be more educated and with the relentless waves of information of this era, political preference will come naturally to everyone.

Without clear ideology, political party will die out, neglected by its constituents.

This is when the work of Widjanarko Puspoyo comes in handy. By documenting the journey of general elections in Indonesia, we can trace back the steps of political parties, the dominant issues they have propagated, and the strategies they have employed to attract the swing voters, and so on. By studying those, we can capture the political contestations that appeared in each election and each party's ideological consistency or lack thereof.

As a closing, by reviewing the issues political parties carried out prior to each election, and the subsequent spread of votes they received from one election to another, my hypothetical guess is that people's political references in the future will be heavily influenced by their rural histories. Regardless to the amount of political parties in the future, they will represent this reality. Here, I propose six rural histories, namely: rice paddy farmers, vegetable farmers, plantation farmers, anglers, industry labors and urban citizens.

Rice paddy farmers unconsciously think in cyclic terms. In their life, they incorporate numerous traditional rites with profound mysticisms. Voters with such characteristics tend to prefer a particular party well-versed in offering the image of charismatic leader. Vegetable farmers who are accustomed to think and act in details (otherwise their fragile plants will ruin) tend to favor a party offering detailed programs. Meanwhile, because the historical existence of plantation farmers has been laden with class struggles, especially with the sugar factories, they tend to be more ideological. As Hermawan Sulistyo points out (2000), communists' insurrections in the past surfaced more often in sugarcane plantations than in any other plantations. Therefore, individuals belong to this group will moor in progressive parties with clear programs. As for the anglers and factory labors, due to the predominant short-term objectives in their life, in which the former are highly dependent to the rapid change of wind courses, while the latter struggle to make ends meet on their daily payment, in the most likeliness, they will resort in pragmatic parties that offer immediate incentives and short-term objectives. Lastly, because urban citizens tend to be more rational, the

programs and rational level of the leaders of each party will influence them more than ideological matter will. Therefore, they will constitute a large proportion of the floating mass in the election.

The aforementioned is a short hypothesis on the characters of the parties and the political preferences of the constituents in the future. Political parties' rivalries, which in recent years have been solely built on images, will shift toward that of the competition of programs. A book that highlights the elections and political parties in similar spirit to that of Leo Suryadinata (2002) and Kevin R. Evans (2003) as this one does, is expected to serve as the foundation and pillar to cement *sephology* (the statistical analysis of elections) as a respected subject of political science that encourage political practice applied as part of public service.

Sukardi Rinakit, Ph.D

Senior Researcher at Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate

Foreword

POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

I sincerely welcome the publishing of *From Soekarno to Yudhoyono: Indonesian Elections, 1955-2009* by Widjanarko Puspoyo. The subject matter of this book is quite remarkable, a documentation of the journey of elections in Indonesia. Therefore, not only it depicts the dynamics of party and election system adopted in Indonesia, from the post-independence era to that of reform era, it also provides several notes underlining that both the political system and dynamics will continue to improve. On any account, the journey of party system and all the knowledge we have experienced from one election to another throughout the history of the nation's political history are worthy references for preserving and improving Indonesia's political system in both present and future time.

In recent reform years, we have adopted multi party system and—particularly in the 2009 elections— limited open list proportional electoral system resulted from the revision of the previous political laws. The establishments of legislative candidates in 2009 election were no longer based on sequential system as adopted in 2004 general election but on majority of votes as stipulated by the Constitutional Court in response to judicial review toward Law No. 10/2008 on General Election. The mechanism of democratic system seems improving in accordance with the nation's political needs and dynamics. Such progress has signaled the growth of intelligent and critical political dialogues, able to withstand the challenge of time, in the spirit of fortifying the fundaments of civic life, especially in term of politics.

Vigorous and dynamic democracy needs the existence of political parties of the same qualities. Political parties are the foundation of democratic political process in many countries. They are responsible in spearheading the implementation of democratic civic life. Therefore, their qualities should reflect a high-quality democracy. In that respect, political parties have underlying functions in performing political education and communication, aggregation, articulation, recruitment, and conflict arbitration.

After three legislative elections and two presidential elections conducted in the reformation era (1999-2009), political parties still show some defects, especially in the implementation of the said functions. Too often political parties have been used as a means for political recruitment, driven by political pragmatism. They have yet to perform optimally on the functions of political education and communication that can enlighten the people. Therefore, their images have seemed to decline over time.

Political parties need to consider the solution to such predicaments more seriously so they will be able to concentrate on the optimization of their substantial and ideal functions. The objective is none other than the improvement of their participation in the election for a better democracy.

Lastly, I hope *From Soekarno to Yudhoyono: Indonesian Elections, 1955-2009* is able to inspire vigorous dynamics of political parties and more democratic political system. Once again, I congratulate the publishing of this book.

Dr. AKBAR TANDJUNG

The Speaker of DPR-RI, 1999-2004
The General Chairman of Partai Golkar, 1998-2004

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

History has the development of party system in Indonesia started when the government authorized an edict on November 3, 1945. The Edict declared that the government was keen to welcome the formation of political parties, on the basis that such development would enable all existing *aliran* (lit: streams) in the society to be guided in the right path. Before the issuance of the Edict, political movements in the Republic were generally conducted by social organizations that had been formed under the Dutch's colonial government and Japanese occupation.

Indonesia held the first general election in 1955, ten years after the issuance of the Edict. The election was hailed as democratic and peaceful despite the strong primordial sentiments (based on ethnicities, religious beliefs, social castes and regional backgrounds) that bound the political parties at that time. It was so exceptional that the election eventually garnered much of international acclaims. The 1955 general election shared many similarities with the Reformation Era's 2004 general election, in which democratic atmosphere, peaceful ambience and positive international acclaims engulfed the Republic. The success of 2004 general election automatically overshadowed the pseudo-elections and authoritarian political practices of the New Order regime during which the authority regarded political parties as mere sources of political instabilities.

Therefore, if the existence of political parties and general elections were used to benchmark Indonesia's political civilization in a linear time flows, the result should have shown more advance political practices and democratic life than they are today. Moreover with the fact that two elections held in 1999 and 2004 went smoothly and democratically, during which the government gave the widest possible access to all political parties to develop themselves. In reality, this is not the case. Indonesia's political civilization is still weak. It is evident particularly in the policies taken by political parties and government which more often than not tend to overlook the real substantial

problems people face in their life. The said phenomenon can only mean that the two pillars of democratic civilization (political party and general election) are flawed at best. Even in their simplest form, those flaws will only result in the emergence of politicians with questionable qualities. In addition to that, the most recent 2009 general election is deemed as the worst election ever in the history of the Republic of Indonesia for which the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusional*) indicted the National Elections Commission (KPU) as being unprofessional. As the result of the alleged negligent of the KPU, tens of millions people lost their right to vote for being unregistered in the fixed voters list (DPT).

The Flaws of the First Pillar

As noted earlier, the first pillar of political civilization is the political parties. If they are weak, political civilization will also be unstable. These far, political parties have been granted the utmost freedom in exercising their rights and performing their duties. In rare occasions where there are any limitations, those regulations are subjects to concession, such as the ones concerning party's infrastructures and the electoral threshold. Meanwhile, other regulations concerning the existence of money deposit and party's business affiliations have not been strictly enforced yet.

The given privileges, imperfect as they are, are more than enough for political parties to express their role and duties as the first pillar of political civilization undisturbed. However, that role has yet to be performed optimally.

So far, both the ruling party and the oppositions have not wholeheartedly carried out their role and functions yet. The parties' obligations to uphold the supremacy of law, democracy and human rights, as well as to guarantee the success of election and provide financial reporting as a form of public accountability, still yet become their integral consciousness. All of it can be traced back to each party's fragmented efforts in carrying out its roles, most notably in terms of regeneration and political recruitments; political educations of its members and wider communities beyond; safeguarding the unity of the nation and; channeling people's aspiration.

Political party, by its activists, is too often regarded as a tool to achieve political power and gain privileges on behalf of the few, whether individuals or groups.

Three factors have contributed to political parties' incapability in upholding its role as the first pillar of political civilization. The first factor is the ever-present paternalistic culture within each party that always put the Chairman at the center as the spearhead of political power.¹ Such centralistic behavior not only hampers the party's ability to self-develop and ruins its flexibility in responding to the nation's dynamic problems, but also responsible in forming oligarchic political structure that usually follows. This situation further impedes the vertical mobilizations of its members, most severely those who have all the potentials to be great politicians but rather slow-witted when it comes to attracting the attentions of the Chairman and his inside circle.

Public enthusiasm in the formation of political party can be used as indicator of the existence of this paternalistic behavior. For example, toward the 1999 general election there were no fewer than 141 established parties. Filtered out by the administrative stipulations needed to be included in the election, those numbers were sharply reduced to 48 parties. Next, prior to the 2004 general election, there were 237 political parties. The filtering process came up with only 24 parties included in the election. Meanwhile, toward the 2009 general election, tens of newly established parties emerged, with 38 parties plus 6 local Aceh parties eventually permitted to participate in the election. Right now, there are 79 newly established parties.² Their political resources, no matter how infinitesimal, will only serve to accelerate every political contest in the future.

Public's high enthusiasm to form political party on one hand and the reluctance to form coalition with each other, on the other hand, show that

¹ Sukardi Rinakit, "Indonesia", Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (ed.), *Parties and Democracy* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Bonn, 2007), p. 150-154.

² "Departemen Hukum dan HAM Bisa Verifikasi Parpol Baru", *Kompas*, November 5, 2007.

there is more than meets the eye. Although the formation of each of the new political party responds to the complexity of public interests and the yet-to-be accommodated public aspirations, the same phenomenon hints us the existence of considerable ego of the party's founders. Not so few are under illusion of self-centered belief that they are the only ones capable to remedy the nation's predicaments. If an individual with the said self-centered perception is rewarded with political position, he will gradually transform into centralistic figure who will further promote the paternalistic and oligarchic culture, especially if primordial sentiments and political *aliran*³ also decorate the relational and promotional systems within his close circle.

The second factor is the loopholes in the existing laws and regulations. For instance, the laws have yet regulated the sanction toward political parties unable to pass the electoral threshold. The Law No. 12/2003 about General Election regulates the electoral threshold to be three per cent of the legislative seats. However, the same subject has not been addressed yet in the Law on Political Parties. Regardless of the possible change of percentage of the electoral threshold in the future, the ideal is to address this issue in the latter as well. In addition to that, it should also regulate the sanction for the parties that fail to meet the threshold, possibly in the form of prohibition to participate in future time elections.

Another flaw is the absence of regulation that stipulates merging mechanism of political parties, both prior to and after the election. The existence of such stipulation will surely reduce the numbers of the parties because it will encourage them to merge with other parties with which they share their ideologies. Parties that fail to meet the threshold can merge with major parties or form coalition with each other to form a brand new political entity. The law should also regulate the rights and obligations of parties involved in such coalition, including all possible political compensations.

³ In the long period of the 1950s to the late 1990s, the existence of political *aliran* proposed by Clifford Geertz (1960) was very dominant in Indonesia's contemporary politics. Despite various critiques he received, there have not been any other political scholars who can replace his position or his original thought on the subject in discussion.

As long as the decision makers fail to lay down two points above into law, there will be no significant progress concerning Indonesia's political parties in foreseeable future. As a result, political parties will once again unable to fulfill its role as the main pillar of political civilization in Indonesia.

That role will be more difficult to fulfill once the third and last factor, the people, is taken into consideration in calculating the institutionalization of political civilization. Every party will find it difficult to uphold the role whenever people are more driven by melodramatic inclination, as is the case in Indonesia. In practical politics, the majority of Indonesians tend to incline to antithetical choices. For example, if the president happens to be taciturn in nature, people will naturally seek for a leading individual with considerable oratory skill to whom they will give their votes in the next election. The same goes if the president is generally viewed as indecisive; people will vote a figure with more decisive image, however artificial the imagery. The political platform of the presidential candidates, however realistic and well-composed, is surprisingly of insignificant matter. The said characteristic of the majority of Indonesians can easily evolve into pessimism and nonchalant pragmatism. Whenever the government fails to bring prosperity to the people—or any other achievement for that matter—the majority of people, in immediate fashion, will be drawn into pessimism. This pessimistic mood then will lead to nonchalant pragmatism toward the elections, in which people are quick to vote the candidate who is able to give them more incentives, most significantly when they come in form of money.

The Flaws of the Second Pillar

The second pillar that indicates the maturity of a political civilization is the general election. The general election has in itself five technical aspects, namely nominations, voting method, electoral areas divisions, vote counting method and election scheduling.⁴ The implementations of the five aspects will determine the quality of the election. Inadequacy induced toward any of the

⁴. R. Pipit Kartawidjaja and Sidik Pramono, *Akal-Akalan Daerah Pemilihan* (Jakarta: Perludem, USAID, DRSP, 2007).

aspects can only mean that the election fails to institutionalize political civilization on the basis that it is unaccountable, inappropriate, ineffective, and has weak governability.

Throughout the history of general election in Indonesia, from the era of Soekarno, Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, general elections have been laden with efforts to maintain the balanced representation harmoniously. But in truth, they are just provisional attempts to cope with the complexity of Indonesia in both geographical and demographical spread. For the proponents of proportional system, to apply "one seat per one constituency" method is synonymous to the eradication of that very complexity. In the contrary, the district system's proponents argue that a system solely seeks to maintain the balanced representation will only result in the emergence of incompetent politicians, due to their lack of understanding and expertise toward local issues.

In response to the critiques, the proportional system's proponents tried to reestablish their position by adjusting the underlying mechanism of the election. They changed the closed-list proportional implemented in the 1999 general election into open-list proportional adopted in the 2004 and 2009 general elections. Furthermore, by revoking the serial number system of candidacy in the latter, they also incorporated massive change in accordance with the Constitutional Court's majority decision. This change ensures that a candidate with most votes wins, regardless of his/her serial number in the fixed list of candidates composed by each party.

Nevertheless, the efforts to strengthen the election in its role as the second pillar of political civilization are still far from success. Despite being hailed as accountable and truly democratic, the 2004 general election still contained wide fragmentation of votes. Compared to the 1999 general election, the 2004 election had an effective number of parties of more than 8 points, while in the former, 5 points. It indicated that votes' fragmentation grew significantly in 2004. Clear as it was, it showed that the overall parties' electoral performance had weakened considerably. Interestingly, similar

condition appeared in 2009 when the young and educated candidates were increasing in numbers.

The high electoral volatility is the next issue needs to be addressed in the election system. The votes of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), for instance, decreased from 32 per cent in 1999 to only 18.5 per cent in 2004. The same applied to *Partai Golkar* whose votes decreased from 22.4 per cent to 21.6 per cent in similar time span. Electoral volatility is highly dependent on district magnitude. In relatively small-populated district, the amount of votes needed to win a chair is considerably less than that of the district with higher population. Such aspect is beneficial for a lot of parties, including Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*) which in 2009 general election was able to defeat *Partai Golkar* and PDI-P, the winning parties of 2004 and 1999 general elections, respectively. In the meanwhile, two newly-established parties, the People's Conscience Party (*Partai Hanura*) and Great Indonesia Movement Party (*Partai Gerindra*), were also able to secure their positions in the People's Representative Council (DPR). Mechanism aspects aside, the relatively short time span in the preparation of the election can become another factor that eludes the general election to be a strong pillar of the political civilization.

From Soekarno⁵ to Yudhoyono⁶

The political dynamics of the last decade have shown that optimism is needed above all else. The discourses on alternative strategies to develop Indonesia, for example, the ones concerning independent (non-party) candidates, have become a wakeup call to many politicians. If they are monitored, it will be apparent that internal rearrangements are currently taking place within political parties. If the said rearrangements can be

⁵ Soekarno or Bung Karno (his affectionate nickname) was the first President of Indonesia and the Proclaimer of the Independence of Indonesia, a status he shared with Mohammad Hatta (Bung Hatta) the first Vice-President of Indonesia. Soekarno is also known as Indonesia's Founding Father for his pioneering leadership in uniting the nation.

⁶ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) is the sixth (2004-2009) and the seventh (2009-2014) President of Indonesia. In his first presidential term, he teamed up with Jusuf Kalla who held the position of Vice-President, while in the second term Yudhoyono is paired up with Boediono.

maintained consistently, political parties' functions, especially its regeneration and leadership recruitment policies, will be reinforced substantially.

For future reference, the flaws of proportional system responsible for votes' fragmentation, electoral volatility, low accountability of elected candidates, and the government instability can be minimized by incorporating mixed-member electoral system. Such breakthrough is expected to bring not only more significant elections but also more accountable politicians in the parliament and a more stable government. Many observers believe that if this mixed-member electoral system is adopted, democratic quality in Indonesia will increase accordingly. Its projected abilities to minimize the fragmentation and create more stable government are the source of such belief.

Once the political parties are ready to fulfill its role to the fullest, and whenever the election system is able to synthesize both proportional and district system into one functional integrated system, political civilization will surely integrate even more. However, before harboring to that shore, we first need to follow closely the journey of political parties and political practices, from the era of Soekarno to Yudhoyono, from which we can learn to improve the role and the accountability of political parties and create more evocative implementation of election system. Therefore, through the long journey of the ten elections, from 1955 general election to that in 2009, we can all start to hope.

CHAPTER 2

1955 GENERAL ELECTION: PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY FAILED EXPERIMENT

A History of Conflicts

Whenever politics is regarded as Lasswell points out in *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (1936), political disputes and conflicts will never cease to exist. Moreover, it will increase instead of diminishing the scale and varieties of the conflict of interests between groups in a political domain. However, if politics is observed in another light as medium to share and give the best for the nation and implemented as a mutual effort to uphold justice and prosperity to achieve people's sovereignty, their façade will change dramatically. It is safe to say that, "to be involved in politics is to govern and to govern is to comply with the constitution." Therefore, all the leaders of political parties and social groups (based on their ethnics, religions, races and groups) have the obligation to comply dutifully, rightfully and consistently with the Constitution as social contract.

Worthy to note is the comment former Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, addressed to audience at the *Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional*⁷ (National Defense Institution). He said, "During the 10 years of post-Reformation Era, the nation has not truly achieved great things due to intrigues and political bickering. Ten years have been wasted in endless strife, which brought everything but people's prosperity." His comment indicated that people's prosperity and sovereignty should be prioritized over political agenda, and the implementation toward which has to be carried out by all without any pressure whatsoever from parties and political elites.

Jusuf Kalla could not have been more spot-on. Political bickering has plagued Indonesia ever since it gained independence.⁸ For 65 years, political

⁷ *Kompas*, July 11, 2007.

⁸ President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono marked the year 2008 as a political year. The political frenzies that followed, in response of the upcoming legislative and presidential election in 2009, were enormous. Moreover, the regional elections for governors, regents and mayors, which were to be held simultaneously made political atmosphere extremely dynamic. Political

elites have dedicated themselves in quarrels, intrigues and slanders of which more often than not were accompanied by degrading psyche terrors. The late former president, Soeharto, was not exaggerating when he lamented on the nation's insatiable lust for what he referred to as *gontok-gontokan* (verbal and physical quarrels). Essentially, the history of politics in Indonesia is a history of conflicts. In fact, conflict is one of interesting aspects of post-Independence political history of Indonesia. In their struggle through conflicts, people also learn about their own nature, although often in the hardest way. Thus, from the outcome of the conflicts, hints toward the cultures, structures and systems of political characteristics in Indonesia can be seen.

In 1926, Soekarno emerged as a young, brilliant and visionary thinker. His sharp analytical views and understanding of the people made him able to produce series of exceptionally significant writings, authentic and original in nature. One of which he had written as a young thinker was about the three ideologies attributed to, and recognizable on, the people of Indonesia (then, Dutch East Indies), namely Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism. He had made this political mapping prior to Indonesia's Independence.

The three ideologies mentioned above had significant influences over the nation, counted as noteworthy powers in the span of 1945-1965. Although substantially all of the three ideologies were at odds with one another, Soekarno saw them as political realities which had to be accepted. Moreover, Soekarno insisted that each ideology had positive contribution to the people. Toward this notion, the late Dr. Alfian (1978) points out that, "Soekarno indeed perceived conflicts as acceptable phenomena in the post-Independence politics of Indonesia." In certain limits, Soekarno's thoughts have reverberated to the present time.

In addition to Soekarno's political canvass mentioned above, the late American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in his book, *The Religion of Java*,

elites all over the nation were busy scheming and devising strategies to either capture or maintain their power. Political flows in the administration were disturbed because political elites had let their ambition to seize and maintain power took the better of them. At that time, there was not a single day passed without political precedent.

theorizes that “people of Java can be grouped based on their self-view, religious beliefs, ethical preferences and political ideologies into three variants, namely *Santri*, *Abangan* and *Priyayi*” (Geertz, 1960: 27-29).⁹

In Geertz's theory, *santri* is the people who identify themselves with Islam and consciously observe all of its religious obligations. They also build their living and orientation pattern, belief system, values and symbols of expression based on Islam. They put emphasis on Islamic values and used to be associated with merchants, property owners and wealthy farmers.

Abangan, meanwhile, is a group which emphasizes animism and general Javanese syncretism beliefs in their life. They used to be generally associated with farm laborers, petty farmers, anglers and rural villagers. The *abangan* as a way of life and belief is also known as *kejawen* due to its allegiance to Hindu-Buddhist and pre-Islamic traditions indigenous to Javanese.

Priyayi is a term used for royalties and aristocrats in Javanese society. The *priyayis* have bureaucratic characteristics due to *keraton's* (monarchy) influence. They usually hold the status of nominal Muslims with slight Hindu-Buddhism influences. In generalization, a *priyayi* is a person who is unfamiliar with rural societies, the member of which he treats as inferior in status.

⁹ There have been substantial critiques toward Geertz's work. Readers have found the book difficult to understand, mostly due to its notion toward religion in the classification of *Santri*, *Abangan* and *Priyayi*. Geertz does not explicitly mention the limitation of the term “religion” in making such definition. In response to this, the late Nurcholish Madjid (1982) gives lengthy explanations on the difference between religion, cultural customs and one's social status. However fundamental the critiques have been, there are no other theory that can replace the one by Geertz, yet. Furthermore, on their research, Gaffar (1988) and Imawan (1993) conclude that during the period of the 1955 general election to the New Order Era's general elections (1971-1997), Geertz's theory presents in *Religion of Java* is still a relevant basis for analyzing the contemporary politics in Indonesia. The most relevant of all is the compatibility of Geertz's *aliran* with the three political parties formed after the fusion of political parties in 1973. The three parties, namely Golkar (represented *Priyayi*), *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (represented *Santri*) and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (represented *Abangan*). Meanwhile, Liddle (1992) theorizes that the political *alirans* are latent groups that can manifest in new form, anytime, anywhere in Indonesia. The proof of which can be found in the new parties formed prior to the 1999 general election which adopted the *aliran* theory as their principles. In 1999 general election, *Partai Masyumi Baru*, *Partai Bulan Bintang*, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, and *Partai Amanat Nasional* represented *santri*, while parties such as PNI-Marhaen, *Partai Pelopor*, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* represented *abangan*, and *Partai Golkar* represented *priyayi*.

These social groupings of cultural aspects and religions often claimed to be self-created by the Javanese. Meanwhile, to complement the three-way classificatory division of *santri*, *abangan*, *priyayi* (trichotomy) by Geertz, Hildred Geertz's *The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization* (1961) is a worthy read. Clifford Geertz's another work, *The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States* (1963) explains about the primordial ties commonly found in developing countries. It emphasizes on the importance of regional, tribal, religious, racial, lingual and customary sense of belonging—famously abbreviated as *SARA* (*suku*, *agama*, *ras*, and *antar golongan*) by the New Order regime—as a frame to give lights on any occurring political conflicts/clashes in many countries, including Indonesia. His underlying ideas were indebted to a long time affiliation pattern described as “cleavage” pattern of the 1950s, to which Feith and Castles seem to agree in their *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965* (1970) which focuses on five “cleavages” in Indonesian politics, namely Political Islam, Radical Nationalism, Democratic Socialism, Javanese Traditionalism and Communism.

Studies mentioned above have contributed greatly in shedding some lights on the political conflicts in Indonesia in the period of 1945-1965. Due to extreme principal differences, the existing political *alirans* (political and socio-religious entities) found it very difficult to cooperate with each other. The same paradigm applied to political parties existed in the post-Independence era. The influence of ideologies, enforced by the existence of political *aliran*, then found its way to wider potential addressees including, but not limited to, those who lived in rural areas. In the apparent result of which, *santri*-affiliated people *always* channeled their aspiration through Islamic parties such as the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations or *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masyumi), Ulama Awakening Party or *Partai Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), Indonesian Islamic Union Party or *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) and Islamic Educators Association or *Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (PERTI).

In similar way, the *abangan* always affiliated with parties, such as Indonesian Communist Party or *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), Socialist

Party of Indonesia or *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI), Mass Consensus Party or *Partai Murba*, People's Sovereignty Party or *Partai Kedaulatan Rakyat*, Indonesian Union Party or *Partai Serikat Rakyat Indonesia* and Indonesia People's Party or *Partai Rakyat Indonesia* (PARI). The *priyayi* meanwhile had a tendency to join Indonesian National Party or *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) and Indonesian Nationality Party or *Partai Kebangsaan Indonesia*. They were all specimens of political parties existed in the period of 1945-1965. However, under the New Order regime—after the fusion of political parties in 1973—the *santri* subsequently affiliated with United Development Party or *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), *abangan* with Indonesian Democratic Party or *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI) and *priyayi* Functional Group or *Golongan Karya* (Golkar).

The trichotomy of Geertz in truth is not only focused on tradition, religion and culture but is more an integrated system covering all aspects of the societies, including the existence of political and economical conflicts. The so-called Geertz's phenomenon is exceptional simply because it is in agreement with neither general sociological structure model nor Marx's class stratification. Not only it has been able to explain the *aliran*-based conflicts in Indonesia, but also the conflicts of political elites, which invited the involvement of military, particularly the army, in the period of 1960-1965.

With the help of political parties, ideologies made their way from the central (Jakarta) to rural areas (Sjamsuddin, 1993:102-103). Political *aliran* had also helped ideologies to find new followers among the grass roots and other societies' structures, in a way that enabled political parties to form affiliate organizations to which each cultural group belonged. Examples were Indonesian Farmer Ranks or *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI) which affiliated with PKI; Indonesia Muslim Farmers Movement or *Gerakan Tani Islam Indonesia* (GTII), which affiliated with Masyumi; Farmer's Union of NU *Persatuan Tani Nahdlatul Ulama* (PERTANU); and Indonesia National Farmers Unity or *Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia* (PERTANI) of the PNI.

Simply put, all parties had their own affiliate organizations (Dutch: *onderbouw*) the themes of which were based on social groups or classes,

such as farmers, women, laborers, students and the press. Golkar, PDI and PPP would later adopt these practices shortly after their formation until well in the 1990s. Among the three, Golkar had the most affiliates, which included *Musyawarah Keluarga Gotong Royong* (MKGR), *Koperasi Gotong Royong* (KOSGORO) and *Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia* (SOKSI). All of which were formerly known as ABRI (Indonesia Military)-sponsored affiliates formed to counterbalance similar affiliates owned by PKI, namely BTI (for farmer and laborer), Lekra (for artists and culturist), Gerwani (for women), CGMI (for undergraduate students), *Pemuda Rakyat* (for the youths), Baperki (for businesspersons) and *Harian Rakyat* (leftist newspaper).

Ideology, which had already spread with the help of political *aliran*, made it possible for political parties to influence their supporters living in rural area to be voluntarily involved in their conflicts. As a result, whenever the central authority failed to solve any ongoing conflict, it leaked and found its way down to rural areas. The grave situation that followed forced the rural residents to take matters into their own hands and ready themselves for the upcoming clash. When it happened, they did not hold back and were more than willing to use violence toward their fellow residents belonged to different *aliran*. Situation as such found its peak in the bloody incidents prior to the *Gerakan 30 September*, known as G-30-S/PKI 1965 and its even bloodier aftermath.

Other than Soekarno and Geertz, two Australian scholars, namely Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (1970) tried to analyze political thoughts that occurred in Indonesia during the period of 1945-1965. They did so by studying every material written by Indonesians on the subjects. Their aim was to separate the development of political thinking in Indonesia into three periods, namely; (1) Armed Revolution period of 1945-1949; (2) Parliamentary (Liberal) Democracy period of 1950-1959; and (3) Guided Democracy period of 1960-1965.

In their studies, Feith and Castles conclude that there were two main sources of political thought in Indonesia in the period of 1945-1965. The first source was tradition, mainly Javanese, and the second was Western thinking.

Both sources somehow transfigured into five political schools/philosophies. The first of which was communism. Adopted directly from western thinking, in Indonesia it was brought to fruition by the help of Javanese traditionalists, *abangan* and traditional *santri* groups altogether.

The second was Democratic Socialism. Its modern idea was taken from western model, but the parties adopting it were relatively unsuccessful in representing themselves among the Indonesian people. This group was more elitist and the party later transformed into cadre party, as represented by *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI). Before its demise, banned and dissolved by Soekarno in 1960, PSI used to have significant influence over other parties, such as Masyumi, PNI and NU.

The third was Islam. At that time, this group was religiously and politically separated into modernist (reformist), centered on Masyumi, and traditionalist, led by NU. Along with these major parties, there were also smaller ones such as *Persatuan Tarbiah Indonesia* (Perti) and *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII).

The fourth was Radical Nationalism. It was closely related to the traditionalists, especially Javanese and the democratic socialists. Parties such as *Partai Nasional Indonesia* and Murba belonged to this group.

The fifth and the last was Javanese traditionalism. Interestingly, this group did not belong to any specific party and, therefore, was more individualistic in nature. This political thinking explained the phenomena of independent candidates and local-level parties participated in the 1955 general election.

Looking back at the advent of 1955 general election, one should not view political parties as mere vast-influenced hierarchic entities that were ready and willing to fight one another fiercely in the name of ideology. Instead, he should view them as groups of national elites that had separated due to differences in individual perception on worldly affairs. When political parties were competing against each other in either the parliament or the cabinet, ideological boundaries referred to by Geertz as cultural identification,

set in naturally. In turn, their respective sympathizers would support these ideological-cultural boundaries.

Surely, prior to 1955 general election conflicts had occurred, either between political *alians* or between political parties. Nevertheless, quite often the conflicting parties were able to be reconciled simply through the mechanism of solidarity among the party's elites. Therefore, despite the existence of government instability during the Parliamentary Democracy period in 1946-1956, it was largely a more stable period compared to that of the late 1950s to the mid 1960s. In the latter period, the lengthy inter-parties conflicts had dragged on relentlessly, and sometimes resulting in loss of lives. In the former, though, political life was satisfactory dynamic.

Political parties' efforts to exploit people's primordial loyalty were responsible in the escalating numbers of inter-parties conflicts (Rocamora, 1991: 6-8). The same efforts were also responsible in bringing the existing conflicts between *aliran* and party-affiliated social groups to the national level. Parties' leaders considered themselves as elite group separated from the rest of the masses creating a distance between them and their supporters. This shift in psyche and views of the national's elites only resulted in conflicts that in contrast of the previous times were more difficult to subdue. At the same time, the influence of local leaders toward the people also increased, forcing the parties to double their efforts even more.

New groups that eventually joined the ranks of the parties' elites not only made the parties bigger in size, but also hampered the inter-parties coordination and weakened the parties considerably. Such were situations faced by the 1955 general election winners, namely *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI), *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masyumi), *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) and three other parties, Indonesian Christian Party or *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (Parkindo), Catholic Party or *Partai Katholik Indonesia*, and *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI), respectively.

The continuous internal conflicts within each party and ideological conflicts it held against other parties caused the cabinet and parliament under such party barely functioned. As if the condition was not unfortunate enough,

a series of insurgencies erupted in several regions. In chronological order, they were PKI's Madiun rebellion led by Muso (1948)¹⁰; the South Maluku Republic (RMS) rebellion under Robert Steven Soumokil (1950); Makassar Movement led by Captain Andi Azis (April 5, 1950); and the *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (DI/TII)¹¹ orchestrated by Kartosuwiryo in West Java, Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi (1951), Ibnu Hadjar in South Kalimantan (1951-1959) and Daud Beureueh in Aceh (September 20, 1953), together with other armed movements in Brebes, Tegal, Pekalongan, and Kudus. The insurgencies only worsened the situation and Jakarta's politicians were left dumbfounded.

On February 15, 1958, Achmad Hussein declared the creation of Revolutionary Government of the Republic Indonesia or *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI) and appointed Syafruddin Prawiranegara as its Prime Minister. Then, on February 17, 1958, Lieutenant Colonel D.J. Somba, the North and Central Sulawesi Military Commander, declared its separation from the central government and pledged its allegiance to PRRI. This movement is known as the *Gerakan Piagam Perjuangan Semesta* (Permesta) or Universal Struggle. Thus, the joint-movement between the two armed-forces are referred to as the PRRI/Permesta Uprising.

¹⁰ Dr. Pranarka (1985: 74-84) in *Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila*, concerning Sukarno's reaction toward PKI-Madiun uprising led by Muso in 1948, the dissolution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), and the reestablishment of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) on August 17, 1950. In a speech on September 20, 1948, Bung Karno said, "PKI Muso have staged a coup d'état by seizing the power in Madiun. That is a seizure of power which they have planned as the beginning to rob the power of the Republic entirely. Madiun does not stand alone; it is a link in a chain to overthrow the government of the Republic.... I call upon you the people of Indonesia, at this juncture where you and us all are going to have our will to live free to be tested, two choices for you, join Muso and his Communist Party who shall bring the bankruptcy upon the ideals of Indonesia's independence, or join Soekarno – Hatta, who, Insya Allah, with the help of God Almighty, will lead the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia to utter freedom, with no nation shall bring us down." In another speech on October 28, 1948, Bung Karno criticized PKI's Madiun rebellion under Muso for its betrayal against the values of Pancasila, nationalism, humanitarian, people's sovereignty and belief in Almighty God, social justice, and mutual-cooperation.

¹¹ In Tasikmalaya, a charismatic Muslim leader, named Sekartadji Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the formation of Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia* or NII) on August 7, 1949. This led to hostile encounters between NII's troops, named the *Darul Islam*/Indonesian Islamic Army which had patrolled the regions since January 5, 1949, with the Republic's Bandung-based Siliwangi Military Command troops.

Tensions also escalated between the central and regional governments at that time, which mostly revolved around the issue of revenue imbalances between the central and regional administrations. Following these, some regions staged revolts, spearheaded by military officers, such as Colonel M. Simbolon, the *Teritorium* (Territorial) I Army Commander, who formed *Dewan Gajah* in North Sumatra; Lieutenant Colonel Barlian, Territorial II Army Commander, who formed *Dewan Garuda* in South Sumatera; and Lieutenant Colonel HNV Sumual, Territorial VII Army Commander, who formed *Dewan Manguni* in North Sulawesi. During these whole commotions, some members of political ranks in Masyumi and PSI were allegedly involved in the PRRI/Permesta movements. These armed movements crippled the parliamentary cabinets. As a result, on August 15, 1950, the President of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), Soekarno, declared the restoration of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Effective on August 17, 1950, The Republic of the United States of Indonesia was officially dissolved, thus, marked the failure of the parliamentary democracy and liberal democracy era in Indonesia (1946-1956).

Dissatisfactions and disappointments toward parliamentary and liberal democracy were understandable. The cabinets' failures to uphold people aspirations were to be blamed (Djiwandono, 1996: 18). It was difficult to comprehend though, if the failure was solely imposed on the system, which was neutral by its nature. As flawed as it was, so did everything else. During the New Order regime (1966-1998), it was suggested that liberal or parliamentary democracy was incompatible with Indonesia simply because it was at odds with the tradition, culture and characterization of most, if not all, Indonesians, a topic on which political scholars discussed endlessly in the 1980s. Soeharto, the then President of Indonesia, argued, "Our culture is not familiar with liberal and parliamentary democracy, nor with socialism and communism; we only recognize the culture of Pancasila democracy."

It is true, that at certain points, parliamentary democracy was incompatible with Indonesia as a nation. Nevertheless, it will be more truthful to say that the failure of the implementation of the parliamentary democracy

was due to the politicians' lack of adeptness to carry out the system instead of the failure of the system itself. The era of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia also marked the beginning of the forming of political parties that would participate in 1955 general election.

The Formation of Political Parties

Giovanni Sartori (1976), in his book *Parties and Party System: A Frame Work for Analysis*, proposes a thesis that it is possible to carry out party system in harmony with the development of cultural shift of the people, from traditional to modern. Two major obstacles serve as the keys to the evolution of party system, namely the strong ideological influence and the heterogeneity of the social groups within the society. Naturally, society favors one system over the others within the party system's linear dimension, whether it is the system of Automized, Polarized Pluralism, Moderate Pluralism, Two Party, Predominant Party, Hegemonic Party, or Single Party. Mouris Duverger (1965: 5-8), meanwhile, prefers to divide the party system into multi-party, two-party and single party system.

Both Sartori's and Duverger's point of views are valid means to analyze the evolution of party system in Indonesia since the issuance of the Government Edict of November 3, 1945 to the 1998 Reformation era. Soon after the issuance of the Edict, under the spell of political euphoria, people were really enthusiast to formulate political party to be included in the upcoming election.¹² November 3, 1945, just three months after the

¹² Throughout the history of Indonesia, political euphoria leading to the formation of political parties in Indonesia occurred twice. First, following the issuance of the Government Edict of 1945, which saw more than 29 political parties and dozens of local parties and independent candidates participated in 1955 general election. From that amount, seven parties received significant votes, namely PNI, Masyumi, NU, PKI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik and PSI. Second, in the post-reformation (*reformasi*) era, prior to 1999 general election, in which hundreds of political parties were established, but only 48 parties passed the verification and were able to participate in the election. Out of those 48 electoral parties, only seven were able to pass the electoral threshold, namely, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Golkar Party (Golkar), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). Similarly, toward the 2004 elections, hundreds of parties were established, but only 24 of them were selected to participate in 2004 general election. In this election, seven parties were able to pass the 2.5 percent electoral threshold, namely Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PKB, the Democrat Party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and PAN.

Proclamation of the Independence, is a historical day that marked the birth of political parties in the history of Indonesia. That day, the government issued an edict of the formation of political parties authorized by Vice-President Mohammad Hatta.¹³ Stated in the Edict were:

Government Edict

Government's recommendation for the formation of political parties: On the advice of the Working Committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee (BP-KNIP) to the government, the people will be given a chance to form political parties, under restriction that the parties in discussion are solely formed to assist in the struggle of defending the independence and to insure people's security. The government has taken its decision and it hereby declares:

- A. The government is keen to welcome the formation of political parties with which the existing ideologies in the society can be guided in the right path.
- B. The government expects that parties in discussion will have been formed prior to the election of the People's Representative Council in January 1946.

Vice President

Jakarta, November 3, 1945

Mohammad Hatta

Political parties formed in compliance of the Edict were divided into three major ideologies, namely; Islam, Nationalism and Marxism, just as Soekarno had pointed before. In other manner, the three ideologies were based on (1) religious values; (2) nationalism; and (3) Marxism-Socialism or Communism-Leninism (Pranarka, 1985: 100-128). For decades, these divisions were instrumental in shaping Indonesia's political mapping. Meanwhile, Neuman (1963) and Macridis (1967) give the following limitations as description of political parties:

¹³ The Government Edict of November 3, 1945 sparked a lot of pros and cons. Masyumi considered the time was not right to form political parties and stated that "in these critical moments that require physical and spiritual unity of all the people, the recent announcement and suggestion of the government toward the establishment of political parties will only create division among the people, and we truly regret this," Deliar Noer (1987: 47). Meanwhile, non-Islamic groups supported such recommendation, emphasizing their acceptance on the reason given by the government, "with which the existing ideologies in the society can be guided in the right path." Masyumi finally accepted the recommendation and set itself up as a political party in its First Congress in Yogyakarta, November 7-8, 1945.

“... articulate organization consists of people with active political behavior. It focuses its efforts in attaining control of the government and competing with other groups of different views in order to garner people’s support...”

“... or an organization formed by citizens belong to similar ideologies, values, orientations, and aspirations to achieve or assume power in the government, pursuant to the constitution through competition with other political groups in general election, the winner of which can direct the government through its policy ...”

Based on above formulations, political party can be described as an intermediary body that connects both the influence and the social aspects of ideology with the government and applies it into political actions in the society. In this respect, a closer look toward Indonesia’s political parties at that particular time and their respective ideologies is needed.

Parties with Religious Ideology

According to Deliar Noer (1987: 44 – 101), the position of Islamic groups during the early years of the Independence was relatively at disadvantage compared to their nationalist counterparts. It was thought to be the continuation of their weak position in the Working Board of the Central Indonesian National Committee (BP-KNIP). The early formation of Indonesian National Party (PNI) on August 1945, which was claimed as the ruling party, was another culprit to this disadvantage.

The disadvantage was evident in the composition of Central Indonesian National Committee, the then People’s Representative Council. From a total of 136 president-appointed members of which, only 15 members clearly affiliated with Islam, namely Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf Wibisono, Dahlan Abdullah, Moh. Roem, A.R. Baswedan, A. Bajasut, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Ny. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, KH Wahid Hasjim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Zainul Arifin, Haji Agus Salim, and Anwar Tjokroaminoto. In the Working Committee itself, only Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and KH Wahid Hasjim were the Islamic-affiliated members. Therefore, the Islamic groups decided to join forces and strengthen their ranks to form a political coordinating body, so they could perform their role in politics and state affairs according to their own ideology.

On that behalf, during November 7-8, 1945, prominent Islamic figures held *Muktamar Islam Indonesia* or Indonesia's Islamic Conference in Yogyakarta attended by various Islamic delegations from all over Indonesia. From the conference, *Majelis Syuro Pusat Umat Islam* or Masyumi was born.

Since its establishment on November 7, 1945, Masyumi had become official political vessel of Indonesian Muslims with the supports of major Islamic groups, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Bond of Ummah or *Perikatan Umat Islam* and Unity of Ummah or *Persatuan Umat Islam*. Another major group, Ahmadiyah was excluded from the membership since it did not represent the value of *ahlusunnah wal jamaah*.

Islamic groups that would later join the ranks in the Masyumi were *Persatuan Islam Bandung*, *Al-Irsyad Jakarta*, *Al-Jamiyatulah Wasliyah* and the North Sumatra's *Al-Ittihadiyah*—after the region had remedied its broken tie with Yogyakarta due to the *Dewan Gajah*'s uprising. Later, Masyumi also included *Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia*, *Persatuan Islam Priangan* (West Java), *Mathla'ul Anwar* (Banten) *Nahdlatul Wathan* (NTB) and Daud Beureueh's *Persatuan Umat Seluruh Aceh* (PUSA) the latter of which joined in clandestine fashion.¹⁴ Masyumi had so rapid a growth owed in parts to the supports of its members and local Muslim clerics, called *ulama* or *kyai* (traditional title of *ulama*) whose role were instrumental in the future development of Masyumi.

On November 8, 1945, Masyumi elected its central functionaries with details as follows: Chairman, Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo; Deputy Chairman I, Kasman Singodimedjo; Deputy Chairman II, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso; Secretary I, Harsono Tjokroaminoto; Secretary II Prawoto Mangkusasmito; Treasurer Mr. R.A. Kasmat. Members: K.H.M Dachlan, H.M. Fariet Ma'roef, Junus Anies, KH Fakih Usman, KH Fathurrahman, Dr. Abu Hanifah, M Natsir, SM

¹⁴ The relation between Masyumi and Bung Karno turned sour. Bung Karno suspected that Masyumi had silently supported Kartosuwarno's DI/TII insurrection and involved in PRRI/PERMESTA uprisings in West Sumatra together with PSI. On the other hand, Masyumi's elites had their resentment grew against Soekarno, whom they perceived as becoming more authoritarian, and for his sympathy toward PKI. The tension between both sides continued until it reached its peak in 1960, when Bung Karno disbanded and outlawed Masyumi and PSI.

Kartosuwiryo, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Mr Samsudin and Mr. Mohammad Roem.

In its Articles of Association, the purposes of the formation of Masyumi were (1) to uphold the sovereignty of Islam and the state and (2) implement Islamic aspiration in the affairs of the state.

Since its formation until its demise in 1960, Masyumi's structural and organizational issues had been under constant discussions from one conference to another. The discussions occasionally produced detailed decisions on points that had been prepared beforehand, while in other occasions, the decisions simply abrogated the previous ones, which had been authorized but had not yet carried out (Noer, 1987: 48). The issue of unique membership, in which the party granted membership to organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, was never resolved. Every time the decision concerning the membership had been formulated, Masyumi always failed to carry it out.

Masyumi indeed consisted of two kinds of members, individuals and organizations. Individual members had the right to cast vote, but organizational members were privileged with the rights to give advice and counsel. The motivation behind these dual memberships was none other than to rapidly grow the party. After all, accepting Islamic organizations as members was seen as a natural and logical thing to do for a party that intended to be the coordinating body of everything Islam. According to Deliar Noer, this kind of membership was weak as it was too loose. For example, a member of Muhammadiyah could have denied his affiliation to Masyumi by arguing that it was Muhammadiyah instead of him who was a member of Masyumi, and as such led to a loose form of loyalty. The same went for the *nahdliyin* (NU-affiliated *santri*) and other organizational members. Masyumi's nonchalant attitude toward its membership was a huge disadvantage, especially at times when the loyalty, attentiveness and militancy of the members were instrumental to the survival of a political party.

The next Islamic party was Islamic Educators Association or *Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (PERTI). Formed in West Sumatra on

November 30, 1945, it was based on nativist traditional Islam philosophies, in which it did not distance itself from the local wisdom and national culture.

Its nativism approach was also the reason why PERTI did not join the ranks of Masyumi, but instead had closer relation with fellow traditionalist, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU). The party was formed in a well-known *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Candung, Bukittinggi in West Sumatra. *Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* was the stronghold of traditional Islam against the modernists' movements in big cities. Among its founder were Syekh Abbas of Padang Lawas, Syekh Sulaiman ar-Rasuli of Candung and Syekh Muhammad Djamil Djoho from Payakumbuh. They were all greatly respected ulama, each of whom led well-known *pesantren* in Bukittinggi. Despite being traditionalists, when it came to education, these leaders were keen to accept modern influence (Noer, 1987: 72).

Articles number 2 and 3, about principles and goals, of its Articles of Association stated that: the Principle of PERTI was Islam, in sharia and religious service according to Syafi'i school, and in value according to *Ahlussunah wal Jamaah*. The objective of the party was *Kalimatullaahi hijal ulajaa* (Islam sovereignty) in its widest possible form. PERTI was quite successful in spreading its influence in provinces well-known for their traditional education centers such as Jambi, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Aceh, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and various traditionalist' centers in Java. In certain aspects, PERTI was similar to both NU and PSII. In the same way NU has been associated with the family lines of KH Hasyim As'jari and PSII with the Tjokroaminoto's, PERTI was associated with the family line of Syekh Abbas, one of its founder and also the father of Haji Siradjuddin Abbas and Haji Sjamsiah Abbas. Later, the former represented PERTI as parliament member following the 1955 general election (Noer, 1987: 75; Pranarka, 1985: 102).

Indonesian Islamic Union Party or *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) was formed in 1946. But actually, it had existed since 1912 under the name of Islamic Union Trade or *Sarikat Dagang Islam*, a fact its members was so proud of. Growing restless under Masyumi, Amir Sjarifuddin, Wondo

Amiseno and Aruji Kartawinata suggested the reformation of the party out of its long slumber state. Some regions showed their enthusiastic support toward the reestablishment of PSII.

The Articles of Association of PSII did not change much from their principles formulated in 1933, which in part might have been due to its elites' admiration toward the original founder, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. Six basic principles of PSII, namely:

- "The unity of Muslims: to unite all Muslims, all societies within Indonesia have to be united first.
- Freedom of the *ummah*: the *ummah* should have autonomy over their freedom both as Muslims and as part of the nation.
- The nature of the government should be carried out democratically as *surah Asj-Sjura* (XLII): 38, of the Holy Qur'an points out.
- The economic living: In order to bring about the prosperity to the *ummah* and the nation, PSII stands against any discrimination, including economical and political discrimination. Government should be free to incorporate all efforts to bring the prosperity to the people, if only with people's consent, and based on Islamic principles.
- The inherent equality of human condition and rights: PSII refuses discrimination in life and advocates equality before the law.
- The intrinsic freedom: PSII believes utter freedom is going to set people free from any kind of slavery through freedom, liberty and fraternity, especially in the path of freedom based on Islamic teachings."

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), according to its Principles and Objectives is based on Islam and has objectives to uphold the *Sharia* based on the teachings of Shāfi'i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hanbali and carry out the laws of Islam in the society. In practice, NU believes that the implementation of such principles should not contradict the principles of the Republic. It is worthy of note that NU has not intended to substitute the principles and objectives of Republic of Indonesia with its own.

During its early years, Nahdlatul Ulama as a social-religious

organization was unique to say the least. Its uniqueness emerged due to the dual roles of social-religious organization and a political party it had assumed. *Nahdlatul Ulama* remains as the biggest religious organization in Indonesia with more than 36 Million members. In its First Conference (*Muktamar*) in Palembang, May 1952, *Nahdlatul Ulama* declared itself as political party, officially parted way with Masyumi. As an organization, NU is not only a *jam'iyyah* characterized by its structural and administration-management process, but also a *jama'ah* based on the culture of traditional *pesantren*.¹⁵

Failure in analyzing the nature of NU as both *jam'iyyah* and *jama'ah* can lead to incomplete understanding toward the organization. Quite often *Nahdlatul Ulama* has been viewed as mere accommodative and inconsistent religious organization. Benedict R. Anderson, a well-respected expert on Indonesia, lamented on the rare existence of comprehensive Western-scientific works on NU. He also regretted the fact that there have been too many Indonesian critics referring NU as mere traditional, accommodative and opportunistic organization (Feillard, 1999: xv). In truth, many people have found it difficult to capture what lies beneath the eccentricity and the inconsistency of NU. However, in few occasions throughout its existence, NU has also failed to keep the balance between its cultural and political aspects in check.

The role of *ulama* or *kyai* cannot be separated in discussing NU. The clerics are integral part of NU as they are to the *pesantren* culture. A *santri* who has finished all the required education will become a *kyai* responsible for the education of his juniors who likewise will become *kyai* and so on. To examine NU comprehensively, one has to take into consideration the interchangeable relation between the *ulamas*, politicians and the *ummah* of

¹⁵ *Pesantren* refers to either traditional Islamic education system or the place where it is physically situated. *Pesantren* flourished first in Java and Madura, where these educational institutions began shaping the Islamic characteristics, from the center of the Islamic empire to the corners of the countryside. These early boarding school/institutions were the source of a number of manuscripts on the teaching of Islam in Southeast Asia. The manuscripts then collected by the pioneers from the Dutch and British trading companies in the late 16th century. Through *pesantren*, the teachings of Islam were spread throughout the country. Dhofier, *Pesantren Tradition: Studies of Living Kyai's View* (1982: 18-19).

NU (called *nahdlyyin*) as they all are the past, presents and future elements of NU.

Political group within NU consists of the *ulamas*, *kyais* and non-structural members who have been educated to be the cadres of NU and politicians. Indeed, in many NU-affiliated organizations, *ulama* and *kyai* not only have the passion for *dakwah* (preaching) but also for politics as well. These phenomena clearly show the predominant practices of interlinking religious and political interest within NU. If politics is being put in context as a means to gain power, NU has, since its birth, a substantial nuance of it.¹⁶

NU's involvements in politics by and large have been influenced by its interests in both religious and national affairs. Indeed, its various political maneuvers have reflected self-belief that it is on the one hand religious and on the other nationalist. In the early days of independence, NU always based its involvements in politics on the tenet of "for the people, for the country and for the religion." Nahdlatul Ulama's involvement within Masyumi (1946-1952) showed its willingness to uphold the unity of the people and the nation and the *ukhuwah islamiyah* altogether. However, NU's affiliation with Masyumi ended abruptly.¹⁷

¹⁶ Many past and current NU leading figures have been active in politics, both within NU when it was still a political party or in other parties, including by becoming bureaucrats in the government. The most prominent among them are Idham Khalid, Zubchan ZE, Saichu, KH Zainuddin Zukri, KH Yusuf Hasyim, Makbub Djunaedi, Imron Rosyadi SH, Hamzah Haz, Matori Abdul Djalil, KH Alawy Muhammad, Chalid Mawardi, Slamet Effendi Yusuf, and KH Abdurachman Wahid (Gus Dur).

¹⁷ The separation from Masyumi was preceded by NU's disappointment in the Fourth Congress of Masyumi held in Yogyakarta, 1949 which was directed by non-NU politicians. These non-NU leaders deliberately changed the status of the *Majelis Syuro* (the Consultative Board), which originally had the authority to determine party policies, into mere advisory board without political power. Many members of the *Majelis Syuro* were scholars or leaders of NU; therefore, the change of status of the council was seen as a deliberate attempt to narrow down NU's involvement within Masyumi. Already familiar with the political affairs, NU felt betrayed and neglected. According to Deliar Noer (1987: 87-89), the resignation of NU from Masyumi was triggered by two events as follows: In the same Congress, according to NU's circles, some of the participants of the congress had disrespected senior *kyais* of NU. Those participants, in condescending manner, considered the Dutch schools' undergraduates (like they were) were more superior to that of *pesantren*. NU's bitterness peaked when one of the leading members of Masyumi, Mohammad Saleh, Mayor of Yogyakarta at that time (1949), addressed the Congress and said, "Because politics is very complex and cannot be handled by *Ulama* alone. Do not ever think that the political arena is similar to boarding schools." In response to that speech, NU's delegation protested furiously, demanding Moh. Saleh to take his words back. Because Mohammad Saleh refused that demand, about 30 members of NU's delegation walked out of the meeting as a sign of protest. Meanwhile, the second incident

In its First *Muktamar* in Palembang on May 1, 1952, NU declared its official resignation from Masyumi with majority decision and declared its status as a political party. From that point on, NU which used to linger on the region of socio-religious and cultural-religious activities, has participated in political practices for the sake of Islam, especially that of the *nahdliyin's*. After its separation from Masyumi, NU, now a political party, built good relationship with Perti, PSII and even nationalist party such as PNI.

Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), meanwhile, was formed by Dr. Probo Winoto in Jakarta on November 18, 1945. This religious-based party was affiliated with nationalist ideology in which it intended "to struggle in politics, economic and social fields under the guidance of Words of God in the Bible." As mentioned in its Articles of Association, Parkindo was based on the principles of Christianity.

The Catholic Party or *Partai Katolik* was formed, among others, by I.J. Kasimo in Jakarta on December 8, 1945. According to Articles 2 of its Articles of Association, Catholic Party was based on the Oneness of God in general and Pancasila in particular and based its conducts on Catholic principles. The objective of Catholic Party was to participate in the efforts of developing the Republic of Indonesia and the sovereignty of the people.

Those principles and the objectives were further elaborated as follows: Catholic Party would participate in the advancement of Republic of Indonesia and the spiritual, political, economical, social, and cultural prosperities of the nation. Above all, Catholic Party would always base its belief on the Oneness of God in general and Pancasila in particular. Catholic Party acknowledged that the world was created for the well-being of human. By means of solidarity, the party would spread social love and social justice to conquer the fierceness of liberal-capitalism and eliminate the inter-groups conflicts.

took place during Masyumi Council Meeting, held in Bogor in 1952. The incident took place when NU's leader, KH Wahid Hasjim was delivering his speech. Not a single non-NU member paid any attention to his speech and even made fun of him by talking to each other. Seeing this, KH Idham Chalid protested Mohammad Natsir who led the meeting. Both incidents finally led to the division between NU and Masyumi, although the seeds of disunity had appeared since Natsir replaced Sukiman as Masyumi's Chairman. Finally, NU declared its resignation out of Masyumi and founded its own political party on May 1, 1952.

Catholic Party was keen to cooperate with other organizations according to any programs that had been discussed and decided accordingly.

In 1955 general election, Catholic Party exceeded its own expectation by defeating PSI, the once powerful party, which during parliamentary democracy period, had been able to dominate the national politics and had held great influence over other parties such as NU, Masyumi and PNI.

Nationalist Parties

Important event that led to the formation of *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) on January 13, 1946 was the formation of People's Union of Indonesia or *Sarikat Rakyat Indonesia* (Sarindo) (Rocamora, 1991: 18-19). Sarindo was a minor party formed in December 1945. The discussion that would lead to the formation of Sarindo had taken place in the KNIP office, between Mr. Sartono, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro and Osa Maliki. A more formal meeting soon followed at the residence of Soewirjo, in Pegangsaan Barat No. 6 on December 4, 1945. In addition to the three persons already mentioned, Soewirjo, as the host, Mr. Lukman Hakim, Mr. Wilopo, Sabilah Rasid, and Sudiro attended the meeting. The meeting was successful. Shortly after, Sarindo was formally established on December 13, 1945.

Sarindo's first Congress was being held in Kediri, East Java, from January 28-February 1, 1946. The Congress stipulated a decision to merge Sarindo with six nationalist-affiliated local parties, namely PNI-Madiun, established in Madiun by Dr. Soeradji; PNI-Pati led by Sarino Mangunpranoto; People's Sovereignty Party or *Partai Kedaulatan Rakyat*, formed by Sujono Hadinoto in Yogyakarta; PNI-Sumatra, led by Dr. AK Gani; and PNI-Sulawesi under Manai Sophiaan. The Kediri Congress led by Sidik Djojosoekarto decreed the formation of Indonesian National Party or PNI on January 29. By and large, PNI was a fusion of minor parties from the remnants of the *Staatspartij* (local parties) of the same name, established in August 1945.

The ranks of the party functionaries then decided as follows: Chairman: Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, Regional Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Djody Gondokusumo (Central Java), Sidik Djojosoekarto (East Java) Mr. Wilopo

(West Java), Dr. AK Gani (Sumatera), AS Pello (Lesser Sunda), Mr. Gozali (Borneo), and Manai Sophiaan (Sulawesi). Meanwhile, the positions of Heads of Departments were as follows: Mr. Sartono (Politics), Mr. Soemanang and Mr. Lukman Hakim (Economy), Sudiro (Social), Sjamsuddin Sutan Makmur (Information), and Moerdjojo (General Department).

In Article 2 of its Articles of Association, PNI stated that it was formed under the principle of Socio-National-Democracy known as *Marhaenism*. Soekarno, as the originator of the concept, had intended to make Marhaenism as a form of either Marxism or Socialism adjusted to Indonesian culture. The objectives of PNI as stated in Article 3 were: (a) defending and upholding the sovereignty of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI); (b) creating a state and society based on people's sovereignty and social justice (socialist society); (c) cooperating with other nations and nationalities on the basis of equal rights in creating a new order of society based on humanity and justice.

In further elaboration, PNI portrayed itself as a mass party with Socio-Nationalist-Democracy principles (Marhaenism), a fusion of nationalism and socio-democracy.

Socio-Nationalist-Democracy mandated the forming of: (a) in political domain, a nationalistic struggle and a government structured by sovereignty of its people; (b) in society, a society based on mutual-cooperation (*gotong-royong*) against the existence of individualist society (capitalism).¹⁸

The next party, Greater Indonesia Party or *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Parindra), as stated in their Articles of Association, was a party that believed in One Almighty God, nationalism, populism, and social justice. Its objectives were (a) strengthening the state and its people; (b) creating a democratic

¹⁸ PNI opposed capitalist system on the basis that it was the source for oppressive nature of one society to another which had led to 350 years of imperialism and colonialism in Indonesia. Due to its rejection of capitalism, PNI also rejected the ideology of liberalism, the very basis of capitalism. In democracy, PNI believed in democracy that included the participation of the entire social classes among which PNI manifested as a revolutionary mass party. Therefore, in running its political course, PNI chose the radical way. It did not want to compromise and perform half-hearted efforts, but intended to bring changes down to the roots. On that basis, PNI always united its struggle with the fate of the *Marhaen* people, who constituted greatest proportion of the population and yet possessed the worst fate (Pranarka, 1987: 104-105).

Unitary Republic of Indonesia; (c) creating a just and prosperous social society and; (d) preserving the culture of the nation.

In achieving all of its objectives, Parindra would give the utmost efforts for the sake of the state and the nation based on patriotism, populism and social justice.

People's Party of Indonesia or *Partai Rakyat Indonesia*, which was affectionately called People's Party or *Partai Rakyat*, stated in its Articles of Association, Article 2, that it had Pancasila as its principle as stipulated in the party's first Congress when the party was formed. Partai Rakyat based its efforts on the conscience of the people and the well-organized power of the people.

Its objectives, namely (a) preserving and upholding the sovereignty of NKRI as proclaimed in August 17, 1945; (b) bringing about and maintaining a State based on Pancasila; and (c) achieving the implementation of humanity, eternal world peace and fraternity among other nations on the principles of kinship and mutual recognition of the freedom and sovereignty of all nations.

Partai Rakyat National (PRN) or National People's Party was a fraction¹⁹ of PNI. As stated in its Articles of Association, National People's Party had its principles on democracy, nationalism and mutual-cooperation.

With those principles at hand, the party focused its efforts on achieving; (A) a law-abiding State whose administration governed on the majority of votes; (B) prosperous people, as a nation and a state, in which economy was regulated on mutual-cooperation with the state controlling the means of production and all natural resources for the prosperity of all.

There were other nationalist parties in this period. However, most of which were minor parties with very limited influence in the 1955 general election, such as Indonesian Marhaen People's Union or *Partai Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia* (Permai) and *Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya*

¹⁹ In the early years of independence, internal divisions within political parties already took place, such in the case between National People's Party (PRN) and the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Similarly, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) declared itself out of Masyumi and moved on to form its own party in early 1952 to participate in 1955 general election in which it was included in the top four. Similar schisms occurred in the era of New Order and even reached new height in the post-reform era (1998).

(PIR) with principles of nationalism, populism and humanity. There were also *Partai Wanita Rakyat*, *Partai Kedaulatan Rakyat* (PKR), *Partai Serikat Kerakyatan Indonesia* (PSKI), *Partai Ikatan Nasional Indonesia*, and *Partai Tani Indonesia*, all of which based on the principles of nationalism and populism.

Marxism-Socialism Parties

Other than the parties with religious and nationalist ideologies, other parties based their principles on Secular-Western concepts of Marxism, Socialism and Communism-Leninism.

The most prominent of such parties was the Indonesian Communist Party or *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI), formed by Mr. Moh. Jusuf on November 7, 1945. The party's Articles of Association, Article 3, stated that, "with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, PKI is keen to form a socialist society in Indonesia, a structural society in which all the means of productions are controlled by the people for the interests of people." Furthermore, it also stated, "in achieving its goals, PKI will empower the revolutionary classes, namely the laborer class, farmer class and all those oppressed by the bourgeois class."

Surely, in its actions within and beyond the parliament, PKI upheld the progressive-revolutionary approaches. In PKI's Broad Line Programs it was stated, "Indonesian Communist Party is the highest form of the organization among other organized progressive labor classes." Furthermore, "Indonesian Communist Party represents both the state and the people's general interests. The ideal struggle is to achieve the state of People's Democratic Republic of Indonesia and create a Pan-Indonesian Communist society."

In its revolution, PKI demanded all members to be militant in supporting the progressive-revolutionary mass organizations. *Partai Komunis Indonesia* had to act sternly against any insurgents both external and internal aiming to divide the unity of laborer and farmer classes and disunite the unity of labor class unions and their affiliates and all revolutionary attempts. Its motto was not to give room for opportunists, both leftists and rightists, in all

aspects within the nation's structure. PKI had to act uncompromisingly and vehemently toward the opportunists, compromisers and adventurers in all elements of the party and beyond.

All of the statements above indicated that PKI thought it would have been foolish to detach itself from the people. Therefore, it was formed as a revolutionary, militant, and steel-disciplined Centralism-Democracy coordinating body, which had to be obeyed by all members of the party (Pranarka, 1985: 118-119). For the same reason, PKI was the only political party that had the guts to confront the military. Even so, when the conflict with the military (most notably the Army) escalated, PKI found itself at the losing end, especially when the conflict reached its zenith in the G-30-S/PKI in 1965. The party and its sympathizers lost and were crushed, but their ideas, aspirations, and thoughts probably have still existed in the present time.²⁰

To strengthen its foothold as a socialist party based on Marxism-Leninism, PKI made several claims that intended to outlaw other socialist parties in Indonesia. For example, PKI demanded the dismissal of socialist parties, such as *Partai Sosialis Indonesia*, *Partai Murba*, dan *Partai Buruh Indonesia*. However, Bung Karno unheeded the demand for he was a pluralist who was keen to diversities. Of course, Indonesian well-known socialists, such as Sutan Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, Chairul Saleh, and Adam Malik also refused to heed such extreme demands.

Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) was formed by the fusion of two parties, namely the party of the same name formed by Amir Syarifuddin on November 10, 1945 and the Socialist People's Party or *Partai Rakyat Sosialis* (PRS) formed by Sutan Sjahrir on November 20, 1945. In the principles and the

²⁰ Although had been completely defeated and ousted from political scene in Indonesia, it was revived in the form of Democratic People's Party (PRD) in post-reform era. The birth of PRD in 1997 under Budiman Sudjatmiko et al. sparked a lot of controversies to the point where Syarwan Hamid the then Minister of Home Affairs gave warnings of "bahaya latent PKI" or latent threat of PKI (New Order's favorite catchphrase) and accused PRD as "Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk," or "Formless Organization" (another New Order's favorite catchphrase). New Order regime scapegoated PRD as the one responsible for the violent takeover of PDI Headquarter in the Incident of July 27, 1996. It has to be admitted that Leftist ideologies as such surely still exist today in Indonesia although it may have been different from that during the 1960s. On global level, communism is generally thought to be finished with the downfall of Soviet Union in the early 1990s

objectives, "Partai Sosialis Indonesia has principles as taught by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which accept class struggle as both reality and progress in a Capitalist society. The aspiration of the PSI is to create a Socialist Society of Indonesia."

Although it suffered defeat in the 1955 general election, fell in seventh place after the Catholic Party, PSI had held a great influence in the cabinet, especially over Masyumi, NU and PNI. Together with Masyumi, PSI was allegedly involved in the insurgent of PRRI/Permesta in response of which Soekarno dissolved both parties in 1960.

The Socialist People's Party or *Partai Rakyat Sosialis* (PRS) founded by Sutan Sjahrir did not mention any principles, but stated in its broad lines that, "PSI applies tactics and stratagems seen fit with situation in the world. PSI admits that progress is not the same in every nation and society, and is subject to differ according to each nation's capacity to progress and the difficulty level of that nation's problems," it added, "therefore, PSI intends to become the forerunner of new politics in Asia by first encouraging Asia to detach itself from the influence of both United States of America and Soviet Union." In its struggle, PSI "will seek to cooperate with other progressive democratic organizations, national and foreign, especially in countries currently struggling for its rights for freedom and sovereignty, as a counterbalance of the international politics."

Partai Murba (Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak) or Mass Consultative Party was another post-Independence socialist party. In Article 2 of its Articles of Association, it stated that, "Partai Murba is an anti-fascism and anti-imperialism party which based its struggle on the regular mass consultative movements" (Pranarka, 1985: 121-122). Among its objectives, Murba "is determined to defend and strengthen the freedom and the independence of NKRI, for the sake of the Republic and the people as mandated in the Proclamation of Independence of 17 August 1945, and to create a just and prosperous socialist society."

In terms of ideology, Partai Murba was strongly related to the figure of Tan Malaka.²¹ The meaning of Murba as explained in the commentary section of the party was "...a group constituting greatest part of the people among the other groups in Indonesia, who no longer possess anything but their own mind and body." The term "*Murba*" more or less refers to the proletariats. However, *proletariats* here had a distinct character from its Western counterpart in which these people still held ties with their kins instead of being completely cut off from them as in Western understanding. At that time, Murba group was described as a group of people living on daily wages, which was among the most oppressed group in Indonesia (Pranarka, 1985: 123).

Indonesian Communist Party accused Murba and its activists²² as Indonesian Trotskyites and as such, viewed them as contra-revolutionary group just as Trotskyites had been viewed in Soviet Union's laborers' movements. As history tells us, Leon Trotsky and his followers had been accused of being agents of fascism and imperialism by their Soviet Union adversaries. The PKIs further posited that the threat of Murba and other

²¹ In some reviews, Tan Malaka (1897-1949) is mentioned as a nationalist, communist and the founder of Murba Party. Muhammad Yamin even named Tan Malaka as the "Founding Father of the Republic of Indonesia" in addition to Soekarno-Hatta. Tan Malaka was indeed a very influential figure of his time. Among his ideas, one that clearly affected Sjahrir's Cabinet I (1946) was called the "minimum program" comprising of: (1) negotiate for 100 per cent international's recognition of national Independence as soon as foreign troops had left the coast and the seas of Indonesia; (2) the existence of people's government, (3) the procurement of people's troops; (4) disarmed Japan forces, (5) holding the captives in union, (6) seize the former Dutch plantations and empower the people to use them; (7) seize the factories and other industrial sites. This program was decided in Solo on January 27, 1946. After Tan Malaka died in 1949, his successors in Murba merely referred to the legacy left by this mysterious figure (Noer, 1987: 155, 287).

²² After came to disagreement with the PKI's triad: Sudjono, Alimin and Muso, regarding their plan to stage a rebellion in 1926, which was planned and agreed in Prambanan on December 25, 1925, Tan Malaka resigned from his membership in PKI. Tan Malaka maintained that such plan was a futile adventure that would bring fatal blow to the National resistance efforts against the Dutch's imperialism. What he had feared came true after the Dutch easily overpowered the rebellions staged by PKI in West Sumatera and other regions, being small uprisings as they were. Due to these small-scale uprisings, the Dutch exiled hundreds, if not thousands, of leading resistance figures to Boven Digoel, Papua. The Dutch used the rebellions as an excuse to capture, detain and exile anyone who were viewed as non-cooperative toward Dutch's imperialist government, not necessarily from PKI. Due to the massive exile, the efforts toward Indonesia's Independence were impeded for several years (Tan Malaka, 2000: v-vi).

Trotskyites lay in the fact that they had claimed themselves as "Communist, Marxist, Red-Revolutionary, Leftist, radical and so on" while in PKI's view they were anything but.

In contrast to the militant and provocative Trotskyites in Spain, Netherland, Italy, Australia, USA, Chinese, and India, Indonesian Trotskyites did not straightforwardly sound their anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin sentiments, or even anti-PKI for that matter. As admitted by Tan Malaka himself, it was due to the extreme popularity of communism and PKI among the Indonesians. However, when the contra-revolutionary events escalated, the Murba/Indonesian Trotskyites openly sided with the contra-revolutionaries. This proved to be a clever move. When its socialist and communists' counterparts were dissolved one by one—Soekarno dissolved PSI in 1960, while Soeharto dissolved PKI in 1966—*Murba* survived and even participated in the 1971 general election. Together with PNI, Parkindo, *Partai Katholik*, and IPKI, *Murba* was included in the fusion that led to the formation of Indonesian Democratic Party or *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI) on January 10, 1973.

Other than PKI, PSI and Murba, there were other socialist parties at that time; two of them shared the same name of Labor Party (*Partai Buruh*), each led by S. M. Abidin and Sarojo. There was also another labor party, named Indonesian Labor Party (*Partai Buruh Indonesia*), a party led by Njono, which later merged with PKI. Following the merger, Njono became the trusted confidant of D.N. Aidit, PKI's Chairman of 1959-1965 (Pranarka, 1985: 124; 127).

The Labor Party led by S. M. Abidin, according to the Article 3 of their Articles of Association, had a principle of social democrat and focused its struggle on creating a structure of socialist society. It underlined two basic ideologies: *First*, it maintained that the laborers were the most crucial aspect in production processes. Therefore, in the process of production, the laborers should have held greater responsibilities, and as such, should have been the ones leading and supervising the production processes. *Second*, it believed that production process in capitalist system had contributed nothing in

creating equal prosperity for the people. In the contrary, it only caused sufferings to the people all over the world, particularly the laborers, and at the same time benefitting the capitalists to the point of receiving excessive profits.

On those principles, *Partai Buruh* concluded that in order for the production process to work smoothly and beneficial for the people, it had to be controlled by the government. Thus, the laborers should have performed their responsibilities by being involved in the government. In the end, as a political party, *Partai Buruh* based its planning and organization on the laborers and for the laborers.

The political beacons of *Partai Buruh*, namely: (1) the international struggle to create socialist society; (2) the cooperation with different organizations in undertaking national and social revolution against colonialism; (3) the ceaseless propaganda concerning the importance of labor power in the society and; (4) the tireless efforts toward social change for the better living of people. Unfortunately, despite its detailed and well-managed work programs, *Partai Buruh* only gathered insignificant votes in the 1955 general election.

Meanwhile, Labor Party led by Sarojo mentioned in its Articles of Association that its allegiance resided on the principles of Socio-Democracy and its struggle in the union of organized progressive-revolutionary laborers. Its goal was to create democratic and socialist society in the Republic of Indonesia. Compared to the one led by S. M. Abidin, Sarojo's party was smaller in structure.

Other than prominent socialist parties prior to 1955 general election that have been mentioned, there were others, such as *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (not to be confused with PDI formed in 1973), *Partai Wanita Rakyat*, *Partai Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia* and some others. However, their influences in national politics were insignificant.

The Rise and Fall of Parliamentary Cabinets²³

The existences of the political parties mentioned earlier reflected the democratic process that manifested in Indonesia during the early years of the Independence. However, the same existences also aggravated the relation between ideologies and political groups therein.

Shortly after the formation of the BP-KNIP on August 29, 1945, Sutan Sjahrir and Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin were appointed as its Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively. Granted by the positions, both persons held the right to choose 13 members of the board. The majority of appointees were Sjahrir's former colleagues with whom he had worked in the clandestine movements during Japan's occupation. They were Mr. Suwandi, Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, K.H. Wachid Hasjim, Mr. R. Hendromartono, Dr. R.M. Sunario Kolopaking, Dr. A. Halim, Subadio Sastrosatomo, Mr. Tam Ling Dji, Supeno, Sidik Mangunsarkoro, Adam Malik, Tajaludin and Dr. Sudarsono.

With the formation of BP-KNIP, the contests between political parties to win influence in the parliament began. The formation also marked the separation of authority between the president and the parliament. This was done to limit the presidential power which some had viewed as too powerful to be left unchecked. Around the same time, BP-KNIP proposed to the President to add KNIP's membership capacity from 150 to 188 members. The additional members would comprise influential individuals in the society, including informal public leaders. Soekarno approved this proposal and started to hand pick the 37 new members. The BP-KNIP was responsible in composing the Broad Outlines of State Policy or *Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara* (GBHN) and, together with the President, the regulations related to

²³ The history of Indonesian Cabinets in the period of 1946-1959: Sjahrir's Cabinet I (November 14, 1945- March 12, 1946); Sjahrir's Cabinet II (March 12, - October 2, 1946); Sjahrir's Cabinet III (October 2, 1946-June 17, 1947); Amir Sjarifuddin's Cabinet I (July 3-November 11, 1947), Amir Sjarifuddin's Cabinet II (November 11, 1947-January 29, 1948); Hatta's Cabinet I (January 29, 1948-August 4, 1949), Hatta Cabinet's II (August 4, 1949-December 29, 1949). Continued to Liberal Democracy Cabinet (1950-1959): Mohammad Natsir's Cabinet (September 6, 1950- April 27, 1951); Soekiman's Cabinet (April 27, 1951-3 April 1952); Wilopo's Cabinet (April 3, 1952-April 30, 1953); Ali-Wongso's Cabinet (July 30, 1953- August 12, 1955); Burhanuddin Harahap's Cabinet (August 12, 1955- March 24, 1956); Ali Sastro Amidjojo's Cabinet (March 25, 1956-14 March 1957); and Djuanda's Cabinet (April 9, 1957-July 10, 1959). See Pranarka (1985); Deliar Noer (1987); Rocamora (1991).

state administration. The resulting regulations were the basis for the president in performing his duties as the head of the government.

However, on November 14, 1945, in a rather bizarre fashion, Soekarno authorized the Government Edict stipulating the change from Presidential system to Parliamentary system.²⁴ In compliance to the edict, Soekarno had to dissolve his Presidential Cabinet (August-November 1945) the structure of which was as follows:

Soekarno's Presidential Cabinet (August 18 –November 13, 1945)

President	Ir. Soekarno
Vice-President	Drs. Moh. Hatta
Minister of Foreign Affair	Mr. Achmad Subardjo
Minister of Internal Affair	Mr. Harmani
Minister of Public Security	Supriyadi replaced by Sulya Adikusumo
Minister of Justice	Mr. Supomo
Minister of Economy	Ir. Surachman
Minister of Finance	Dr. Samsi
Minister of Education	Ki. Hadjar Dewantara
Minister of Social Affair	Mr. Iwa Kusumasemantri
Minister of Information	Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Boentaran Martoatmojo
Minister of Transportation	Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso
Minister of State	Dr. A. Amir

²⁴ The change in government system raised a question as to why different systems as such (Presidential and Parliamentary) retained the same Constitution. Some sources believe that the initiative of the change came from Sjahrir as the Head of the BP-KNIP. Initially, the Masyumi party did not agree to this. However, to avoid disunity, Masyumi acquiesced, if only temporary. Prior to the amendments made in the period of 2002-2004, the 1945 Constitution stated that, "The President of the Republic of Indonesia is the Head of State as well as the Head of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia," of which denoted the presidential system. Next, the Clause IV of the Transitional Provisions stated, "Prior to the formation of the People's Consultative Assembly, People's Representative Council and the Supreme Advisory Council as provisioned by the Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the President assisted by a national committee." Considering there had been no permanent law that regulated what referred to as National Committee (KNIP and BP-KNIP), such clause was tantamount to giving dictatorial power to the President (Djiwandono, 1996: 12-13; Noer, 1987: 46). It implied that the President could have formed the GBHN, laws and any other regulations all by his own, taking the sovereignty of people in his hand. Simply put, the decision to change the government system might have been done to gain the sympathy of the Dutch and the Allied Forces Indonesia was going to have several negotiations with, starting from the Renville Agreement (January 17, 1947), Roem-van Rijen Agreement (May 17, 1949) and the Round Table Conference (July 19-22, 1949).

Minister of State	Mr. Sartono
Minister of State	Mr. A.A. Maramis
Minister of State	Otto Iskandardinata
Minister of State	KH. Wahid Hasjim
Minister of State	Sukardjo Wiryopranoto

After his short-lived Cabinet had been dissolved, Soekarno appointed Sutan Sjahrir as the Prime Minister and gave mandate to the latter to form a cabinet, later known as Sjahrir I Cabinet. Political situations in the period of August 17, 1945 to November 1949 were very grave to say the least. On one hand, there were conflicts between political parties, and on the other, the pressures resulting from negotiations with the Dutch, which cornered Indonesia with barely enough space to maneuver. Since 1946, national security had always been serious issue, especially after the Dutch's Military Offensive in 1948, PKI's insurgent under Muso in the same year, and the 1949 Dutch's Second Military Offensive resulting in the occupation of Yogyakarta that since January 4, 1946 had served as the Capital of Indonesia. The ideological contests also reached their boiling point. There were ruthless debates within KNIP, pitting Masyumi against both PSI and PNI concerning the making of the Constitution and the issue of the transformation of government system mentioned earlier. Meanwhile, Sjahrir I Cabinet structure was as follows:

Sjahrir I Cabinet (November 14, 1945 – March 12, 1946)

Position	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Minister of Foreign Affair	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Minister of Home Affairs	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Vice-Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Harmani	–
Minister of Public Security	Amir Syarifuddin	Socialist
Vice-Minister of Public Security	Abdul Murad *	Socialist
Minister of Information	Amir Syarifuddin**	Socialist
Minister of Finance	Mr. Sunaryo Kolopaking	–
Minisiter of Public Welfare	Ir. Darmawan Mangunkusumo	–
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Abdul Karim	–

Minister General Labor	Ir. Putuhena	Parkindo
Minister of Social Affairs	Dr. Adji Darmo Tjokronegoro***	Socialist
Minister of Education	Mr. Dr. T.G.S. Mulia	Parkindo
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Darma Setiawan	—
Minister of State	H. Rasjidi	Masyumi
Minister of Justice	Mr. Suwardi	—

* Replaced by S. Josodiningrat (January 1946)

** Replaced by M. Natsir (Masyumi, January 3, 1946)

*** Replaced by D. Sudarsono (Socialist, Desember 5, 1945)

Not only did Masyumi base their resentment toward Sjahrir I Cabinet on the change of the government system, but it also sounded its distrust over the cabinet's strategy in the ongoing agreements with the Dutch. Harshly, Masyumi criticized Sjahrir's Cabinet as being "ignorant to the current radical change and psychological revolution taking place all over Indonesia: from a weak and powerless nation to physically powerful, supported by militant fighting spirit. Since the government overlooks this fact, it creates a gap between the people and the government. And the whole Muslim populace, the majority population of the country, believes that the government is no longer representing both the position and aspiration of the Muslims."

Masyumi's resentment grew into a demand to decommission Sjahrir and his Cabinet. According to Masyumi, "...to face the enemy and defend the sovereignty of the nation, several things need to be achieved first, namely the unity and the unification of the people, old and young, from all groups therein, under a government which stands above all groups and beliefs, which is revolutionary in nature..."

Masyumi's demand was granted and Soekarno announced it accordingly in the KNIP Session in Solo on February 28, 1946, in which Sjahrir returned the mandate to the President. However, several days later the decommissioned Prime Minister once again was appointed by the President, this time to serve as the formatter of the cabinet (Noer, 1987: 154-157). Masyumi once again was disgruntled over the appointment of Sjahrir. In its view, instead of reappointing Sjahrir whom he had just demoted, the President should have appointed such formatter from among the opposition ranks (the *Persatuan Perjuangan* or United Struggle faction) who had

petitioned to demote Sjahrir in the first place. In reaction to this, Sjahrir tried to hand over the mandate back to Soekarno. Nevertheless, on March 12, 1946, Sjahrir II Cabinet was formed with compositions as follows:

Sjahrir II Cabinet (March 12, 1946 –October 2, 1946)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Minister of Home Affairs	Dr. Sudarsono	Socialist
Minister of Defense	Amir Syarifuddin	Socialist
Undersecretary of Defense	Arudji Kartawinata	Masyumi
Minister of Justice	Mr. Suwardi	-
Undersecretary of Justice	Mr. Hadi	-
Minister of Information	M. Natsir	Masyumi
Minister of Finance	Ir. Surachman	-
Undersecretary of Finance	Mr. Syafuddin Prawiranegara	-
Minister of Welfare	Ir. Darmawan Mangunkusumo	-
Minister of Farming	Ir. Rasad	-
Undersecretary of Farming	Ir. Saksono	Socialist
Minister of Trade and Industry	Darmawan Mangunkusumo	-
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Abdul Karim	-
Undersecretary of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. Putuhena	Parkindo
Undersecretary of General Labor	Ir Laoh	PNI
Minister of Social Affairs	Maria Ulfah Santoso	Perwari/PPI
Undersecretary of Social Affairs	Abdul Madjid Djojodiningrat	Socialist
Minister of Education	-	-
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Darma Setiawan	-
Undersecretary of Public Health	Dr. J. Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	H. Rasjidi	Masyumi
Minister of State	Wikana	Youth Group

During the administration of Sjahrir II Cabinet, political conflicts and disagreements between the government and the Masyumi-supported *Persatuan Perjuangan* opposition were all but stopped. The oppositions relentlessly pressured the government over its policies to the point when not long after the *Persatuan Perjuangan* Congress was held in Madiun on March 17, 1946, the government resorted to extreme measure by arresting two

members of Masyumi. The Minister of Defense and the Minister of Internal Affair recommended the arrests. Both ministries then published official announcements stating it was necessary for the government to take stern measures against individuals or groups caught (1) spreading ill words or doing conducts that caused unrest and riots among the people; (2) spreading ill words or doing conducts that aimed to create division among the people and; (3) deliberately stalling the effort of perfecting the national defense.

Under such tense and scorching political atmosphere, Prime Minister Sjahrir was abducted in Solo, on June 27, 1946 and was only released on July 2 with the intervention of Soekarno. Shocking event also happened the next day, July 3, 1946 in Yogyakarta, in an incident vaguely described as a seizure of power (Noer, 1987: 162; Pranarka, 1985: 69-71). Following the incident, the government announced that certain group had threatened the president by force to dissolve Sjahrir II Cabinet in order to form a new one. Included in the demand was the privilege to choose the head of this new cabinet. The announcement did mention the involvement of some individuals, namely Tan Malaka, Subardjo, Sukarni, Iwa Kusumasumantri and Muhammad Yamin.

At that time, Masyumi had practically joined forces with the *Persatuan Perjuangan* faction Tan Malaka had formed in Purwokerto, Central Java. The *Persatuan Perjuangan* front demanded the "Minimum Program", a seven-pointed framework by Tan Malaka to be adopted by the government. They also demanded Tan Malaka to be appointed to form the cabinet. Because the government refused both demands, as a result, Tan Malaka strongly forbade the *Persatuan Perjuangan* faction and its affiliates to participate in the next cabinet. Masyumi heeded the call as soon as they heard that the next cabinet was once again going to be led by "Tuan" Sutan Sjahrir.²⁵ Such political

²⁵ Here, the title "Tuan" or Sir was a cynical remark to an otherwise common title for an adult Indonesian male. Resentment toward Sjahrir grew because he who had been famous for his non-cooperative approach against Japan turned "soft" in the negotiations with Netherlands. Moreover, he should have avoided the shameful concessions of Linggajati and Renville Agreements in which Indonesia's territories were reduced into several puppet states. Masyumi objected heavily on the formation of Netherland-Indonesia Union and several puppet states, namely Negara (State) Pasundan, Negara Indonesia Timur, Negara Sumatera, and Negara Sulawesi and so on. According to Deliar Noer (1987: 165), "the rejection of Masyumi was preceded by resolutions Muhammadiyah took in Yogyakarta, 24-27 November

tension forced Sjahrir to return the mandate to Soekarno yet again. Nevertheless, after the tension had cooled down, on October 2, 1946, Soekarno gave mandate to Sjahrir to lead his third Cabinet with structure as follows:

Sjahrir III Cabinet (October 2, 1946 –June 27, 1947)

Position	Name	Parties/Affiliation
Prime Minister	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Sutan Sjahrir	Socialist
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Moh. Roem	Masyumi
Undersecretary of Home Affairs	Wijono	BTI-PKI
Minister of Defense	Amir Syarifuddin	Socialist
Undersecretary of Defense	Harsono Tjokroaminoto	Masyumi
Minister of Justice	Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojo	PNI
Undersecretary of Justice	Mr. Hadi	-
Minister of Information	M. Natsir	Masyumi
Undersecretary of Information	A.R. Baswedan	-
Minister of Finance	Mr. Syafuddin Prawiranegara	Masyumi
Undersecretary of Finance	Mr. Lukman Hakim	PNI
Minister of Public Welfare	Dr. A.K. Gani	PNI
Undersecretary of Public Welfare	Mr. Jusuf Wibisono	Masyumi
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Undersecretary of Transportation	Setiadji	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. Putuhena	Parkindo
Minister of Social Affair	Maria Ulfah Santoso	Perwari/PPI
Undersecretary of Social Affair	Abdul Madjid Djojodiningrat	Socialist
Minister of Education	Mr. Suwandi	-
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Darma Setiawan	-
Undersecretary of Public Health	Dr. Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affair	K.H. Faturrahman	Masyumi
Minister of State	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of State	Wikana	Youth
Minister of State	K.H. Wahid Hasjim	Masyumi
Minister of State	Dr. Sudarsono	Socialist

1946; PUI in Majalengka on December 12, 1946; and NU in Tebuireng, Jombang, East Java on December 18, 1946, in which the latter even went as far as encouraging the ulama and kyai to preach about the rejection toward those Agreements in their sermons.”

Minister of State	Mr. Tan Po Goan	Socialist
Minister of State	Dr. D.D. Setiabudi **	-

**inaugurated on April 27, 1947

In anticipation to the failure of Linggajati Agreement, Masyumi released a political manifesto on June 6, 1947. Its purpose was to show and propagate Masyumi's political programs to the public, nationally and internationally, if only it was given a chance to lead the Cabinet. Masyumi's Manifesto aimed to raise the fighting spirit and moral of the people in general and Muslims in particular in the struggle against the Dutch, which arrogantly intended to occupy Indonesia once more by hiding behind the Allied Forces. The manifesto was none too subtle jab toward Sjahrir who it viewed as being too soft and dependent toward the Dutch and international world. It was an interesting fact given that Sjahrir had notorious reputation for his non-cooperative stance during the occupation by Japan, during which he even used to sneer at Soekarno and Hatta for their more cooperative approaches. Masyumi refused most, if not all, Sjahrir's policies, particularly after he had given too many concessions to the Dutch during the peace agreements. These refusals soon followed by other parties, which brought the end of his Cabinet for the third time on June 27, 1947.

The formation of the next cabinet inevitably caused political intrigues and contests to escalate yet again. Moreover, it was also responsible in creating division in Masyumi. On June 30, 1947, President Soekarno gave mandate to Amir Sjarifuddin (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia*), Sukiman (Masyumi), A.K. Gani (PNI) and Setiadji (*Partai Buruh*) to form a new coalition Cabinet. Amir Sjarifuddin eventually formed the new cabinet, with composition as follows:

Amir Syarifuddin I Cabinet I (3 July– 11 November 1947)

Position	Name	Parties/Affiliation
Prime Minister	Amir Sjarifuddin	Socialist
Deputy Prime Minister I	Dr. A.K. Gani	PNI
Deputy Prime Minister I	Setiadji	PBI

Minister of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs	Mr. Tamzil	Socialist
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Wondo Amiseno	PSII
Undersecretary of Home Affairs	Abdul Madjid Djojohadiningsrat	Socialist
Minister of Defense	Amir Sjarifuddin	Socialist
Undersecretary of Defense	Mr. Arudji Kartawinata	PSII
Minister of Justice	Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojo	PNI
Undersecretary of Justice	Mr. Hadi	-
Minister of Information	Sjahbuddin Latief	PSII
Minister of Finance	A.A. Maramis	PNI
Undersecretary of Finance	Dr. Ong Eng Die	Socialist
Minister of Public Welfare	Dr. A.K. Gani	PNI
Undersecretary of Public Welfare I	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Undersecretary of Public Welfare II	Dr. A. Tjokronegoro	Socialist
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Mr. Enoch	-
Minister of Social Affair	Supardjo	PBI
Undersecretary of Social Affair	Sukoso Wirjosaputro	PSII
Minister of Education	Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo	PNI
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Leimena	Parkindo
Undersecretary of Public Health	Dr. Satrio	PBI
Minister of Religious Affair *	H. Aswaruddin	PSII
Minister of State	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of State	Wikana	Youth
Minister of State	Siauw Giok Tjhan	-
Minister of State	Mr. Hendromartono	Socialist
Minister of State	Drs. Maruto Darusman	PKI

* The appointed Minister of Religious Affair was K. Achmad Azhari from South Sumatra, however he never attended the cabinet meeting, thus H Aswaruddin from PSII was appointed as ad interim Minister.

The Amir Sjarifuddin I Cabinet continued the negotiation with Netherlands. However, the Dutch always rejected their proposals. In response to the stagnation, on the suggestion of Van Mook, the Dutch High Commissioner Beel commanded Netherland's troops to mount a military offensive on Indonesia. The attack was called "*Agresi Militer Belanda*" (Dutch Military Offensives) and naturally was a violation to the Linggajati Agreement. The offensive was a breach to the armistice agreed on August 24, 1947 and was the first of two military offensives conducted by the Dutch. The second

offensive took place in December 1948-January 1949, to which Indonesia staged guerilla warfare known as *Serangan Oemoem* (General Offensive) on March 1, 1949.²⁶ However, the resolution that followed the first offensive did not include the issue of demarcation lines.

During the turmoil, the Netherlands incessantly created pseudo-states within Indonesia's territory, namely State of Pasundan, State of East Indonesia, State of North Sumatra and State of Madura. Meanwhile, another negotiation was about to take place on the suggestion of the Commission of Good Offices, known as KTN-*Komisi Tiga Negara*, comprising United States, Australia, and Belgium under the supervision of the United Nation. On June 17, 1947, under the pressure of the Dutch, Republic of Indonesia reluctantly signed the Renville Agreement. It regulated 10 points of armistice agreements, 10 political principles, and 6 additional points proposed by the Commission. The people of Republic took the results of Renville Agreement very badly because it gave the Dutch the upper hand. Following the protests

²⁶ The controversy surrounding *Serangan Oemoem* dominated the headlines right after Soeharto stepped down from his presidency. The polemics revolved around the question of who had really masterminded the six-hour offensive against the Dutch in the city of Yogyakarta and the neighboring areas. The Royal Highness Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, or Soeharto? During the New Order era, the offensive was said to be the brainchild of Soeharto, then a Lieutenant Colonel commanding *Wehrkreise* (Defensive Area) III Command quartered in Yogyakarta. This claim was even augmented by two screenplays "Janur Kuning (1979) and *Serangan Fajar* (1981)," specifically made to boost his image by conveying his supposed heroic acts during the whole operation. Challenges to his claim were popping out during the Reformation era. At the time of the offensive operation, there were no fewer than five leading figures, including Soeharto himself, who had the ability, resources and tactical knowledge to initiate such well-coordinated attack. They were Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, the Head of State of Yogyakarta; Colonel Bambang Soegeng, Soeharto's direct superior officer; Commander of the Armed Force General Soedirman; and Java Territory Commander, Colonel AH Nasution. Soeharto, at one occasion dismissed this doubt by stating matter-of-factly, "Just ask those who were involved yourself, whether they had given the order of the attack on March 1, 1949 or not." Unfortunately, like some parts of the history of Indonesia, this part is still pretty much obscured. The late Sri Sultan HB IX had never spoken publicly about it at all, although if he had, it would have been as fruitless since the media was heavily censored during Soeharto's presidency. It was pretty much similar to the 1965 tragedy in which the fact and the real culprit behind the tragedy are still obscured from the public. The same went for the Order of March the Eleventh (Supersemar), a mere document (which had been lost, that is) that gave Soeharto authority to secure the Capital, purge the communist and deliver him to national leadership.

from the political parties and negative public sentiments, Amir Syarifuddin I Cabinet came to an end.²⁷

Even so, Soekarno once again appointed Amir to lead the next cabinet. Regardless of Masyumi's negative sentiments toward Amir, they still intended to be involved in the government, especially when it came to the negotiation with the Dutch. The following is the composition of Amir Syarifuddin II Cabinet:

Amir Syarifuddin II Cabinet (November 11, 1947 –January 29, 1948)*

Position	Names	Affiliations
Prime Minister	Amir Syarifuddin	Socialist
Deputy Prime Minister I	Sjamsudi	Masyumi
Deputy Prime Minister II	Wondoamiseno	PSII
Deputy Prime Minister III	Setiadjit	PBI
Deputy Prime Minister IV	Dr. A. K. Gani	PNI

²⁷ The interesting point to note, "Why did Masyumi remain as opposition against Amir Syarifuddin's administration even though its members were involved in his Cabinet?" In fact, Masyumi was even allotted five seats in the Cabinet, more than other parties e.g. PSII, which only got four seats. The Socialist leader was, in the eyes of Masyumi, less credible, because he was a Muslim-born who converted to Christianity. At the beginning of independence struggle, Amir led the Gerindo movement against the Dutch though later he was quite cooperative (Noer, 1987: 172). He was working at the Ministry of Economy in Jakarta, when Japan entered Indonesia. He allegedly received 25.000 Gulden in bribe from the East Java Governor, Charles Van Der Plas to orchestrate public protest against the Japanese army. On top of that, Masyumi doubted Amir Syarifuddin's sincerity during his tenure at the Department of Defense, in which he was perceived as abusing his power for the benefits of the Indonesia's Socialist and Communist Party. During his tenure as the Minister of Defense in Sjahrir's Cabinet and the Chairman of Bureau of Struggle and Inspectorate Bureau of Struggle, the Department of Defense was fully controlled by the leftists. The bureau was originally established to oversee Indonesian army-paramilitary troops and party organizations, but what happened was the opposite: it was increasing its own paramilitary troops to the point where they became the "second army" whose numbers even exceeded that of the People's Security Army (TKR), the official army of the Republic. Aside from being trained in combat and warfare, the members of the bureau's paramilitary also received indoctrination of the Socialist Party. Masyumi deemed it unacceptable and it was proved to be the last straw. This largest Islamic party finally decided to oppose Amir Syarifuddin. According to Asvi Warman Adam (2007: 44), following PKI's uprising in Madiun, Amir was executed by military soldiers along with 10 other leaders of the Communist Party in the village of Ngaliyan, Solo on December 19, 1948. The former Prime Minister was executed by his own nation, without knowing what his crime was (allegedly for his involvement in Madiun Affair). The tenet of political world on the seizure of power is sometimes cruel and tragic, especially when "the revolution took her own children" as was the case of Amir Syarifuddin.

Minister of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs	Mr. Tamzil	Socialist
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Moh. Roem	Masyumi
Undersecretary of Home Affair	Abdul Madjid Djojohadiningsrat	Socialist
Minister of Defense	Amir Sjarifuddin	Socialist
Undersecretary of Defense	Mr. Arudji Kartawinata	PSII
Minister of Justice	Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojo	PNI
Undersecretary of Justice	Kasman Singodeimedjo	Masyumi
Minister of Information	Sjahbuddin Latief	PSII
Undersecretary of Information	Ir. Setiadi	Socialist
Minister of Finance	A.A. Maramis	PNI
Undersecretary of Finance	Dr. Ong Eng Die	Socialist
Minister of Public Welfare	Dr. A.K. Gani	PNI
Undersecretary of Public Welfare I	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Undersecretary of Public Welfare II	Dr. A. Tjokronegoro	Socialist
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of Labor Force	SK Trimurti	PBI
Undersecretary of Labor Force	Mr. Wilopo	PNI
Minister of Social Affairs	Supardjo	PBI
Undersecretary of Social Affairs	Sukoso Wirjosaputro	PSII
Minister of Education	Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo	PNI
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Leimena	Parkindo
Undersecretary of Public Health	Dr. Satrio	PBI
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjukur	Masyumi
Minister of State	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of State Youth Affairs	Wikana	Youth
Minister of State of Food	Sujas	BTI
Minister of State of Natality	Siauw Giok Tjhan	Socialist
Minister of State of Police Force	Mr. Hendromartono	Socialist
Minister of State	Drs. Maruto Darusman	PKI
Minister of State	Anwar Tjokroaminoto	Masyumi

* As a protest to Renville Agreement, Masyumi ministers resigned on January 22, 1948.

Masyumi's fury toward the Renville Agreement more or less was caused by the fact that; (1) the whole agreement only benefited the Dutch and harmed the Republic of Indonesia even more; (2) Amir Sjarifuddin as the head of the Indonesian delegation did not reject the agreement, even though the rejection had been agreed and ratified in the Cabinet session. The

rejection should have been presented to the Dutch and the three arbitrary countries, but Amir did not present it sooner. The chance to present the rejection was completely lost when the time allotted was used by the Commission's delegation to suggest changes to the Dutch's proposal. The Cabinet accepted Amir's official reason for his failure in presenting the rejection, but Masyumi was adamant that Amir had to take full responsibility on the violation of the Cabinet's decision. Masyumi announced this stance in its Fourth Conference held in Yogyakarta, which led to the downfall of Amir Sjarifuddin II Cabinet.

After the fall of Amir's cabinet, Soekarno appointed Vice-President Hatta to work together with Masyumi to form a new cabinet. Masyumi had had a good relation with Hatta because he was an astute Muslim. Hatta, who was calm in nature, apparently had the same effect to other groups in the government, save for the leftists who tended to be closer to Soekarno. In response to his earlier rejection toward the leftists' demands, Hatta excluded them from his cabinet, save for Soepeno, a non-party legislature. It was during the administration of Hatta's Cabinet that PKI rebelled under the leadership of Muso (1948).

Hatta's Cabinet had four main programs, namely; (1) implementing the resolutions of Renville Agreement and conducting further negotiation on certain points that had been agreed; (2) accelerating the formation of United States of Indonesia; (3) carrying out the nationalization programs; and (4) repairing the economy that had been neglected as a result of political conflicts. Hatta's Cabinet was as follows:

Hatta I Cabinet (January 29, 1948 –August 4, 1949)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Mohammad Hatta	-
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Minister of Home Affairs	Dr. Sukiman	Masyumi
Minister of Defense	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of Justice	Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojo	PNI
Minister of Information	Mohammad Natsir	Masyumi

Minister of Finance	A.A. Maramis	PNI
Minister of National Food	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Minister of Public Welfare	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara	Masyumi
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of Labor Force/Social Affairs	Kusnan	PBRI
Minister of Development/Youth Affairs	Soepeno	Socialist
Minister of Education and Culture	Ali Sastroamidjojo	PNI
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjkur	Masyumi

By the time Hatta finished forming his cabinet, the ideological conflicts had reached its peak. Many regional administrations voiced out their dissatisfactions toward the central leadership. The final blow came from the opposition of the leftists, which were strongly against the Cabinet from the start, with the former PM, Amir Sjarifuddin spearheading the movement. He formed the People's Democracy Front or *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* (FDR) and used it to create incidents that succeeded in crippling the Cabinet (Pranarka, 1985: 73). However, despite the demand of overhauling the Cabinet they put forward, the opposition did not specifically ask Hatta to step down.

The supporters of Tan Malaka and other revolutionary youth organizations then formed People's Revolution Movement or *Gerakan Rakyat Revolusioner* (GRR) to contest Amir Sjariffudin's FDR. The FDR's actions had more communism tendency in their effort to seize the power, using both parliamentary and non-parliamentary means, while the GRR used the Trotskyite's contra-revolutionary tactics.²⁸

²⁸ At the same time, a cadre of PKI named Suripno made a trip to Soviet Union through Prague. His trip was none other than to fetch Muso, who had lived in Moscow since 1926. Both of them then travelled back to Indonesia through Bukittinggi before heading to Jakarta. The presence of Muso brought a new life to PKI, opening a way to its fusion with Amir Syarifuddin's faction. With Muso's presence, political agitation increased and reached its peak on September 18, 1948, when he led PKI's leaders in Madiun to proclaim the establishment of Soviet Republic of Indonesia. Several days earlier, on September 13, a battle had ensued in the nearby city of Solo between the FDR's faction militia with the Republic's Siliwangi Division. Despite being supported by its full military power, FDR failed to defend Solo, so they fell back to Madiun on September 17. The rebellion did not last long. By September 30, Siliwangi Division had cleared the whole city of Madiun from communists, although it was not until December the same year that the clearing operation finally ended (Sundhaussen, 1982: 72).

On December 19, 1949, the Dutch launched another military offensive. The deployment was directly aimed at Yogyakarta, then the central government and the Capital of the Republic. In the chaos that followed, the Cabinet made an important decision to give mandate to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to form Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia* or PDRI) in West Sumatra because Soekarno and Hatta had chosen to stay in Yogyakarta and refused to take refuge somewhere else. If both were captured (and they did), the Republic would have still had a governmental body to rule on Soekarno-Hatta's behalf. Meanwhile, the military personnel stationed in Yogyakarta were ordered to disperse their troops out of town and engage Dutch's army in guerrilla warfare.

When the Dutch captured Soekarno and Hatta, General Soedirman was commanding the guerrilla wars waged against the Dutch's offensive. On January 28, 1949, the UN's Security Council adopted resolutions for both countries, which; (1) called upon the Netherlands to immediately discontinue all military operations and upon the Indonesian Republic to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare. It suggested both parties to cooperate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area. (2) It called upon the Netherlands to release all political prisoners arrested since the military offensive in 1948, (3) and to facilitate the immediate return of the Government officials of the Republic of Indonesia to Yogyakarta and afford them such facilities as may reasonably be required by that Government for its effective functioning in that area. (4) It also suggested both parties to adhere to the Renville and Linggajati Agreements and form an ad-interim government before March 15, 1949.

The following was the composition of Hatta II Cabinet, after Dutch's Second Military Offensive had discontinued the first:

Hatta II Cabinet (August 4, 1949 –December 29, 1949)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Mohammad Hatta	-
Deputy Prime Minister	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara	Masyumi
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Minister of Home Affairs	Dr. Wongsonegoro	PIR
Minister of Defense	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of Justice	Mr. Susanto Tirtoprojo	PNI
Minister of Information	Mr. Samsuddin	Masyumi
Minister of Finance	Mr. Lukman Hakim	PNI
Minister of National Food	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Minister of Public Welfare	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Minister of Transportation	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of General Labor	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of Labor Force/Social Affairs	Kusnan	PBRI
Minister of Education and Culture	Sidik Mangunsarkoro	PNI
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Surono	-
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjkur	Masyumi
Minister of State	Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo	Masyumi
Minister of State	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of State	Dr. J. Leimena	Parkindo

After only three months of active administration, Hatta returned the mandate to Soekarno. Thereafter, Susanto Tirtoprodojo (PNI) led the Cabinet with composition as follows:

Susanto Tirtoprodojo Cabinet (December 20, 1949 –January 21, 1950)

Positions	Names	Party/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Susanto Tirtoprodojo	PNI
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Haji Agus Salim	-
Minister of Home Affairs	Susanto Tirtoprodojo	PNI
Minister of Defense	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of Justice	Susanto Tirtoprodojo	PNI
Minister of Information	Mr. Samsudin	Masyumi
Minister of Finance	Mr. Lukman Hakim	PNI
Minister of National Food	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Minister of Public Welfare	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic

Minister of Transportation	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of Labor Force	Ir. Kusnan	PBRI
Minister of Education	Sidik Mangunsarkoro	PNI
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjkur	Masyumi

Susanto's Cabinet had the shortest tenure among other cabinets during the parliamentary government. Between 1950 and 1957, in fact, one year was the average tenure for a cabinet, in which some even served no more than six months, or even, in the case of Susanto's cabinet, one month. The continuing intrigues and conflicts between parties and their respective ideologies were to blame once again. Each party had hidden agenda and partial ambitions; they harassed each other and lured people's supports in such a way that Soekarno once described as *vivere pericoloso* (Italian: living dangerously).

Indonesia entered the year 1950 as a Republic of the United States of Indonesia under the Provisional Constitution of 1950 (UUDS 1950). This phase marked an interesting progress in Indonesia's international relationship. The new nation finally earned the international recognition and as a result, was granted the membership in the United Nations on September 27, 1950. The UN membership proved to be of massive importance for Indonesia's active-free (*bebas-aktif*) approach in international politics and in garnering support for the re-annexation of West Irian.²⁹

The progress in its international relationship was in the contrary to national situation. The political upheavals and the instability of the government prolonged, due to the fall and rise of the cabinets. Separatist movements in some area had worsened the situation and the inter-parties conflicts did not help either. No fewer than seven cabinets were formed in a span of just nine years. The most recent was Mohammad Natsir's Cabinet with composition as follows:

²⁹ On December 18 to 25 April 1955, on the initiative of Indonesia together with India, Pakistan, Burma, South Africa, and Sri Lanka, the Asia-Africa Conference was held in Bandung, West Java. On May 3, 1956, Indonesia unilaterally cancelled the Indonesia-Netherlands relationship stipulated in the Round Table Conference.

Natsir Cabinet (September 6, 1950 –April 27, 1951)³⁰

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Moh. Natsir	Masyumi
Deputy Prime Minister	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr Mohammad Roem	Masyumi
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Assaat	-
Minister of Defense	Dr. Abdul Halim	-
Minister of Justice	Mr. Wongsonegoro	PIR
Minister of Information	M.A. Pellaupessy	Democrat
Minister of Finance	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara	Masyumi
Minister of Agriculture	Mr. Tandiono Manu	PSI
Minister of Trade and Industry	Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo	PSI
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. H. Johanes	PIR
Minister of Labor Force/Social Affairs	RP Suroso	Parindra
Minister of Education and Culture	Dr. Bader Djohan	-
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Johanes Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Wahid Hasjim	Masyumi

Concerning the formation of Natsir's Cabinet, two events were worthy of note. The first was Natsir's bold move by deliberately excluding PNI from his Cabinet, and the second was the critiques he received from his own party, Masyumi, over his appointment as the head of the Cabinet/Prime Minister. The critics said that Natsir had violated the decision of Masyumi's Conference held in Yogyakarta in 1949, which regulated that incumbent Chairman of the party should not have been appointed as minister in the Cabinet, let alone the Prime Minister. The decision was made so that the Chairman could be more active in improving and developing the party's structures down to the villages instead of running errands in the Cabinet. The critiques lasted, even though such prohibition had already been abrogated in the party's Central Executive Council meeting in Bogor on June 3-6, 1950, which stated, "If really

³⁰ In the volatile post Madiun-Affair (1948) political situation, Natsir cabinet was formed under the Provisional Constitution of 1950. The Cabinet was led Mohammad Natsir of Masyumi.

necessary, the Chairman can be appointed as a minister on the basis that the Prime Minister is also from Masyumi."

One of Masyumi's leaders, Dr. Sukiman, on behalf of Natsir and on the defense of Natsir's exclusion of PNI from the Cabinet said, "As has been mandated by President Soekarno and preferred by the people, Natsir's Cabinet is an experts' (*Zaken*), not the usual party-based Cabinet." The argument did not do much in consoling PNI's pride, so PNI preferred to stand as opposition and was closer to NU than to Masyumi ever since.

Islam and its modern variants were Masyumi's ideological bases. In Islam, according to Masyumi leaders, politics was the integration between religious values and political decisions. In Masyumi's most extreme view, such integration had to be manifested in the formation of Islamic State (Rocamora, 1991: 53). On the contrary, PNI believed that an aggressive, heavily-politicized Islam was a real threat to the nation and the state, as had manifested in an armed revolution to create Islamic state, known as the insurgence of DI/TII. Therefore, PNI believed that Masyumi's and some other Islamic parties' view on this matter were merely different approaches for the same destination.

The differences and the political rivalries between Masyumi and PNI were byproducts of the differences between religious and cultural values, which had become more important and critical by the time both parties reigned as political powers in their attempts to gain more supporters prior to 1955 general election. These differences had fewer impacts on their rivalries in earlier times. Back then, any differences that occurred were limited to the differential views between both parties' leaders. Nevertheless, when it finally came to rallying their supporters for the upcoming election, both parties needed to bridge all the differences between them and their respective supporters.

The period of 1946-1950 was a "frustrating period for PNI as much as the period of 1951-1955 was of amazing development." During the latter, PNI was able to replace Masyumi as the dominant power in Indonesian politics, both in the cabinet and in the parliament, with a faction that was able to rival

that of the Masyumi. PNI succeeded in developing a solid organization, covering not only the main cities but also the backland regions of Indonesia. The party was able to secure the supports of the bureaucrats and the newly formed entrepreneurs, and thus became the political spearhead of Geertz's *priyayi* class to rival the Masyumi's *santri*. All of that started after Natsir excluded them from his cabinet (1950-1951). After Natsir stepped down as Prime Minister, Sukiman took over the Cabinet (April 27, 1951 –April 3, 1952) with composition as follows:

Sukiman Cabinet (April 27, 1951 –April 3, 1952)³¹

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo	Masyumi
Deputy Prime Minister	Mr. Suwirjo	PNI
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr. Achmad Subardjo	Masyumi
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo	PNI
Minister of Defense	Mr. Sewaka	PIR
Minister of Justice	Mr. Moh. Yamin	-
Minister of Information	Mr. Arnold Mononutu	PNI
Minister of Finance	Mr. Jusup Wibisono	Masyumi
Minister of Agriculture	Ir. Suwarto	Catholic
Minister of Trade and Industry	Mr. Sudjono Hadinoto	PNI
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. Ukar Bratakusumah	PNI
Minister of Labor Force/Social Affairs	Iskandar Tedjasukmana	Labor Party
Minister of Education and Culture	Mr. Wongsonegoro	PIR
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Johanes Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Wahid Hasjim	Masyumi
Minister of General Affairs	M.A. Pallaupessy	Democrat
Minister of Civil Service	R.P. Suroso	Parindra
Minister of Agrarian	Gondokusumo	PIR

³¹ Moh. Yamin resigned his post and was replaced by Mohammad Nasrun on November 20, 1951. On May 9, 1951, Sewaka was inaugurated as Defense Minister after Sumitro Kolopaking had refused the position. On July 16, 1951, Mr. Sudjono Hadinoto resigned and was replaced by Wilopo, but not before the post of Ministry of Trade and Industry had been renamed into Ministry of Economy on May 19, 1951.

Sukiman Cabinet had endured a couple days shy of one year before he returned the mandate back to Soekarno. The fall of his cabinet was due to internal conflict between Masyumi's own faction over the San Francisco Agreement and the Mutual Security Act of the United States. Both issues became the center of conflicts between Masyumi and the Cabinet while simultaneously created division within Masyumi's own faction in the Parliament.

In 1951, United States invited Indonesia to attend San Francisco Convention concerning the peace agreement with Japan. On September 7, 1951, the Cabinet voted whether it was necessary for Indonesia to attend and sign the agreement produced in the Convention or not. The votes went 10 to 6 in favor of those who agreed to attend and sign the agreement. The ten votes included that of the ministers from Masyumi, which caused temporary upheaval in the party. However, Sukiman was able to gain the party's blessing to attend the convention and decided to delegate Achmad Soebardjo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as diplomatic envoy. Mohammad Natsir's group which voted against it was temporarily yielded.

However, it was the other issue which finally forced Sukiman to succumb, and later led to his cabinet's downfall (Noer, 1987: 219-220). The Mutual Security Act was part of US-provided aid to Indonesia. Natsir and his supporters felt that Indonesia's foreign politics under the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmad Soebardjo, was no longer reflecting the active-free stance that had been maintained since the Indonesia's Independence. Sukiman, on the other hand, viewed the tendency of favoring US and its policy was tolerable as it was inevitable. In his view, Indonesia had been under the influence of the US right from the start. However, after the polemic regarding the MSA finally led to the resignation of some of his ministers, he had no other choice but to return the mandate to Soekarno. Wilopo's Cabinet then replaced his Cabinet.

On March 1, 1952, Soekarno appointed Sidik Djojosoekarto (PNI) and Prawoto Mangkususanto (Masyumi) as formatters to form a strong coalition Cabinet that ought to be accepted by the Parliament (DPRS-Provisional

People's Representative Council). However, their efforts met a dead end and they failed the given task. Soekarno then appointed Wilopo (PNI) to form the Cabinet. On April 3, 1952, Wilopo Cabinet was formed with composition as follows:

Wilopo Cabinet (April 3, 1952 –April 30, 1953)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Mr. Wilopo	PNI
Deputy Prime Minister	Prawoto Mangkusasmito	Masyumi
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr Wilopo	PNI
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Moh. Roem	Masyumi
Minister of Defense	Hamengku Buwono IX	-
Minister of Justice	Mr. Lukman Wiradinata	PSI
Minister of Information	Mr. Arnold Mononutu	PNI
Minister of Finance	Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo	PSI
Minister of Agriculture	Moh. Sardjan	Masyumi
Minister of Trade and Industry	Mr. Sumanang	PNI
Minister of Transportation	Ir. Djuanda	-
Minister of General Labor	Ir. Suwarto	Catholic
Minister of Labor Force	Iskandar Tedjasukmana	Labor Party
Minister of Education and Culture	Bader Djohan	-
Minister of Public Health	Dr. Johanes Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Faqih Usman	Masyumi
Minister of General Affairs	M.A. Pallaupessy	Democrat
Minister of Civil Service	R.P. Suroso	Parindra
Minister of Social Affairs	Anwar Tjokroaminoto	PSII

In Wilopo's Cabinet, it was NU's turn to feel betrayed. NU had previously proposed Masyumi to appoint KH Wahid Hasjim, NU's prominent leader, to fill the position of Minister of Religious Affairs. The proposal was rejected and Masyumi appointed K.H. Faqih Usman from Muhammadiyah instead. This appointment disappointed NU and so enraged its leaders that they threatened to leave Masyumi. The Executive Board of NU in its meeting in Surabaya decided to take this matter in the *Nahdlatul Ulama* XIX Conference, held in Palembang on May 1, 1952. As a token of goodwill, Dr. Sukiman attended the Conference, but any attempt toward reconciliation was

already too late at that point. *Nahdlatul Ulama*'s decision to part ways with Masyumi, and to form its own party was final.

Masyumi's position in Wilopo's Cabinet was not too good either. They were bruised and left high and dry due to conflicts and internal rivalries. With hindsight, it can be concluded that this was the beginning of the steady decline of Masyumi. Many efforts had been taken to avoid the divisions among Islamic groups within Masyumi to no avail. One of which was the regular meeting between Natsir, KH Wahid Hasjim and Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, three leaders of the biggest factions in Masyumi. The chance of consolidation became thinner with the passing away of KH Wahid Hasjim on April 19, 1953 (Noer, 1987: 225).

Meanwhile, the relation between PNI and Masyumi deteriorated even further as reflected in the controversial incident of October 17, 1952, which nearly cost Wilopo his Cabinet.

Political scene in Indonesia at that time was predominated by the tug of war between political parties. Soekarno, on the other hand, skillfully controlled the political situation by orchestrating it with the army and political parties. The numerous political parties and their rivalries had caused instabilities, as reflected by the rises and falls of the Cabinets mentioned earlier. The combination of Soekarno's ambition to hold more power beyond his position as political figurehead mandated by the Provisional Constitution of 1950 and the army top brasses' intention to be involved in politics only made things worse. At this point, Indonesian Military, mostly the army, had lost their patience and trust toward political parties and civil politicians, especially on how they ran the government (Crouch, 1986).

The Incident of October 17, 1952 was the byproduct of such tensions and rivalries. There were several versions of the incident. In one version, it began with the issue of reassessment on the position of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Force (*Kementerian Pertahanan dan Angkatan Perang RI*) motioned by I.J. Kasimo and Natsir with the backing of Masyumi, Parkindo and *Partai Katholik*. The same proposal of reassessment of the leadership and

the structure of Ministry of Defense and Armed Force was also motioned by Manai Sophiaan with the backing of PNI, PSII and NU.

In retaliation fit, the army strongly suggested Soekarno to enforce the State of Emergency, dissolve the Parliament (the DPRS or Provisional People's Representative Council) and form DPR (People's Representative Council) in the shortest possible time based on the outcome of the election that had to be held as soon as possible in accordance with people's aspiration. The entire commotion was merely a result from lengthy conflict, which coincidentally reached its peak during Wilopo's administration.³²

Abdul Haris Nasution, in his book, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas : Masa Pancaroba Pertama* (1983) tries to elaborate the details that led to the Incident of October 17, 1952. He points out that there was a dispute between him, then Army Chief of Staff, and Soekarno, which led him to take some measures easily seen as *coup* attempt, for which he was removed (in Nasution's words, he resigned) from his position.

Nasution also wrote that while the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamijoyo was busy doing political errands in national affairs, as well as in the preparation of the general election and the upcoming Asia-Africa Conference, the national economy was deteriorating. Corruption increased. Regional's upheavals and bitter rivalries in the cabinet went incessantly. Rumors about power abuse were circling, especially concerning political positions giveaways conducted by

³² Another version maintained that while Soekarno agreed for the election to be held, he refused to dissolve the parliament (DPRS). He asked for these demands of the military (army), especially the one about the parliament not to be made public. However, it turned out that someone had leaked those demands to the press (Adam, 2007: 57). The statements of the Army Command were published in the daily newspaper "Merdeka" on October 24, 1952. It mentioned that (1) the Army Commander was concerned by the discussion concerning Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces taking place in the Provisional People's Legislative Council's (DPRS) sessions; (2) the way some of its elements discussed this matter...had shown a tendency of creating divisions within the Armed Forces; (3) imposing such ploy on the military was a precarious attempt; (4) public aspirations as mentioned in news media and carried out in demonstrations had affirmed the allegation that the DPRS worked in such a way that could cause peril to the state; and (5) on behalf of the security of the state and the unity of the Armed Forces, Army Command decided to; (1) proposed the President to dissolve the DPRS and hold general election the result of which would be used to form the DPR in speedy manner; (b) inactivated the elements with tendency as mentioned earlier." Following the Incident of October 17, 1952, military officers were divided along the pros and cons line. The Army Chief of Staff, General AH Nasution, either resigned or was sacked from his position.

some government officials and the privileged trading licenses concession that involved the Minister of Trade, Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisuryo.

The administration and its opposition were always critical to each other in unmannered ways. The condition in the army was in likewise manner. No efforts were specifically allocated to address the fundamental national issues such as the development of the state and the nation and the improvement of economical condition. The government and its elements simply had lost their influence and authority. National securities were miserable and military's authority declined. The politicians were mocking each other with the phrase, "*Kalau tidak bisa, beri tahu saya*" (If you can't do it, tell me, I'll do it for you). The deteriorating situations acted as a wakeup call for both politicians and the army to bury the hatchet on the Incident of October 1952 and reunite.

Thus, on January 21 to February 15, 1955, the army held a major conference in Yogyakarta, which intended to discuss three important issues, namely the unity of the army, the solution for the Incident of October 17, 1952 and the development of the army.

The Conference resulted in the "*Piagam Keutuhan Angkaran Darat Republik Indonesia*" or Charter of Army Unity, which later would be known as Yogyakarta Charter, as the foundation for the solution and the development of the army.

The Charter was signed by 29 army top brasses. The Conference, led by Maj. Gen. Bambang Sugeng, declared that the army was part of the unity and the integrity, the power, the spirit and the ideals of Indonesia consisting of well-organized armed units to defend the homeland and to fight against any adversary from within or beyond the nation. After the closing ceremony, the whole delegation visited *Taman Makam Pahlawan* (War Heroes Cemetery) *Semaki* where the declaration was read as a vow before the tombs of the Great General Soedirman, General Urip Sumoharjo and several others'.

Nasution further wrote, "The solution has strengthened the military and open a new page. It was comforting to meet old companions in arms and to forgive each other. For this integrity, neither Presidential Palace nor political parties would ever be able to intervene with military ever again."

Wilopo's Cabinet ended in June 3, 1953 and was replaced by the joint-cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wongsonegoro, aptly named Ali-Wongso's Cabinet, with composition as follows:

Ali Sastroamidjojo–Wongsonegoro Cabinet³³ (July 30, 1953–August 12, 1955)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Ali Sastroamidjojo	PNI
Deputy Prime Minister I	Wongsonegoro*	PIR
Deputy Prime Minister II	Zainul Arifin	NU
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr. Sunario	PNI
Minister of Home Affairs	Dr. Hazairin*	PIR
Minister of Defense	Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri	Progressive
Minister of Justice	Mr. Djody Gondokusumo	PRN
Minister of Information	Dr. F.L. Tobing	SKI
Minister of Finance	Dr. Ong Eng Die	PNI
Minister of Agriculture	Sudjarwo	BTI
Minister of Economy	Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo	PNI
Minister of Transportation	Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso	PSII
Minister of General Labor	Ir. Ruseno	PIR
Minister of Labor Force	S.M. Abidin	Labor Party
Minister of Education and Culture	Moh. Yamin	-
Minister of Public Health	Dr. F.L. Tobing (a.i)	SKI
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjukur	NU
Minister of General Affairs	M.A. Pallaupessy	Democrat
Minister of Social Affairs	R.P. Suroso	Parindra
Minister of Agrarian	Moh. Hanifah	NU
State Minister of Public Welfare	Sudibyo	PSII

³³ By the time Ali-Wongso's Cabinet was formed, political allegiance in the parliament had been on a balance state. The coalition of parties that supported the government comprised 114 seats, while the oppositions consisted of 103 seats. The proponents of the government were *Partai Nasionalis Indonesia*, 41 seats; *Partai Komunis Indonesia* 15 seats; *PIR Wongsonegoro* 3 seats; *Progresif* 9 seats; PRN 11 seats; *Nahdlatul Ulama* 8 seats; *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Parindra) 6 seats; *Partai Buruh* 5 seats; *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) 4 seats; SKI 4 seats; Sobsi 2 seats; BTI 2 seats and Perti nil (its representative, Siradjuddin Abbas had been appointed as State Minister of Public Welfare to replace Sudibyo). The oppositions were consisted of Masyumi, 40 seats; PIR Hazairin, 19 seats; PSI, 15 seats; *Demokrat*, 9 seats; *Partai Katholik*, 8 seats; *Parkindo*, 4 seats; and 7 seats of non-party representatives. Such were the constellation of Indonesian politics prior to 1955 general election.

Note on Ali-Wongso's Cabinet: Sudibyo was replaced by Siradjuddin Abbas on November 6, 1954; Wongsonegoro, Hazairin and Rooseno resigned on October 23, 1954; Iwa Kusumasumantri resigned on July 13, 1955 and his position was filled by Ali Sastroamidjojo, gave him dual role, as Minister of Defense and Prime Minister; Dr. Lie Kiat Teng from PSII was appointed as Minister of Health in October 1953; Abikusno and Sudibyo resigned on September 14, 1953, and replaced by Rooseno and Moh.Hassan (PSII) respectively on October 12, 1953.

The Provisional Constitution of 1950, which reflected liberal democracy as practiced in Western countries, had given tremendous role to the DPRS in holding massive influence over the government and significant power over the Cabinet. Since the parliament was consisted of parties' representatives, their virtually unlimited power reflected the power of the political parties.

Ali-Wongso's Cabinet was replaced by Boerhanoedin Harahap's with composition as follows:

Boerhanoedin Harahap Cabinet (August 12, 1955–March 24, 1956)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Boerhanoedin Harahap	Masyumi
Deputy Prime Minister I	Danu Ismadi	PIR
Deputy Prime Minister II	Harsono Tjokroaminoto	PSII
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Anak Agung Gde Agung	Democrat
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Sunario	PNI
Minister of Defense	Boerhanoedin Harahap	Masyumi
Minister of Justice	Mr. Lukman Wiradinata	PSI
Minister of Information	Sjamsuddin St. Makmur	PIR
Minister of Finance	Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo	PSI
Minister of Agriculture	Muh. Sardjan	Masyumi
Minister of Economy	I.J. Kasimo	Catholic
Minister of Transportation	Ir. H. Laoh	PNI
Minister of General Labor	R.P. Suroso	Parindra
Minister of Labor Force	I. Tedjasukmana	Labor Party
Undersecretary of Labor Force	Asraruddin	Labor Party
Minister of Education and Culture	Prof. Dr. Suwandi	Catholic
Minister of Public Health	Dr. J. Leimena	Parkindo
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. Masjkur	NU
Minister of General Affairs	M.A. Pallaupessy	Democrat
Minister of Social Affairs	Sudibyo	PSII
Minister of Agrarian	Moh. Hanifah	NU
State Minister of Public Welfare	Sudibyo	PSII

State Minister	Abdul Hakim	Masyumi
State Minister	Sutomo	PRI
State Minister	Drs. Cumala Noor	PIR

It was during the administration of Boerhanuddin's Cabinet that on September 29, 1955, the Republic of Indonesia finally held its first general election. It was divided into two voting days, first day was to vote for parliament members and then, on December 15, 1955, to vote for the Constitutional Council (*Badan Konstituante*) members. The outcome of legislative votes showed seven political parties gained significant votes, namely PNI, Masyumi, NU, PKI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik and PSI.

The 1955 general election was expected to be the first step toward the improvement and stabilization of the relatively weak democracy in Indonesia. But in reality, aside from its relatively smooth execution, it also caused the ideological frictions to widen, not only among the political parties and their respective leaders, but also among their supporters in the society. Boerhanoedin returned the mandate to the president in March 1956 after the formation of DPR based on election results had been established. Ali Sastroamidjojo then was appointed to run the Cabinet once again. What follows was the composition of his Cabinet:

Ali Sastroamidjojo II Cabinet (March 24, 1956–March 14, 1957)

Positions	Names	Parties/Affiliations
Prime Minister	Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo	PNI
Deputy Prime Minister I	Moh. Roem	Masyumi
Deputy Prime Minister II	KH Idham Chalid	NU
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ruslan Abdul Gani	PNI
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr. Sunarjo	NU
Minister of Justice	Mr. Muljatno	Masyumi
Undersecretary of Justice	A.B.L De Rosario	Catholic
Minister of Information	Sudibyo	PSII
Minister of Finance	Jusup Wibisono	Masyumi
Minister of Agriculture	Eni Karim	PNI
Minister of Economy	Boerhanoedin Harahap	Masyumi

Undersecretary of Economy	F.F. Umbas	Parkindo
Minister of General Labor	Ir. P Muhammad Noor	Masyumi
Minister of Labor Force	Sabilah Rasjad	PNI
Minister of Education and Culture	Sarino Mangunpuspito	PNI
Minister of Religious Affairs	K.H. M. Ilyas	NU
Minister of Social Affairs	K.H. Fatah Yasin	NU
Minister of Agrarian	Ir. Suhardi	Catholic
Minister of Planning	Ir. Djuanda	Masyumi
State Minister	H. Rusli A. Wahid	PRI

Initially, PNI (*priyayi*) and Masyumi (*santri*) had been able to work together in the cabinets, albeit instable and temporal. Their joint-cabinets usually involved other parties which acted as a buffering between them, such as PSI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, PSII, and Perti.

Unfortunately, the coalition of PNI-Masyumi-PSI (which represented *priyayi-santri-abangan*) did not stay solid long enough. Each party's ambition to hold strategic position in the cabinet and the lure of such position was enough to shake the coalition. Inter-*aliran* frictions also became more frequent during this time. The existence of *santri*-affiliated NU, which by that time had separated from Masyumi, made it possible for PNI to form coalition involving neither Masyumi nor PSI. Meanwhile, the role of PKI as a buffering powerhouse also increased in this phase. Although it did not hold any ministerial position, PKI openly showed its support for the Cabinet.

Ideological differences between Masyumi and PKI (*santri* and *abangan*) were so extreme that it was only a matter of time before they pitted against each other. These conflicts in turn would place both PNI and NU in intermediary positions in the political constellation of Indonesia. Furthermore, these developments enabled the coalition of PNI and NU with the out-of-cabinet support of PKI in Ali Sastroamijoyo II Cabinet, thereby ending the previous triad of Masyumi-PNI-PSI without ever negating the balance of *aliran*. After Ali Sastroamijoyo II Cabinet ended, Djuanda's Cabinet, titled *Kabinet Karya* or Functional Cabinet, was formed.

The Functional Cabinet included two military representatives in its composition. Its programs, named *Pancakarya*, (Five-Working Programs) were as follows:

1. Forming a National Council
2. Normalizing the situation in the Republic of Indonesia
3. Preserving the annulment of the Round Table Conference (KMB)
4. Achieving the re-annexation of West Irian
5. Accelerating the physical development

Prior to the formation of Djuanda's Cabinet, in an attempt to subdue the rising tension in the post-election, Soekarno had suggested several concepts. Among others were the Presidential Conceptions (*konsepsi*) he delivered on February 21, 1957 in which he stated that:

1. The parliamentary democracy had failed to be adopted in Indonesia, because Western tradition was not compatible with Indonesian cultures. Therefore, the system had to be replaced using the Guided Democracy system.
2. The implementation of the Guided Democracy system needed the presence of *Gotong Royong* (mutual-cooperation) Cabinet consisting of all parties based on their electoral influence on the people.
3. The formation of National Council consisting of functional groups within the society was needed with sole task of giving counsel, whether called or uncalled for, to the Cabinet.

The conception also proposed for the formation of a "Rectangle Cabinet" comprising the four election winners, PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI, to cooperate in achieving mutual-cooperation in national level.³⁴

Djuanda's Cabinet was the last cabinet formed under the Provisional Constitution of 1950 Soekarno deemed as a failed constitution. Soon after, democracy system in Indonesia was replaced with the aforementioned Guided Democracy, a fair means for Soekarno to reenact Indonesia's pre-

³⁴ The proposed *konsepsi* sparked heated debates in the DPR and the communities. In contrast to their nationalist counterparts, the religion-based parties such as Masyumi, NU, PSII, Parkindo and *Partai Katholik* rejected the idea, solely on the involvement of PKI in it.

independence political canvass of Nationalism, Islam and Marxism which now found its channel in the PNI-NU-PKI triangular structure.

Judging from the distribution of seats in the Cabinet, PNI-NU coalition was mutually beneficial since they did not have to share their ministerial seats with PKI, their main supporter in the parliament. On the other hand, PKI's support for the Cabinet was also self-beneficial since it eluded its main rivals, Masyumi and PSI, from entering the Cabinet.

Masyumi was a political party with notoriously strong anti-PKI sentiment. However, due to the involvements of some of Masyumi's leaders in the PRRI/Permesta and DI/TII insurgences in West Sumatra and in West Java, it had lost its former strong presence in the central government. Nonetheless, Masyumi still fanatically strived to show its influence as a prominent political party. Masyumi's resilience and fanaticism in struggling for its *santri*-based political ideology, whose purpose was to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia, was clearly seen in the Constitutional Assembly's sessions where the formulation of the new constitution was taking place. These relentless efforts showed that Masyumi was as uncompromising as it was consequent with its political stance.

While on one hand, Masyumi's uncompromising stance succeeded in showing its militant side, on the other hand, its fanatic inclination to its Islamic ideology also caused wariness among other political powerhouses, most notably the military. In the latter's view, Masyumi was a representation of the extreme right political power, just as PKI represented the extreme left. Such view was proved to be detrimental in the future relation of Masyumi and the military.

During this period, PKI was able to maintain its position as a party whose stature needed to be taken into consideration. The key reason for this was the support and sympathy Soekarno gave PKI in his capacity as national leader. The gradual demise of its main political rivals, Masyumi and PSI, from the national stage gave chance for PKI to increase its political influence further. The steady decline of PNI and NU's influence was also instrumental for PKI to develop itself. Another key point was its own clever strategy to

steer clear from the cabinet. By avoiding the position in the cabinet, PKI gave off a much cleaner image toward the people, in contrast to the parties whose members usually held office in the cabinet. As a party, PKI was highly discipline and very adept in managing its organization, thanks to its militant, progressive and dedicated cadres. So impressive PKI's performances were, the military critic of Crouch's caliber confirms in his study (1986: 108-121) that "PKI was the only political party organization with a level of discipline and organizational networking rivaling those of the military."

The Change of Direction in 1955 General Election³⁵

At the very end, election became the main choice favored by all political parties at that time. Likewise, the people with awareness toward the role of democracy in the government also believed that implementing election was a non-negotiable obligation. After all, election is one of the main pillars of democracy other than political parties, the government, parliament and mass media.

There has been consensus among the scholars of political studies that to determine whether democracy is present in a particular government, indicators in the following must be present (Dahl, 1989): (1) a regular, independent and well-organized election with a high level of competition among the parties involved. (2) As the logical consequence of such election, the chances toward the shift in power are high. The party that wins the election shall hold the right to form the executive body. (3) A transparent recruitment to fill the available top to bottom spots in the political position, whether in executive or legislative bodies. Every citizen, in compliance of the Law, shall hold equal rights to fill such positions. (4) All citizens shall be free to enjoy and carry out their basic rights such as to elect and be elected (suffrage and eligibility), freedom of assembly, forming organization and expressing opinions; and (5) rights to receive information from the government and criticize the government officials. The entire indicators are

³⁵ See Herbert Feith, *The Indonesia Elections of 1955* (1957, 58-59); Alfian, *Ulama, Umat Islam dan Pemilihan Umum* (*Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, no. 3, AIPI, 1988, 38-41); and Miriam Budiardjo, *Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik* (1991, 194-195).

meant to influence all governments to carry out election in the most organized, orderly and democratic way.

Even years prior to 1955 general election, the electoral issues had already dominated the political organizations' activities, not only in major parties such as PNI, Masyumi, NU, PKI and PSI, but also in parties like Parkindo, *Partai Katholik*, PSII, Perti, IPKI, *Partai Rakyat Nasional*, Murba and *Partai Buruh*. In other words, all of the discourses and preparations toward the general election had become major motivations for parties to improve their organizations.

If in the immediate years following the Independence, political parties had been preoccupied in conflicting each other, in 1954, they were determined in increasing their activities to promote national consciousness to the public, even if it required them to give presentation concerning the government and all its problems down to each *kecamatan* and *desa* (sub-district and village). These actions triggered and created new enthusiasm toward politics in the otherwise quiet, peaceful and uneventful rural areas.

In the election's simulation using none-direct system held in Yogyakarta, Masyumi won 18 while PNI won 4 of the available 48 Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) seats. However, in the simulation using direct votes in the DPRD of Minahasa, North Sulawesi, PNI was able to get 13 seats from the total available 25 seats (Reksodipuro. In Rocamora, 1991: 154). Although there were other factors beyond the election system that might have influenced the outcome of the election, those simulations showed that the direct system was more beneficial to PNI.

For that reason, the ratification of Election Law No. 7 of 1953 proved to be a huge advantage for PNI. The Law stipulated that the election would adopt direct election system and gave all citizens aged 18 and more or those who had been married the right to vote. The election would be conducted twice, first to elect the candidates of the People's Representative Council and the Regional People's Representative Council members, and the second to elect the members of Constitutional Assembly. The general election would adopt the proportional representation system. In the election, Indonesia

would be divided into 16 electoral areas (constituencies) with each area got allocation of seats based on its population. Each area would be allotted at least six seats in the Constitution Assembly and three seats in the parliament. Seats would be distributed to parties based on the amount of votes they had received in each electoral area while surplus of votes would be distributed among the parties in the same area or to one party in national level.

On September 29, 1955, the Election Day, 37,875,299 out of 43,104,464 registered voters casted their votes to elect the DPR and DPRD members. The election included no fewer than 172 sign-pictures on its ballot sheets, representing arrays of national political parties, local parties and individual nominees competing for 257 seats in the parliament. The result of the election saw four parties received the majority votes, namely PNI with 22.3% votes (57 seats); Masyumi with 20.9% votes (57 seats); *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) got 18.4% votes (45 seats); and PKI with 16.4% votes (39 seats). Meanwhile, other parties and their respective votes were as follows: PSII won 2.89% votes (8 seats); Parkindo with 2.66% votes (8 seats); *Partai Katholik*, 2.04% votes (6 seats); PSI with 1.99% votes (5 seats); IPKI with 1.43% votes (4 seats); and PERTI with 1.28% votes (4 seats). At last, PNI's ambition to become the number one party in Indonesia came to fruition.

Several accounts indicated that the influence PNI had around bureaucratic environments was instrumental in determining its victory. At that time, PNI held dominant influence over government officials in both central and regional level, including those in Provincial and Administrative Regencies' level. Aside from that, PNI also "owned" the Ministry of Education and Teaching, Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Home Affairs, which gave them access to government resources it used as mechanism that gave birth to influential regional leaders (Rocamora, 1991: 173-175). The latter was evident in the fact that six out of twelve governors in Indonesia were PNI's cadres. Golkar would repeat similar domination, if in a grander scale, during the New Order regime. Other than that, Golkar and PNI also shared the same status as *priyayi*-affiliated parties. However, the 1955 general election in which PNI achieved its victory was an honest and just election,

while the New Order's elections in which Golkar achieved its victories were crammed with ploys and manipulations.

Party's influence over government officials was immense, especially to those belonged to regional administrations, and it had been exploited to pressure the lower level institutions into helping the party in assisting its regional campaigns. In likewise manner, every party that held access to government institutions would use its influence for its benefit the same way PNI had done. Such influence was evident especially in the bottom-most bureaucrats, such as *camat* or *lurah* who held direct access to the constituents. In conclusion, PNI and other parties such as NU and Masyumi mostly received supports from the currently exist political structure.

Besides impeding Prime Minister Boerhanuddin Harahap's chance to lengthen his administration or his cabinet, the outcome of the 1955 general election showed a wide polarization between religion-based parties and the non-religion-based parties. In Java Island, for example, the joint forces of non-religion-based parties (*priyayi* and *abangan*) were more powerful than that of the religion parties (*santri*). In islands outside Java, though, Islamic parties were more powerful than the non-religion-based ones.

Therefore, it can be concluded that 1955 general election displayed tight competition among the *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi* political *aliran*. The election results also displayed a new constellation in the parliament although it did not go as far as changing the adopted multi-party system. Furthermore, the 1955 general election also demonstrated the real political power of Islamic parties. Four Islamic parties (Masyumi, NU, PSII, dan Perti) in all gathered no less than 45.2 percent of votes, equal to 116 seats in the parliament or the Provisional People's Representative Council (DPRS) from the total 257 available seats.

Nevertheless, that numbers were not enough. Islamic parties were still bested by their Nationalist counterparts. Even with Muslims voters constituted 90% of the valid voters, Islamic parties could only gain 45.2%. Among the four major Islamic parties, Masyumi got the most seats, with 57 seats, followed by NU, 45 seats. However, the real winner between the two Islamic

parties was in fact NU. The result of the election brought five-fold boost of its parliamentary seats, from 8 to 45 seats. Moreover, NU had relatively shorter period of preparation compared to other parties in the election. Meanwhile, secular parties (PNI, PKI, PSI, Murba dan IPKI) saw an overall decrease of their votes. Prior to the election, the percentage of their joint votes had been 69.8% (164 seats). After the election, however, the percentage was down to 49.4% (127 seats). The Christian parties, Parkindo and *Partai Katholik* received relatively stable votes, from 5.9% (14 seats) to 5.4% (14 seats).

Table 1: Results of 1955 Legislative Election

No.	Parties/Registered Names	Votes	%	Seats
1.	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	8.434.653	22,32	57
2.	Masyumi	7.903.886	20,92	57
3.	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6.955.141	18,41	45
4.	Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6.179.914	16,36	39
5.	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1.091.160	2,89	8
6.	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)	1.003.326	2,66	8
7.	Partai Katholik	770.740	2,04	6
8.	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	753.191	1,99	5
9.	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)	541.306	1,43	4
10.	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)	483.014	1,28	4
11.	Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	242.125	0,64	2
12.	Partai Buruh	224.167	0,59	2
13.	Gerakan Pembela Panca Sila (GPPS)	219.985	0,58	2
14.	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)	206.161	0,55	2
15.	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi RI (P3RI)	200.419	0,53	2
16.	Murba	199.588	0,53	2
17.	Baperki	178.887	0,47	1
18.	Persatuan Indoenesia Raya (PIR) Wongsonegoro	178.481	0,47	1
19.	Grinda	154.792	0,41	1
20.	Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai)	149.287	0,40	1
21.	Persatuan Daya (PD)	146.054	0,39	1
22.	PIR Hazairin	114.644	0,30	1
23.	Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (PPTI)	85.131	0,22	1
24.	AKUI	81.454	0,21	1

25.	Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD)	77.919	0,21	1
26.	Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka (PRIM)	72.523	0,19	1
27.	Angkatan Communist Muda (Acoma)	64.514	0,17	1
28.	R.Soedjono Prawirisoedarso	53.306	0,14	1
29.	Others	1.022.433	2,71	-
Total		37.785.299	100,00	257

Source: *Media Transparansi* Edisi 8/Mei 1999.

Table 2: DPRS Seats Prior and After the 1955 Election

Political Allegiance	DPRS Prior to 1955 Election		Result of 1955 Election	
	Seats	Percentage	Seats	Percentage
Secular Parties	164	69.8%	127	49.4%
Islamic Parties	57	24,3%	116	45,2%
Christian-Catholic Parties	14	5.9%	14	5.4%
	235	100%	257	100%

Source: Ali Moertopo, *Strategi Politik Nasional* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1974), 69

In all, Islamic parties were able to increase their percentage of votes into 45.2%. This happened when Muslim population in Indonesia was somewhere around 90%. From that figure, it was safe to assume that the majority of Muslims preferred the non-religion parties than the Islamic ones. In this election, PNI received the majority with 22.3% votes, while PKI received 16.4% votes.

Table 3: Religion-based and Non Religion-based Parties in Electoral Areas

Electoral Area	Secular Parties (PNI, PKI, PSI, Murba, IPKI)	Islamic Parties (Masyumi, NU, PSII, Perti)	Christian Party (Parkindo, and Partai Katolik)
East Java	46.60 %	45.75 %	0.51 %
Central Java	59.53 %	30.27 %	0.84 %
West Java	42.30 %	42.10 %	0.28 %
South Sumatera	29.10 %	63.40 %	3.00 %
Central Sumatera	10.24 %	79.74 %	0.50 %
North Sumatera	26.05 %	45.40 %	14.80 %
West Kalimantan	20.40 %	41.90 %	0.50 %
South Kalimantan	11.20 %	81.35 %	1.40 %
East Kalimantan	37.33 %	40.68 %	3.91 %
North Sulawesi	19.21 %	50.90 %	21.36 %
South Sulawesi	6.51 %	64.30 %	11.41 %

Maluku	11.81 %	38.81 %	38.42 %
East Nusa Tenggara	6.53 %	17.52 %	58.74 %
West Nusa Tenggara	61.00 %	29.90 %	0.29 %
West Irian	-	-	-

Source: *Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, no. 3, 1988: 38

The vote casting to elect the Constitutional Assembly (Dewan Konstituante) members was held on December 15, 1955. The total seats available for the council were 520 seats, with 6 reserved seats for West Irian (due to no election), which left the total available seats of 514. Compared to the total votes received in the election for People's Representative in September, the outcome of Constitutional Assembly election saw the votes for PNI, NU and PKI increased while that of Masyumi slightly decreased although it did not necessarily cost its runner-up status. The result of the Constitutional Assembly Election was as follows:

Table 4: 1955 Constitutional Assembly Election Result

No.	Parties/Registered Names	Votes	%	Seats
1.	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	9,070,218	23.97	119
2.	Masyumi	7,789,619	20.59	112
3.	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6,989,333	18.47	91
4.	Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6,232,512	16.47	80
5.	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1,059,922	2.80	16
6.	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)	988,810	2.61	16
7.	Partai Katolik	748,591	1.99	10
8.	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	695,932	1.84	10
9.	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)	544,803	1.44	8
10.	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)	465,359	1.23	7
11.	Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	220,652	0.58	3
12.	Partai Buruh	332,047	0.88	5
13.	Gerakan Pembela Panca Sila (GPPS)	152,892	0.40	2
14.	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)	134,011	0.35	2
15.	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi RI (P3RI)	179,346	0.47	3
16.	Murba	248,633	0.66	4
17.	Baperki	160,456	0.42	2
18.	Persatuan Indoenesia Raya (PIR) Wongsonegoro	162,420	0.43	2
19.	Grinda	157,976	0.42	2
20.	Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai)	164,386	0.43	2

21.	Persatuan Daya (PD)	169,222	0.45	3
22.	PIR Hazairin	101,509	0.27	2
23.	Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (PPTI)	74,913	0.20	1
24.	AKUI	84,862	0.22	1
25.	Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD)	39,278	0.10	1
26.	Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka (PRIM)	143,907	0.38	2
27.	Angkatan Comunis Muda (Acoma)	55,844	0.15	1
28.	R,Soedjono Prawirisoedarso	38,356	0.10	1
29.	Gerakan Pilihan Sunda	35,035	0.09	1
30.	Partai Tani Indonesia	30,060	0.08	1
31.	Radja Keprabonan	33,660	0.09	1
32.	Gerakan Banteng Republik Indonesia (GBRI)	39,874	0.11	
33.	PIR NTB	33,823	0.09	1
34.	L,M,Idrus Effendi	31,988	0.08	1
	Others	426,856	1.13	
Total		37,837,105	100	514

Source : Media Transparansi May 8, 1999 Edition

As mentioned earlier, the most significant phenomenon of the 1955 general election was its orderly, peaceful and democratic implementation. Nevertheless, the shared political power between political *aliran* practiced during that time was a threat to the stability of the government on its own. The autonomous political practices that on one hand were able to trigger people's enthusiasm to participate in politics, on the other hand were mostly decorated with self-beneficial motives instead of that of the national interests. Moreover, with the almost limitless autonomy given, fanaticism within social groups also increased. To put it shortly, such political practices only served to elude the government from doing the best for the benefit of the people.

A year after the 1955 general election, on the anniversary of Youth Pledge Day (*Hari Sumpah Pemuda*), on October 28, 1956, Soekarno delivered a fiery speech in which he condemned the Government Edict of November 3, 1945, which legalized the formation of political parties. It was, according to him, the biggest mistake there ever was. He said, "...We've made so big a mistake by calling for the formation of political parties. My wish is for all the leaders to discuss together on how to bury all political parties." On the same

occasion, he added, "western democracy is incompatible to be adopted in Indonesia."

The alleged incompatibility was the main reason why the parliamentary democracy deemed as a failed experiment. There was nothing extraordinary with Soekarno's statement because he had already shown his rejection toward parliamentary and liberal democracy since before the Independence. However, when his anti-political parties' speech was linked with his *konsepsi*, it was a sudden nationwide issue (Noer, 1987: 352). Implied in his ideas, Soekarno intended to reorganize and even change the government structure that had been adopted for seven years since the Dutch recognized the nation sovereignty in 1949.

Before the audience at the *Merah Putih* (Red and White) Public Assembly in Bandung, on January 27, 1957, the President conveyed his intention to intervene in the government affairs in the ongoing transition period, before the Constitutional Assembly finished forming the new constitution and before the new constitution came into effect. Soekarno also stated that he would declare the *konsepsi* that would legalize his involvement in the government. Intriguingly, in this matter, Bung Hatta, an astute proponent of democracy, either he was being influenced by Soekarno—both were still getting along pretty well—or he was simply reflecting his own thought, seemed to agree with him when he stated, "The parties had outgrown their reason for being and the State was merely regarded as their personal tool. The government was nothing but the lackey of the parties." In front of another public assembly in Medan, North Sumatra, March 16, 1957, Soekarno informed the audience, "my *konsepsi* is facing objections and challenges from particular parties." However, he added that he "won't leave the *konsepsi* and is more than willing to carry it out."

In the Muslims' General Assembly held in Surabaya on March 10, 1957, a resolution was agreed to reject the President's *konsepsi* it deemed as against the Constitution. Meanwhile, several parties also strongly refused the President's idea, namely Masyumi, *Partai Katholik*, Parkindo, PSI and PSII. Following their open rejection, the leaders of the parties had to endure terrors

from unknown groups, which only created more tension in the political situation.

At the same time, concerning the recent situation, the military considered it was time to expand its role to narrow down the possibility of civilian politicians' intervention in what it viewed as military's internal affairs. Military's trust toward political parties had reached the point of nonexistent, which called for an immediate new approach for it to be involved in politics.

The blossoming idea in the military at that time, according to Sundhaussen (1986) and Yahya Muhamin (1971), was that the military had the basic right to participate in the State's administration. Such claim was based on the reasoning that Indonesian Military (Armed Forces of Republic of Indonesia or ABRI) had been the main political machine during the struggle for independence, and that the military had spent "day and night" ceaselessly to safeguard the unity of the Republic. Therefore, the military deemed it was logical for it to be involved in the state administration.³⁶ However, even if that might have been the case, as a result of the 1958 coup (PRRI/Permesta) and the Incidents of October 17, 1952, which still fresh in the memories of national figures, the military still lacked of solid leadership and command. However, according to Nasution, even with that desire, military had never planned to stage a coup. Since Nasution was a figure respected by all military

³⁶ Mas Isman, the founder of Kosgoro and one of Soekarno's confidants once said, "...it is a fact that Indonesian military is a self-made institution, not a byproduct of some political decisions, as well as the main power in the struggle to defend the independence from the threat of the Dutch. Nowhere does it say that the armed force is the subordinate of civil authority." Mas Isman's opinion was reverberated not only by other military officers but also by some political parties' elites (Sundhaussen, 1986: 214). Such opinion became the foundation of the spirit of *Dwifungsi* ABRI concept conveyed by AH Nasution in front of the audience at the *dies natalis* ceremony of Magelang State Military Academy on November 12, 1958. During the occasion, Nasution declared, "We do not covet nor intend to follow the revolution taking place in South America where military is a direct political institution, nor we desire to copy the European military model in which military is the passive tool of the State." This concept would later develop into a system that enabled the military to be actively involved in non-military affairs as it was in the New Order era, during which military held all the strategic positions, from President, Vice-President, Ministers, as well as Governors and Regents, on top of being Soeharto's main political tool. Prof. Joko Sutono referred Nasution's speech as the Army's "Middle Way" Doctrine, while Nasution himself preferred the name "Wide Front or Stand Shoulders to Shoulders," which implied to mutual cooperation and non-egoistical approach much needed in that time's situation. Nasution's speech became the sought after solution for military officers to participate in day-to-day politics (Budi Susanto, SJ dan Tony Supriatma, 1995: 36).

men and endowed with strong political influence, he saw to it that there would be no coup without his knowing and blessing.³⁷

On July 5, 1959,³⁸ without Hatta who had already resigned from his position as Vice-President, Soekarno declared a Presidential Decree to end the prolonged inter-parties and ideological conflicts, including those between him and some parties' elites, and for the impasse in the Constitutional Assembly. The presidential decree marked the period of Guided Democracy³⁹ in Indonesia, especially as a means to overpass divisions between political parties in the last decade and the deteriorating relation between PKI and the army. The decree was an initiative and a suggestion of Nasution, the Army Commander-in-Chief, in the height of his political influence, as a follow through on the suggestion to force martial law in Indonesia following the

³⁷ In reality, political concepts of Soekarno and Nasution were at variance with each other. Any synchronization therein, which were embodied in their joint programs during 1957-1959, was nothing more than the manifestation of their shared "nationalism and patriotism" which strived to rekindle the "revolution spirit" against the arrogant and divisive power games of the political parties (Sundhaussen, 1986 : 221).

³⁸ University of Indonesia's Political Scholar, Miriam Budiarjo (1977) describes that the Decree can be regarded as an effort to break the political stagnation by clinging to a powerful central leadership. The 1945 Constitution stipulated a president to hold office for five years a term and after which he could be reelected (without limitation of how many terms). However, this limitation was abrogated by the MPRS Regulation No.III/1963 which in an obvious breach to the Constitution stipulated Soekarno as President for a lifetime. It was not the only violation of the constitution—or democracy for that matter—conducted during that era. In 1960, the President dissolved the People's Representative Council, the members of which were elected in 1955 general election, although the Constitution clearly stated that his position did not granted him the authority to do so. On top of that, as stipulated in Law No. 19/1964, the President as the executive body was even granted the right to intervene in judiciary body while the Presidential Regulation of Procedure No.14/1960 granted the president authority to bypass legislative council's decision.

³⁹ Guided Democracy was an Indonesian-style democracy (1959-1965) in which all the decision-making and planning processes were carried out by the President. The *raison d'être* of this system were: (1) from national security perspective, the numerous separatist movements in several regions; (2) from economic perspective, the faulty government programs that led to economic catastrophe due to the rapid rise and fall of the Cabinets; (3) from political perspective, the failure of Constitutional Assembly to formulate new constitution. The Guided Democracy started as a suggestion of Soekarno to the Constitutional Assembly to reestablish the 1945 Constitution as the State Constitution, replacing the 1950 Provisional Constitution. In the voting that followed, 269 members of the assembly agreed to the suggestion while 119 members disagreed. With this as the starting point, Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959 which declared: (1) the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly; (2) the reestablishment of 1945 Constitution to; (3) abrogate the 1950 Provisional Constitution and; (4) the formation of Provisional People's Consultative Assembly and Provisional Supreme Advisory Council. Indonesian Communist Party was in full support of the Decree, sating its own self-importance in the **Nas-A-Kom** (**NAS**ionalisme or Nationalism, **Agama** or Religion (Islam) and **Komunisme** or Communism) political configuration implied by the Guided Democracy.

regional insurgents. Soekarno declared the decree from Istana Merdeka, but not before Ali Sastroamidjojo had returned the mandate of the cabinet.

The decree was intended to stop any disagreement in the Constitutional Council and among political parties with Soekarno taking the leading role in the government until a more authoritative stipulation could be created. Soekarno reintroduced the 1945 Constitution with the full backing of the military, especially the army. By aligning himself with the military, Soekarno realized that he was putting a risk upon his position. Therefore, he also encouraged civilian powerhouse, such as PKI to be more active in politics to counterbalance the army's influence.

Although both powerhouses, PKI and the army, had pledged their allegiance to Soekarno and respected him as "*Pemimpin Besar Revolusi*," or the Great Leader of Revolution, in practice, they both were locked into unreconciled showdown. In such situation, Soekarno intended to create awareness toward the nation's mutual interest that could overcome any political distinction, which could threaten his Guided Democracy.

Other than its reasons of existence mentioned above, the Guided Democracy can be viewed in a more traditional way. His radical slogans and allegiance with PKI aside, Soekarno often acted out as a traditional King of Java instead of a modern national leader. It was in part due to the immense power given by the 1945 Constitution (prior to the amendments) to the president. The Constitution gave no fewer than fourteen rights to the President, but only as much as two or three to other high institutions. As a result, whoever became the president under the pre-amended 1945 Constitution would mostly transform into hegemonic and authoritarian figure as was Soekarno and, later, Soeharto.

Like a Javanese King, Soekarno appointed several ministers to administer the State's affairs (later he would appoint an absurd amount of 100 ministers) while the "Great Leader of Revolution" himself would only give general directions instead of personally engaging in the affairs. In securing his position, he adopted the ancient approach originated from the Sultan of Mataram's (Javanese Islam Sultanate of Mataram) of balancing two rivaling

groups to his advantage, which later would also be adopted by Soeharto in his administration.

The stability equilibrium during the Guided Democracy period was highly depended on the cooperation between Soekarno and the army. In previous occasions, as the two of the most powerful political powerhouses at that time, both sides had been able to replace the old political system despite not sharing similar interest.

The mutual-cooperation between Bung Karno and the army more or less was based on the understanding that each should not underestimate the other's capability. The army's nationwide military resources, which could always be mobilized in the shortest possible time, was a reality Soekarno had to accept. Meanwhile, the army had to acknowledge Soekarno's charisma as a president and the nation's leader who gave off authoritative power over the nation, without whom the nation could have existed in the first place. Instead of sharing their powers and resources for a mutual hegemony, both Soekarno and the army maintained their relationship and influence through stable conflict managements, marked by mutual-cooperation, political competition and tension playing of two well-matched rivals (Feith, 1963: 325).

Thus, the democracy's golden era in Indonesia as it had been during the parliamentary and liberal democracy deteriorated to oblivion. From that point on, the nation's political activities were more centered on the tug of war between Soekarno, PKI and the army. Another characteristic that distinguished the period of post-1955 general election to 1963 were the low, almost to the point of nonexistence, inter-parties competitions (Gaffar, 1988: 3). On the contrary, the inter-*aliran* conflicts remained, more obvious than ever in the political interaction in Indonesia, resulting in the stagnation of political development itself.

Chapter 3

1971 GENERAL ELECTION: THE DEFEAT OF PNI AND THE RESILIENCE OF NU

The Waning Influence of Political Parties

It is very unfortunate that the success implementation of 1955 general election ended up anti-climactically as a dusty record in distant past of Indonesia. No immediate election followed this first, most democratic and peaceful election in Indonesia. Instead, Indonesia entered a new political format as marked by the declaration of Presidential Decree, on July 5, 1959, a decision that ended the Constitutional Council and marked the reestablishment of the 1945 Constitution. The decree was the solution "to bury all too raucous political parties," just like Soekarno and the army had wanted. Thus, it also ended the Parliamentary and Liberal Democracy and opened a way to the Guided Democracy. Undeniably, Soekarno was violating the very principle of *trias politica* when he dissolved the Constitutional Council. His decree would stir a lot of political debates and arguing among constitution law experts in later years. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Presidential Decree was Soekarno's political monolith that displayed his determination to overcome any political abnormality of that time (*Kompas*, November 23, 2009).

In their efforts to strengthen their power, President Soekarno and army's top brasses, such as A.H. Nasution, Ahmad Yani and T.B. Simatupang intended to weaken the influence of their main rivals, the conflicts-laden political parties. Since the enforcement of the Martial Law in 1957, the army had had every possible access to improve its influence in the state administration. However, the supposedly non-party *Kabinet Karya* or Functional Cabinet under Prime Minister Ir. Djuanda was in fact still controlled by parties' people. It was not until one year later, after the PRRI/Permesta

insurgent had been crushed, that Soekarno and the military were finally able to remove political parties' institutional foundations of power.⁴⁰

In the period of July to November 1958, the National Council, formed by the joint initiatives of Soekarno and the army, was holding a series of meetings to discuss the basic stipulations needed for simplifying the party system, forming non-party National Front Organization and parliamentary groups consisting of functional groups' representatives (Rocamora, 1991: 184). The proposal caused constant uproar in the parliament, lasting from August 1958 until February 1959. A source described it as a showdown in which "the main contenders, who attack each other in complicated, intertwined relations, are Bung Karno and his loyal supporters in the National Council, the army, and the political parties represented in *Kabinet Karya*."

Even so, the military's role in the National Council was not too prominent. It would take some time later before Bung Karno and his allies were finally able to control the newly formed institution. For the army, the chance to play a bigger role came along with the intensifying campaign of West Irian's liberation. On February 10, 1958, Maj. Gen. A.H. Nasution who had been reinstated as the Army Chief-of-Staff formed the West Irian National Liberation Front which, unlike the National Council, consisted of military representatives predominantly.⁴¹

⁴⁰ In the speech he delivered on October 28, 1956, Soekarno presented his intention to dissolve political parties. Two days later, he conveyed yet another idea, a concept of a system known as the "Guided Democracy." Among other political parties, Masyumi was the one which vehemently opposed such system. While Murba and IPKI praised such idea, PKI, which was in dire need of security to ensure its survival, supported it to get Soekarno's sympathy although it did not want him to implement the dissolution of parties. PNI, NU and Catholic Party, which realized that to abolish parliamentary system would be too costly, restrained themselves from openly supporting or rejecting it. This era marked the end of post-war political revolution in Indonesia. However, other predicaments had already waited to be addressed. Concerning the Republic of Indonesia, the consensus of that era had already decided that Indonesia was not a federal state, Islamic state, communist state, or a state under occupation of other nation (Netherlands). However, some underlying predicaments should have been addressed more properly in those critical times. Knowing that even now, political elites are still facing the same problems, people would agree that Revolution alone is barely enough (Ricklefs: 2010, 469-490).

⁴¹ While the military were focusing on the liberation of Irian (Papua), negotiation it had held with the representatives of PRRI since August 1958 to February 1959 started to give positive result. At that time, the rebel troops were under serious shortage of ammunition and other provisions. In February 1959, some of the troops surrendered in North Sulawesi. Cornered, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the Prime Minister of PRRI then commanded his subordinates to

The army's roles in military and non-military area increased rapidly during the period of 1958-1959. To keep in level with political parties, most prominently PKI, the Ministry of Defense and Security under Nasution, initiated the formation of Coordinating Bodies or *Badan Kerjasama* (BKS) between military and civilian, such as Youth-Military BKS and Clerics-Military BKS. The nature of these coordinating bodies was similar to affiliate organizations of political parties. The coordinating bodies, especially the Youth-Military BKS, were the main supporter of West Irian National Liberation Front. Witnessing this, Soekarno sensed the army's increasing influence could become a threat to his position, so he subsequently attempted to curb Nasution's influence.

The National Front consisted of representatives of political parties, functional groups (non-party) and other individuals. At that time, there had been political rivalries between the army and the left wing parties, most prominently PKI, to achieve greater influence in national and regional level, while the President, who supposed to be in an arbitrary position, showed an unmistakable partial support for PKI instead (Suryadinata, 1992: 11-12).

Gradually, PKI was expanding its influence over the National Front while the army and Islamic groups was trying hard to contain that expansion. However, with Soekarno's recent penchant of going more left, PKI finally succeeded in shadowing the joint military-Islam influence in the National Front. Nevertheless, even with this fact, we cannot simply regard Soekarno as part of PKI. Until the day he died, Soekarno had never become a member of communist party, let alone a communist. If at certain point he seemed to favor PKI, it was more a part of his strategy in keeping the balance of power he shared with PKI and the army instead of representing his ideology.

surrender. Many troops heeded his call. The leaders of the insurgents, such as Colonel Malaudin Simbolon, Lt. Col. Zulkifli Lubis, Lt. Col. H.N.V. Sumual, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Natsir, and other leaders were sent back to Jakarta. Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, who at that time lived abroad, stayed there until 1967. Seeing how the event turned against them, rebel troops in Aceh; Darul Islam in West Java; and Kahar Muzakar's followers in Sulawesi followed suit. By 1960, no fewer than 100,000 rebels had surrendered to the army. Soekarno demanded the rebels to be treated severely. However, the army under Nasution's command only imposed house arrest to the leaders of the movements, such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara and Mohammad Natsir. Soekarno condemned such soft treatment and used it to attack Nasution out of national politics (Ricklefs : 2010, 558-559).

The contenders of the political game, namely Soekarno, the army and the political parties, save for PKI, were united in their desire to create new political institution that could guarantee a stable and better administration. On August 1959, three major parties PNI, NU and PKI officially announced their support for the Guided Democracy. By this time, both Masyumi and PSI had been a little more than political exiles. They never openly supported Guided Democracy and gradually were shoved away from the constellation of national politics.

The factional interests, partial understanding of the recent political stagnation, and the solution each had in mind on how to bring back the nation on the right track, deteriorated the relations between Bung Karno, the army and the rest of political parties even further. In the period of Guided Democracy, between 1959 until 1965, political structure in Indonesia is best described as “a triangle of political power structure” with the President at the apex of that triangle. The army whose political power was augmented by its nationwide resources and firepower, held the other angle whereas PKI, with its popularity among the grass roots and its disciplined organizational skill and ability to create new ideas and relevant issues, held the last angle (Gaffar, 1988: 29).

Indonesian Communist Party had many militant affiliate organizations, such as *Lembaga Kesenian Rakyat* (LEKRA), *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI), *Pemuda Rakyat*, *Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia* (BAPERKI), and *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia* (Gerwani), which progressively sought for people’s supports. In many regions, LEKRA routinely held art happenings by working together with local artists. The same went for Gerwani and *Pemuda Rakyat*, which actively held social events (*bakti sosial*) for local people. In similar display of militancy, BTI (Indonesia’s Farmers Front) was never reluctant to help petty farmers in regions in the early 1960s. Due to these active greets and meets by their affiliates, PKI’s popularity among the people increased. All of these programs made PKI the most progressive mass

party that had to be counted by the military in its efforts to gain more political power in Indonesia.⁴²

In understanding the era of Guided Democracy as mentioned above, we cannot put aside the role of other political entities such as NU, PNI, PSII, Perti, Parkindo, *Partai Katholik* and some others. For that reason, to divide the Guided Democracy period into period of 1959-1965 and the period of 1963-1965 is needed to be done. In the former, PKI began to infiltrate civilian bureaucrats and military, although not as strongly as PNI, NU and Masyumi had been. What distinguished PKI from other parties was its daring attitude to sound its demands during the Guided Democracy era, whereas PNI and NU were more accommodative to avoid unnecessary pressure from Soekarno and the army.

The period of 1959-1965 saw the decrease of political parties' influence in national politics in comparison to that of the President and the army. Supported by 1945 Constitution and 1957 Martial Law respectively, Soekarno and the army, in separate occasions, were able to contain most of the parties' activities. The exclusion of parties' representatives in the cabinet and their limitation in the parliament made it impossible for them to create major national decision. This period, as one once put it, was a period "without political parties power in national politics."

Out of three political parties still existed in the period of 1960-1966, PNI was the one with most advantages. Unlike NU, which still lacked of experienced cadres to be able to influence the bureaucrats, PNI had had firm foothold among the bureaucrats. PKI and its affiliates, meanwhile, had become more confident and aggressive in their actions. With the support of

⁴² Bung Karno formed the National Front when DN Aidit was holding the position of Chairman of PKI. At first, the communist party was strongly against such institution. But later, it saw an opportunity to use it as its political channel if not the main source of its influence. Although the Central Committee of the National Front predominantly consisted of anti-communist figures, namely Nasution, Chairul Saleh, Ruslan Abdulgani, Arudji Kartawinata, I.J. Kasimo, and Idham Chalid, PKI held control through other members such as its Chairman Aidit, Ali Sastro Amidjojo (PNI) and Soekarno as the Chairman of the National Front. Anwar Sanusi, a PKI's functionary (1963) was even appointed as the secretary general (Suryadinata, 1992 : 13). The programs of National Front pretty much resembled that of PKI. In many occasions, PKI even carried out its programs such as advocating petty farmers against wealthy property owners by hiding behind the National Front.

Soekarno, they suggested the idea of *Nasakom*, an acronym of *NASionalisme*, *Agama* and *KOMunisme*; a threefold blend of political concept intended to appease the major factions in Indonesia: the army, Islamic groups and the communists, and demanded the *nasakomisasi*, an enforcement of *nasakom* concept, to the military. Their influence in the National Front was also able to withstand the anti-PKI and anti-communist forces.

In their attempts to develop substitutes for political parties, Bung Karno and the army created social organizations consisting of civilian figures and accelerated the growth of functional groups. Soekarno also started to carry out his conservative ideas. On the anniversary of Indonesia Independence, August 17, 1959, for instance, he announced his political manifesto, in which he declared "for the sake of the continuation of the revolution we have to rekindle the spirit of revolution, social justice and the completion of national institutions and organizations."

The idea behind such manifesto was not entirely new. Sometimes before, Soekarno had presented similar idea related to Guided Democracy in the First Pancasila Seminar in Yogyakarta, in which he stated the importance of the Guided Democracy and on how Pancasila could be used as a legitimize source for it. Some of his presentations were as follows:

- (1) "...this seminar gives strong support to the idea of Guided Democracy, gives precious directions on the implementation of Guided Democracy..."
- (2) "...I do not propose a blind thing; I do not propose anything contrary to my conscience. I do not propose something, which in my opinion can harm the state and nation. What I am proposing is a matter that I believe is best for the country, for our struggle, and for our revolution..."

At the beginning of 1960s, Soekarno combined his political manifesto⁴³ concept with the 1945 Constitution, especially in relation to Indonesia's

⁴³ In the early 1960s, *Manopol Usdek* was Soekarno's widely used political slogan. It was the acronym and abbreviation of ***Manifesto Politik tentang UUD 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, dan Kepribadian Indonesia*** (Political Manifesto on 1945 Constitution, Indonesia's Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and the

Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and the Indonesia's Characteristics, widely known for its acronym, *Manipol-Usdek*. That way, Pancasila,⁴⁴ an authentic concept Soekarno coined on June 1, 1945, which is the Way of Life of the state and the nation, was officially reinstated to drive the Republic toward ideological conservatism (Somantri, 2006: 12-13).

In practical level, his conservatism thickened when he proposed to combine the ideological elements, namely nationalism, religion (Islam) and communism—or *NASAKOM* as aforementioned earlier—and wanted to make them as inseparable parts of Indonesia's Revolutionary thoughts. The *Nasakom* concept was symbolized by the existence of PNI, NU and PKI, with each party representing each ideology. It was also during this time that Soekarno represented Pancasila as the basis of Universal Charter of Human Welfare in his speech "To Build the World Anew" in front of the audience at the UN General Assembly.

Soekarno's centralist administration was further seen when he issued Presidential Regulation No. 3/1960 (*Perpres No 3/1960*) to dissolve the People's Representative Council (DPR) elected by the 1955 general election, soon after the said institution rejected Draft National Budget (RAPBN) he had proposed. Enraged, Soekarno dissolved the DPR. Then, by employing his Presidential Decree of July 5 1959, he single-handedly formed the DPR-GR (People's Representative Council-Mutual Cooperation) and MPR-S (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) by personally handpicked all their members.

The direct appointment, instead of election of DPR-GR/MPR-S members sparked some debates among intellectuals and other prominent figures because the 1945 Constitution itself did not regulate about the nature of the election of DPR/MPR. Similar practice happened later in the New Order era, in which Soeharto directly appointed 100 members of the DPR comprising 75

Indonesia's Characteristics). Because of its wide-ranged scope, Soekarno deemed it as the Broad Outline of State Policy (GBHN) the implementation of which the nation had to respect, maintain and obey.

⁴⁴ For better understanding toward the history of Pancasila and Pancasila ideology, see AMW Pranarka (1985); Ruslan Abdulgani (1963); CST Kansil (1977); Dardji Darmodihardjo (1978); Sukadji Ranuwihardja (1976), and the published works of Laboratorium Pancasila, IKIP, Malang (1975-1976).

military and 25 non-military figures. As President, Soeharto also appointed those who would occupy the 393-reserved seats in People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which were divided into 100 seats for Functional Groups representatives; 140 seats for Regional Representatives; and 153 seats for Golkar-affiliated ABRI (military). During Soeharto's tenure, governors, provincial military commanders and provincial police chiefs were made into *ex-officio* members of Regional Representatives (*Utusan Daerah*). The two political parties, PPP and PDI, meanwhile, did not have the luxury of reserved seats in the MPR and only received the equipoise of electoral votes they received in DPR. Indeed, substantively, there were no differences between the centralism practiced by Soekarno and that by Soeharto as far as the appointment of DPR/MPR members was concerned.

Surely, the consequence of such practice was the cooptation of the institution itself. Both MPR and DPR, which according to 1945 Constitution were the highest authority and equal to President in authority, respectively, were now merely the subordinates of the President. For Soeharto, this was part of his ploy to control the political parties. As expected, political parties' leaders then would indulge in shameful approval-winning attitudes toward him, in hope to get benefitting position in either institution. Just as Soekarno had abused this roughly unlimited power mandated by the constitution, so did Soeharto (Rocamora, 1991: 306). Meanwhile, after Soekarno had appointed the members of MPRS, the said institution granted him the title of president for the lifetime on the MPRS General Assembly in 1963. Similar phenomenon happened with Soeharto when the MPR appointed him as "*Bapak Pembangunan*" and *Jenderal Besar* (The Father of Development and The Great General). What Soekarno had done dumbfounded the political parties. As much as they despised such decision, they were unable to do much but to "fall in terrible rage and frustration."

Conflict Climaxing: G-30-S/PKI

Securely protected by Soekarno's approval, Indonesian Communist Party or PKI became bolder and more militant and exercised greater control

over national politics than ever before. With its *onderbouw* such as Baperki, BTI, LEKRA, Gerwani, CGMI and *Pemuda Rakyat* and their respective members, PKI claimed to have more than 29 Million members. Meanwhile, feeling extremely edgy for being ceaselessly nagged by the *nasakom*-ization issue, the military finally decided to refuse the concept for good (Suryadinata, 1992: 18). In response to the growing influence of PKI, some army generals reportedly were holding routine meetings to discuss the heated tension surrounding the national politics.

Soekarno's high profile and progressive foreign policies worked perfectly for the benefit of PKI. During those Cold War periods, Indonesia's foreign policies were gradually inclined to the Eastern Bloc. It is worth to note that at that time, PKI was the third largest communist organization after that of the People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, just as *Nahdlatul Ulama* is the biggest Islamic organization in the world. During this high-tension period, Soekarno launched an idea about a confrontation (*konfrontasi*) with the neighboring nation, Malaysia. The army halfheartedly accepted such idea, while both the Navy and the Air Force were obediently preparing for the mobilization. In the same period, an idea of creating the "Fifth Force" emerged. The plan was to arm the laborers and farmers with Chinese-made weaponries and then put them under PKI's command. The militia would be an addition to Indonesia's four armed forces, the army, the navy, air force and police corps, hence the name. Soekarno himself and the People's Republic of China allegedly endorsed such an idea.

Wide polarization emerged because of the race of influence between the pro-PKI groups and those who against it. The rivalries gravely affected the economy and the nation was on the brink of bankruptcy. Inflation rate was ridiculously high, reaching almost 650%, while the price of staple goods and other basic needs were soaring high. Foreign loan had reached 3 Billion USD, while unemployment, illiteracy and school dropouts' rates increased and remain unchecked. In order to buy staple goods, people had to endure exhausting queue, which could last for hours. Political and economical structure almost crumbled and on the top of it, the widely circulated rumors

that Soekarno had been gravely ill, threw the political situation graver and uncertain.

Under all of those confusion, PKI masterminded a coup d'état known as *Gerakan 30 September* (G-30-S) (Suryadinata, 1992: 18-19). In this bloody event, seven senior officers of the army were killed, namely General Ahmad Yani (Army Commander), Major General Soeprapto (Chief Deputy II), Major General M.T. Haryono (Chief Deputy III), Major General S. Parman (Head of Army Intel), Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan (Army Assistant Logistics), Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomihardjo (Army General Auditor) and Captain Pierre Tendean, the aide-de-camp of General A.H. Nasution. Nasution himself barely escaped the ambush, injuring his leg in the process, while his daughter Ade Irma Suryani Nasution died several days later of shot wounds she had received from the assault group. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the assault groups kidnapped the generals, killed several of them on the spot and a police officer in the process. None of the abducted saw another day in their life. The bodies of the fallen generals then dumped in an unused well in the area of Lubang Buaya, just around the Halim Perdana Kusuma airbase. Similar killing and kidnapping took place in Yogyakarta, in which Brigadier General Katamso, the Chief of Yogyakarta Military Command and his deputy Brigadier General Sugiyono were killed.

The bloody event of 1965 is a "mystery" that remains unsolved well until now. The questions surrounding the tragedy constantly surface, "Who was the real mastermind? Who were really responsible behind the incident?" and "How many were killed by the army and groups commanded by Kostrad and RPKAD under the command of Soeharto and Sarwo Edhie Wibowo⁴⁵ in

⁴⁵ In post-1965 Tragedy, for different reasons, three individuals stood out from the tumultuous situation, namely President Soekarno, Commander-in-Chief of Kopkamtib and Kostrad, Soeharto and Commander in Chief of RPKAD, Sarwo Edhie Wibowo. Following the bloody event, Soekarno was toppled from the presidency he had held for 21 years. Soeharto, who would reign for 32 years, succeeded him. During Soeharto's reign, Sarwo Edhie did not rise to national leadership. His son-in-law, General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, however, is currently serving as the President of Indonesia. He was elected as the President of the Republic of Indonesia in the period of 2004-2009 and was reelected to serve his second term of 2009-2014. In the history of Indonesian presidency, only Soekarno, Soeharto and Yudhoyono have ever held the position for more than 5 years. The rest, namely BJ Habibie (18 months), KH Abdurrahman Wahid (2 years) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (3 years) held

the purge that followed?" In an interview with one Jakarta's newspaper, Sarwo Eddhie told Permadi SH that, "roughly two million people were being cruelly and brutally murdered in the period of 1965-1966." Others have estimated that at least 600 thousand members of PKI, BTI, CGMI, *Pemuda Rakyat*, Baperki, dan Gerwani perished in those extrajudicial killings. The tragedy remains as the darkest time in the history of Indonesia with only a slightest chance of being unveiled.

The official New Order version of the event, known as "*Buku Putih*" by the State Secretary (1994), in agreement with Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh (1968), contends that "PKI conducted the bloody event of 1965 as a coup d'état by recruiting dissident army officers and pitted them against the army generals who intended to seize power." Another version mentions that "the bloodiest event in the course of Indonesia's political history, which ability to stir controversy is second to none even now, was an internal conflict within the army in which PKI was involved incidentally." This view is presented in what is known as "Cornell Paper," written by Benedict Richard O'Gorman Anderson and Ruth T. McVey (1971). The third view, presented by Harold Crouch (1999) in his book *Militer dan Politik Indonesia*, states "The coup d'état was a joint-force of PKI and dissident army officers, driven by different motives, to wipe out the Council of Generals (*Dewan Jenderal*)" (Somantri, 2006: 14; Suryadinata, 1992: 19-21).

Prior to the G-30-S movement, in early September, an issue had circulated that PKI had allegedly spread the rumor about certain "Council of Generals" (*Dewan Jenderal*) which intended to seize power during the anniversary of ABRI on October 5, 1965. Interestingly, the structure of cabinet of the *Dewan Jenderal*, should they have been able to seize power,

the position for less than 5 years. Javanese mysticism or *kejawen* teaches that the "power to rule" (Javanese: *wahyu keprabon*) always resides in every true ruler. Its absence means short tenure, riot and other shortcomings for the person in discussion. It is widely believed that both Soekarno and Soeharto had held this "power," hence their long reign. But such power is also believed to be dynamic, independent and temporal, which explains the abrupt ends of both presidents. For Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, however, his share of power was now "inherited" by Yudhoyono, his son-in-law. This is but Javanese concept of authority as an embodiment of divine will. Although such belief could easily be ridiculed as nonsense, it is widely believed among Indonesians, especially the Javanese.

mentioned in the “Buku Putih” only differed slightly from what Lt. Col. Untung and Njono, the then Head of PKI Central Committee, had stated. Both maintained that Hadisubeno, Roeslan Abdulgani and Brig. Gen. Sukendro would hold the positions of Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Foreign Trade, respectively. Notwithstanding with the abundant theories and hypothetical works toward the subject, the whole affair of *Dewan Jenderal* is still pretty much obscured until today. Not even those who have been involved are able to provide satisfactory explanation for the event to transpire.

Rumors concerning Soekarno’s failing health had also been widely circulated since August 1965 and somehow even made its way to the public. The source was unknown although there was strong allegation that the People’s Republic of China’s team of doctors assigned to tend to his health deemed responsible for it. One of CIA agent’s cable, coded TDCS-314/11665-65, mentioned, “It has been estimated that Soekarno could’ve passed away if he was not taken care of intensively,” which supposedly quoted a close confidant of Soekarno concerning the president’s chronic kidneys problem.

Two weeks later, mysterious pamphlets mentioning the details of regular meetings of PKI’s Central Committee began circulating. The content of the pamphlets, which mentioned PKI’s plan to seize power in case Soekarno passed away in the near time, worried the army, especially because it also contained a death list, a list of the army’s generals that needed to be killed in the event of power seizure. Interestingly, at the same time, PKI also received similar pamphlets about the detailed plan of *Dewan Jenderal* to seize power and their subsequent plan to execute prominent PKI’s leaders. The prolonged political contests between both sides finally entered the phase of an unnerving, tense, psychological war.

Two weeks prior to G-30-S/PKI, the then US Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green had allegedly ordered CIA to intensify their black campaign against Soekarno. The British MI6 was reportedly doing just that by repeatedly launched disinformation campaigns. Simultaneously, a Malaysian newspaper reported that a ship hauling weaponries from the People’s

Republic of China for PKI had sailed from Hong Kong to Jakarta (Ralph McGehee; *The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA*). That particular Malaysian newspaper was quoting from a Bangkok-based newspaper, which in turn got their information from another source in Hong Kong.

McGehee, a former CIA agent, maintains that there was a deliberate disinformation attempts including, but not limited to, document forgeries, which can explain the origin of the pamphlets mentioned earlier. With cunning efforts, CIA succeeded in creating higher tension in an already grave situation to the point where so small a spark could trigger so massive a bloodbath as it was turned out to be.

The peak of what would transpire as the bloodiest conflict in Indonesian history started when Lt. Col. Untung, a former aide-de-camp of Soeharto back in Diponegoro Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer or Kodam), handed out the list of the alleged members of *Dewan Jenderal* to Soekarno. What happened right after that is still subject to dispute even now. Certain versions have it that Syam Kamaruzaman initiated the murder of the generals. This Sjam Kamaruzaman was an obscure person to boot. He was once reported as a former member of Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) who had had close relationship with Soeharto in Semarang. He was also said to be a spy of Kodam Jaya (Central Regional Military Command) sent to infiltrate PKI. During his trial, he confided to his interrogator that he had been appointed by PKI Chairman, D.N. Aidit to form and lead the Special Bureau (*Biro Khusus*) with sole mission to infiltrate the army.

Interestingly, no members of PKI's Politburo and Central Committee other than Aidit himself knew about the existence of such bureau. Interesting still, such thing as a secret bureau was very unlikely to exist considering PKI's nature as a Marxism-based organization. Aidit himself was executed by the army a day after an assault team had captured him in his hiding place in Boyolali, Central Java. The death of Aidit made it impossible to prove the existence of the alleged Special Bureau headed by Sjam Kamaruzaman. Peter Dale Scott, meanwhile, maintains that there were too many things that did not add up in the alleged coup d'état of September 30, 1965. One of which

was that the assault groups consisted of two-third of a brigade plus one company and one platoon, had been personally inspected by Maj. Gen. Soeharto the day before. Not only that, part of the rebel forces that would occupy the Presidential Palace, the elite troops of Battalion Raider 454 Diponegoro and Battalion Raider 530 Brawijaya, were dispatched to Jakarta to participate in the Military Anniversary on October 5, 1965 on the order of Soeharto, via radiogram. Both elite troops allegedly had routinely received military training from the US since 1962.

On October 1, 1965 afternoon, broadcasted from national radio broadcast (RRI), Lt. Col. Untung announced that *Dewan Jenderal* had planned to mount a coup against Bung Karno's administration and that President Soekarno was save under the protection of the Revolutionary Council. Interestingly, by the time the announcement aired, the person in discussion had been in Halim Perdana Kusuma airbase all along. Untung also announced the structure of the so-called Revolutionary Council but mentioned neither about Soekarno nor about his involvement in the bloody coup.

The troops that occupied the RRI or those surrounded the Presidential Palace interestingly did not take measure to occupy the Army Strategic Reserve Command or Kostrad Headquarter, which situated just across the square of where they were stationed. Kostrad was Soeharto's headquarter, from which he coordinated the counter strategy against the September 30 Movement. Similar to PKI's Special Bureau, the real involvement of Lt. Col. Untung was obscured following his execution in Central Java, shortly after he had been captured during his attempt to flight. Untung and Aidit's deaths were simply a beginning of the systematic, massive bloodletting led by RPKAD, army's elite force, in purging the communists.

In 1965, situation in Jakarta was not in any way certain since the G-30-S/PKI. However, Norman Reedway, an MI6 expert on psywar stationed in Singapore confided that during this period, he had been working with CIA in disinformation campaign that hinted PKI's involvement in the coup. In such disinformation broadcasted through BBC (RRI was closed during this period),

the People's Republic of China was portrayed as the helping hand that helped and supported PKI in the bloody event.

In the events that followed, the then President of The United States of America, Lyndon B. Johnson sent directives to the US Embassy in Jakarta stating "this is the time of victory for the army to take action, because they are very crucial to Soekarno's power. If the momentum is allowed to pass without swift and precise measures, the opposition can retaliate with greater resistance. But if the army can win this, President Soekarno will never be able to hold any power whatsoever." The United States held greatest interest to stall the growth of communism all over the world, especially in relation to the Cold War and the ongoing Western versus Eastern Bloc power contest. Although the anti-communist purge that followed the 30 September Movement was single-handedly carried out by the army, it was clearly taken with the support and blessing of the United States. The US roles were limited to intelligences and minor aids, which did not cost them too much, for which the White House saw the purge as great achievement of Indonesian Army, especially since PKI was the third largest communist organization in the world and, therefore, part of Communism the Western Bloc (US, Canada and Western Europe) viewed as evil.

Their support was further shown when they approved to send weapon supplies Soeharto had asked through the US Embassy in Jakarta to arm the Muslim militias during the purge in Central Java and East Java regions. United States Government sent the weaponries disguised as medicine supplies. Not only that, as reported by Kathy Kadane, United States Government, through US Embassy in Jakarta, had been responsible in compiling "comprehensive lists of Communist operatives, from top echelons down to village cadres" (no fewer than 5000 members) which they passed to Soeharto through the mediation of Adam Malik.

Colonel Latief, in his *pledooi* (self-defense plea) mentioned about his close relationship with Maj. Gen. Soeharto and confided that he had already informed Soeharto twice that a coup was going to take place. Soeharto did not heed the information since he was preoccupied by the condition of his

son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, who was hospitalized in the Gatot Subroto Hospital after he had spilled some hot soup on himself. Latief, the alleged second-in-command after Untung in the failed coup, further concluded, "It is self-evident that the Council of Generals is truly exists. As of this moment they have succeeded in seizing power from Soekarno, The President of the Republic of Indonesia."

Unfortunately, the evidences that have emerged to help shedding a light on what happened in Indonesia 45 years ago could not have helped 700,000 to a million people that were murdered simply because they were alleged members and sympathizers of PKI. None of the evidences could revive those who were murdered in cold blood, without trial. The re-disclosure attempts on the 1965 tragedy could not have recovered the loss and suffering of almost 2 million people and their subsequent families, who were captured, tortured and suffered humiliation from the army regime because of their "involvement" in G-30-S/PKI. Many of them confessed that they did not get just trials for the alleged crime imposed on them, and some other could not even grasp to what sin they owed such brutal treatments. They were all victims of sophisticated and well-orchestrated political conflicts conducted in Indonesia, especially in Jakarta and other cities in Java Island. As such, it has been the bottom-most historical point in Indonesia which no one dares to disclose well until now, when most of the historical witnesses are all but dead.

Of course, other questions have arisen. Was it logical that Bung Karno, the Proclamator and the Great Revolutionary Leader, indeed had anything to do with the murders of the six generals and one senior officer, who were not only well-known to be his supporters but also being disliked by Soeharto who was an anti-Soekarno himself? Did it make sense that Soekarno would have launched a coup against his own administration through such cunning manipulation, only to see it backfired against himself? Again, these questions remain unanswered. Judging from all the ideological elements involved in the G-30-S/PKI and its aftermath, the incident was another form of conflict, the most obscure and bloodiest has ever been between political *aliran*. It was a culmination of what had already taken place since the Parliamentary

Democracy Era (1946-1956) and continued to the Guided Democracy Era (1959-1965), pitting the *abangan* against *santri*, *santri* against nationalists and Islam versus communism (Suryadinata, 1992: 32).

After the bloody event in 1965, the military launched extensive campaigns to purge communism down to its roots. It was also the beginning of anti-Soekarno and anti-PKI movements using the popular catchphrase of "*bahaya laten PKI*" or latent danger of PKI. The army made use of the hysteria-possessed elements of society to help them exterminating the PKI and its elements. As admitted by KH Abdurachman Wahid, *Nahdlatul Ulama* through its affiliate Ansor Lines (*Barisan Ansor*) was involved in the massacre of hundred thousands of communists in East Java during the purge. He made this statement in 2001 as the President of the Republic of Indonesia, on which he officially apologized to the victims. The bloodletting aftermath of G-30-S/PKI left hundreds of thousands to millions people lost their parents, brothers and families. Nevertheless, even these did not stop Soeharto from pestering Soekarno's administration, although he too was a minister in Soekarno's Development Cabinet I. It was easy for General Soeharto as the Commander-in-Chief of both Kostrad and Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order or Kopkamtib to arrange street demonstrations to be held by undergraduates and students. The protesters demanded the dissolution of PKI, price lowering and the dissolution of 100 ministers' cabinet. Those demands were known as Tritura (Three People's Demands), a legacy of the under-graduates students of class 1966.

The pestering reached its climax on March 11, 1966, when unidentified troops, disguised by the demonstration, surrounded the Merdeka Palace, where the Dwikora Cabinet held a meeting. The Chief of Presidential Guard Brigadier General Sabur reported the situation to Brig. Gen Amir Machmud and Chairul Saleh who in turn reported to Soekarno.

Later that day, three senior army officers, namely Brig. Gen. M. Jusuf, Maj. Gen Basuki Rachmat and Brig. Gen. Amir Machmud visited Soekarno in Istana Bogor where he stayed with his wife, Hartini, to deliver a message from Soeharto. The message implied that Soeharto had asked for the

necessary authority to restore national order. If this were granted, he would use it to improve the situation that was developing toward civil war. Toward his request, Soekarno signed the order known as *Supersemar*, an abbreviation of *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* (Order of March the Eleventh) which gave Lt. Gen. Suharto the authority to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to restore order to the chaotic situation.

After Soeharto had received the order (the real copy of which intriguingly has disappeared ever since) on the next day on March 12, 1966, he worked swiftly by first disbanding PKI and all its affiliated organizations. The rest is history. The birth of the New Order began in a seminar held by Indonesia University (UI) in May 1966 entitled “New Trace” and the Army II Seminar held in Indonesian Army Staff and Command College (Seskoad) in Bandung the same year. Soeharto would lead the New Order for the next 32 years (until he resigned on May 21, 1998). Bung Karno, meanwhile, was allegedly willing to cede his power to Soeharto because he did not want more horizontal wars (*perang saudara*) happened between his own people. Ironically, Soekarno’s willingness to cede his power was later imitated by Soeharto, when the latter, on the pressure of reformation (*reformasi*) spirit had to step down from his presidency. Like Soekarno in the late 1960s, he too did not want the people to partake in violent conflicts against each other following the political and economical turmoil in May 1998.

Initial Determination of the New Order

Golongan Karya (Golkar) or Functional Groups, at first was called Joint-Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar) and formed by Indonesia Military (ABRI) on October 20, 1964, in order to stall PKI’s expansion within the National Front. Initially, it consisted of 61 non-party affiliated individuals. In its first National Consensus (Munas) the Sekber Golkar was able to establish a program and ratified its Articles of Association/Bylaw (AD/ART). In 1969, under the regulation of SK DPP Sekber No. 107/1969, Golkar was divided into seven Core Organizational Groups (KINO) namely Union of Multifunctional Mutual Assistance Organizations (Kosgoro), the Indonesian

Entrepreneur Workers Organization Centre (Soksi), the Mutual Assistance Families Society (MKGR), the Profession (Profesi), the Defense and Security NGOs (Ormas Hankam), the Enforcers of the Mandate of the Indonesian People (Gakari), and the Development Movement (*Gerakan Pembangunan*). Prior to 1971 general election, with the supports of these KINOs, Golkar emerged as a party using the banyan tree (*pohon beringin*) insignia.

During the transitional period following the 1965 Tragedy, political power was practically at the hands of the New Order, dominated by the army and technocrats under Soeharto. The call for development in all areas, especially in the economy sector became the “new ideology” endorsed by military and civilians officials as represented in popular catchphrase of that time, “Politic no, Development yes.” It showed a shift of orientation in a society that previously had endorsed politic into an economic-minded society. This surely gave a new impression toward the New Order. Its emphasis on the importance of national economy development as its initial objective gave them distinct nature acting as the main instrument that separated it from the previous order (administration) and its policies. It was in this context that Golkar purported itself as the embodiment of development and, therefore, became the main supporter of the New Order. Along with Golkar, other components, such as military, civilian bureaucrats, mass organizations, entrepreneurs and traditional groups also put their allegiance to the New Order. With all those supports, it was no surprise to see Soeharto and his New Order managed to stay in power for more than three decades.

On the low side, economic development demanded a stable political situation, therefore systematic gag upon political parties and other form of depoliticizations were carried out inexorably. New Order formed the Development Trilogy as guidance to carry out their policy, which focused on the actualization of stable political situation, economic growth and fair distribution of development results. The regime could not afford anything that could risk such implementations. After all, economy was in pathetic condition at that time. The inflation that reached 650%, high prices of staple goods, high unemployment, poverty and uneducated rates, the story of which

dominated those days' headlines, needed to be addressed immediately. Worse yet, Indonesia was still isolated from the international economy because of the *berdikari* (self-sufficiency) economical program endorsed by Soekarno's administration. Therefore, to achieve a more stable politic situation that would enable economic growth, New Order prioritized the depoliticization programs to take place with the support of the military.

The depoliticization itself was meant to create order in the society so that the regime could carry out the First Five Year Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun I-Repelita I*) immediately. In the depoliticization process, the Indonesian Armed Forces or ABRI utilized its components such as *Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (Kopkamtib), Intelligent Coordinating Body or *Badan Koordinasi Intelejen* (Bakin), Special Operation or *Operasi Khusus* (Opsus), ABRI Functionality or *Kekaryaan ABRI* which transformed into Socio-Political Department of ABRI or *Sosial Politik ABRI*, Regional Military Command or *Komando Daerah Militer* (Kodam), Military Area Command or *Komando Resimen Militer* (Korem), District Military Command or *Komando Distrik Militer* (Kodim), and Sub-district Military Command or *Komando Rayon Militer* (Koramil), to Noncommissioned Officers for Village Control or *Badan Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa* (Babinsa) along with other related institutions, including Golkar. The New Order regime was really in high spirit to improve the economic development and people's life quality of a nation that was in a "wreck" condition due to economical and social neglects of the previous administration.

Faced with such unhealthy and deteriorating economy, Soeharto's administration decided to put economic development over other national managements. These prioritized developments would in turn greatly influence people's social life and the perspective of national politics, including the rights and obligations therein. The question of why such rapid development in economy did not immediately followed by meaningful political change was a dilemmatic question that would be answered after Soeharto had stepped down (*lengser keprabon*) from his presidency on May 21, 1998.

Aside from tending the national economic problems, the administration implemented some restructuring policies to tame political parties. Harold Crouch (1986) describes, "The emergence of the army in such dominant position in politics is gladly received by civil politicians, especially Golkar, while the majority of others have seen it as inevitable reality." Many civil politicians hoped that the army's involvement in politics could guarantee a more conducive, democratic and, most importantly, indiscriminative treatment against them (civil politicians), especially in relation with the participation in the newly formed administration. However, when the New Order was finally become well-established, civil politicians' role within and beyond political parties were still pretty much marginalized. The role of politics in the government was also abandoned due to the centralism of authority advocated by Soeharto and his inner power circle. Meanwhile, the internal conflicts resulting from this centralism of power that emerged within political parties after their fusion in 1973 will be addressed in another chapter.

After 1965, military-affiliated political party was barely survived. The one that remained was IPKI, formed by Nasution back in the Parliamentary Democracy era. Other survivors included PNI, NU, PSII, Perti, *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi), Parkindo, *Partai Katolik* and Murba.

In the transitional period, military started to make contact with the scholars and former PSI activists. Military's negative view toward political parties were interestingly similar with Soekarno had had back in 1950s. Keeping in level with the existing parties, Soeharto intended to develop an independent group headed by an anti-Soekarno and anti-PKI scholar into a political party. However, Soeharto later abandoned this idea and decided to stick his option on Sekber-Golkar which had existed since 1964. While he was preparing to form a political group to support his administration, General Soeharto finally put his choice on Sekber-Golkar as his main political vessel (Suryadinata, 1992: 28). On his directive speech addressed to Sekber Golkar as the Head of Presidium Cabinet, a position he was holding since July 30, 1966, Soeharto wished Sekber-Golkar to have a clear sense of mission.

On September 5, 1966, as Defense Minister, Soeharto gave order to ABRI's Chiefs of Staff to begin facilitating the development of Sekber-Golkar and all its activities from the central down to regional level. The revitalization of Sekber-Golkar began ever since, and this banyan tree-bearing organization was officially become his and his followers' political machine and a tough adversary of the remaining political parties. Many organizations joined hand with Golkar. The numbers of its affiliate organizations grew from 64 in 1965 into 128 in 1966, and increased yet again into 262 organizations before the 1971 general election. To political parties, it appeared that military and scholars were no longer their sole enemies, and "worse yet for them, to legitimize the birth of the New Order, Soeharto's administration has vowed its intention to make Sekber-Golkar as the victor of the 1971 general election."

The Defeat of PNI and the Resilience of NU

At the end of 1966, Soeharto, with Brig. Gen. Ali Moertopo, Maj. Gen. Soedjono Humardhani, Maj. Gen. Amir Machmud, and Maj. Gen. Soekawati and other top brass army officers were secretly consolidating their ranks in anticipation to what they thought was going their way, namely open conflict with Soekarno's supporters. If this was going to happen, Soeharto needed to consolidate his position with the rest of the Military. The order to sweep and arrest the allegedly leftist officers in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police Force was not politically sufficient, although such measure was still in force. Massive sweeping as such was also conducted among civil bureaucrats and government institutions. The government issued the much-dreaded official category of "politically unclean" (*tidak bersih lingkungan*) to be immediately imposed on those who happened to be relatives of communists in general and those who were involved in G-30-S/PKI in particular. Because none of the above measures deemed sufficient, it was then decided that both military and civil bureaucrats needed to be indoctrinated with principles important to the New Order (Swantoro, FS: 1996: 65).

The decision would lead to the prototype of political education later known as Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (P-4) and

Litsus, Penelitian Khusus, a fit and proper test or a screening process government officials or legislative candidates needed to undertake. The army officers, especially, were indoctrinated to the point where they were encouraged to surpass the army's role outlined in the Nasution's 1958 "Middle Way" concept, namely to be the decisive power in shaping the nation and to be politically adept in the Dual Roles of Military (*Dwifungsi* ABRI) and New Order's politics.⁴⁶

In 1967, after he had been appointed the Acting President in People's Consultative Assembly Special Session, Soeharto announced, "Election shall be held." His announcement triggered long discussions. Therefore, way before the scheduled election took place, some prominent figures in politics and the class of 1966 undergraduates accompanied by Ali Moertopo held a meeting with Soeharto. This meeting would lead to an agreement called the National Consensus.

The Consensus was a political agreement formed to implement democratic practice based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution as pure and consequent as it supposed to be. The background of the Consensus was none other than the situation all had experienced in 1945-1965, during the Parliamentary Democracy and Guided Democracy era, in which Pancasila and 1945 Constitution were misconstrued and misused. It was also motivated by the desire to build a political life based on Pancasila as an ideology (Harry Tjan Silalahi, 1990: 1-2). The Consensus was hoped to be able to create a better national politic life, and democratic practice consistent to Pancasila and 1945 Constitution.

One of the main items of the Consensus stipulated what democratic practices to be used in formulating the Law as a foundation of the election initially planned to be held in 1968. Due to unpreparedness, the general

⁴⁶ This explained why on the formulation of Broad Outlines of State Policy (*Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara* or GBHN) it was mentioned, "Socio-political power of political parties and Golkar is the nation's potential and effective power. Meanwhile, ABRI as defense and security and socio-political (*Dwifungsi*) institution is developed from the people, and together (with the people) it will uphold and make the best use of the Independence of the nation and the state." Such regulation simply put ABRI above all institutions, including political parties and Golkar, and at the same time under the control of Soeharto.

election was postponed to 1969, and again to 1971. Some of the items of the Consensus were as follows: (1) Pancasila and 1945 Constitution are deemed to be unchangeable; (2) the Election shall make New Order as the victor; (3) Indonesian Military members are not allowed to vote but will be appointed as representatives in DPR and MPR as many as 75 members; (4) the appointment of non-military Golkar representatives as many as 25 members; (6) the appointment of functional groups and regional representatives in MPR; (7) the amount of DPR members are 460 members, 360 of whom are elected by the election, while 100 others are appointed; (8) the election system shall be simple proportional representation system; (9) the system of votes is list system (*lijsten stelsel*); and (10) the electoral areas are provincial-based.

The purpose of the Consensus was none other than to defend and uphold the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution as purely and consequently. The procedure of which was referred in the provision of Article 37 of 1945 Constitution in which to amend the Constitution, two-thirds of MPR members had to be present and the decision had to be supported by two-thirds of the members in attendance. Clearly, Soeharto intended to win his New Order's first general election by any means.

The Consensus then was rendered into Law No. 16/1969 about the structure and membership of MPR, DPR and DPRD (UU Susdik). This would mean that even before the Election took place, Soeharto's administration had already had significant support in the MPR with 75 seats (Military), 25 seats (non-military Golkar), 100 seats of Group Delegates, and 146 seats of Regional Representatives, equal to 346 seats in total. The available seats in the DPR were 360 seats (460 total seats minus 100 appointed seats). Therefore, from the total 920 seats in MPR, unreserved seats available for political parties were 214 seats, which would be allotted based on electoral votes received by each party. This number was further subtracted by the allocation of appointed members of the Military in MPR, in which it was granted a half of their appointed members in MPR (38 seats). Therefore, seats available for political parties participated in the election were only 176 seats.

Such stipulation was made specifically to protect Pancasila and 1945 Constitution from being amended. The two-thirds requirement of MPR members to amend the constitution, as stated earlier, was equal to approximately 612 seats. With the Soeharto's regime already had 346 seats in its tally as mentioned above, they would need another 272 seats to secure the two-thirds in the MPR. If this numbers were rendered into DPR seats and the projected votes received in 1971 general election, Soeharto's government through Golkar would have to win 182 seats in DPR. The question then was whether Golkar could win the 1971 general election or not. Even to the members of Sekber-Golkar and prominent figures in the government, it was a big question. The government finally scheduled the general election to be held on July 5, 1971. The leaders of other political parties were confident that their respective parties would win this election because of their experience back in 1955 general election. This confidence came from two facts. First, military personnel were not allowed to vote and only given 75 seats in the MPR and, second, unlike them, Golkar had never participated in general election.

Initially, both the government and military elites were not so optimistic about the outcome of the election. The same went for Golkar luminaries such as Maj.Gen. Soekawati, Maj.Gen. Amir Moertono, Brig.Gen. Ali Moertopo, Maj.Gen. Soedjono Humardhani, Maj.Gen. Amir Machmud and prominent civilians such as Rachman Tolleng, Drs. Murdopo, Drs. Sumiskum et al. They even predicted Golkar would only end up within the big three, instead of winning the election. It was in response to this that measures were made to ensure Golkar's victory. The National Consensus therefore, was a political format of an extreme importance for Soeharto and Golkar.

When the 1967 MPRS Special Session appointed Soeharto as the Acting President succeeding Soekarno, he did not immediately plan to hold an election to legitimize his position during the transition period. In the same occasion, he even went as far as postponed the planned election, which according to MPRS Regulation XI of 1966 should have been held in 1968, to 1971. Soeharto also preserved the MPRS and DPR-GR formed by Soekarno

during his tenure as Acting President, although not before he had dismissed members with strong affiliation to the Old Order, especially the communist party.

The second general election in the history of Indonesia finally was held on July 5, 1971, four full years into Soeharto's presidency. The distinct nature between the first and second election was that government officials were expected to be impartial toward the parties. Back in 1955, government officials, including the Prime Minister and ministers members of political parties were allowed to formally participate in the election to represent their respective parties. However, in practice, it was proven otherwise. Approaching the 1971 general election, all government officials acted partially and biased by showing their sole support for Golkar. In other words, the government was actively responsible in conducting manipulation that benefitted Golkar, most evidently was when they put an obligation to all civil servants to vote for Golkar. Prior to the election, simulations held by government institutions in various regions from central to district residencies also being staged for the benefit of Golkar. These all were conducted to smooth Golkar's ascension as Soeharto's political vessel.

The seats distribution method in 1971 general election was different from the 1955 general election. In 1971, the method was based on Law No.15/1969 which stipulated that all seats were divided out in every electoral district. This method effectively reduced the amount of seats a party could have won compared to the combination method used in 1955 general election. However, this method also caused too many votes gone to waste. For the first time, *stembusakkoord* was introduced in this election. It is an election agreement conducted by two parties or more, in which they agree to cede its leftover votes to other parties with the most leftover votes.

The apportionment in 1971 general election was conducted in three stages. However, if a party intended to enter a *stembusakkoord* with other party, it needed to do so before it submitted the list of candidates. In the electoral area where there were no parties made such agreement, apportionment only conducted in two steps.

First, the votes received by each party was divided by divisor number differed for each electoral area, for instance, 400,000 votes per one DPR seat. Parties with *stembusakkoord* whichever votes leftover was lesser ceded those to the other party, the amount of which then was divided by the same divisor. In the next step, any remaining seats then were distributed to the party with most leftover without having to be divided by the divisor. In electoral area where no such agreement was made, after the first step, any remaining seats were distributed directly to a party with most votes leftover.

However, the apportionment of seats conducted in 1971 general election caused discrepancies between the actual votes received by a party in national level with the amount of seats it received in the DPR. What happened to PNI was a clear example. Nationally, PNI had received more votes than Parmusi, but the seats PNI received in DPR were less than that of Parmusi. By and large, long before it took place, New Order's first election had been set to be won by Golkar. It was the first manipulative election held by New Order and surely not the last. It also marked the beginning of Golkar's transformation into a hegemonic party.

Table 5: Seats Won by Political Parties Participated in 1971 General Election

No.	Parties	Votes	%	Seats
1.	Golkar	34,348,673	62.80	227
2.	NU	10,213,650	18.67	58
3.	Parmusi	2,930,746	5.36	24
4.	PNI	3,793,266	6.94	20
5.	PSII	1,308,237	2.39	10
6.	Parkindo	733,359	1.34	7
7.	Katholik	603,740	1.10	3
8.	Perti	381,309	0.70	2
9.	IPKI	338,403	0.62	-
10.	Murba	48,126	0.09	-
Total		54,699,509	100.00	351

Source: *Kompas*, August 9, 1971: Ali Moertopo (1974: 69). In 1971 election, ABRI received 75 allotted seats, Golkar non-ABRI 25 allotted seats. Population 114,190,163 people, 58,179,245 registered voters; 54,700,126 valid voters (94.02 %); 3,479,119 people did not vote (5.98 %); 351 DPR seats.

Soeharto's administration did not immediately inaugurate the People's Representative Council and People's Consultative Assembly elected by the election. The MPR Special Session was not even held until 1973. The long time gap turned out to be a contingency plan of the New Order in anticipation if Golkar did not win the election, which might as well be another ploy to lengthen its power.

The success key for Golkar's victory in 1971 general election was its predominant control over civilian bureaucrats and military personnel. Such approach served two things. First, it hinted the political allegiance of all government officials and civil servants beforehand. Second, the mono-loyalty doctrine imposed on government officials and civil servants toward the government only served to detach civil politicians from its political parties' roots (Gaffar, 1988: 69). Its victory in 1971 marked Golkar's consecutive winnings in all elections held by New Order between 1971 and 1997, which were achieved with manipulations and deceits.

There was another thing that led to Golkar's success in winning people's support, and that was its image as development agent (Arief Budiman, *Kompas*, July 21, 1971). At that time, Soeharto's administration relentlessly emphasized the importance of national stability to avoid tumultuous conditions as had happened during the Parliamentary and Guided Democracy era. The stability in turn was utilized as a foundation upon which economic development was going to be built. Political dominance in Soekarno's era was about to be replaced by economic development. Employing this strategy, Golkar was able to secure massive wins in big cities and other developed regions, as well as attracting educated people. Moreover, the development issue Golkar was campaigning proved to be too difficult a challenge to keep up with by the remaining political parties e.g. PNI, NU, Parmusi, PSII, Parkindo and *Partai Katholik*.

On top of it, what happened in 1965 was still fresh in people's memory. They knew exactly what the government, through the hand of military, had done to those who were involved in G-30-S/PKI. Golkar, which was identical with the government, posed a stance that could not have been ignored. It gave people no option other than to vote for it. Government officials and common civilians all around the country literary rushed to the polling places to vote for Golkar. Rumor started circulating that whoever did not vote for Golkar was against the government and those who against the government were clearly communists. Since people knew how the military had treated communists and PKI members, this kind of campaign was effective to frighten them off to vote for Golkar. No wonder, Golkar was able to garner 62.80% votes in the 1971 general election.

What happened to PNI, meanwhile, was best-described as a downfall of political party. Once the ruling party and the victor of 1955 general election, PNI had to endure shameful defeat in 1971 general election. Its waning influence was further weakened ever since Soekarno had been stripped down from his position (1966). The PNI did not even have enough perseverance to be able to withstand the new political climate. In the wake of 1971 general election's result, PNI faced a dilemma whether to take the role as opposition or to move toward the center of power and assume new political stance.

The dilemma was resolved, for better or worse, in the PNI IX Congress, held in Semarang in 1970. In his speech at the opening ceremony, Brigadier General Ali Moertopo conveyed Soeharto's message, "The alignment of political parties into ideology and *aliran* is not achievable nor allowed anymore. Such alignment as was conducted in *Nasakom* era will only lead to inter-ideology conflicts that will harm the people. After all, any ideological issue in fact had been resolved since 1945."

Soeharto's message implied that his administration did not support PNI's intention to become opposition party but instead expected it to be a pro-government party. Its chairperson candidate, Hadisubeno, who maintained pro-government stance, finally received the government's blessing

and succeeded in being elected as PNI's Chairman. His rival candidate, Hardi SH, who insisted to make PNI an opposition party, had to suffer defeat despite vast supports he received from the majority of regional representatives. Due to the alleged covert operation by Ali Moertopo and his infamous *Opsus*, Hadisubeno who was only supported by three regional representatives, namely Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java, succeeded in defeating Hardi SH in the race for Chairmanship.

The story became part of PNI's defeat in 1971. Due to government's intervention in its Congress, PNI under Hadisubeno was humbled; it became soft toward the government. He was known to have good relation with Soeharto. When the latter had served as Diponegoro Territorial Commander-in-Chief (Pangdam Diponegoro), Hadisubeno had been the Governor of Central Java. Hadisubeno's mission to lay a new foundation for the party was cut-off tragically (*Kompas*, July 21, 1971). He fell ill and died before the election took place. Was it the death of Hadisubeno or something else entirely that led PNI to its defeat, one might ask. The answer was simple. The PNI simply did not have both funds and masses needed to counter the rapid growth of Golkar as the new political power in the nation.

Meanwhile, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), the biggest Islamic party at that time, took a more critical position toward Soeharto's administration. It was a party that able to withstand the barrage of New Order's early years, due in part of the role of its most prominent figures at that time, namely Subchan ZE, Jusuf Hasjim, Achmad Sjaichu, Chalid Mawardi, Chalid Ali, Mahbub Djunaedi, Imron Rosadi, Zainuddin Sukri, H. Moh. Munasi, and Idham Chalid. *Nahdlatul Ulama* proved that a party's stance toward the government indeed was a crucial factor in determining its performance in 1971 general election. *Nahdlatul Ulama* succeeded where PNI faltered, namely maintaining its votes as it had been in 1955.

However, not even PNI, or NU, could rival the achievement of Golkar in 1971 general election. The same went for other parties such as Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Parmusi (formerly, Masyumi), *Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII), *Persatuan Tarbiah Islamiah* (PERTI), *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan*

Indonesia (IPKI), and *Partai Murba*. Their downfalls were marked by the enforcement of Minister of Home Affair's Regulation (Permendagri) No. 12 / 1970, ordering civil servants to show their loyalty to the New Order by voting for Golkar. Such stipulation was a deathly blow to all political parties.

In the wake of 1971 general election's result, many found it hard to believe that Golkar was able to defeat the well-established parties of NU, PNI, PSII and Parmusi's caliber. The result of the election in which nine political parties and Golkar participated were as follows: Golkar received 227 seats (62.80 %), PNI 20 seats (5.55 %); Parkindo 7 seats (1.94 %); and *Partai Katholik* got 3 seats (0.83 %) while both IPKI and Murba did not get any seat in the DPR.

The Election's result marked the beginning of Golkar's domination in Indonesia's political map. Its status as a single majority party made it even more difficult for other parties to oppose the involvement of military in politics. When Golkar attributed its victory to the New Order and, by extension, to the people, it was just something other political parties could not top.

One out of many political phenomena during the election was the internal conflict within PNI. Many of its members, and nationalists in general, changed their allegiance to Golkar. Loyal PNI members were scarce and its campaigns prior to the election were weak compared to NU, which was brave enough to criticize the government. It then led to its defeat whereas NU survived. The intimidations of the New Order's cohorts toward PNI's sympathizers down at the rural areas and the inabilities of PNI's leaders to prevent such thing were tantamount to betrayal in the eyes of its members. The PNI simply failed to show sympathy to its own members to the point of abandonment. Indeed, the power to rule (*wahyu keprabon*), for Javanese, is not absolute and static nor an abstract thing. Instead, it is a dynamic force, which can even change sides once the one who possesses it is no longer deemed appropriate to hold it.

People are always drawn to such power, or to the one who holds it. Since it was Golkar that was perceived as currently holding it, people, like

moth to fire, were drawn to it. Judging from PNI's weak state and Golkar's newly found power with the supports of military and civil bureaucrats, it was really just a matter of time before the people, particularly PNI's members, switched side to Golkar as the new power holder. *Nahdlatul Ulama* could escape the same fate because its leaders and *kyais* were more responsive to what their members and *santri* needed, and never hesitated to stand between them and government's intervention. Other than that, the nation was simply tired of political conflicts, which had brought them nothing but suffering and strife just as it had been in the G-30-S/PKI.

Some have said that political parties were powerless due to the 10 years maneuvers of Indonesian Communist Party (1955 – 1965). Deliberate efforts to slow the pace of Islamic parties prior to 1971 election were other culprits. Either of which was the truth, many Islamic and nationalist figures joined Golkar eagerly. Hardi SH said, "The role of political parties has started to wane since 1958 due to various pressures imposed by certain few who believe that political parties have had their chance to lead the nation during the Parliamentary and Liberal Democracy era, but they simply failed to do that." Such notion only affirmed that the experiment of Parliamentary Democracy was indeed a failure.

Golkar's status as majority party in 1971 general election was a result of various factors. First, the supports it received from civilian bureaucrats, ranged from Minister of Home Affairs, Governors, Head of Regencies and Mayors. Second, the supports of the military, especially the army, through their top-to-bottom hierarchical structure, from Soeharto as President (Military's Highest Commander) down to Armed Forces Commander (*Pangab*), Minister of Defense and Security, Army, Navy, Air Force and Police Force Chiefs of Staff; Regional Military Commanders; District Military Commanders; and Sub-District Military Commanders, respectively.

Third, the technocrats and intellectuals' supports: their thinking, within both educational and bureaucrats' environments, were influential in shaping Golkar's policies. Fourth, the support of prominent figures in society, religious leaders and other luminaries. Fifth, immense funds to build facilities and

infrastructures needed. More often than not, Golkar posited such funds as its own although in fact they were government's funds. Other than that, Golkar's strategy to make use of celebrities in its campaigns in order to attract people's supports worked miraculously, especially within the middle-low class society. Finally, with the combination of these supports, plus the manipulations conducted by the government, Golkar was victorious in 1971 general election.

Aside from the structural endorsement that sustained its performance, Golkar's methods in garnering people's support by any means possible were quite innovative. Its rivals had to admit that they were incapable of combining political issues and leadership into something of interest for their respective constituents as Golkar did.

Another interesting phenomenon emerged during 1971 general election was the *Golput* or *Golongan Putih* (White Group) movement declared by Arief Budiman in Jakarta on June 3, 1971, in order to boycott the election. This movement housed several undergraduates who had been largely disappointed with how New Order had carried its policies. The movement provoked angry reactions from government officials to the point where one of them named those responsible in the movement as traitors. The emergence of *Golput* was none other than mere reaction to the authoritarian and centralist tendencies already shown by Soeharto and his military backers. Instead of utilizing election as democratic participation, Soeharto's administration deliberately abused and altered it into mere mass exhibitions and festivities with sole purpose of making Golkar the victor in the election.

The 1971 *Golput* movement was an early warning of what might have happened when election was abused and the authority responsible conducted it beyond acceptable political culture. As the catalyst of the election, *Golput* phenomenon never dies out. Just as it had existed throughout New Order's period of influence, it also existed in the elections of 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Chapter 4

1977 GENERAL ELECTION: GOLKAR TRANSFORMS INTO HEGEMONIC PARTY

New Order's Political Format⁴⁷

Derives from civic awareness toward the hardships our founding fathers had endured during their struggles, and departs from contemporary consciousness and awareness of the mistakes of the New Order which

⁴⁷ The New Order regime is synonymous with authoritarian regime or a bureaucratic state. Since early on, Soeharto often emphasized five kinds of order, namely political order, economic order, social order, order of the law, and order on defense and security. To achieve these objectives, he founded various institutions such as State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Kopkamtib*), Special Operation (*Opsus*), General Directorate of Home Affairs Department (*Ditjendepdagri*), and Socio-Political Staff of ABRI (*Kassopol ABRI*) and so on. Military figures, both active officers and retiree controlled various strategic positions in his administration. The institutions he founded were heavily hierarchical. They had at least representative post in every administrative level, from central to regional. *Kopkamtib* for example, was an institution involving in national defense and security matters. It was infamously repressive and was established during the tumultuous period following the G-30-S/PKI to deal with the communists. *Kopkamtib* was formed in pursuant to Presidential Regulation of March 3, 1969. It was assigned to investigate any political crime and misdemeanors, including controlling the press whichever was deemed as posing a threat to national stability. The President was the head of this institution, although the daily operation was under the command of ABRI Commander-in-Chief. In this "super body" institution, Commander of Defense Area Command (*Kowilhan*) and Commander of Regional Military Command (*Pangdam*) were assigned as its regional persons-in-charge (*Laksusda*) to control national security. Next, there was BAKIN, a fearsomely repressive body infamous for its psychological terror to anyone or any institution that was foolish enough to oppose Soeharto. An Army General, with whom Soeharto held direct command line, was in charge in this intelligence body. It was assigned to gather information and political intelligence, and report the recent national political situation to Soeharto. Its intel-gathering functions were sometimes intertwined with that of *Kopkamtib*, Police Force and the army. Meanwhile, Special Operation or *Opsus* was *Kostrad*'s own intelligence body. During the first decade of New Order, it was notoriously popular among the undergraduates-activists. In the 1980s, Sutopo Yuwono headed this institution with Ali Moertopo as his deputy. Moertopo was Soeharto's Personal Assistant (*Aspri*) of Politics, and he was widely regarded as one of the main architects of the New Order regime. With Soedjono Hoemardhani he founded the think tank Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 1971. In the period of 1978-1983, he held the position of Minister of Information in Soeharto's Development III Cabinet. He was still holding the position when he outlined New Order's strategy and approaches into a series of books, namely: *Dasar-dasar Pemikiran Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan 25 Tahun*, *Strategi Kebudayaan*, and *Strategi Politik Nasional dan Strategi Pembangunan*. The *Opsus* he led held significant roles in the regime's national and international interests (Gaffar, 1988: 31-32; Samego, et al., 1998: 105-107). These all are but a few examples of how powerful Soeharto's authority was with the backing of ABRI, civil bureaucrats/political parties, businessmen, nationalists and traditionalists in 32 years of his reign.

deviated from the underlying virtues of the formation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the following chapter is duly needed.

Historically, the birth of New Order⁴⁸ was preceded by the bloody tragedy of 1965 which almost brought the country to ruin. The concept of New Order was initially promising. Many have still remembered how Soeharto and his aides campaigned and promoted the existence and objective of New Order, which they posited as "a total correction on the abuses and errors done by the Old Order." The correction itself aimed at things mentioned in Soeharto's speech on August 16, 1967 as follows:

"....Serious breach toward 1945 Constitution occurred when authority was centralized on a single figure only, the Head of State. The principles and the fundaments of a lawful state have been abandoned so the nation transformed into mere authoritarian state. The principles of constitution have changed into absolutism. The highest authority was no longer held by the MPR(S) but by the president. President was no longer obedient to MPR(S), but instead MPR(S) was forced to yield under the President's authority."

"The Just and Civilized Humanity Principle has been abandoned as well. Human rights were denied because everything was in the hand of the sole ruler, the President. Legal assurance and protection were no more."

"The Principle of People's Sovereignty has been obscured; all that is left is leader's sovereignty."

"Principle of Social Justice has been further away because the nation's wealth is used for personal gain... The guided economy

⁴⁸ The birth of New Order in May 1966 marked the demise of two major political powerhouses of the Guided Democracy era, namely Soekarno and PKI. By rejecting the decisions of 1966 MPRS General Session, Soekarno gave Nasution, Soeharto and other army generals no other choice but to assume that he did not want to adjust himself to the political condition which was in dire need of new policy. Soekarno's fiery speech delivered on the Independence Day that year, colloquially titled "Jasmerah" or "*Jangan Sekali-kali Meninggalkan Sejarah*" (Never ever leave history) proved to be the last straw for army leaders and political elites to maintain his status as President of Lifetime. Toward the end of 1966, Soeharto and his fellow generals concocted contingency plan to anticipate what was at the time thought to be inevitable: an open conflicts with Soekarno's fanatic supporters. Even with his newfound power, Soeharto still needed all the support he could muster from all ranks and top brasses in ABRI. To weaken the enemy by capturing all the leftists' officers and officials were merely enough. The consolidation he was looking for was in need of something more permanent and thus, the decision to indoctrinate all military personnel and government officials was taken. The indoctrination program would be known as *Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (P-4) or the Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila.

in practice is no more than a licensing system which only benefit a few people close to the ruler..."

The government officials, civil and military from central to regional, echoed Soeharto's criticisms all the way. The bottom point of his statements was that the New Order, which was founded in May 1966, proclaimed itself as the agent of change that would align the history of Indonesia back to the ideals as stated in the Proclamation of Independence of August 17, 1945, and aimed to uphold Pancasila and 1945 Constitution as purely and consequently.

Initially, the ideal of New Order was seen as new formulation and fresh revival of the nationhood and statehood of Indonesia. Nevertheless, this initial noble spirit would transform into everything it used to resist, namely all the mistakes Soekarno had done, and as such, Soeharto too would later abuse his power and conduct a centralistic government himself.

New Order's fixation toward security and stability would be abused to hamper the people's sovereignty, the soul of the principle of Indonesia itself, while its focus on economy would bend into an act of enriching himself, his families and cronies. There was a long list of New Order's policies that virtually betrayed the ideals of the Proclamation of Independence. They were, to name a few: the concept of floating mass; the *litsus* (*Penelitian Khusus* or background screening process) imposed on every candidates of MPR, DPR and DPRD, civil servants and Military/Police personnel; the appointment, instead of election, of military personnel and civil Golkar members into MPR, DPR and DPRD; the demand of loyalty imposed on Military personnel and KORPRI members; the ban imposed on several political parties and the castration of political parties' aspiration by fusing several parties together; the enforcement of its own version of Pancasila as the sole-principle of the fused parties, Golkar and other mass organizations; the deliberate manipulations of Law of Election, Law of Political Parties-Golkar and Law of Structure and Position of MPR, DPR and DPRD so that they conformed to the regime's interests; and also the executive body's intervention on political parties for the benefit of Soeharto and his cronies. Largely, such misconducts were part of Soeharto's ploy to maintain his power. New Order preserved its political

format, which should have been transitional, and imposed it on military, civilian bureaucrats and Golkar to maintain political power that lasted for 32 long years.

The floating mass concept originated from the period of depoliticization and restructuring of political parties. In the early 1970s, on the suggestion of Brigadier General Ali Moertopo, the Special Operation (Opsus) Commander, the then Diponegoro Regional Military Commander-in-Chief, Major General Widodo, said "political parties are prohibited from holding activities within the rural areas," and that "any structural and personnel office of political parties and Golkar were limited to Administrative Regency (Kabupaten) only." Soon after, Ali Moertopo intensively promoted the concept of floating mass within Golkar's circle. The intimidation toward political parties began not long after and resulted in broken relationship with their respective constituents in rural areas.

The concept stipulated that the mass or people were not allowed to involve themselves in daily politics, save for during election time. The government prohibited people to hold any political role in between elections and ushered them instead to participate in national development, particularly the economy. Such stipulation killed the relation between parties and their supporters and rendered the parties politically powerless. However, the same thing did not apply to Golkar. As a ruling party and the regime's vote gathering machine, it always received the support of civil bureaucrats (including in the villages, where other political parties' activities were prohibited) and the military. In too many things, Golkar had the support of military, from the Regional Commands down to the District and Sub-district Commands. Example of which was the saying of the former Army Chief of Staff, Gen. R. Hartono when he accompanied the entourage of *Mbak* Tutut (Soeharto's eldest daughter) in the 1997 election campaign in Mantingan, East Java: "Armed Forces is Golkar and Golkar is Armed Forces." He received harsh criticisms for making such remarks, but that did not mean what he said less true, no matter how wrong that truth was. Simply put, the implementation of the concept dwarfed the influence of political parties, while

at the same time profiting Golkar to the point where it managed to dominate every election held during New Order's reign.

The floating mass concept was never institutionalized into MPR's Regulation on State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) out of respect toward other political parties involved, namely PPP and PDI. Nevertheless, it was mentioned in Regulation No.15/1969, which stipulated that political parties and Golkar were prohibited to form coordination bodies in sub-district and rural areas level. In deliberate violation of this regulation, the government discriminately allowed Golkar the very thing it was prohibited from, namely forming coordination offices in the sub-district and village areas. In a bit of irony, Golkar was ascending to political domination while its rivals were weakening.

The floating mass concept, in other words, was a deliberate attempt to chastise political parties for their past sins. Affan Gaffar suggests (1992) that the political parties were confronted with their past conducts that were so laden with conflicts they eventually led to G-30-S/PKI in 1965. Accusations as such were mainly instigated by the "*sayap elang*" (Eagle's Wings) faction within the army, consisting of Siliwangi Division Commander, Major General H.R. Dharsono, Seskoad Commander, Major General Soewarto and RPKAD Commander Major General Sarwo Eddhie Wibowo with the support of former PSI intellectuals, such as Prof. Dr. Sarbini Somawinata.

Political castration toward political parties in the 1970s, according to Liddle (1977) was inspired by certain practices as follows. *First*, political parties had been more ideology-oriented instead of paying attention to platform and programs. *Second*, the parties had instigated ideological tensions within the grassroots. *Third*, the parties had instigated tensions between mass organizations in order to gain and maintain supports from their sympathizers. *Fourth*, the parties' elites had changed into irresponsible opportunists who focused more on themselves, their positions and their own groups instead of struggling for the people's benefit.

The losses caused by such practices not only limited to the party organizations, but to other institutions beyond political parties as well.

Therefore, Soeharto perceived the multi-party system as the real culprit behind the political and security instabilities, a fertile soil to cultivate discords, in similar way Soekarno and Nasution once had. In prospective view, even now, 13 years into the Reformation era, political elites seem as ignorant to people's prosperity and welfare as they were back then. Soeharto emphasized repeatedly, "Indonesia recognizes neither the political culture of opposition nor the dictatorship of majority nor the tyranny of minority," which led to another favorite political catchphrase of his era, "political development *no*, economic development *yes*."

The floating mass concept truly is not a phenomenon exclusive to Indonesia. It can be found in any democratic countries such as Australia, USA, Netherland, Italy, German, Belgium, and French, in which it is referred as swing voters, or something to that effect. The term refers to a particular group of voters or constituents who either unaffiliated to any party or do not have clear alignment with one of the party, whose votes are dependent to the factors of candidates and political issues rather than political affiliation or ideology. Because they constitute a large proportion of people, the parties race to target them in every campaign. However, in Indonesia's New Order, instead of being entirely self-determining, these people were mobilized, organized and directed by the bureaucrats and military bodies to vote for Golkar. Hence, the election was no longer a free, active participation, but rather an orchestrated mass mobilization.

Therefore, the concept, which was part of the *departyization* and restructuring program conducted by the government on political parties, was also a "Golkar-ization" attempt imposed on the people. Judging from the Regulation on Political Parties and Golkar made in 1969, which was revised in 1975 and 1985, it was clear that the government intended to abolish the practice of full-throttle politics and mass mobilizations as there had been during the Parliamentary/Liberal Democracy era (1946-1965). The New Order maintained that the high dynamics that led to political discords and social conflicts had to be replaced by more calm and feud-less politics, so that the people as supporter of the parties could focus more on the development

process instead of unproductively fighting each other. The government, through the Minister of Home Affairs, dedicatedly saw to it by any possible means.

Political and security stabilities hammered by Soeharto were done as preconditions of the economic development in pursuant to the creed of Development's Trilogy (*Trilogi Pembangunan*) as follows: (1) political stability and national security; (2) high-growth economy; and (3) fair distribution of development and its results. However, the high and noble nature of the creed would gradually give way to abuses and manipulations related to corruption, collusions and nepotism (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme-KKN*).

Furthermore, the very existence of Law on Political Parties and Golkar and Law on Election substantially enabled New Order's long lasting reign through Golkar's domination as its votes gathering machine. If only all political elites at that time were fairer in maintaining political climates, party system in Indonesia would have been very different. The military and civil bureaucrats should have been neutral instead of acting as Golkar's agents to maintain the status quo. Both institutions should have kept the same distance in relation to Golkar and political parties and avoided such political favoritism. Nevertheless, history records otherwise. Military and civil bureaucrats were Golkar's tools in gathering the votes needed to legitimize Soeharto's power, as well as tools to keep PPP and PDI's activities and influence in check.

There were some susceptibilities in the Law on Political Parties and Golkar. First, since its formulation in 1969 and its corrections in 1975 and 1985, it stipulated that no parties were allowed to have structural bodies in administrative areas lesser than the Regency (*Kabupaten*) level. As a result, parties found it difficult to keep in contact with their constituents living in rural backland areas. However, since the heads of administrative areas from the sub-districts down to the villages were part of civil bureaucrats/servants, and therefore affiliated to Golkar, they could breach this limitation for the benefit of Golkar. These violations reportedly took place in many electoral areas in which Golkar managed to secure massive victory over its rivals, gaining from 65% to 73% of votes. All of which were attainable with the help

of Golkar functionaries serving as respective Sub-districts' heads (*Camat*), village heads (*Lurah*) and other village officials. Simply put, the floating mass concept brought nothing but disaster for political parties during the New Order's administration (Gaffar, 1992: 43).

The absence of political parties in day-to-day politics in certain areas most certainly hampered the functions and roles of each party in facilitating political education, communication, aggregation, political articulation, or simply conflict-solving arbitration among the people. Parties' members living in village were powerless because Golkar functionaries in sub-district controlled the only inlet/outlet for anything political. Political communication, if any, was highly bureaucratic in nature and ineffective.

The second susceptibility, meanwhile, was that the Law abolished social segmentations among the villagers. New Order viewed such segmentations, including those by ideological orientation and political groupings, as the source of conflicts that would hamper the function of social control. In short, New Order believed that society with no segmentations promised an effective social control. But this was not the case. More often, social control was exerted more effectively when those who were critical toward the government were responsible for carrying it out instead of the other way around. With no segmentations as such, the society was merely a homogenous mass obedient to the government. It resulted in no social control whatsoever out of fear of offending the government. Without social control, society then became an open market for any kind of embezzlements conducted by government officials, including those in the villages. When the New Order's authority finally ended with Soeharto's resignation, people who knew all along about the abuses and no longer feared the authority or Golkar, for that matter, started to criticize any abuse they found. Protests and demonstrations were staged against village officials who were corrupt or incompetent. The same thing happened to police officers, legal institutions and their respective members: judges, prosecutors and lawyers, whom people perceived as the most corrupt of all. The questionable sincerity of the law

enforcers and legal institutions led to the formation of Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) in post-Reformation era.

The third susceptibility laid on the stipulation that prohibited political parties and Golkar to own affiliate organizations (*onderbouw*). Formally, PPP, PDI and Golkar were not allowed to have direct relation with the paddy-roots class. However, since Golkar was supported by all government's elements, law as such simply did not apply to it. Golkar did own numerous affiliate organizations, among others were AMPI, various profession-based organizations⁴⁹ and organizations known as Core Organizational Groups (KINO).⁵⁰ These support organizations worked directly among the communities for Golkar's benefits, as parts of its political clockworks. Not only limited to organizations, Golkar's affiliates also included individual functionaries whose line of duty enabled them to meet the paddy-roots directly, such as civil servants serving as the heads of regency-administrative area (*Bupati*), sub-district (*Camat*) and village (*Lurah*).

Before we jump into other political format other than the floating mass concept, which specifically made to dwarf the influence of political parties, the following need to be reviewed first. The shift of orientation from politics to economy Soeharto commandeered was triggered by a zeal to overcome the ruined economy which were marked by 650% inflation, high rates of unemployment and poverty, skyrocketed price of staple goods, extraordinary expensive health care, and the US\$ 3 Billion's worth national debt.

For economy-related development to take place, a necessary precondition in form of political stability needed to manifest first. To pull it off, the New Order employed distinct approaches, which pretty much summarized

⁴⁹ Golkar's professional organizations: Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI), Harmony of the Indonesian Farmers Association (HAKI), Association of Indonesian Anglers (HNSI), and the All-Indonesia Workers' Federation (FBSI) which later was renamed into All Indonesian Workers Union (SPSI).

⁵⁰ There are several Core Organizational Groups (Kino) of Golkar, among others Kosgoro, Saksi, MKGR (Tri Karya), GAKARI, GUPII, and MDI. There are also youth organizations such as AMPI, Pancamarga Youth, Communication Forum of the Children of Retired Armed Forces (FKPPI), and Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI). Some of the members of these organizations have become influential figures of Golkar, in particular Akbar Tandjung, the late David Napitupulu, Aulia Rachman, Abdullah Puteh, Freddy Latumahina, and Tjahjo Kumolo.

its overall political format and were characterized by: (1) the dominant role of Military (ABRI), especially the army; (2) the heavy-involvement of military in socio-political matter, as was outlined in its dual role (*Dwifungs*); (3) all-out development in all fields, especially economy; (4) the restructuring of political dynamics, especially in political parties, mass organizations and religious bodies (5) the reinforcement of civil bureaucrats; (6) the overzealous spirit to uphold Pancasila and 1945 Constitution; and (7) the position of Soeharto as the central and highest authority, as the Head of State, Head of the Government and the Chairman of Golkar's Board of Trustees. Due to such centralistic behavior, it was impossible for anyone to serve the position of Directorate General, Inspectorate General, Ambassador, Public University Rector, Provincial Governor, Minister and Military/Police Commander without the blessing of Soeharto.

Soeharto and his clique decided that the best way to overcome the dire situation was to work on national development by focusing on national stability, economic growth and redistribution of the results of development. From these creeds emerged platforms that were called the Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita), the National Development's Trilogy, the 25-Years Development Plan, and so forth.

The Departyization and Restructuring of Political Parties

In the early 1970s, intensive discussions took place between the government and political parties' representatives concerning the restructuring of parties' organizational bodies. The purpose of which was not only to reduce political parties in numbers but also to alter their structural compositions which were overloaded with *aliran* and ideology into something more platform-esque and program-oriented.

The restructuring itself had to be supported by the Law. Since neither his administration nor the DPR had geared up for this, Soeharto suggested another constitutional alternative, on one condition that the new parties it produced had to be based on the spirit of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The majority of parties agreed. In addition, since physical

development was not something that could be bargained at this point, the spirit toward which had to be prioritized. However, some others suggested spiritual aspect not to be neglected. At this point, two factions were formed. While the first prioritized physical development without neglecting the spiritual aspects, the second prioritized spiritual development by supporting physical aspects. Soeharto then incorporated these agreements into foundations to form two political parties. The first faction, the material-spiritual one, consisted of *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI), *Partai Kristen Indonesia* (Parkindo), *Partai Katholik*, *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (IPKI) and *Murba*. Taking the name of Development Democracy, this faction would transform into Indonesian Democratic Party or *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI).

The second faction, or the spiritual-material one, consisted of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Parmusi), *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII) and *Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiah* (Perti). It was grouped into United Development faction which would become the United Development Party or *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP).

New Order's administration planned to separate Islam as a religion of the majority of Indonesians, including all of its obligations toward its adherents, from Islam as political movement and ideology. Soeharto also wanted to eliminate religion's structural influence from the nation's administration, or in other words, to secularize the country in order to separate political structure from its religious counterpart (Smith, 1970). This separation he deemed important to avoid the emergence of religious belief as an alternative ideology within the nation, which surely would hamper the convergences of different values that characterize modernization from materializing.

Toward the end of 1972, the idea about parties' fusion had snowballed into public discourses. Direction toward political restructuring and simplification become even clearer when it was highlighted in every newspaper. It was implied that the 1977 general election would involve only three Organizations of Participants in General Elections (OPP). The public

discourses helped in accelerating the fusion. Run out of option, the parties in discussion could only wait for the decision that would seal their fate came out from the 1973 MPR General Session. Preceded with tough sessions of lobbying, finally, in January 1973, the new party system was built.

On January 5, 1973, the United Development Group consisting of NU, PSII, Parmusi (*Muslimin Indonesia*) and Perti declared itself as United Development Party.⁵¹ This *santri*-affiliated party, according to Feith and Castle (1982), consisted of modernists, represented by Parmusi and PSII, and traditionalists group, represented by NU and Perti. Unlike its traditionalist counterpart, the modernists group had suffered government's intervention in terms of leadership.

Parmusi was reminisced from the banned Masyumi, formed under Presidential Regulation in 1968 and initially led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun of Muhammadiyah (Haris, 1991: 9-10). However, in its First Congress in 1968 in Malang, the one who was elected as Chairman was Muhammad Roem. Soeharto did not please with this decision because he was rather wary with Masyumi, and Roem had been Masyumi's prominent figure. Therefore, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun then were appointed to lead Parmusi. Before long, both leaders were toppled by H. John Naro and Imran Kodir for rather obscure reasons. The internal feuds that followed were finally settled through the Presidential Regulation in 1970, which appointed H.M.S Mintaredja, a moderate Muhammadiyah's member, as the Chairman. The same happened in PSII, in which Anwar Tjokroaminoto toppled the duet of H.M. Ch. Ibrahim and Wartomo Dwidjojuwono, party's Chairman and Secretary General elected in its *Majalaya*'s National Consensus, on the

⁵¹ The organizational structure of PPP in the period of 1973-1984 comprised of Prof. Dr. Idham Chalid (NU) as Party's President, assisted by H.M.S. Mintaredja, S.H., Drs. H. Th. M. Gobel, H. Rusli Halil, and K.H. Masykur as the vice-presidents who represented each of the elementary organizations that built PPP. Its Central Executive Council consisted of H.M.S. Mintaredja, S.H. as the Chairman and H. Nuddin Lubis as Deputy-Chairman, accompanied by five heads of executive board that supervised 33 members hailed from the four elements within PPP. Jahja Ubeid S.H. held the position of Secretary General, while K.H. Masykur led the twelve members of the party's Consultative Board. The *Rois A'am* KH Bisri Sjansuri and his deputy KH M. Dachlan led the *Syuro* Council comprising of 18 *ulamas* (Haris, 1991: 162-163).

allegation that their leaderships were not in line with New Order's policy. Anwar's camp was included in PPP's elite ranks.

Meanwhile, internal conflict within NU that pitted K.H. Idham Chalid and K.H. Bisri Sjansuri against Subchan Z.E, a pro-reform, young figure of NU, did not attract the same intervention. With the absence of the regime's intervention, in the 1971 general election NU was able to win 18.60% votes, 2% more than their votes in 1955. In the same election, the intervened Parmusi, as the reincarnation of Masyumi, only managed to win 7.3% votes, while PSII and Perti gathered votes of 2.3% and 0.7%, respectively. The outcome of 1971 general election sealed the fate of Islamic parties because it served as legitimacy basis for the government to carry out the *departyization* and restructuring of political parties. The government argued that judging from Golkar's tally that reached 62.80%, which made it a majority party,⁵² the fusion of parties was the right momentum for Islamic parties to consolidate and strengthen their ranks.

On January 10, 1973, just several days after PPP had been formed, Development Democracy Group declared itself as Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI). It consisted of elements from PNI, Parkindo, *Partai Katholik*, IPKI and *Partai Murba*. The influence of PNI on PDI's core structure as a socio-political entity and a political party (*Merdeka*, January 13, 1981) was hard to deny. To discuss PDI was to discuss about the attitude, behavior and political alignment of the former PNI members in its structural frame, daily policy and PDI's own future.

Concerning the fusion of parties into PDI, two things are worth mentioning. The first was Gen. Soeharto's initiative to hold PNI Congress in Bandung, 1966. The initiative was extraordinary since some factions within the New Order's clique and some unnamed international influence wanted the

⁵² Since 1971, general election had always become a nightmare for both Islamic and nationalist parties, which in 1973 merged into PPP and PDI, respectively. By this time, political issues had shifted into apolitical development issues that cost both PPP and PDI interesting topic for their political campaigns. There was practically no interesting issue for PPP to carry out other than religion, while PDI could only "sell" the issue of marginalized people. Just like a mascot, the issue of marginalized people reoccurred in PDI's campaigns in every election thereafter. Realizing the importance of such issue, in the 1980s PPP and Golkar joined in by raising the issue of *Dhu'afa* (Arabic: the weak) and poverty, respectively.

New Order to outlaw PNI as it had done PKI. Second, the demand to dissolve PNI that came from military and political ring in 1967 and 1968, which Soeharto rejected following the counsel of the Minister of Home Affairs. Finally, on January 10, 1973, PDI was formed.

The fusion of political parties in fact not only transformed Indonesia's political structure at that time, but rather the earlier political powers as well, which was represented with the transformation of PNI to PDI. In some way, PDI was PNI's answer to New Order's political context, as evident in the predominance of its former members in the leaderships of PDI during its initial years. Unfortunately, in 1974, merely a year after its formation until well in 1996, there was no single occasion passed without conflicts among its elite members. In 1974, conflict arose between the incumbent Chairman Mohammad Isnaeni and Sunawar Sukawati, two former PNI's cadres. The conflict prolonged for some time to the point when it drew Soeharto's attention. On his suggestion, Sanusi Hardjadinata, another former PNI who once held the position of Minister of Home Affairs in the Parliamentary and Liberal Democracy era, was appointed as PDI's Chairman.

Sanusi who was elected as Chairman in PDI First Congress in Jakarta in 1976, was later toppled by Achmad Sukarmadidjaja and Muhiddin Nasution prior to 1978 MPR General Session. Both were former members of IPKI and Murba, respectively; two parties which failed to get any seat in the 1971 general election. They both brought massive changes to PDI's structural composition stipulated in the 1976 Congress. Due to these changes, PNI elements within PDI started to lose influence (*Media Indonesia*, August 3, 1993). Any PNI elements remained were removed from their respective positions. The changes saw Sunawar Sukarwati replaced Sanusi, while Moh. Isnaeni replaced Usep Ranuwidjaja. In addition, some new-emerging politicians such as Abdul Madjid, I Gde Djaksa, Rasjid St, Radja Mas, Soelomo, and M.T. Siregar were introduced as the elite members of PDI's Central Executive Council (DPP). The conflict itself allegedly started from some differences in perspective between both factions in anticipation of the

1978 MPR General Session. However, not so few were convinced that the conflicts were deliberately instigated to incapacitate PDI.

The ongoing discords worried everyone out of fear that it would ruin the newly-born organization for good. At this point, the National Intelligence Body (Bakin) decided to interfere. Witnessed by its Commander-in-Chief, Major General Yoga Sugama and its Vice-Chief Brigadier General Ali Moertopo, a consensus of adding more functionaries with PNI's background was agreed. Following this agreement, former PNI members such as Moh. Isnaeni, Sunawar Sukawati, Hardjanto Sumodisastro, Usep Ranuwidjaja and Abdul Madjid were integrated back into the party. The hope that such change would solidify PDI was futile. The party once again plunged into internal conflicts more severe than before. Dismissal games in which each functionary sacked a fellow functionary out of spite were such a trend. In its extreme stage, the members of Regional Executive Councils (DPD) and Sub-regional Executive Councils (DPC) around Jakarta, West Java, Central Java and some regions in Sumatra even went as far as creating mirror Councils to rival those of the opposing factions.

At certain point of the conflict, Sanusi sacked both Isnaeni and Sunawar Sukawati from the ranks of PDI's DPP. Isnaeni and Soenawar Soekawati, at the same time, refused to stand idly. Their faction sacked back Sanusi Hardjadinata from his position as PDI's Chairman.

Four factors led to Sanusi's dismissal. First, Sanusi did not have a valid basis to sack Isnaeni and Soenawar in the first place (Swantoro, 1996: 82-83). Second, PDI's political strategies deemed as potential nuisance to the ongoing process of economic development carried out by Soeharto's administration. Third, the political differences with Soeharto's administration were due to rather immature regeneration process within the party. Fourth, the implementation of the fusion was simply chaotic so that the interests of each element within the party were blocking each other's way.

The PNI's elements infighting within PDI reached its peak nearing PDI Second Congress planned to be held in Jakarta on January 13-17, 1981. The conflicting factions were both proposing for permit to hold the Congress to

the Home Affairs Department (*Depdagri*), but their proposals were rejected by the then *Kopkamtib* Commander in Chief, Admiral Sudomo, on the basis that the permit would only be given whenever both factions ceased the infighting and called it a truce. Meanwhile, other faction led by Usep Ranuwidjaja, Mrs. Walandouw, Abdul Madjid and Zakaria Rahib determined the Congress was invalid in nature since it violated the party's Articles of Articulation/Bylaw stipulated in PDI's First Congress and the Law No.3/1975 on Political Parties and Golkar. Any consolidation attempts that followed were unsuccessful and this bull's head insignia bearing party continued their infighting, albeit under different reasons, until well in 1996.

By and large, the aforementioned incidents showed that through the *departyization* and restructuring of political parties, the government was successful in short-leashing the parties involved while at the same time was able to convert military and civil bureaucrats' supports as tools to successfully develop and consolidate Golkar. Theoretically, parties' fusion served as a means to downsize every conflict within society into an unthreatening scale. For the government, with only two parties (aside from Golkar) under its supervision, asserting control on the internal conflicts within each party would not be complicated to pull off. The fusion triggered the inter-element and inter-faction's conflicts within the merged parties as were the cases mentioned earlier. As it was, the new entity created by the parties' fusion or merger acted as a new arena of discords. In short, conflicts that had usually taken places *between* parties now deliberately moved *within* the parties. This was what a cunning government would do to avoid disruption toward its planned economic development.

Major obstacle in fusing several parties into one body was the difficulty to unite all those ideologies and backgrounds into a consensus. Within PDI, various arrays of principles and ideologies that sourced from different philosophies intertwined together. The same went for PPP. Although all elements within the party adhered to Islam as their religion and ideology, such allegiance came from distinctive understandings and backgrounds so that consensus was still a luxurious thing to come by.

The United Development Party even had to learn this in the hard way when NU decided to part way by declaring its intention to go back to its 1926 Khittah (Basic Resolution) during its *Muktamar* (Congress) in 1986, just as it had been in the 1952 *Muktamar* in Palembang, which marked its separation from Masyumi. Overall, every merged party had to endure heartbreaking decline due to *departyization* and restructuring policy of the New Order under Soeharto. At the same time political parties succumbed to debilitating discords, Golkar was ascending its way to become a hegemonic party.

Pancasila Democracy Experiment

In Indonesia, general election has been a pentennial mechanism. Under Soeharto, however, there was an exception once, in which the 1971 general election was separated by six years gap from the next election, instead of five. The culprit was the time it took to form the MPR from the outcome of 1971 general election, which was formed no sooner than October 1972. The delay triggered domino effect on other scheduled mechanisms. The MPR in discussion then held General Session to elect and inaugurate the President and Vice-President in March 1973. Interestingly, the tenure of the President and Vice-President ended in March 1978 after the tenure of MPR itself ended in October 1977. Soeharto gave his accountability speech not until March 1978 in front of MPR formed by the 1977 election, instead of the MPR that elected him back in 1973.⁵³ As dubious as it was, the President should have given his accountability speech to the MPR that elected him, instead of that of the next election.

In his accountability speech, President as MPR's mandatory informed the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) that had been implemented in the five-year development (PELITA) programs of his recent presidential term. From then on, DPR formulated the Draft National Budget to finance the development set forth in the Five Year Development Plan (REPELITA) for the

⁵³ A lot of criticisms (albeit silently) emerged from the parties' camps in response to this development. Why did a president give accountability speech to the newly formed MPR instead of the one that had elected him? If this should indicate anything, it was that his accountability speech was nothing more than a meaningless formality if not a complete subterfuge.

next term. In short, the pentennial presidential term started with General Election, including its mechanisms i.e. voters' registration, the nomination of candidates, the electoral campaigns, quiet week, voting day, vote counting and the announcement of the election results. It then continued to the inauguration of the newly elected MPR, DPR and DPRD members. The newly elected MPR then held its General Session which rundown went as follows: President's accountability speech, discussion of MPR Regulations (Tap MPR) on GBHN and non-GBHN matters; and the election and inauguration of President and Vice-President. Once he was officially inaugurated, the elected President then formed his cabinet and carried out the mandated GBHN in his term as president until the next election. Together, this cycle was so-named the pentennial leadership of New Order.

The aforementioned cycle pretty much summed up the mechanism of Pancasila Democracy promoted by New Order's entire cohorts, from the national to the district and sub-district leaders. Indonesia indeed has such a long chain of democracy experiments. No fewer than three democracy systems had been implemented in Indonesia prior to the reformation era. The first was Parliamentary/Liberal Democracy implemented just a month after 1945 Proclamation. The second was Guided Democracy promoted by Soekarno and the third was Pancasila Democracy of the New Order. All of which had greatly affected the party system's dynamics of Indonesia. The parliamentary democracy was implemented soon after the Proclamation of Independence in form of parliamentary government. It started with Sjahrir I Cabinet and lasted through the whole chapter of the United States of the Republic of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat-RIS*) and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia under the 1950 Provisional Constitution (UUDS 1950). Afterwards, following the Presidential Decree of June 5, 1959, Indonesia entered the era of Guided Democracy, in which it went back to the 1945 Constitution and adopted presidential system that lasted until 1965.

Following its rise to power after the G-30-S/PKI, the New Order under Soeharto implemented the Pancasila Democracy in 1966. He purposefully emphasized that it was going to be a different democracy from its entire

predecessors. The implementation of the system itself was best described as an experiment than a fixed theory. As an ongoing experiment, it was stopped short after Soeharto stepped down from his presidency on May 21, 1998, following the economical crisis of 1997 that swelled into political crisis. Prior to his downfall, the Pancasila Democracy his regime had promoted ever so enthusiastically underwent a phase of ambivalences, riots and distortions.

Parliamentary democracy was first implemented as a diplomatic tool to uphold the struggle of independence under the name of Liberal democracy. At the end of Soekarno's reign as well as at Soeharto's downfall, everyone who did not even understand its real meaning denigrated the term *liberal* into something negative: a much-hated word that would be imposed on everything considered different from the government's view. By the New Order administration, liberal was likened to "anti-Pancasila" or "communist-like." It was the same thing as a betrayal to the nation (Djiwandono, 1996: 13). Irrational hate toward liberal democracy had closed the room for dialogue to the point where the system might as well have been non-existent. The truth was, New Order regime could not accept differences, the very essence of democracy. To have a critical or different view at that time was enough to earn a status of enemy of the state (traitor).

No differences of opinion mean a dead democracy. This was not something New Order was fully aware of, especially when the authority was centered on one figure, President Soeharto. Example of the violation of democratic principle was evident in all General Session of MPR held during Soeharto's reign. Voting was not allowed in the process of appointing President and Vice-President. All decisions were made and agreed in advance between parties and Golkar elites before they were presented and hammered accordingly in the session. This was the famous consensus-style policy-making of Pancasila Democracy.

New Order resented Guided Democracy not because of its ideology or constitution, but because it was deemed as a manipulation and abuse of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Some of Guided Democracy's practices it resented were the one-in-twenty years (1945-1965) general election, the

dissolution of Provisional People's Representatives Council (DPRS), and the nature of its replacement whose members were directly appointed by Soekarno instead of being elected in an election. It also resented Soekarno's nonchalant attitude toward the provisional nature of the otherwise permanent high institutions of the state, such as the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), People's Representative Council (DPR), Supreme Audit Board (BPK), Supreme Court (MA) and People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The foremost thing New Order resented was the Nasakom principle the Guided Democracy promoted, which was the harbinger of the bloody incidents of 1965.

Interestingly, both Old Order's regime of Soekarno and New Order's regime under Soeharto shared their resentment toward Liberal Democracy. The fact that those sentiments were sourced from rather biased perspective was an entire different matter. The fact remains that "liberal" is still tantamount to anti-Pancasila (not suitable for the characteristic and the culture of Indonesia) even today. For Soeharto, Liberal Democracy was the source of distortion of Pancasila Democracy.

Therefore, his resentment toward Liberal Democracy was based on a more personal basis instead of common logic. For him, it was the culprit that had given birth to the ideologically shallow, extreme left and fundamental right parties in Indonesia, as well as a source of inter-parties conflicts and incapable short-lived cabinets. It had also triggered insurgencies and separatist movements all over the nation, which either intended to replace Pancasila as the ideology of the state or simply wanted to part way from the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

Based on those experiences, he built an unwavering believe that the nation was in constant danger from either political or territorial disunity. Political parties had given more problems than solutions. Political freedom, which had been granted by the democracy system, had been abused for factional interests instead of that of the nation and the people. The system had created further instabilities due to the provisional nature of the government, the administration of which had seldom lasted more than 8 months. It all had to change, and the change was represented in Golkar and

its victory in 1971 general election that paved its way to become a hegemonic party. Various political activities that had been embraced in the spirit of freedom were replaced with the spirit of development. Political freedom euphoria gradually dissipated to give way to his economy-oriented programs. In short, development became the “new ideology” sponsored by Soeharto’s administration and a part of the Pancasila Democracy experiment.

Nevertheless, in 1974-1975, the undergraduate students, intellectuals and political Islam groups brewed new movements with the backing of some military members against Soeharto’s administration. In major cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya, undergraduate students hoisted street demonstrations, self-called them as “Movement against Ignorance” and “Movement against Poverty.” The most highlighted demonstration that gained the government’s attention was the demonstration against the construction of *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, a massive amusement park initiated and enthusiastically supported by the First Lady, Ny. Tien Soeharto. The protesters, mostly undergraduate students, mockingly called the project as “lighthouse project” (*projek mercusuar*) due to its pretentious and extravagant scale. Another demonstration, which led into riots and political turmoil, took place in Jakarta, on January 15, 1974, to which it owed its acronym, *Malari* (Disaster of January 15). It was the first significant challenge, in political context, to Soeharto’s authority since he had held his presidency. The demonstration-turned-riot marked the first political crack within the ranks of Golkar, or, between the government with the intellectuals and undergraduate students.

Malari started from the growing resentment toward Japan and its foreign investment in Indonesia, and the now apparent Soeharto’s authoritarianism leadership. The protesters hoisted their action when the then Japan’s Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was visiting Indonesia. Critical undergraduate students and intellectuals then rallied the masses to demand the dismissal of President’s Personal Assistant (Aspri) consisting of Ali Moertopo (Politics and Security), Soedjono Humardani (Economy) and Tjokropranolo (People’s Welfare), all of whom had close tie to Golkar and

Soeharto. At the same time, there was a bitter rivalry between Ali Moertopo and General Soemitro, the then Commander of Restoration of Order and Security, Kopkamtib. In this rivalry, Soemitro apparently chose to team up with the students/protesters (Suryadinata, 1992: 87). In the wake of the riots, the authority arrested some intellectuals and prominent students, such as Dr. Dorodjatun Kuncorajakti, Prof. Dr. Sarbini Sumawinata, Dr. Hariman Siregar, Sutan Sjahrir (not to be confused with PSI's Sjahrir), Theo Sambuaga, and Rahman Tolleng. There was also an ongoing political rivalry within Golkar itself, namely between the intellectuals belonged to Bandung group and Yogyakarta group. The groups were so named after the cities where the members of respective groups once had studied and graduated from. In the rivalry, the Bandung group considered as more radical and, therefore, less-favored by the central leaders. Nevertheless, Golkar's central leaders did not prohibit this group from participating in the 1977 general election, and still gave them chances to nominate as legislatives and campaign for this banyan tree-bearing party.

Golkar as Hegemonic Party

For the success of development process, especially in the economic sector, the government increased its political pressure to achieve national stability prior to 1977 general election. Formal preparation for the election had started since 1975 with the brewing of Law on Political Parties and Golkar. It was going to legitimize the simplification of political parties on top of prohibiting the creation of new political party. The Law was going to deny political parties' access to its grassroots constituents and prohibit them to form structural connection with other mass organizations.

The short-leash imposed on political parties made them unable to cope with Golkar and its vast structural resources that reached deep to rural areas and various mass organizations. With all the limitations legitimized by Law No.3/1975 on Political Parties and Golkar, each political party was similar to a bound gladiator thrown into a fight with not only an unbound enemy, but fully armed as well, as Golkar was. These limitations were enforced so that Golkar

could achieve a landslide victory as it had been in 1971 general election. In other words, each of the laws concerning political parties and the election itself was mere ploy to keep Soeharto in power.

The government regulated all technical practices in the Law on General Election to suit its own end, as displayed in the mass-based campaign it promoted. Other parties, with their infinitesimal funds, could not gather the masses as many as Golkar did with its glamorous celebrities-totting technique to attract people. The government also placed polling places (*Tempat Pemungutan Suara -TPS*) in government offices so that on the voting day, which was not set on holiday, all government officials and civil servants could vote in their respective offices, which they were obliged to do after all. After they had voted, they were sent home with specific instruction to vote again on the polling places of their respective home area. Military and civil bureaucrats also actively conducted concealed campaign to promote Golkar around villages and rural areas.

To hamper the chance of the legislature nominee flagged as uncooperative by the government from being elected, the government imposed a screening process called *Litsus* on the alleged nominee. As if that was not enough, many military officers and government officials committed intimidations and psyche terrors to PPP and PDI cadres. These all were a short description of what had happened since the *departyization* and structuring of the political parties.

Authority became hegemonic ⁵⁴ while the election was treated as a mere tool to legitimize the repressive and authoritarian government. It can be

⁵⁴ Hegemonic refers to "a system in which a party or a coalition of the same parties holds the authority of the government for a long duration of time," and that such system "involves a political party under exclusive control of the government," as La Palombara and Weiner (1966: 35) describe it. Giovanni Sartori (1976: 230) elaborates the characteristics of a hegemonic party system as follows: A hegemonic party does not allow either formal or *de facto* competition to win the authority over to take place. Other parties are allowed to exist but merely as complementary objects. They are prohibited to hold contest with the hegemonic party in a real antagonistic competition based on equality. Therefore, the rotation cycle of authority does not happen in the general election. As such, a hegemonic party keeps on ruling the state whether public fancy it or otherwise. Whatever policy it is making, no one can challenge its domination. The same condition existed in Golkar with Soeharto as the Head of its Board of Trustees. During his 32 years rule, he would crush whoever was foolish enough to challenge his authority.

seen how poor the democracy was in Indonesia at that time, especially when everything was in the hand of the Golkar's Head of Board of Trustees, President Soeharto.

Some factors created, or at least contributed in the formation of hegemonic party in Indonesia. *First*, the formation of military commands assigned to maintain national order and security, such as the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), Special Operation (Opsus), military intelligence bodies/secret police, such as BIA/BAIS and Bakin, Military Chief of Socio-Politics Department (Kassopol ABRI), Regional Military Commands (Kodam), District Military Commands (Kodim) and other military commands, including the civil Socio-Politic Directorate General of Home Affairs Department (Ditjen Sospol Depdagri). *Second*, the depoliticization of the masses conducted in order to usher them to national development efforts, especially economic development. *Third*, the forced *departyization* and restructuring of parties (PPP and PDI), which rendered each party's function into ornamental at best. Fourth, the manipulative nature of Law on Political Parties and Golkar, Law on General Election and Law on Structure and Position of MPR, DPR and DPRD, all of which benefitted Golkar so that it was able to achieve landslide victories, albeit manipulative, in all elections held by the New Order regime. Since it needed the existence of tampered laws to ensure its victory in each election, a hegemonic party as Golkar was more dependent to the government⁵⁵ than to the people or constituents.

A hegemonic party is an ever-in-power party no matter whether or not it represents the will of the people. The relationship between the hegemonic party and the government is always mutual. The party can achieve and maintain its power through the total support of the government, while the government can maintain its political legitimacy provided by the party's electoral victories. However, a hegemonic party does not hold any autonomy

⁵⁵ Rully Chairul Azwar (2008) in "Politik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era: Dari Partai Hegemonik ke Partai Berorientasi Pasar", p. 28-32.

over political control asserted by the government upon itself and tends to be a mere political machine of the authority.

Meanwhile, there were two main issues asserted by Soeharto's administration to discredit PPP, namely (1) that it intended to replace Pancasila with Islam as the State's Ideology and (2) commenced the *Komando Jihad* (Jihad Command) movement. The second issue surfaced for the first time in early February 1977 when Admiral Soedomo, the then Commander-in-Chief of Kopkamtib, said that he had unraveled a conspiracy movement against the government called *Komando Jihad*. Soedomo, however, did not explicitly accuse PPP for having a direct relation with the alleged movement. Nevertheless, PPP's leaders and Islamic figures beyond political parties felt that Soedomo's announcement was tantamount to direct assault to their direction. Slowly but surely, the regime's efforts to sabotage the aspiration of Muslims in order to defeat PPP in 1977 general election ran their course very effectively.

The 1977 general election was PPP and PDI's turn to be regarded as new comers as Golkar had been in 1971. From any point of view, this was not entirely wrong. The 1977 election indeed was PPP and PDI's first election since their formation in 1973, despite the familiar figures dominating both parties. In reality, the election was going to be an entire new arena as well, in which both parties would compete with the party of Golkar's caliber Indonesia had never seen before. The electoral campaigns would also be quieter with only three parties participated in the election.

With the new identity, it was necessary for each political party to represent its new self to the public. Having a clear identity was half the battle, since without which constituents could not give their supports and subsequently, their votes. It was, therefore, instrumental for each party to identify itself with the people it deemed to be its supporters, and this relation could only be built if there was an effective communication between both sides.

With such relation in mind, it was clearly understood why from the very beginning of the campaign period PPP used religion-related issues to attract

voters (Dhakidae, 1981). The United Development Party was employing a strategy that aimed for traditionalist voters, especially Muslims who once had supported the elemental organizations of PPP, namely NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti, without closing the door for rational voters who were looking for an alternative. In PPP's campaigns, the party leaders boasted that it was the only *sahih* political vessel for Muslims. Its campaigners fiercely endorsed whatever issue religious enough to attract support for their course. This strategy proved to be effective in economically neglected rural areas. In 1977, PPP's votes even managed to surpass Golkar's in the capital DKI Jakarta and in DI Aceh. These were hurtful blows to the government-endorsed Golkar. As the capital of Indonesia, Jakarta has been an important barometer for national politics, while Aceh, the "*Serambi Mekkah*" or the Porch of Mecca, has been known as a city with all-Muslim citizens. The PPP's victories in such electoral areas displayed that Islam was a fierce political rival to Soeharto's administration.

Unlike PPP that had set its identity as Muslims' political vessel, PDI was still searching for its own. It could declare its beliefs in nationalism, democracy and social justice, but that would be too blurry to be used as identity. It then built a populist image, portraying it as a party for the marginalized people (*wong cilik*), but these too were ineffective to gather the necessary votes. Due to its inability to relate itself with its prospective constituents, PDI always became the third-best party in every election there was during the New Order's regime. Its lack of popular leader was also detrimental to its success in attracting the first-time voters.

Given above facts, the 1977 general election campaigns automatically became a fierce competition between Golkar and PPP, during which both parties were competing to acquire as many supports of the Muslims. Both parties tactfully tried to improve their images, sometimes by accusing each other. The campaigners from PPP even went as far as claiming, "Whoever does not vote for PPP is a *kafir*, hence will be denied entrance to heaven." Other campaigners maintained that, "PPP struggles in the way of Allah," so it was an obligation for Muslims to vote for PPP. Their messages implied that a

Muslim who did not vote PPP for fear of losing livelihood or position might as well have become an apostate.

The strategy PPP employed by using religion as support gatherer made Golkar slightly overwhelmed. However, facing such challenge, Golkar's Chairman, Amir Moertono, did not lose his ground. He then rallied many *ulama* and *kyai* as Golkar's campaigners. Even he himself stood before Golkar's audiences in many campaigns, citing the Holy Qur'an. A lot of *āyāt* or Qur'anic verses decorated the campaigns. Each party sought justification through the Qur'an by citing the verses they thought represented their policy and so forth. Both parties even facilitated religious sermons and politicized them as campaign grounds.

In the 1977 general election held on May 2, Golkar suffered 0.69% decrease in its votes compared to the result in 1971. Meanwhile, calculated from the votes its elementary parties had received in the 1971 election, PPP and PDI received 2.17% increase, and 1.48% decrease respectively (see Table 6). Although the 1977 general election saw Golkar defended its title, it was quite an achievement for PPP, especially due to its success in DKI Jakarta and DI Aceh electoral areas,⁵⁶ in which PPP's votes defeated Golkar's convincingly. This Islamic party also managed to score success against Golkar in other electoral areas, such as Serang, Pekalongan, Tanjung Karang and Bukittinggi in Padang.

⁵⁶ Did PPP's victory in prestigious areas, such as Jakarta and Aceh, bring any implication in the government? Obviously not. The Islamic party did not hold the positions of DPRD Chairman and Governor/head of administrative of that area following its victories as it was supposed to be. The absence of political implication of such victories could only mean that political parties other than the ruling party were only complimentary objects for balancing sake and legitimacy basis, if not less. Laws no 5/1974 on The Principles of the Head of Administrative Areas stipulated the DPRD to elect the Governor. In compliance to this regulation, the combination of votes of Golkar and ABRI Factions in the DPRD were enough to undermine that of the PPP Faction. The same went with the election of DPRD Chairman. Although it should have been decided through direct vote casting, the central government and the military through the Department of Home Affairs always intervened to ensure that they did not lose the position, including, in this case, to PPP (Padmono, 2006 : 619). Similar incident happened in the 1999 general election when for the first time Golkar was bested by PDI-P under Megawati Soekarnoputri. Megawati, the Chairwoman of the winning party, PDI-P, and a presidential candidate, failed to be elected President due to political maneuver of the "Middle Axis" (*Poros Tengah*) led by Amien Rais (PAN) and Akbar Tandjung (Golkar) in the DPR Extraordinary Session which elected KH Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur (PKB) instead.

Table 6: The 1977 Legislative Election Results and Comparative Percentage toward the 1971 Election

No.	Party	Votes	% (1977)	Seats	% (1971)	Notes
1.	Golkar	39.750.096	62,11	232	62,80	- 0,69
2.	PPP	18.743.491	29,29	99	27,12	+ 2,17
3.	PDI	5.504.757	8,60	29	10,08	- 1,48
Total		63.998.344	100,00	360	100,00	

Source: M. Sudibyo (1995), *Pemilu 1992: Suatu Evaluasi*; *Suara Karya*, June 10, 1977.

In DKI Jakarta, PPP received 1,097,214 votes (43.77 %), Golkar gathered 961,030 votes (38.96 %), while PDI got 425,940 votes (17.27 %). From those results, both PPP and Golkar received five seats in DPR, while PDI got two seats. In Aceh, PPP received 52.48 % (6 seats) of votes, Golkar 37.72 % (4 seats) and PDI 9.80 % (no seat). Despite the results, PPP's victories did not significantly alter the regional government or the legislative structural formation. As if nothing happened, Golkar still occupied the positions of Governors, Head of Administrative Areas and DPRD's Chairmen in those areas, which should have been gone to PPP.

The following data of 1977 election results could show the strength of each party in national level. Nationwide, Golkar received 232 seats (64.42 %); PPP 99 seats (27.50 %); and PDI 29 seats (8.08 %). This formation remained unchanged in all elections held by New Order, including its last in 1997. The total amount of combined seats of PPP and PDI in DPR never exceeded 170 seats. That was because Soeharto and his administration regarded both parties as mere balance tanks. Whenever the votes of PPP increased, that of PDI decreased accordingly, and vice versa. No matter which party had the most votes in provincial or district level, Golkar was always become the national victor.

Other than in the two aforementioned electoral areas, PPP managed to best Golkar in the Regency (Kabupaten) of Serang where it received 256,374 votes. In the same area, Golkar received 197,877 votes and, trailing behind, PDI with 11,719 votes. As mentioned earlier, PPP also defeated Golkar in

certain Administrative Cities, such as Padang, Bukittinggi, Padang Panjang, Palembang, Tanjung Karang and Pekalongan.

The increase of votes received by PPP in the 1977 election, and the decrease suffered by Golkar, was not direct result of the decreasing phobia toward political party. In truth, it was sourced from the innovative strategy and improvisation employed by PPP by turning religious issues into its selling point. It was able to wrap the up and running issues on Islam to its advantage, such as the draft of Marriage Law it had vocally struggled against, back when it was not yet a party (a political group named *Persatuan Pembangunan*). Ironically, such approach was done in line with what Soeharto had been suggested: "People need to be informed on how to exercise their right in election. However, do not do this in fearsome ways. There is no need for coercion, either. Coercion will only make democracy falter. With coercion, democracy won't grow and with intimidation it will die" (Soeharto's speech on August 16, 1976). He added, "...by exercising political improvisations in electoral campaigns, democracy will grow undeterred and enrich Indonesia's political horizon with new ideas, which in turn will foster the growth of political culture in Indonesia." Such was Soeharto's suggestion to all participants of the 1977 election, although in practice it was never be the case.

Situation surrounding the 1977 general election was rather different either, in which political party phobia was not as intense as it had been in 1971.⁵⁷ It was also around this time that, for the first time, Indonesians started to experience social injustice and inequality. People who lived in areas rich with natural resources, such as Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Irian

⁵⁷ In the contrary of the multi-party system adopted in 1955 and 1971 general elections, 1977 election streamlined the participants of the elections into two parties, PPP and PDI, plus Golkar (which insisted that it was not a political party). On the ballot, the sequence went as follows: 1. PPP, 2. Golkar, 3. PDI. The three parties system was adopted to simplify the ideology-based parties into three major channels. Based on Geertz's trichotomy, PPP represented *santri*, while PDI represented *abangan* and Golkar, *priyayi*. This system was quite an effective approach to modernize the state. However, in practice, it was another embodiment of the survival of the fittest type of game, where the strong (Golkar) devoured the weak (PPP and PDI). Another interesting development was the shift toward program-oriented political platform from the ideological-based platforms adopted in 1955 and 1971. The leaders of PPP and PDI found such shift paralyzing, because the adaptation toward which became the main source of internal conflicts within the parties instead of solution.

Jaya had to witness the wealth of their areas was viciously pirated to Jakarta while they were struggling with poverty. These social injustices were able to be Islamically presented by PPP and became the issues Golkar could not counter. As for PDI, although it had positioned itself as a marginalized people's party, it was still not able to gather significant votes.

In relation to the illicit practices in the election, Bung Tomo, one of prominent members and the highly respected elder of Golkar, stated that Golkar had to show its dignity and act maturely, especially after it had gained so massive a winning in the 1971 general election. However, the fact was in the contrary. During the election campaigns, Golkar positioned itself in shameful deep moral decadence. Golkar and its ranks, including the military, conducted illicit practices in form of intimidations, terrors and coercions in its efforts to win the election, while the people it aimed its abuses to were simply too afraid to speak up. In this matter, Golkar, which keep insisting that it was not a political party, simply did not heed Bung Tomo's call for fair game.

Meanwhile, many predicted that PDI's votes in 1977 would be significantly better than the parties it was formed from had received in the 1971 general election. A lot of PDI's functionaries in the central felt optimistic that that would have been the case. However, it turned out that it only received 29 seats, 1 seat fewer than what its predecessors' received in 1971.

There were two reasons that led to PDI's poor performance in the 1977 general election. Firstly, it was in constant internal tumults due to the feuds between its former PNI members and those among its elementary organizations. Secondly, while PPP and Golkar had established their respective identities for image's sake, and social classes to cater to, PDI simply had not yet found its own. While the *santri* found their political inlet and outlet in PPP and the bureaucrats (*priyayi*) found theirs in Golkar, the *abangan* had not found theirs in PDI, at least not yet. This indicated that PDI did not possess the same level of ability to gather constituents as was shown by PPP and Golkar.

In conclusion, political parties conducted many illicit practices in order to gather more votes in the 1977 general election, especially Golkar that

abused its domination in every possible means. Members of Golkar who held positions in the arbitrary electoral bodies acted predisposed and biased against other parties. It was as if Golkar was both the referee and the player altogether in this political game/election, something that would be repeated in the elections thereafter during the New Order's reign. On top of that was the weak position of political parties resulted from the *departyization* and restructuring efforts of the government since the early 1970s. According to Liddle (1992), Golkar's victory in 1977 was something that was achieved by causing too many victims and costly expenses.

Chapter 5

1982 GENERAL ELECTION: MILITARY'S DOMINATION AND GOLKAR'S STRATEGY

The Political Role of the Military

As has been mentioned in earlier chapter, the socio-political role of the military (ABRI or The Armed Forces of Republic of Indonesia, which was renamed into Indonesian National Army or TNI in the Reformation era) was not achieved overnight in Indonesia's political journey. Instead, the role of armed forces was a *conditio sine qua non* with the formation of Indonesia as a nation. Unlike what happened in western countries, the Indonesian military's involvement in politics had taken place from the very beginning of the independence revolution, as a byproduct of the situation at that time.

The Great Commander General Soedirman, once declared, "Armed force is formed to liberate Indonesia from the threat of Dutch's imperialism and colonialism." From such perspective, the socio-political role of military emerged. The armed forces were not only deployed on the battlefield against Dutch's Military Offensives (*Agresi Militer I* and *Agresi Militer II*) in 1948 and 1949, respectively, but its commanders also took charge in the government as *de facto* leaders (Samego et al., 1998: 247-248). The military's non-combat role also applied when insurgencies emerged in Indonesia, as in PKI's rebellion in Madiun, DI/TII and PRRI/Permesta, to the more recent Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*), Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*), East Timor integration in 1975 and its post-Referendum in 1999, and also during the riots in Ambon-Maluku (2000-2003). Whenever and wherever territorial discords and disunity appeared in Indonesia, military was compelled to resolve it, including by involving itself in high politics.

During the Parliamentary/Liberal Democracy era, military's involvements in civil affairs took place intensely. On October 5, 1951, *Saptamarga* (Seven Ways) soldier's oath was introduced as the "ideology" of

the military. Through the fulfillment of *Saptamarga*, the soldiers' character, spirit and sense of politics were expected to develop to the fullest. Under his Guided Democracy, Soekarno gave military wide access to express its existence by allowing it to be involved in the government and civil management. Moreover, with the comeback of Nasution as the Army Commander-in-Chief, the role of military in national politics went further. The military strategically positioned its officers in various civil posts that involved them directly in non-military affairs, especially in politics.

In 1958, General Nasution introduced the concept of "Middle Way" (*Jalan Tengah*), a prototype of *Dwifungsi* ABRI (Dual Role of ABRI), to end the ongoing political strife between ideologies or *aliran*. This concept encouraged Soekarno to announce the Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959. The Middle Way concept was built on the premise that, "the civilian leaders have failed to formulate new constitution," so that Nasution, on the behalf of ABRI, suggested Soekarno to re-implement the 1945 Constitution and dissolve the Constitutional Council (*Dewan Konstituante*).

Military's action and functional roles (*peran aksi dan kekaryaan*) became more prominent since the New Order assumed power following the September 30, 1965 tragedy. The military even constructed its structural bodies somehow to mirror the civil hierarchical bodies. From bottom, ABRI and Police Force structural commands have gone as follows: *Babinsa* (Non-Commissioned Officers) in village level; *Koramil* and *Polsek* in Sub-District level; *Kodim* and *Polres* in administrative city/regency level; *Korem* and *Polwil* in residency areas and; finally, *Kodam* and *Polda* in Provincial level. It is worthy to note that until recently, Police Force used to be part of the Armed Forces, so that there were four armed Forces consisting of Army, Navy, Air Force and Police Force.

The relation between military structural commands and civil hierarchical structures then developed into joint-coordination in form of third-party institutions. For example, in sub-district areas, there have been Sub-District Consultative Leadership (*Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan-Muspika*), consisting of the Sub-District's Head of Government or *Camat*, *Koramil*

Commander, *Polsek* Commander, and prominent members of the sub-district's communities. There have been similar institutions in Administrative City/Regency or in Provincial level, in the latter of which it has been called *Muspida* or Provincial Consultative Leadership. In all administrative levels, such third-party institutions have always consisted of the heads of administration, the commanders of military and police force units, and legislatures of the respective Provinces and Administrative Regencies.

Other than structural-wise, military also broadened its influence through direct placements of both active and retired military officers in government's administrative positions and other civil-based bureaucracy, such as Governor, Regency's Head, City Mayor, Head of Provincial People's Representative Council, Directorate General, Ambassador, and Inspector General or Minister heading government department. In some provinces (*Daerah Tingkat I*), a Major General often held the position of Governor, with an exception of the Capital, Jakarta, which had a series of Lieutenant General instead of Major General as its Mayors. In successive accounts, those Lieutenant Generals/Governors were Ali Sadikin (1966-1977); Tjokropranolo (1977-1982); R. Suprapto (1982-1987); Wiyogo Atmodarminto (1987-1992); Surjadi Soedirdja (1992-1997); and Sutiyoso (1997-2007). However, the current Jakarta's Governor, Fauzi Bowo, is a civilian bureaucrat although he has a deputy governor from military background, namely Maj. Gen. Suprijanto.

Military officers had dominated Golkar since its *Sekber-Golkar* days (1966) until it changed its status as Golkar Party (1998). Retired military officers had also been dominant in the elites' ranks of Golkar, both in central and regional. The same thing went for Golkar's leadership. It had had several military officers as its Chairman, in chronological order, namely Lt. Gen. Soekawati, Maj. Gen. Amir Murtono, Lt. Gen. Soedharmono and Maj. Gen. Wahono. Meanwhile, Soeharto, who was a military general himself, had held the position of Golkar's Head of Board of Trustees (*Ketua Dewan Pembina Golkar*) from 1969 to 1996. Since its formation, only two civilians had ever held the position of Golkar's Chairman, namely Harmoko and Akbar Tandjung

(and during reform-era, Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie as well). In Golkar's Board of Trustees, Habibie, who succeeded Soeharto as its head, was the only civilian who had ever held the position. During the tenure of Habibie, Golkar's Board of Trustees changed its name into Golkar's Advisory Board (*Dewan Penasihat Golkar*).

Frankly, in many things, civilian and military interests within Golkar or other political parties were at odds with each other. However, whenever such cases occurred, the civilians often had to give up their cause. In all fairness, however, ABRI's domination and the civil-military relation within Indonesia's politics itself was not static but was subject to change according to the overall national political climate. The Minister of Defense and Security/ABRI Commander-in-Chief, General M. Jusuf once instructed, "ABRI personnel who wants to be involved in business or politics should retire first." He also advised ABRI in all area commands to be neutral toward all Organizations of Participants in General Elections (*Organisasi Peserta Pemilu*), namely Golkar, PPP and PDI. These remarks by M. Jusuf implied ABRI's intention to stay aloof from Golkar and give chance to civil politicians to take more active role in politics, as well as reflected ABRI's intention to be more professional in defense and security matters instead of socio-politics.⁵⁸ It was also during M. Jusuf's tenure as Minister of Defense/ABRI Commander-in-Chief that the concept of "ABRI and People Integrated" (*ABRI manunggal dengan rakyat*) was introduced and implemented in form of *ABRI Masuk Desa* or AMD, a program that sent ABRI personnel to rural areas to help the locals in the infrastructure development.

There was a saying at that time which went as follows, "throughout its history, ABRI has served greatly in keeping the unity and integrity of the nation and the state and maintaining the Unitary Republic of Indonesia by withstanding harmful threats that have come successively. Therefore, it

⁵⁸ *Dwifungsi* and *Kekaryaan* ABRI were two separate things. While *Dwifungsi* was the will, spirit and commitment of ABRI to uphold the national objectives based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution together with other socio-political institutions, such as Golkar, PPP and PDI and other mass or professional organizations, *Kekaryaan* ABRI was the deployment of active military personnel in non-military institutions. In both cases, ABRI's role was dominant, in defense and security as well as in socio-political matters.

cannot be denied that ABRI has fulfilled its function as the stabilizer and dynamic force of the nation." Along those lines were sayings concerning ABRI's considerable success in implementing the *Dwifungsi* function that it claimed to be another fulfillment of its role as dynamic force to revive the nation's socio-political life. In reference to its performance in the ABRI/Polri Faction of the legislative bodies (DPR and DPRD), it was also said, "ABRI marches straightforwardly to uphold its role as 'democracy maker'." Sayings as such, no matter how well-grounded they were, only served to feed the arrogance of some ABRI personnel and led to the exaggeration of military's conduct and merit. Such arrogance was the source of the apprehension of many Soeharto's political adversaries toward the military, aside from its potential and willingness to conduct violence.

With such structural pattern and strategic placements of military personnel throughout the state, it was unsurprising to find that every problem-solving attempt of socio-political matter was often conducted in military-like fashions. The negative excess of practices as such resulted in the violent behavior conducted in various occasions, such as (in no chronological order) the murder of Marsinah, a woman labor in Porong-Sidoarjo, East Java; the shooting of farmers in Nipah, Madura; and the murder of Fuad Muhammad Sjafruddin, a journalist in Yogyakarta. The military also involved in several cases of violence of greater scale, such as the Tanjung Priok Tragedy; the killings of alleged criminals in Java (the cases were colloquially nicknamed *Petrus* or Mysterious Shooter); and the violation of human rights that had taken place in Lampung, Aceh, Irian Jaya (Papua), Ambon-Maluku, and East Timor during the whole 1980s and 1990s. It was more than irony to find that "the weapons procured from people's money were the ones that killed them." Whatever reason behind those incidents, "killing civilians is a heavy violation of Human Rights."

Prior to the 1997 general election, in an attempt to assess *Dwifungsi* ABRI on the request of President Soeharto himself, a team of researchers from LIPI concluded that four factors had encouraged the military to pursue dominant role in politics (1998: 243-268). First, a strong belief that military

had an obligation to take the mantle as the savior of the state and the nation. Second, the military related itself to the interest of its function as the guardian of the nations, which it did in pursuant of the Constitution i.e. "(to) protect all the people of Indonesia and all the independence and the land that has been struggled for." Third, military identified itself as stabilizer, dynamic force and democratization force as well as the agent of development and modernization of the nation. Fourth, military identified itself as the protector of public freedom.

All of those convictions were the factors that had endorsed ABRI's socio-political role to be as dominant as it was. Therefore, many referred New Order as a military regime in which military personnel controlled all strategic positions within the state.

In the reform-era, under the escalating public demand, ABRI Headquarter reduced the number of military representatives in DPR from 100 to 75 seats, and then in post-2004 general election to nil. Nevertheless, there have been no restrictions for retired officers to nominate themselves as legislative candidates. Ever since the *reformasi* took place in 1998, the military had gradually reduced its socio-political role and business practices. It had also lost the privilege of reserved parliamentary seats. The Law on Election has clearly stipulated civil positions to be contested through elections and no longer catered to the interest of ABRI as it had been for 30 years. These post-Reformation spirits also saw ABRI's Chief of Socio-Political Staff renamed into Chief of Territorial Staff.

From the historical point of view, ABRI's status as people's hero was inseparable from its own effort in manufacturing its public image using its socio-political role and function. Unlike other countries, the armed forces in Indonesia had not started as a band of mercenaries. Instead, the People's Security Forces or TKR (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*), the embryo of ABRI, had started as people's own militia consisted of the nation's own children, such as the sons of farmers, teachers, merchants and petty laborers who had participated in the long struggle against Dutch's colonialism and Japanese occupation. It had been consisted of people with similar goal to repel the

colonialists/invaders from the motherland. These people and their struggle had been the forerunners of the formation of ABRI that in the Reformation era was renamed into TNI, Indonesian National Army. These backgrounds motivated the military to take actions, not only in the defense and security of the nation but also in the efforts to promote patriotic values of the nation's struggle to the people as well.

It seemed that the Middle Way concept proposed by Nasution in the 1950s was of tremendous benefit for the military. Initially, the purpose of the concept was to provide guidance for individual officer who was going to fulfill another role beyond military position in the government. However, in 1967 Soeharto and his regime modified the concept to become more institutional and collegial in nature to fit his interest.

Soeharto, as President, formulated the *Dwifungsi* according to the formulation made by General Ahmad Yani in a speech he had delivered to army's officers in Bandung. Yani's version was rather different from Nasution's concept. During Soeharto's administration, *Dwifungsi* was formulated and implemented in a way that enabled ABRI as an institution to secure all strategic positions in the government, ranging from Minister, Secretary General, Directorate and Inspectorate General, to Governor, Regent/Mayor and legislative members in DPR/DPRD, in the latter of which it was even granted the whole faction. It was an ordinary phenomenon to have a military officer serving as a director of government-owned company (BUMN and BUMD). In short, the military secured all possible positions, with minor exceptions of certain economic and finance-related positions of public departments and ministries, which usually were reserved for technocrats.

During his administration, Soeharto used *Dwifungsi* politically, especially in relation to Golkar. As has been mentioned earlier, Soeharto, a military man himself, held the position of the Head of Golkar's Board of Trustees. Meanwhile, in each regional level, a military commander always held the supervisory position of Golkar's functionaries. Along with the Indonesian Civil Servants Corp (Korpri), ABRI had become the top-most institution within Golkar. Directly or indirectly, the domination of ABRI was a

result of the incapability of civil politicians to build an effective control system and opposition mechanism to contain the fluctuation of political dynamics. Such incapability created a void the military easily fulfilled with its disciplined and orderly organizational structures. Consequently, the military dominated the national political life and held decisive role within.

Golkar's Consolidation

Now a ruling party, Golkar underwent internal consolidation following its consecutive wins in the 1971 and 1977 general elections. In 1971, it had held its first National Meeting (*Rakernas*) to discuss future internal programs while preparing for the upcoming 1973 MPR General Session. The *Rakernas* had set five key areas for Golkar to focus on as its future objectives, namely Ideology, Politics, Defense and Security, Economy, and the last, Social Culture. In Ideology, Golkar intended to strengthen the position of Pancasila as the sole ideology of the nation. In accordance with the will and the spirit of New Order, Golkar determined to carry out Pancasila and 1945 Constitution as purely and consequently.

In Politics, Golkar intended to reinforce the Pancasila Democracy and restore the functions of the Supreme Institutions of the nation pursuant to the 1945 Constitution. Moreover, Golkar endorsed the simplification of political parties, planned to alter the outlook of ideological policy of previous era into platform-based policy that endorsed people's participations in development process, and intended to implement a clean and authoritative government.

In Defense and Security area, Golkar planned to assist ABRI by facilitating the implementation of *Dwifungsi* needed in fulfilling the latter's roles as the stabilizer, dynamic-generator and democracy-maker.

In Economy, Golkar was set to abandon the practices of statism (*etatism*), political lip service mishmash and lighthouse projects by replacing them with economic improvement and real sector development. Golkar planned to invite foreign investments to boost the economic growth,

encourage private and cooperative economic practices, and build economic cooperation with other nation based on mutual partnership.

In social culture, meanwhile, Golkar was going to wipe out any form of primordial fanaticism based on tribes, religions, races and groups (SARA), or other chauvinistic views; build interreligious harmony; endorse the development-oriented national education; and preserve national cultures, including local, customs and absorbed foreign cultures.

Golkar's intention to carry out the points stipulated above, according to Ali Moertopo (1974), was meant to encourage productive activities (*kekaryaan*). There was no better start for a nation undertaking the process of development than to encourage productive activities—the subjects of which were categorized into profession and functional groups—among its people. Therefore, the encouragement toward productive activities in fact was aimed to grow the sense of profession by first providing the vessel for the development's vanguard organizations, which could also act as the political channel of the functional and profession groups in national level. These broad layouts remained as Golkar's main objectives until the 1997 general election.

Golkar's convincing wins in 1971 and 1977 served as strong legitimacy for Soeharto's administration to the point where it needed optimization on its structure to maintain its performance. The first policy Golkar took to increase its efficiency was by integrating all Core Organizational Groups (KINO) under the command of Golkar's Central Executive Council (DPP). Internal consolidation and organization were also conducted, in which Golkar members were clustered into three factions, namely Faction A (ABRI), Faction B (Bureaucrats) and Faction G (Golkar).

Meanwhile, a more substantial consolidation was initiated in Golkar's Second National Consensus (Munas Ke-2) held in Bali in 1978. If at its first National Consensus Golkar had stipulated the Board of Trustees as a collective leadership to be headed by Soeharto, in the second *Munas* it dismissed the structure of the Main Trustees entirely, leaving only Soeharto as the Head of the board. This decision reflected Golkar's stronger inclination to the model of structural authority stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, which

centralized prominently on the role of President as the mandatory of MPR. The collegial nature of the Board of Trustees, which commonly consisted of prominent government officials, showed the wide polarization of authority in Indonesian political superstructure even further, in which authority was centralized on Soeharto. The position of the Head of The Board of Trustees reinforced Soeharto's political position by giving him prerogative right to annul the decisions of the National Consensus, or the Extraordinary National Consensus (*Munaslub*), if they were not in line with Golkar's policies that had been outlined before.

Three phenomena were apparent in Golkar throughout its existence until the 1997 general election, which could determine its function and give hints of its internal system altogether. First, Golkar was functioned as vote-gathering machine for the New Order regime, serving to provide institutional legitimacy for its status as the ruling authority. It began with the election, the inauguration of the elected MPR, DPR and DPRD members; the President's accountability speech in MPR General Session; the appointment and inauguration of President and Vice-President and the formation of the cabinet; and five years later, back to President's accountability speech in front of MPR assembly of the previous election. The whole process was known as the pentennial cycle of the Pancasila Democracy.

Second, Golkar could not tolerate different opinions, the very essence of democratic life, among its members. Golkar expected all members to be politically passive and uncritical "Yes Men," a practice that gave birth to political adventurers and brokers who lived off the party. This kind of political culture was rather different from the ones practiced by the more egalitarian PPP and PDI.

Third, Golkar cadres were incapable to articulate, let alone initiate and implement political ideas that would benefit the nation. This led to the allegation that Golkar was simply following the direction stated by the regime under Soeharto instead of carrying its own policies. In its electoral campaigns, Golkar's campaigners would sheepishly support everything the government had stated. If there were any Golkar's cadre who was vocal and critical to

government's policy, which was tantamount to being disloyal, needless to say, the party would recall him out of the parliament. These pretty much summed up Golkar's characteristics as a hegemonic party that was functional in the election time but hibernating every time else.

The Disunity of PPP

The declaration that gave birth to PPP was signed by K.H. Idham Chalid and K.H. Masjkur from *Nahdlatul Ulama*; H.M.S. Mintaredja from Parmusi or MI (*Muslimin Indonesia*); Anwar Tjokroaminoto from PSII; and Rusli Djalil from Perti. All of them agreed that although the word *Islam* was absent from the party's name, its spirit had to be maintained. A tension arose in 1973 when this Islamic party protested against the draft of marriage law proposed by the government, and again in 1977, after PPP proposed the use of Ka'aba picture as its insignia. It insisted that the draft of marriage law was against Islamic teaching. Many Islamic scholars and organizations, or even common Muslims supported PPP's stance in the matter. Surprisingly, despite only having 94 members, the PPP's faction in DPR succeeded in rallying supports against the passing of the draft. Under rather inharmonious relation with Soeharto's administration triggered by the dispute, PPP held its National Consensus on November 6-8, 1975 to establish its Articles of Association/Bylaw and inaugurate its central functionaries'. Since the resulting decisions did not annul the structure had been agreed in the initial declaration, PPP maintained H.M.S. Mitaredja as its Chairman, K.H. Idham Chalid as Party's President, K.H. Masjkur as the Head of Central Advisory Council and K.H. Bisri Sjansuri as *Rois Aam* of the *Majelis Syuro*.

In the Consensus, PPP's executive board also agreed that it was necessary to arrange the seats allocation within PPP to mirror the seats each elementary party had received in the 1971 general election. This agreement, known as "1975 Consensus", was meant to avoid any strife within PPP's internal structure. Unfortunately, it led to just that. Another tension with the government rose when K.H. Bisri Sjansuri proposed the Ka'aba picture as the party's insignia. The highly respected K.H. Bisri Sjansuri claimed that his

proposal was inspired by divine intervention while he was performing *salaat-ul-Istikhaarah*. The elites of PPP wholeheartedly believed that it was a sign that Allah blessed their undertakings. Although initially the Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud and the Department of Religion had refused the idea of using Ka'aba as PPP's insignia in the 1977 general election (Haris, 1991: 11-12), the government reluctantly accepted the proposal after a series of long discussion had been taken to address this matter. *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* also refused the Tap GBHN (Broad Outlines of Government Policy) on Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (P-4) and the People's Consultative Assembly's decision to regulate Spiritual Beliefs (*Kepercayaan Kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) into Law. Such distinct standpoint toward the government's policies immediately positioned PPP as Golkar's main contender, leaving PDI trailing in the third place in the elections thereafter. Indonesian Democratic Party or PDI indeed did not able to stand firm following the 1973 fusion. It suffered too long an internal strife to be able to stand undivided. It would eventually gain popularity in the national level, but not until 1992 and before collapsing again in 1997, following the crippling conflict during its 1996 National Consensus.

It has to be admitted that from the very beginning, PPP had held potential of triggering internal conflicts that would provoke government's intervention. The on and off conflicts between *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muslimin Indonesia* (MI) elements were out of extraordinary. The frictions usually took place prior to the formulation of the list of parliamentary candidates, in the election of Faction and Commission leaders in the DPR, and during the party's Conference (Muktamar). The rivalry grew worse at the beginning of 1980s when NU element voiced out its disagreement toward the Draft on Election Law the People's Representative Council was discussing. Some NU prominent figures argued that the Draft did not reflect the parties' political aspirations. They stated the draft was a direct violation of the Regulation on General Election of the 1978 General Session concerning parties' roles, whose regulation and supervision had not been accommodated in the Draft yet. *Nahdlatul Ulama*'s arguments were sensible, especially to better the chances

of political parties in the election. The supports Golkar received from military and civil bureaucrats, in addition to massive funds it received from the government and various Soeharto's foundations were too powerful for other parties to keep in level with, let alone defeat.

For the public's eye, this rejection reflected NU's concerns toward the implementation of general elections in 1971, 1977 and the upcoming 1982, which it deemed to be far from democratic and only served to inflict losses on PPP and PDI. The internal conflict within PPP grew sharper when NU threw an allegation that MI had secretly worked together with government in drafting the list of PPP's parliamentary candidates. Both sides had been adamant to defend their respective seats allocation in the DPR. *Nahdlatul Ulama* was insistent that the party should have stuck to the allocation that had been agreed on its 1975 Consensus, which not coincidentally stipulated a bigger proportion for NU. In practice though, in the list drafted by *Muslimin Indonesia* elements, NU's seats were gradually reduced and MI's increased.

Before the issue subsided, another one had arisen. This time, it was about the seats allocation for the Commissions' Head and members in DPR. *Muslimin Indonesia* proposed an allocation of five seats in every DPR's commission. If this were granted, the composition of PPP representatives in each commission would be NU: five seats, MI: five seats: PSII: two seats and Perti: one seat. The members of NU refused such apportionment because it meant that they had to let go two of their seats. Prior to this dispute, the NU faction had been allocated seven seats in the composition, while MI got four seats, PSII, two seats and Perti nil. This composition changed yet again in 1980 when NU received eight seats; MI received three seats; PSII 2 seats and Perti remained nil (Haris, 1991: 67-69).

This favorable composition surely made NU reluctant to grant MI's proposal. However, this refusal meant nothing since NU-affiliated party members were not able to counter the political maneuvers of MI's cadres, such as Sudjadi and H. John Naro, who cunningly managed to restrain their movement. Their maneuvers would cost NU five of its seats in the commission, so that in the end both NU and MI held three seats each. From

that point on, conflicts between the two factions became steady sources for news headlines. It was not until Jhon Naro was elected as PPP's Chairman and able to shove away NU's hardliners, that the conflicts between both factions finally subsided (Swantoro, 1996: 234). Because the remaining NU elements were quite cooperative toward the party and government's policy, PPP was considerably internal conflict-free during Naro's tenure as Chairman.

From the description above, it can be concluded that there was fragility within PPP since its fusion on January 5, 1973. According to Liddle (1992: 93-95), it was caused by a numbers of reason.

Firstly, there were two kinds of leadership within the party, the hardliners and the moderates, the latter of which obviously were more accommodative toward the government. Nahdlatul Ulama's luminaries, such as KH Yusuf Hasyim, KH Saifuddin Zuhri, Idham Chalid, Imron Rosadi, Nurdin Lubis and Mahbub Djunaedi et al. represented the first group, while the new and emerging politicians, such as Ridwan Saidi, Ismail Hassan Metareum, H. J. Naro and Sudardji et al. represented the second group. Members of the first group were more charismatic than the second one. However, the majority of the new and emerging politicians of the second group were more educated (in formal education) than the first one. They, the second group, were also more cooperative toward the government. They adapted easily to the ongoing political dynamics of that time and had close relation with the government's elites and other prominent figures in MPR/DPR.

Secondly, despite mentioning the word *persatuan* (United) in its name, PPP did not really possess any control mechanisms to circumvent any disunity that occurred. Such absence proved to be detrimental, especially when its internal conflicts not only arose between those of different elements (the forming parties) but also within each element, as would happen between Sudardji and Jhon Naro, or the latter against Buya Ismail, all of whom belonged to Parmusi faction. The ego of each leading figure was kept unchecked. As a result, all of them were driven to garner as many supports from PPP cadres in central, regional and branch level to strengthen their bargaining point. Such conflicts usually precipitated every process of

regeneration of the position of Chairman. Conflict of interests of the same nature also plagued *Nahdlatul Ulama* although it was curbed in form of formal rivalry over certain position within the party, as happened in 1993 when two NU's cadres, Matori Abdul Djalil and Hamzah Haz, were chasing the position of Chairman in PPP's National Conference held in Jakarta.

Thirdly, there were no charismatic leaders to hold the ranks intact, so that the party was susceptible to external interventions. The demand for a strong, charismatic figure was due to the strong patron-client pattern in Indonesia's politics. As comparison, prior to its fusion to PPP, NU had had several charismatic and well-respected *ulamas* whose presences alone were enough to win a lot of votes as had shown in the outcome of 1971 general election where it had been able to surpass that of PNI. The strong charismatic leader was absent in PPP since the fusion, which made the Ka'aba bearing party lost the otherwise devout voters.

Fourthly, there were too many political adventurers in the party, who, aside from lived off the party, inclined to prioritize their own interest or their group's instead of that of the party and its constituents. Exclusive as they were, they did not even leave a room for reconciliation with fellow members of the same Islamic background. Such phenomena were evident in the conflicts that involved fellow NU members, such as Suryadharma Ali with Hamzah Haz, or Hamzah Haz with Mathori Abdul Djalil, and in similar infighting among former MI members, such as Ismail Hasan Metaerum, Sudardji and H.J. Naro.

Fifthly, due to the strong patron-client pattern, relation between the inner circles of PPP went inharmoniously. The domination of senior members, especially the *ulamas*, had led to what could be described as clash of generations between the junior and the senior party members. Cultural influence, especially Javanese, which demanded the junior to respect the elders to the point of blind obedience as was expected of them, played a major part in such cases. If only the senior members also respected the opinion of their junior in reciprocal manner, things would have gone harmoniously. Nevertheless, that was not the case. The absence of open

communication between members, elements and leaders of the party were detrimental to their unity. Reciprocal suspicions and behind-the-back slandering decorated the relation of party members, which made internal conflicts inevitable.

However, even with the given reasons above, the internal conflicts within PPP should not have been as worst if only each responsible party's element could synchronize their Islamic background, tradition and perception. Apparently, such synchronizing had never taken place among the elites of PPP. Concerning this, what the MI faction lacked was profound tradition, while NU was in excess of it, especially with its traditional mass base. However, with its formal education background, MI was more lavish with professional skills compared to NU.

Nahdlatul Ulama has been characterized by its massive reservoir of members, its simplistic approaches and its tendency to resort to tradition, which has earned NU the epithet of traditionalist. The sheer numbers of its mass supporters in Java Island, assumed to reach 30 Million people at that time, brought confidence in NU and gave it strong bargaining point in national politics as far as political party system was concerned (Ali and Iqbal: 1981). It was this strong bargaining point that MI had lacked and most feared, and finally motivated its members to align themselves with Soeharto and his circle of power.

That kind of relation between NU and MI elements by itself was a treacherous one that could burst anytime. Figuratively speaking, like "fire in the husk," it would only need a douse of "political gasoline" to make everything was blown to smithereens. Such relation survived until well in the 1990s. After NU had officially resigned from PPP and had decided to go back to its 1926 *Khittah* (Basic Resolution) pursuant to its *Muktamar*, held in Situbondo in 1984, PPP suffered significant decline in its election results.

The main trigger behind NU's resignation probably was the preparation of the list of candidates' nominee composed by Jhon Naro's et al. The latest list it had made prior to the 1982 general election had completely removed 29 of NU-affiliated candidates from the top list. *Nahdlatul Ulama* argued that that

removal was not a coincident but had been premeditated by Jhon Naro to fulfill his particular scheme. Interestingly, by placing NU candidates in the non-elected order of the list, Naro had jeopardized PPP's chance to score similar results it had received in the 1977 general election, simply because such placements would reduce the numbers of *nahdliyin* voters. Among the "sabotaged" 29 NU's candidates were some prominent NU members, such as Jusuf Hasjim, H.A. Chalik Ali of East Java; KH Saifuddin Zukri, KH. Muklas Chudori, Karmani, Rachmat Mulyomiseno of Central Java; H. Imron Rosjadi, Mahbub Djunaedi from West Java; KH Masykur from Jakarta and HA Zaidan Djauhari from Sumatera. Somehow, this sabotage also triggered internal strife within NU, and thus precipitated its resignation from PPP. However, in a wider perspective, the whole commotion was just another repressive implementation of government's *departyization* and restructuring policy. So repressive, it deadened any critical view left within political parties toward the government to the point of creating a situation where every man was for himself.

Internal Conflicts within Indonesian Democratic Party

Other than PPP's internal conflict mentioned earlier, that of PDI was the most difficult to subdue. Internal conflicts had been plaguing this party since the day it was formed on January 19, 1973. In its most critical form, which took place in its Extraordinary Congress and National Consensus in 1996, the conflict even cleft PDI asunder with Soerjadi led a faction and Megawati Soekarnoputri led another.

The conflicts were more related to structural matters instead of ideological, and allegedly inflicted by the government in the name of *departyization* and restructuring policy. These conflicts, which were divided into two phases, could give a clear picture of conflict-laden political situation in national level of that time. In the first phase, the conflicts were curbed within the circle of party elites only. In the second phase, however, the conflicts started to expand by including the party's grassroots sympathizers, known as "*arus bawah*" as well.

In 1974, just a year after the fusion, a conflict arose between two PNI's ex-members, Moh. Isnaeni and Soenawar Soekawati. The conflict quickly captured Soeharto's attention who decided to intervene by proposing Sanusi Hardjadinata to hold the position of PDI's Chairman to buffer the situation. Sanusi Hardjadinata was the former Minister of Home Affairs during liberal democracy era, and Isnaeni and Soenawar's fellow former PNI. As the situation progressed, Sanusi was elected as Chairman in PDI's First Congress, which was held prior to the 1978 MPR General Session. However, before long, Achmad Sukarmadidjaja and Muhiddin Nasution, who formerly affiliated with IPKI and Murba respectively, toppled him from the position. These two names demanded changes to be made within the ranks of PDI's functionaries, which almost tore apart the PNI group.

Gradually, senior PNI's ex-members were excluded from the Central Executive Council. Sanusi was replaced by Soenawar Soekawati, while Soenawar in turn would be replaced by Moh. Isnaeni. Other ex-PNI members who entered PDI's elites rank during this turmoil included Abdul Madjid, I Gde Djaksa and Rasjid St. Radja Mas. Not long after, figures such as Soelomo and MT. Siregar were also removed from the elites' circle. The conflicts culminated just before the 1978 MPR General Assembly was held. By this time, the ongoing conflicts had threatened to divide the party for good; therefore, the National Intelligence Body (BAKIN) and Department of Home Affairs decided to interfere. Witnessed by the Head of BAKIN, Maj. Gen. Yoga Soegama, his deputy, Brig. Gen Ali Moertopo, and Minister of Home Affairs, Maj. Gen. Amir Machmud, an agreement to add more PNI members as PDI's functionaries was made. The hope that the agreement would bring peace to the party was in fact a false one. The conflicts continued and even grew worse as the rivaling factions now resorted in useless attempt of impeaching each other out of spite.

Prior to PDI's Second Congress planned to be held in Jakarta, conflicts worsened once again. In separate occasions, the conflicting factions proposed for permit to host the Congress to the government, but their proposals were

rejected by the then Pangkopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo on the basis that the permit would be granted only if the conflicting parties ceased their infighting.

Both factions then agreed to bury the hatchet for the sake of the Congress. However, Sudomo also reminded them of the resolution of PDI's National Consensus held in Pandaan in 1979. The National Consensus in discussion, which was organized by two party's elites, Marsoesi and Hardjanto, was highly regarded by PDI members, especially for its contribution to the party's internal regulations. The resolution of that Consensus also stipulated the resignation of Sanusi Hardjadinata, Usep Ranuwidjaja, Mohammad Isnaeni and Soenawar Soekawati from PDI, on the basis that their resignations would end the ongoing conflicts.

Sudomo and his colleagues at the Department of Home Affairs insisted that before they granted the permit, this resolution had to be met first. The four members finally agreed to step down for the sake of the party. However, even their resignations did not end the conflicts right away. At this time, the conflicts had spread not only among fellow senior members but also between the senior and the junior members as what happened between the "Group 17" with Soerjadi et al. The discords within PDI, although involving different individuals and factions, continued its way to 1997, after the formation of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) by Megawati Soekarnoputri, which led to inevitable clashes between both parties' sympathizers during the 1997 general election.

What drew government's intervention on political parties, save for Golkar, was the complex, prolonged internal conflict allegedly inflicted by the government itself in the first place. Whenever the concerned party was no longer able to overcome the conflict, government presented itself as the helping hand. Indeed, such intervention was a recurring theme appeared within PDI throughout Soeharto's administration.

Golkar Always Wins

Instead of diminishing, the government's predominant presence was only increasing in the 1982 general election. Through elaborate political

manipulations, the government-supported Golkar was always favored and privileged, while PPP and PDI were marginalized like neglected orphans. The democratic competitions looked ridiculous because they were never democratic in the first place. In the regime's view, Golkar's domination was instrumental for the development process to take place uninterrupted and served as legitimacy source for Soeharto's authority. To put it simply, Golkar was government's vessel to run its plans.

In political area, the government planned to accomplish two things. First, it wanted to reshape national politics by incorporating policies related to depoliticization, *departyization* and the implementation of floating mass concept. The government deemed these measures crucial since they assumed without which the developments would be disturbed. Political manipulation then progressed to the short-leashing of political parties by imposing every possible limitation there was, so that the political parties, especially the Islamic groups, could not position themselves as opposition. Soeharto himself had sternly announced that Pancasila Democracy did not recognize nor tolerate any dissenting opinions, let alone opposition, and that all things had to be resolved through consensus instead of majority of votes.

The said formula proved to be effective to curb any political unrest. Soeharto had also stated the importance of political ethics, in which he expected all parties to support the government's development programs. But first of all, it was clear that the government intended to use its full control of the authority, granted by the support of the people it received in the election, to prevent parties' interventions as what had been happened in the 1950s and 1960s from reoccurring.

Soon after the government had finished reshaping the vessel, it was the contents' turn. The contents were none other than the individuals who were government officials and civil servants, political figures and common people. The reshaping took the form of indoctrination of Pancasila ideology in form of Guidance for Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (P-4) seminar to erase whatever was left of the previous era's political ideologies and replace it with Pancasila. The P-4 seminar was mandatory for all bureaucrats

and officials, from central down to regional, and all members of political parties and mass organizations.

Through these indoctrination efforts, the government intended all officials' ranks, political parties and common people to achieve synchronized perspectives on the ideology, nation's unity and integrity, national insight, territorial insight and Pancasila values as the foundation of the development process. Naturally, the indoctrination was a way for government to propagate Pancasila to political parties and mass organizations as the sole ideology of the nation and the people of Indonesia.

The issue of ideological basis for political party triggered long debates in various public discourses. Within PPP and PDI, intense arguing took place between the proponents of Pancasila as the sole-ideology and those who opposed the idea. Naturally, Golkar was quiet since it had accepted Pancasila as its sole-ideology as had been stipulated by the government. In public's perspective, the division of opinion within PPP and PDI regarding this matter, aside from internal conflicts they suffered, portrayed both parties' unpreparedness to rule, and thus, the public deemed them unworthy of winning the election.

Under such perspective, Golkar's victory in 1982 general election was mere repetition of the New Order's former elections: same atmosphere, same procedures. However, certain phenomena were quite interesting. *First*, the restructuring of political parties that no longer involving the mass worked without much trouble.

Second, while voters were hesitant to vote for the conflict-pestered parties, they were also reluctant to vote for Golkar. This phenomenon was especially true among the independent, middle-class and more-educated voters living in big cities.

Third, the heated tension emerged during the campaign period, especially in East Java and Jakarta, served to disinterest the public toward the election. As a result, the numbers of "Golput" were on the rise. Emerged for the first time in 1971, Golput phenomenon remained until 1997.

In the meanwhile, security forces practiced various kinds of political pressures to terrorize numerous political activists, especially from Islamic group. The leaders from PPP protested about the discrimination faced by their subordinates in various regions, in which some of them were detained, terrorized, intimidated and prohibited from going to the campaign, and so on. Political pressure conducted toward Islamic group was obviously the result of the government's own tendency to create imaginary enemy to protect its interests.

Soeharto's administration stipulated that every violation toward the election process had to be processed in a quick trial. In practice, however, any case as such often ended in confusion. The law enforcers seemed inconsistent and very biased in facing such cases. Many cases ended in unsatisfactory verdicts. Even if there was any stern punishment toward the violators, the victims of which were always coincidentally affiliated to PPP or PDI, while the violators from Golkar elements were treated nicely, despite had been proven guilty for having engaged in destructive acts such as the burning the other parties' banners. At this point, to protect its interest, the government decided to create imaginary adversary which happened to be the Islamic ideology.

One example was what happened during Golkar's electorate campaign in Jakarta, on March 18, 1982. At that time, in rather a show-of-force fashion, Golkar invited a million of its sympathizers to *Lapangan Banteng* and commissioned ranks of famous celebrities as entertainers. It had scheduled Ali Moertopo, the Minister of Information at that time, and Prof. Dr. Widjojo Nitisastro, the Head of Bappenas as campaigners for that day. Both figures were listed as candidates No.1 and 2 in the legislative list of DKI Jakarta electorate area, although their nominations were more of a political tactic as vote gatherers than real candidacies.

The campaign day ran with merriment with the performance of "*Artis Safari*" led by Eddy Soed. Hundreds of thousands of sympathizers had gathered, but the campaigners had not arrived yet. All of a sudden, riot broke. Bottles, sandals and rocks bombarded the crowds. Fear and confusion

followed. Apparently, out of nowhere, some people with PPP attributes had started the chaos. Golkar's security forces (Satgas) were sent scrambling while people rushed to safety. The rioters ransacked and ruined Golkar's banners and attributes; they burned some of those attributes and tore down the campaign stage. No one really knew who these rioters were, except that they were wearing PPP's attributes.

From *Lapangan Banteng*, the riot then spread to other vicinities in the East, Central and North Jakarta. Looting and vandalism were inevitable. Rumor circulated that there were PPP sympathizers on the loose, harassing and mugging women who crossed their way, adding fear to the already tense situation. The rioters in *Lapangan Banteng* were suspected to be deliberately set on the loose by the authority and allegedly consisted of thugs and recidivists who previously had been ordered to start the riots. By and large, because of the shenanigans, PPP was positioned as the culprit in this obvious smear campaign, while Golkar was positioned as the "victim" that needed protection. The Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time, Tjokropranolo, then gave options to DKI Jakarta's Golkar Functionaries whether to continue the campaign or postpone it to later time. Finally, the campaign was cancelled, but not before the plan for a much bigger, merrier campaign had been agreed.

Following the *Lapangan Banteng* riots, 89 people were arrested, but the law process of these detainees have never been made clear to the public. Such was the law in Indonesia, which ironically is a law country. As have been suggested above, the incident of *Lapangan Banteng* was just another ploy of the authority to smear other parties' reputation, especially PPP. The motives behind this ploy were obvious. First, in order to fend off PPP's sympathizers from voting for it, Golkar needed to smear the image of PPP by means of violence and intimidation. Second, it was a part of Golkar's mission to win Jakarta electorate area PPP had won in two previous elections. Lastly, there was no message more powerful for a political entity which sought for ultimate domination than to win Jakarta, the Capital of the State, and thereby the centre of political power. It was as if there should have been no other

parties allowed to beat Golkar in the New Order's elections. Therefore, political scenarios had been set to ruin PPP's power base in Jakarta. Golkar's efforts were paid off with the support of military and civil bureaucrats and criminal underworld. It was finally able to beat PPP in Jakarta in the 1982 general election. However, it was also its dirtiest victory to boot that cost Golkar too much and caused too many victims.

The terror of violence as displayed in the *Lapangan Banteng* Incident was another recurring theme in New Order's political strategy in every election thereafter. The political violence that predominated Soeharto's administration was maintained, enhanced, and even fortified with the practice of money politics. Borrowing the statement of Pangkopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo at that time, such violence was "an action which has been thoroughly prepared to spark similar turmoil in other place whenever there is a party which decides to stand against the government." This incident became part of the history of political manipulation in Indonesia.

Hostility became a legacy of political campaigns in Jakarta, which often involved a lot of mass violence ever since. During the 1992 election campaign, for example, a mob of PDI supporters attacked Golkar sympathizers. At that time, Jakarta was under the "total red" phenomenon (Metal, Merah Total), in reference to PDI-mania that hit Jakarta's populace. Riots of bigger scale also broke out in 1999 when PDI sympathizers ambushed Golkar's supporters in the vicinities of Senen and Jalan Sudirman in Central Jakarta. The incident resulted in the burning of Golkar's attributes and banners, a motorcycle, and three public transport cars which had been used to transport Golkar's sympathizers. In separate occasion, Golkar's regional executive council (DPD) office around Tebet was burned down by unknown mob. These incidents were some kind of political retaliation against Golkar, which for three decades had always won the elections through manipulative ways.

The elections the New Order held with the support of military and civil bureaucrats were well-planned systems to display Soeharto's legitimacy in international's view. Therefore, to call the elections held during this period as

democratic events or democratic fiestas was untrue,⁵⁹ simply because they were no more than mass mobilizations and manipulations conducted to protect the *status quo*. During the elections in the period of 1971-1997, Golkar's 62-73 per cent winnings, which had made it a hegemonic party, PPP's 27-29 per cent and PDI's 8-10 per cent of votes showed how imbalanced the political power sharing between Golkar and other political parties was during Soeharto's administration.

Once the campaigning period was over, the 1982 general election was held simultaneously on May 4, 1982. In the election, Golkar managed to snatch back several electorate areas PPP had won previously, such as Jakarta and South Kalimantan. However, Golkar was still unable to win Aceh which remained as PPP's realm. Nationally, Golkar was able to add 10 more DPR seats, which meant that PPP and PDI had to lose the same amount of seats in DPR. In total, it won 242 seats out of 48,334,724 votes. As follows was the seats distribution in the 1982 general election:

Table 7: The Results of the 1982 General Election and the Percentage of Votes of the 1977 General Election

No.	Parties	Votes for DPR	% 1982	Seats	% 1977	Notes
1.	Golkar	48,334,724	64.34	242	62.11	+ 2,23
2.	PPP	20,871,880	27.78	94	29.29	- 1,51
3.	PDI	5,919,702	7.88	24	8.60	- 0,72
	Total	75,126,306	100.00	364	100.00	

Source: M. Sudibyo (1995), *Pemilu 1992: Suatu Evaluasi* (Jakarta, CSIS).

Golkar's success in the 1982 general election once again was sourced from the full backing of civil bureaucrats and military. Golkar built its hegemonic status by riding on government's structure and channeling the

⁵⁹ For example, in July 1981, the entire staffs of the Department of Religious Affairs signed legal statement that they would vote for Golkar in the election. In September the same year, through the Minister of Information's Regulation, the entire staffs of the Information Department were campaigning for Golkar, while in December the whole Village Heads were enforced to support Golkar. The nation-wide "ABRI Enters the Village" program augmented the supports for Golkar further. These were in reverse to the fate of the castrated and marginalized PPP and PDI.

mobilization of the government officials and military personnel. By combining various methods, from persuasive to intimidation and terror, civil and military officials mobilized the mass to vote for Golkar, occasionally with the help of local officials. Such methods were common phenomena all over the country, in both Java and other islands. Among the illicit practices to boost Golkar's votes, and probably the most outrageous, was when the officials or regional bureaucrats personally marked hundred stacks of ballots on the voting day and included those forged ballots in the counting process to inflate its tally. Golkar's officials were also infamous for their "*serangan fajar*" or "dawn raid operations," door-to-door campaigning on the dawn of voting day by giving incentives, either in money or staple goods supplies.

For the civil bureaucrats and military, the reward for such loyalty and participation was the governmental position they could get. Every of such position, from ministerial level to regional's head of administrative happened to consist solely of Golkar's elements. Such positions that supposed to be of service to the society were abused as mere power source. During Golkar's reign, such formal positions gradually changed into just that. Furthermore, with the blessing of Soeharto, military's domination in all area became something the political parties could not keep up with.

The transformation of government bureaucracy into a source of power abuse actually had started back in 1971. There were several indications. *First*, the formation of strict security forces to create stability and order within the state. *Second*, the mass depoliticization that allowed the government to focus on economic developments. *Third*, the restructuring imposed on political parties, which eventually led to internal conflict within the parties. *Fourth*, the manipulation of the voting and election system to ensure Golkar's victory as a majority party conducted with the supports of ABRI, bureaucrats, businesspersons and profession organizations.

As the biggest and unchallenged political power, Golkar was no longer prioritizing on important and fundamental matters concerning the nation's survival, identity seeking and the nation's character building. Instead, it became more arrogant and overconfident. Golkar also denied the rights of

other political parties and even worse, the people, by repeatedly winning the elections as single majority. Golkar became mere orthodox political power whose sole purpose was to defend the *status quo*. It grew ignorant of people's aspiration and uncreative in forming beneficial programs because of the certainty of the winning it had. The most ironic of all was that everything it conducted was sourced from one man's commands, The Head of Golkar's Board of Trustees.

Chapter 6

1987 GENERAL ELECTION: THE RETURN OF POLITICAL *ALIRAN*

***Nahdlatul Ulama* Goes Back to 1926 Khittah**

Discussing *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) is to discuss about the largest socio-religious organization in the Republic of Indonesia and the world at once. Often represented as being accommodative, traditional, eccentric, and at the intersection of socio-political forms, NU has claimed to have 30 Million members, called *nahdliyin*, since the mid 1980s. It all started when several *ulamas* under the tutelage of KH Hasyim Asj'ari⁶⁰ joined hands to form religious organization named "*Nuhudlul Ulama*," which means The Rise of *Ulama*. However, on January 31, 1926, the "*Hadrotus Syeikh*" or "The Respected Sheikh," K.H. Hasyim Asj'ari, and KH Abdul Wahab Hasbullah finally established NU as a religious organization and changed the name of the organization into *Nahdlatul Ulama*,⁶¹ which means "The Revival/Awakening of The *Ulama*". As a socio-Islamic organization (*Jamiyah Diniyah Islamiyah*), NU has adopted the principle of *aqidah ahlussunnah waljamaah* with the following principles:

1. In *aqidah* (Islamic theology), NU follows the teaching of Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari and Abu Mansur Al Maturidi.
2. In *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), it follows the four *mazhab* of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali.

⁶⁰ The Great Ulama Hasyim Asj'ari (Gus Dur's grandfather) holds a special place among the *nahdliyins*. In his lifetime, he was revered as the *Rais Akbar* (Arabic: The Great Chief) of *Nahdlatul Ulama*, a position none other has ever held and ever will in the history of NU. His successors have taken the lesser title of *Ra's A'am* because they agree that his quality as an *ulama* or a leader is unsurpassable.

⁶¹ The structure of NU's officials when it was established on January 31, 1926: *Syuriah* Council; KH. Hasyim Asj'ari (Rais Akbar), KH Dachlan Achyad (Chief-Deputy), while KH. Wahab Hasbullah, KH. Abdul Halim, A'wan, KH Mas Alwi Abdul Aziz, KH Ridwan Abdullah, KH. Awin Abdul Syukur et al served as the *Katib* or Secretary of the *Syuriah*. The *Tanfidziah* Council consisted of H. Hasan Gipo (Chief Administrator), H. Syaleh Syamil (Vice-Chief), M. Shodiq and H. Nawawi (Secretary); H. Muhammad Burhan and H. Ja'far (Treasurer) (Fathoni dan Zen, 1992 : 26).

3. In *tasawuf* (Islam esoteric teachings), NU follows the teaching of Al Junayd, Al-Baghdadi and Al-Ghazali.

The above principles present *Nahdlatul Ulama* as an Islamic tradition, hardly influenced by the advancement of urban modernization culture. Furthermore, NU has a set of traditions that distinguishes it from the modernist Islam, whose existence alone is a testimony to its great resiliency against the influence of modernization and socio-cultural shifts within the society. The long process it has taken in institutionalizing itself has granted NU more than a firm position in Indonesia, especially in rural areas all around Java Island, and some area on the outer islands such as South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, Jambi, and Bengkulu. From the sheer number of its members and the vast areas it has influenced, many would agree NU has all the potentials as the key to understand Indonesian Muslims.

Nahdlatul Ulama was established on a belief and perception that one can only fulfill one's need only if one is willing to live in a society. By living in the society, a man can engage in the labor to achieve happiness in life and withstand every threat that comes to his way. Unity that follows spiritual bond, mutual-cooperation and conformity, is the precondition of the kinship instrumental to the formation of good, peaceful and harmonious society (Mahfudh, 1994: 228). *Nahdlatul Ulama* is also purported to facilitate the union between the revitalization of *Ulama* and the *ummah* in order to partake in the effort of creating prosperous society and fully-developed nation while upholding the noble nature of human values. Moreover, the strong religious belief of NU is dedicated to create an intelligent, skillful, noble, just, and prosperous society characterized by its devotion toward Allah SWT.

As a religious-cultural organization, NU is an inseparable part of Indonesian Muslim's society that strives to uphold the principles of fraternity, tolerance and mutual existence with other Muslims and fellow citizens. As an organization, NU has always integrated itself with the struggle of Indonesia as a nation, and actively involved in the development of just and prosperous society devoted to Allah SWT.

That being said, it can be concluded that NU is a religious socio-cultural organization which was established by the *ulamas*, well-learned in the understanding of the teaching and in-depth values of traditional Islam. Such proficiencies on various subjects of high-standard religious values of the *ulamas* have emanated from within NU since the first day the organization came into existence (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1994: 4). The Executive Council (*Tanfidziyah*) and the Supreme Council (*Syuriah*) in NU's structural system are the implementation of approbation maintained by the *nahdliyins* toward the *ulamas* and *kyais* or Islamic scholars, which are symbolized by the act of kissing the hand of the *ulamas*.

Such structural division is sourced from a rather extreme stratification of scholarly traditions within the traditional *ulamas*. Those who earn the highest positions in such structural stratification are the *ulamas* who have thoroughly and utterly understood and mastered the *sharia* laws, most especially the *fiqh* and its peripherals. However, the most venerated position among these Islamic jurists is held by the one who has attained the full knowledge of *tafsir* and *ta'wil* of the Qur'an and *hadiths* which serve as the "foundation of the implementation of *fiqh* in social life." Among the few who fall into the last category is none other than the late KH Hasyim Asj'ari, the founder of NU and Tebuireng *Pesantren* in Jombang, East Java.

As have been mentioned earlier, NU had involved politically in Masyumi before it withdrew itself from the latter and established its own political party in 1952. Then, on January 5, 1973, NU was amalgamated with other Islamic parties, namely Parmusi, Perti and PSII to form the United Development Party (PPP). However, by the decision of its *Muktamar* (Conference) held in Situbondo, NU officially resigned from PPP in 1984.

From the days of its founders, the venerable *ulamas* such as KH Hasyim Asja'ri, KH Wahab Abdullah, KH Bishri Sjansuri, KH Samsyul Arifin to that of their successors, such as KH Achmad Siddiq, KH Ali Maksum, KH Syahal Machfud, KH Ali Yafi, and KH Ilyas Ruchiyat, NU has never completely separated political matters from the religious ones. Therefore, when in 1983 NU's Ulamas' National Consensus (*Munas Alim Ulama*) declared its intention to

rejuvenate NU back to its initial *khittah* (Basic Resolution), which later was ratified in its 1984 Conference; it showed NU's intention to go back to its initial form as a religious socio-cultural organization neutral to politics. Nahdlatul Ulama's withdrawal greatly affected PPP in which it saw a sharp decline in its 1987 general election result.

The principles of 1926 Khittah have formulated the nature of NU and the position of the *ulamas* as follows:

"NU is a congregation of *ulamas* who are reawakened in spirit set forth to reawaken that of their disciples together with Muslims from among the people of the nation. With due regards, within NU, the *ulamas* hold the central position as the founders of the organization, the leaders who are responsible in managing the organization, and the moral compass of the *nahdliyin (ummah)*."

The formulation of NU's principles above then continues to the description of the 1926 Khittah, namely:

"...a foundation upon which thoughts, behaviors and actions of NU's members in all dealings and organizational activities and in all decision-making efforts is to be built. The foundation is sourced from the essence of basic aspiration of the establishment of NU, which is a solemn attitude solely attributed to the worship of Allah SWT."

With the rejuvenation of its principles, all elements within NU have agreed and duly conformed that the *ulamas* should once again hold the central position as the leaders of the organization (*Sinar Harapan*, January 5, 1984). Since then, the position and the authority of the *Syuriah* or the Supreme Council have been restored to the highest rank within NU's structural organization, while the members of *Tanfidziyah*⁶² or the Executive Council have been positioned as the daily functionaries whose appointments

⁶² The division of leadership into *Syuriah* and *Tanfidziah* Councils is based on the delegation of tasks, functions and roles of the respective councils in which the *Tadfiziyah* has the outer roles. KH Idham Chalid had led this council before KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), following the Muktamar of Situbondo, replaced him in 1984 and held the position until the Muktamar of Kediri took place in 1999. The *Syuriah* Council, meanwhile, is responsible to inner roles of the organization and usually headed by senior ulama. KH Hasyim Asj'ari, KH Abdulwahab Chasbullah, KH Bisri Sansjuri, and KH. R. Syamsul Arifin, successively used to be the Head of the council, and so did KH Ali Maksum, KH Maskjur, KH Anwar Musadad, KH Achmad Siddiq, and KH Machrus Ali.

have to be authorized by the *Syuriah*. Furthermore, the *Syuriah* can revoke a member of *Tanfidziah*, without having to wait for the end of his tenure, should he violate the principles of the *jam'iyyah* and Islam.⁶³ Hence, the authority of *Syuriah* Council/Board within the *jam'iyyah* has been repositioned into the central leadership that befits the status of NU as a socio-religious organization concerned on improving the socio-cultural aspects within the rural societies.

As stipulated in its Situbondo Muktamar (1984), by re-accepting the 1926 Khittah,⁶⁴ "NU has established new foundations, perspectives and orientations toward the predicaments faced by the people of Indonesia in general and *nahdliyin* in particular, without having to alter the Islamic *fiqh*s as laid out by Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali." Furthermore, the rejuvenation to 1926 Khittah has resulted in:

"The rebirth of socio-cultural movement within NU, namely a non-violence movement that strives to grow and develop relatively new thoughts, perspectives, views, perceptions, and values toward the predicaments of the people of Indonesia in general and the community of *Nahdlatul Ulama* in particular."

This socio-cultural movement striving to promote changes in peaceful, non-violence ways is the very basis upon which both the *ulama* and *nahdliyin* set their behavior and attitude toward the efforts to overcome the predicaments in Indonesia and undertake the transformation of NU itself.

The wholesale transformation did not happen in a rapid fashion, but the process has been fruitful nonetheless. After all, the retroactive

⁶³ The principle, according to several analysts, was preceded by the friction between KH Idham Chalid as the Chairman of PBNU and KH Ali Maksum, the *Rais Aam* of the *Syuriah* Council. In bigger picture, the conflict represented the dissenting opinions of the Cipete Group (politicians) against that of the cultural *ulamas* in various provinces. Following the conflict, the National Consensus of Situbondo in December 1983, which did not invite Idham Chalid, recommended the principles of Pancasila and the 1926 Khittah to be adopted as NU's principles. These recommendations then were ratified in the next Muktamar held in the same place one year later.

⁶⁴ In political context, the 1926 Khittah gives the following principle, "To be involved in politics is one of underlying rights of the people of the nation, including NU's members. However, NU is not a coordinating body for day-to-day politics. Therefore, any political rights there are, should be conducted in accordance with the Laws, religious teachings and noble values, so that they lead to a healthy political culture (Irsyam, *Kompas*, January, 5 1984).

rejuvenation to the *Khittah* has demanded total transformation in every aspect of NU's existence, both religiously and socially, which is impossible to be achieved overnight. The *Khittah* has further defined NU's allegiance in its involvement in the society, the state, and the nation. The *Khittah* has also influenced its view toward the implementation of Pancasila as the sole ideology of the mass and political organizations. In that matter, Pancasila has been positioned as the base ideology and philosophy of the nation, and not of religion. Therefore, to live based on the ideology of Pancasila has been deemed enough by the majority of NU members. The First Principle of Pancasila, Belief in One and Only God, which underlies other Principles of Pancasila, and its detailed account on the Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, is in accordance with the concept of *tauhid* in Islamic belief. Therefore, Pancasila has been seen as a proficient guide for NU's activities, including its political struggle, in civic life.

At that time, the 1926 *Khittah* served as NU's justification for the things that would follow. On one hand, it gave an impression that NU was surrendering its political aspirations, especially its involvement in practical politics. The *Khittah* served as strong argument for withdrawing from PPP, a decision that deflated the latter's votes result in the 1987 general election. However, on the other hand, that did not stop some members of NU from resenting that decision. They were hoping it stayed with PPP for it was the only party that catered to the Muslims' political aspirations.

The reestablishment of the *khittah* was not without problems. Its initial implementation hinted some unfamiliarity and inexperience at the *nahdliyin*'s end, not excluding its own leaders, toward the nature of the *khittah*. The same went with the directive description of the *khittah* which could incite, as it was, different perceptions among NU's politicians. Among all, the less-responsive approach of the NU's highest authority, the *Syuriah* Council, in presenting and socializing the *khittah* to all NU's regional representatives was the most detrimental in creating the institutional crisis that followed the reimplementation of the 1926 *Khittah*.

Due to the crisis, two NU's luminaries at that time, KH Achmad Siddiq and KH Abdurrahman Wahid, encouraged NU to rebuff its involvement in political parties for good. Achmad Siddiq believed such apolitical stance would transform NU into more liable "moral powerhouse" that would be able to influence national politics in better way. In the contrary, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) did not believe that leaving PPP was a way to transform NU into mere moral powerhouse. Instead, he believed it was an opening for NU to spread broader influence to greater milieu in society, including the military, political parties and NGOs. Therefore, Gus Dur maintained that to part way with political party was not a shameful retreat, but instead an advance tactical and militant transformation disguised in an apolitical stance (Feillard, 1999: xix).

The culture of NU is inseparable from its essence as a congregation of *ulamas* including all values and institutions therein. Therefore, the insights of the *ulamas* are the main source of NU's culture. However, the *ulamas* here refer not to individuals, but instead to the qualities of the attained knowledge on Islam.

The majority of NU's *ulamas*, if not all, have mastered *fiqh* or Islamic jurisprudence. The scope of *fiqh* covers all religious practices that manifest in daily life e.g. within family, society and nation. Therefore, the *fuqaha* (those who are well-learned in *fiqh*) are expected to encounter all recent predicaments in the society, which in turn will expand their own functional scope from the issue of mortal life to that of religion and everything in between. The most prominent of all *fiqh* within the scope of NU are the ones related to the education and the development of Islamic teaching, such as *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), *madrasa* (Islamic School), women empowerment, Islamic preaching, moral education of the *nahdliyin*, people's economy, and other socio-cultural developments, including the empowerment of civil society.

Mahrus Irsyam (1984) divides NU's main culture into three patterns. The first is the legal-formal pattern, in which *fiqhs* of the *ahlussunah wal jamaah ulamas* are sourced from the *mujtahid* (authoritative Islamic jurists),

especially the founders of the four *fiqh* schools, namely Imam Hanafi, Imam Maliki, Imam Shafi'i, and Imam Hanbali. The next authorized references are the thoughts of other great *ulamas* who have been regarded as having *mujtahid* qualities. The most important thing about *fiqh* is that it has to be sourced from both the Qur'an and the *hadiths*.

The second is the pragmatic pattern. Ulamas of this type have already familiar with, and have full knowledge of, the structure of the problems in discussion, from the settings, behaviors, attitudes, interactions, standpoints and the processes. Without enough comprehension on the ins and outs of a problem, it will be impossible to give a *fatwa* (verdict) as the solution.

The third pattern is the implementation of *fatwa* (verdict), itself a legal product of *fiqh*, as a solution of a problem instead of retribution. Therefore, although there are strong legal-formal practices within NU, its solution-oriented approach has spared NU from ambivalences.⁶⁵ This explains why NU, which is connoted as traditionalist religious organization, is able to deal with recent developments in society including, but not limited to, ideological matter, with relatively more success compared to the modernist Islam groups. Counted among the leaders of NU who are famous for their cultural approaches were KH Wahab Hasbulah, KH Bisri Syansuri, KH Machrus Ali, KH Syamsul Arifin, KH Achmad Siddiq, KH. Kholil Bisri, KH Ilyas Ruchiyat, and KH Abdurrahman Wahid.

The cultural approach needs to receive special attention, especially because its function has been instrumental in determining NU's position in the last 20 years. Shortly after KH Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur had been elected as the Chairman of PBNU (Grand Committee of *Nahdlatul Ulama*) in Situbondo *Muktamar* in 1984, NU rebuffed its involvement in daily politics. Since then, through his brilliant thinking and approaches, Gus Dur, who led NU for three terms, 1984-1989; 1989-1994; 1994-1999, respectively, was

⁶⁵ Mahrus Irsyam (1984) is not sure of the ambivalence and accommodative inferiorities other groups have believed NU to have, particularly because such conclusions have often come from the impressions NU has instigated toward particular reviewers, which coincidentally have not been that familiar with the inner workings of a socio-religious organization of NU's caliber. Their reviews have not touched the reality of cultural values NU has developed inwardly. Therefore, the said ambivalence still needs to be proved by more empirical evidences.

able to bring NU forward in modern and positive socio-cultural activities. For the same achievement and his prominence, in post-Reformation era Gus Dur was elected as the Fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia in the MPR Special Session in 1999. To a lot of people, Gus Dur was identical with NU and vice versa.

Gus Dur inspired NU's younger generations to explore their thoughts on subjects which turned out to be very relevant with the shifts of values within the society. The discourses on democracy and democratization, humanism, pluralism, the enforcement of human rights and civil society have become *nahdliyin's* steady diet, especially for the younger generations. Gus Dur's persistency in promoting such discourses earned him the position of figurehead for those who intended to review NU's new image. A lot of doctoral candidates came to him to get the most appropriate references for their research on NU.

The main aspects of the combination of the *cultural* approaches of NU with the development of Islam in Indonesia are "the scholarly traditions it has developed, perspective on society it has had, decision-making process it has taken, and the internal reconciliation method it has conducted whenever extreme dissent appears within the organization." All the aspects are related to each other, influenced each other ,and in general supported each other.

The main core of the tradition of NU is the organic inter-correlation between *tauhid*, *fiqh* and *tasawuf* which in long term is expected to bring the knowledge of everything that connects the worldly dimensions with the *ukhrawi* (lit: End of Days), or the traditional with modern. The link between the worldly dimensions with the divine ones in life is the key to NU's psyche mechanism, developed to answer the challenge of secularism that emerged as the byproduct of modernization. In this level, struggles between the proponents of traditional and modern values have taken place rigorously within NU's ruling elites, both in *Syuriah* and *Tanfidziah* Councils, and between the cultural and the structural (politicians) NU's members.

Nahdlatul Ulama's position has always been at the intersection of socio-cultural and socio-political stance. As a socio-religious or cultural religious

organization, it transformed into political party in 1952 and had been involved in politic ever since until it returned to the 1926 *Khittah* in 1984. Ever since Soeharto's administration enforced all mass and socio-political organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideology, ideological conflicts between Islam and Pancasila had been able to be avoided in formal way. However, the solution to that conflict has never been agreed upon since it has moved from the formal to non-formal areas and from political arena to daily life within society.

Therefore, with the rejuvenation to the 1926 *Khittah* as the background, NU's journey should be closely examined. Everyone must learn from the struggle of the cultural versus the structural elements of NU that have taken place so far, so that each element can be accurately categorized, including the *jam'iyyah* and *jamaa'ah* aspects of both. If this cannot be achieved, NU's future will be dominated with sociologically interesting but politically worrying strives, in which NU will transform into a pro-democratic civil society organization that ironically put its members under structural duress that can lead to another crisis.

In Nahdlatul Ulama's *Muktamar* held in Situbondo in 1984, Pancasila received full supports from all of the *muktamirin* (muktamar's attendees) as the sole-ideology of party and mass organizations. Judging from its activities since it left PPP, NU had showed several indications that it would once again enter the politics for the sake of its struggle as what they had done in the period of 1952-1971 and 1973-1984. This was evident when NU entrusted its political aspiration to the National Awakening Party (PKB) in July 1998; a political maneuver which resulted in the election of Gus Dur, its best son, as the Fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia, replacing BJ Habibie in the 1999 MPR Special Session.

Golkar Plans Three Successes

Approaching the 1987 general election, under the leadership of Sudharmono SH and Ir. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja as Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, Golkar was ready to achieve another glory. Supported

by civil bureaucrats and military with Soeharto as the Head of its Board of Trustees, Golkar had been able to expand its influence to all corners of the nation. In all regions, all the government officials such as Governors, Regents, Majors, Sub-District Heads and the Head of Villages were ready to help Golkar maintained its status as New Order regime's political tool.

In the Third Golkar's National Consensus⁶⁶ held on October 20-25, 1983, Sudharmono proclaimed Golkar's main objectives in the next five years, referred as "three successes," as follows: (1) success in consolidating the organization; (2) success in the active involvement of development for the success of Repelita IV; and (3) winning the 1987 general election as a motivation to preserve the national development.

If the first success was a call for the formation of strong political cadres and more stable procurement of funds for the organization, the second success implied Golkar's support for the *Pancakrida* (Five-Point Working Program) of the Development Cabinet IV under Soeharto in fulfilling the objectives of the Repelita IV. Meanwhile, the third success was a battle cry to transform the 1987 general election, the fourth election under New Order's administration, into an orderly and smooth political event Golkar had to win as a precondition of the continuation of national development.

Aside from the proclaimed three successes, Golkar also intended to create a clean and authoritative government. Therefore, Golkar planned to support all efforts toward increasing the skills of the government officials (civil bureaucrats and military personnel), their welfare, and the effectiveness of

⁶⁶ The Third National Consensus of Golkar took place in the period of October 20-25, 1983 in which it produced 12 stipulations. Four of which concerned on the internal arrangements of the National Consensus, while the other eight related to Golkar's political decisions i.e. the improvement on Articles of Association, political statements, the inauguration of party's elders, the inauguration of the Board of Trustees and other general programs. Golkar's Central Executive Council, DPP-Golkar, consisted of eleven members comprising the General Chairman, Chairmen, Secretary-General and Treasurers. Aside from the aforementioned 11 members, the complete formation of the Executive Board included 4 Deputies of Secretary-General and 2 Treasurer's Assistants. The Plenary Board consisted of 45 members, a combination of the members of Executive Board and heads of the 14 Departments in which each department delegated two of its leaders. Golkar accepted the *Dwifungsi* ABRI on the basis that it had always been Golkar's main supporter in developing Pancasila Democracy. In that respect, Sudharmono had asked all parties and mass organizations to accept the sole ideology of Pancasila as their ideology, and the military to activate its role as stabilizer and dynamic factor of national politics.

their supervision, including by giving stricter sanction to officials who violated the law. It also supported every effort toward creating a better and more effective social control to help the government eradicate corruption, national budget over-spending and all activities that would have hampered the national development process. Golkar planned to create highly capable future generations by focusing on the formation of young cadres within the organization and encouraging the involvement of the younger generation in national development process according to Pancasila ideology and 1945 Constitution.

At this point, what did Golkar do in respect of the implementation of Pancasila Democracy⁶⁷ in the future? As a hegemonic party, Golkar then implemented three programs. Firstly, it established a group of intellectual cadres to monitor and analyze all political developments within the nation relating to the spirit of the Proclamation of August 17, 1945. The analyses would be used as the basis of the struggles to value the blessing of independence and to synchronize Pancasila Democracy with relevant issues at that time, namely democracy and the enforcement of human rights.

Secondly, Golkar grouped all potential young cadres in a research group, or organization known to be accurate in associating current national

⁶⁷ In separate occasions, Soeharto stated that he detested Western or Liberal Democracy. At one such occasion he declared, "Pancasila Democracy is not similar to Western Democracy or Liberal Democracy. Pancasila Democracy does not rely on voting and is less dependent to half-plus one aspect of democracy. That is Democracy as implemented in Western countries which embrace Liberalism. As the essence of Western Democracy, people's sovereignty is sourced from individualism where they put individual freedom above all else. This in turn gives birth to free competition that leads to liberalism-capitalism. Therefore, individualism and liberalism are the roots of Western Democracy. That is why it is called Liberal Democracy. Due to the free competition, only the strongest groups in politics and economy are profiting instead of all the people. Individual freedom makes authority revolves around a few people who can amass capital, a practice that leads to colonialism and imperialism. What Indonesia is developing is Pancasila Democracy. Whereas Liberal Democracy perceives people's sovereignty through individualism, Pancasila Democracy perceives it through *gotong royong* (mutual-cooperation). The spirit of mutual-cooperation is different from individualism. So, in that respect, one of the main objectives of political development is to develop the sense of cooperation among the people, so that it is deeply-rooted in the society and in civic life" (*Suara Karya*, October 13, 1983). By making such statement, Soeharto intended to cultivate Pancasila Democracy in daily life. Golkar referred it as "transformation of culture, or the process of Indonesia-nizing ourselves." Soon after Golkar's Third *Munas* was held, its elites planned to expand the paradigm of Pancasila Democracy by developing a new approach toward mutual-cooperation relevant to the change of time. It was done partly to influence the direction of political and economic development of Indonesia in the future.

issues with the international ones, highly proficient in strategic approaches and international awareness, to handle the national economical and political matters.

Thirdly, Golkar tried to improve the solidarity between all Golkar cadres and Golkar's leadership to tighten the ranks for future performance the framework of which had to be based on the analytical reservoir provided by the groups mentioned earlier. The third step was proved the hardest to achieve due to the nature of Golkar cadres who, with whatever background they had, were easily drawn into petty rivalries based on ego and prestige. The collective ego of the factions within Golkar itself only served to worsen these rivalries. However, these were infinitesimal compared to those of PPP and PDI. Yuwono Soedarsono (1983) mentioned that Golkar's right to live and survival had been implied in the message from the experience of political culture development in the past. The message was that Golkar had to be able to perform everything better than other political parties did. The political communities in particular and the people of Indonesia in general expected only the right answer to that message. This demand could have been fulfilled if Golkar was faithful to the noble dream of the Proclamation of Independence just as the nation's founding fathers had mandated it.

ABRI: *Tut Wuri Handayani*

Prior to the 1987 general election, ABRI intentionally loosened its grip on political matters despite its dominant position in national politics. The Armed Forces gradually withdrew its active involvement in politics and paved its way to neutrality above all groups. This creative retreat not only increased the image of ABRI in the people's view, but also earned praises from the intellectuals and international Indonesianists. It seemed that ABRI was able to adjust its *Dwifungsi* role with the current political situation. The Armed Forces took a position called *tut wuri handayani*, a Javanese terminology for stand at the back to supervise, where it could outlook Golkar, PPP, PDI or the people, for that matter. This tactic, more or less, was conducted so that ABRI could gain people's sympathy and support.

The next issue ABRI should have addressed was whether the *Dwifungsi* was still relevant to be implemented within a modern society. Modern society has been characterized by its democratic practices, high regard of human rights and professionalism in which each element conducts its duty according to its role and function and nothing more.

By those criteria, ABRI's non-democratic, rigid inner structural system and its history of poor regard toward human rights failed its *Dwifungsi's* relevancy. Other than that, people were also in need for information the press should have given, un-tampered by any intervention and intimidation from the government. The freedom of the press was simply absent, especially when the Head Editors of the press or other news media constantly received warnings via telephone every time the news they conveyed was considered "too sensitive" by the government. In this context, a good judgment to situate ABRI within a changing society was called for. The implementation of *Dwifungsi* ABRI should have been constantly reviewed to ensure it was still an instrumental part in maintaining normal civilian activities that enabled the members of society competing justly and democratically without any intervention. In other words, in the context of general election, people needed to know whether the existence of ABRI in politics still ensured an honest, just and democratic election.

Soeharto once addressed the issue, saying that ABRI had to be able to fulfill its role as stabilizer, dynamic maker and modernizer as creatively and dynamically as possible. At the same time, he also suggested ABRI not to feel reluctant to assume the *tut wuri handayani* stance if needed, especially when the society was deemed able to support itself, or even the role of *ing ngarso sung tulodo*, "in front giving examples," when the society still needed its assistance. Both Javanese phrases were first coined by Ki Hajjar Dewantara, as parts of his concept of national education he concocted during the Dutch's colonial government. The complete concept consists of three principles, *ing ngarso sung tulodo*, *ing madyo mbangun karso*, *tut wuri handayani* that underlies *Taman Siswa*, an indigenous school network he built. Together, the principles have acted as code of conducts implying to what a leader should do

in society: when in front he leads, in the middle he builds up the spirit and at the back he supervises.

The role of stabilizer and dynamic maker Soeharto suggested were vividly seen prior to the 1987 general election in which ABRI deliberately distanced itself from a particular party and assumed neutral stance toward all the competing parties. As a result, the 1987 general election seemed relatively more peaceful than the previous elections had been, despite also marking the comeback of political *alirans*. Primordial issues relating to tribal, religious, racial and groups' identities emerged once again during the campaign period. For the peaceful atmosphere, however, it might have everything to do with the fact that national economy had gotten better as the result of the development process. People were no longer restless economically, so political parties' campaigns they participated in went smoothly, peaceful and non-violent. The Police Force were also able to conduct their task almost flawlessly in all regions by securing and guarding the whole campaign process with professionalism that earned them people's respect.

The military's neutrality as showed during the 1987 campaign period also attracted international attentions and had positive impact toward democratic image in Indonesia. The professionalism of ABRI could be determined by assessing the extent of its neutrality by which it distanced itself from all election contestants and civil institutions. The stance of *tut wuri handayani* it claimed to assume demanded ABRI to become a professional institution that encouraged the growth of democracy and not the other way around. Intriguingly, at that time, unlike any other candidates from Golkar, PDI or PPP, many ABRI officers still became the members of DPR, MPR and DPRD without having to be elected in elections.

How did ABRI maintain the same distance toward all political parties? This question was a big one, because the implication concerned not only ABRI and its relation to Golkar, but also all people and groups within the Republic of Indonesia. The very essence of living in a nation is that no one or group should be allowed to assume the only power in running the state. That

authority has to be shared with other components of the state. To engage in politics, one must become the subject of the state, and to become the subject of the state, one must obey the constitution. No matter how infinitesimal a group is within a state, the political, religious or primordial majority should never ignore or deny its aspirations. Neither dictatorship of majority nor tyranny of minority should exist within the state. The Faction of ABRI in the DPR started as the relation between ABRI and Golkar was increasing into mutual-cooperation. Instead of ideology, the relation of both was based on mutual interest in the matter of authority and political power. With time, such relation progressed into professional relationship in political process that involved people's aspiration.

With the improvements of economical infrastructures and the subsequent economic growth resulting in better outcome of development and the availability of adequate political supports, it was obligatory for the elements of ABRI and its inner political system to expand and reassess its perception on the importance of having good quality of political relationship and adequate defense and security system. Its professionalism and political neutrality were also instrumental in shaping the future of democracy in Indonesia. With ABRI's neutrality, political powerhouses such as Golkar, PPP and PDI would be able to do more and be more competitive in creating better democracy and facilitating democratization (*Media Indonesia*, July 8, 1992). Therefore, ABRI was expected to concede its influence so it no longer served the interest of the authority but instead that of the people, as what it tried to achieve in the 1987 general election.

Unfortunately, right from the start to the very day it ended, New Order regime had had vicious centralistic, authoritarian and repressive characteristics. With due regards, there was not a single day without violence, deliberately imposed on people who more often than not were merely defending their rights. During its reign, New Order had denied, among others, people's rights to defend their own lands, to express their opinion, to differ in ideology and other political matter, and even the rights over their own lives. The violent past of Indonesia is a lesson to build a better future. Indonesian

people are expectant that no political violence and cruelties, intimidations and scare tactics carried out by ABRI in the past will be repeated. As the saying goes, history is a mirror that reflects the past, the present and the future. The same mirror shows that ABRI was instrumental in the political manipulations orchestrated by the New Order regime against the people, intellectual groups, political parties' cadres, Islamic group and other political entities. The assault on PDI's Central Executive Council (DPP) building at Jalan Diponegoro on July 27, 1996 was the most conspicuous example of such involvement by ABRI personnel (*Kompas*, July 27, 2003), together with the kidnapping of pro-democracy political activists conducted by *Kopassus* Special Team, *Tim Mawar*, in the period of 1997- 1998. The list even grew longer if the *Haur Koneng* incident in Lampung; the *Tanjung Priok* incident; and the establishment of Military Operational Area (DOM) in Aceh that lasted for 10 years, during which many Acehnese suffered kidnapping, killing and raping, were included. Such violations of law and human rights were now "all gone with the wind," no verdicts, no guilty parties, just victims. One thing is clear, though, none of the incidents could have been conducted without some disciplined and tactical culprits behind them. However, pointing finger on military or police force alone is futile to unveil the truth, as displayed in the murder of human rights activists, Munir (2004), which until this day remains unsolved.

The empowerment of ABRI as part of the foundation that legitimized New Order's authority and political system became part of its power-based ideology (LIPI, 2001: 266). The main characteristics of such system are the formation of hegemonic, oppressive and repressive authority, uncontrolled by the public and ignorant to other's political aspiration, just as the Javanese proverb goes, "*Asu gedhe menang kerahe*," the bigger dog always wins the fight. That was how Soeharto and his New Order regime carried out the political system, with the support of ABRI, civil bureaucrats, Golkar, businesspersons, religious groups and prominent public figures. The system was further fortified by legal stipulations such as Law on General Election, Law on Political Parties and Golkar, and Law on the Structure and Position of

Legislative and Consultative members, which successfully maintained Soeharto's reign for more than three decades. Even worse, the 1945 Constitution that stated, "The President holds office for 5 years and can be re-elected," without mentioning further about the limitation of the frequency of the term, was abused to legitimize Soeharto's presidency during which he acted out like a Javanese King.

The New Order regime successfully incorporated the repressive pattern toward every "opposition movement" it perceived as threatening the state and Soeharto's administration. In the period of early 1970s to the late 1990s, these strategies were implemented in (1) the discrimination against political parties (PPP and PDI) other than Golkar; (2) the depoliticization, *departyization* and restructuring of political parties to lessen their influences and capabilities; (3) the elimination and demonization of radical Islamic groups; (4) the elimination and channeling of movements and critiques of the students, intellectuals, artists, and cultural observers; and (5) the implementation of floating mass concept to hamper people's aspiration.

The Return of "Politik Aliran"

The voting day of the 1987 general election was held nationwide on April 23, 1987. The election garnered 85,869,816 (91.32 per cent) valid votes from the total 93,737,633 registered voters. The seats distribution did not differ from the previous elections. However, the outcome of the General Election saw sharp decrease in PPP's votes in which it lost 33 seats, from 94 seats in the previous election to 61. Three factors led to this. First, the government had banned the use of Islam as the party's ideology. Second, in compliance to the ban, the government prohibited PPP from using the picture of Ka'aba as its insignia and changed it to Golden Star emblem instead. The last factor was the resignation of NU from the party as mentioned earlier and its subsequent deliberate efforts to upset PPP's votes in certain areas. Indeed, PPP lost a lot of constituents in East and Central Java and South Kalimantan following the 1984 *Muktamar* that marked NU's readopting of the 1926 *Khittah*.

In one of Golkar's campaigns in DKI Jakarta, no fewer than 175,000 Golkar's sympathizers attended to hear the speech of the then Chairman of Golkar, Sudharmono SH. Some prominent *ulamas* from NU also attended the campaign, to whom Sudharmono commented that by joining Golkar, they had clearly come back to the *Khittah*.

The 1987 general election saw Golkar won 53 more seats in DPR, from 246 seats in 1982 to 299 seats. Meanwhile, PDI that had managed to move closer to New Order's inner ring of power, following its Second Congress held in Pondok Gede in November 1986, added 10 more seats, from 30 to 40 seats.

Table 8: DPR Seats Distribution in the 1982 and 1987 General Elections

No	Party	Votes	Seats (1987)	(%) (1987)	(%) (1982)	Notes
1	Golkar	62.783.680	299	73,16	64,38	+ 8,82
2	PPP	13.701.428	61	15,97	27,78	- 11,81
3	PDI	9.324.708	40	10,87	7,88	+ 2,99
Total		85.809.816	400	100,00		

Source: M. Sudibyo (1995), *Pemilu 1992 : Suatu Evaluasi*, (Jakarta: CSIS).

The 1987 general election so far was quite distinctive among the elections ever held during the New Order era. Not only because the government, prior to and during the election period, seemed to loosen its otherwise tight control, but also because for the first time all political parties adopted Pancasila as their sole-ideology.

Not only that, but the 1987 general election also hinted the revival of strong primordial ties in Indonesian politics as indicated in the eagerness of political parties to bring out the issues of religion, tribes, races and inter-society groups in their campaigns. These phenomena in turn indicated the reemergence of political *aliran* in Indonesia. As Liddle (1992) has pointed out, the political *aliran* that characterized national politics in the period of 1950-1960 is a latent phenomenon that can reemerge anytime. For similar reason,

Gaffar (1988: 163) concludes in his study that "the 1987 general election indicated the reemergence of political *aliran*."

Using Geertz's trichotomy, the 1982 general election was a political contest between *priyayi* and *santri* represented by Golkar and PPP respectively. However, in 1987, the contenders shifted into *priyayi* versus *abangan* or Golkar versus PDI. During the 1987 campaign period, all parties employed a lot of religious (Islamic) idioms in their campaigns by employing campaigners who was adept with Qur'an to persuade the mass and justify their own vision and missions religiously. A lot of tribal, groups and ethnicity-related issues and discourses were carried out in the campaign, e.g. the comparison of Javanese and non-Javanese culture, the civil-military dichotomy, the indigenous versus foreign ethnic in relation to business ventures, and the "development" as a new ideology of the state etc.

In 1987, PPP was the one that received the hardest blow among other political parties. It was defeated by Golkar in Aceh and DKI Jakarta, two electorate areas it had always won. The losses were preceded by the resignation of NU, its supporting faction, which was another blow to boot. Following the dissent with NU, PPP had to endure sharp decline in its votes due to deliberate efforts of NU's politicians to disrupt PPP's potential votes, out of spite of the leadership of HJ Naro, PPP's Chairman at that time, in areas such as East, Central and West Java, DKI Jakarta, Lampung and South Kalimantan. It suffered drastic decline it had never experienced in those areas.

Several factors led to PPP's defeat. Firstly, the dissent with NU resulting in the absence of NU-affiliated influential campaigners such as Chalid Mawardi, Idam Chalid, KH Maskyur, Jusuf Hasjim, Imron Rosyadi, Zaifuddin Zuhri, Nuddin Lubis, and Mahbub Djunaedi who had been instrumental in attracting NU-affiliated mass in PPP's campaigns.

Secondly, the absence of young and emerging politicians and campaigners such as Rhoma Irama, Zamroni, Ridwan Saidi, Salim Qadar and other PPP luminaries who previously were instrumental in attracting young Muslims/first-time voters. Not only were these people critical to the

government, but they also gave strong Islamic impression toward the party sympathizers in presenting the party's issues.

Thirdly, the alteration of party's insignia from Ka'aba to Golden Star it did in compliance to the government's regulation. This change had a huge impact on traditional voters, who were fanatical to everything Islamic. Initially, PPP was very reluctant to alter its insignia, a compulsory act stipulated by the government via the Department of Home Affairs headed by Amir Machmud, following the enforcement of Pancasila as political parties' sole ideology. The party's refusal even reached the point where it threatened to withdraw itself from the election. However, due to the pressures imposed by Kopkamtib, Bakin and Kassopol ABRI altogether, PPP eventually succumbed to the demand of the authority.

Fourthly, the parochial and religion-centric spirit it employed. The party retained the orthodox spirit in exploiting religious issues in its campaigns. Such strategy had given PPP successes in 1977 and 1982 elections, but to repeat the strategy proved ineffective to gather votes in 1987.

In the 1987 general election, the government decided to add more seats in the parliament, from 360 to 400 seats, which was done in accordance with the projected population growth and the addition of reserved seats for ABRI from 75 to 100 seats.

In the election, PDI seemed to be more confident. Indeed, the people gradually started sympathizing for PDI, especially the youth and marginalized people (*wong cilik*). Admittedly, the brilliant performances of PDI in 1987 general election, and later, in 1992 were the outcome of the brilliant leadership of Soerjadi as the Chairman of DPP-PDI. Aside from frequently adopting populist issues familiar to marginalized people, PDI also claimed itself as the future ruling party. Prior to the 1987 general election, PDI had decided to recruit Megawati Soekarnoputri along with her husband, Taufik Kiemas, and her brother Guruh Soekarnoputra to join the ranks of PDI. Both Megawati and Guruh are Soekarno's children, relatively obscured from national politics compared to their older brother, Guntur Soekarnoputra. The Indonesian Democratic Party then tried to gain sympathy of the Indonesian

Chinese ethnic by recruiting Kwik Kian Gie, an economist with no previous political experience. Retired officers of military were the PDI's next targets. Suffocated under the stagnant national politics, military figures such as Colonel (Ret) Bambang Widjanarko, former aide of Soekarno, and Brig. Gen. (Ret) Maiola, former Bakin's intelligent, joined PDI enthusiastically.

During this period, people started to associate the overall political parties' performances with their respective programs instead of their ideological affiliation. There were also several changes took place in the term of parties insignias. In this election, while PPP altered the picture of Ka'aba with Golden Star on a green background, PDI excluded the pictures of rice paddy and cotton from its original insignia, leaving only the bull's head inside a pentagon. The change which was ratified by its DPP, did not cause any precedent nor meet any objection from the government. In the contrary, PPP had to struggle hard with the government on this issue and had to deal with various pressures to the point where it almost torn the party apart.

The proposal to change PPP's insignia was delivered in 1983 during PPP's First *Muktamar*, although not on legal basis. Haji Jaelani Naro was under a lot of pressure from PPP's reformer faction led by Syarifuddin Harahap, HB Taman Achda and Sudardji who demanded the change to be implemented as was implied in the Regulation of MPR No. II/1983. However, defended by other PPP functionaries, especially Ridwan Saidi et al., Naro was insistent to keep the old insignia. With the government's backup, Naro's faction won this contest. However, the government later changed its view and became the most insistent party that urged Naro and the rest of PPP's functionaries to change the insignia in compliance to the aforementioned regulation.

From a different perspective, the 1987 general election felt more like a one party system instead of three parties system, with Golkar leading as the main party or the hegemonic party.⁶⁸ It was because all the parties seemed to propose similar if not identical programs that could not be distinguished one

⁶⁸ Affan Gafar (1992), *Javanese Voters: A Case Study of Election Under a Hegemonic Party System*; and Rully Chairul Azwar (2009), *Politik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era: Dari Partai Hegemonik ke Partai Berorientasi Pasar*.

with another. During the campaign, Golkar, PPP and PDI tended to follow what the government had outlined, especially those related to development process, social justice, people's welfare, education system, health care, family planning program, unemployed rate, and the eradication of corruption and poverty.

Such situation arose in response to the stipulation of Law on General Election, which prohibited political parties to criticize and give corrections to government's development policies. If only the parties had been more program-oriented and not merely focused on their *aliran* rubbish, they could have easily avoided such situation. They should have been more critical to the development policy Golkar was campaigning instead of sheepishly following suit. Indeed, while Golkar was busy praising the great achievements of the government in developing the country, and claiming its own merit to the success, both PPP and PDI were left dumbfounded and unable to respond but to agree.

Singing praises for Soeharto and his regime on the success of development process became a habit for all Golkar campaigners in every election from 1977 to 1987. They presented arrays of numbers that showed progress in every possible way, even through the performances of famous celebrities. Golkar pompously undermined other's hard works and claimed the success of development as its efforts alone. Such arrogance was captured in cheesy catchphrases Golkar concocted specifically for campaigning purpose: "Perforate the banyan tree picture if you want the development to continue" or "Only Golkar can continue the development." On different occasions, Golkar boasted, "The success of development is real proof," and "Golkar loyalty to the poor is undeniable" and "If you let other parties win, the development will come to a permanent halt."

In such situation, PPP and PDI that supposed to be more critical and demanding toward any flaw in the development policy, felt helpless. Sheepishly dragged into development-praising practice themselves, they could not propose any alternatives that could serve as corrections to the promises Golkar had given to the people. Democratic interactive and political socializing

processes were non-existent because there were no alternatives for the people in the first place. With the absent of such corrections, the government simply overlooked any flaw in its policies.

Both PPP and PDI even went as far as agreeing to every proposed Regulation Draft that would be used as reference for the Five Year Development Plan (Repelita). Similarly, in the proposal of the Draft Budget, both parties were merely act as cosignatories; too afraid to oppose or suggest slight correction to the budget proposed by the government. The sovereignty of the people was now merely the sovereignty of the authority.

Using its hegemonic influence, Golkar then feigned the primordial spirits into something of great importance. The primordial differences of tribes, religions, ethnics and social groups were deliberately driven out of proportion, causing frictions among the people and organizations. Politicians used religious issues to assault their rivals in internal strife within a party. In fact, religion was a major theme throughout the 1987 campaign period, another sharp twist of parochial thinking to an otherwise democratic society. The same primordial behavior had given birth to the practice of asking for political instructions and blessings between an underling and his superior in order to be able to maintain his position or gain promotion. Recruiting process, whether in politics or any other areas, was no longer based on one's merit, ability and morality but instead was determined by one's proximity and familiarity to the ruling elites. Such practices have become phenomena that keep on growing into social disease that survives even today.

The outcome of the 1987 general election showed fantastic result for Golkar. For the first time in four elections, Golkar received more than 73 per cent of votes.⁶⁹ This result confirmed that the 1980s was indeed the peak of Soeharto's political prowess. Golkar's victory once again indicated that the

⁶⁹ By thin margin, for the first time Golkar was able to defeat PPP in Aceh Province. It was a major score after it defeated PPP in Jakarta in 1982. This marked a new chapter for Golkar that had been progressively campaigning to win the northernmost province of Sumatra after suffering consecutive defeats in the period of 1971-1982. During that period, from 27 Provinces of Indonesia, Aceh, the Porch of Mecca, remained as the only province Golkar could not defeat. Led by Sudharmono, Golkar was able to win the heart of the Acehnese. Intense communication that had been established between Jakarta and Aceh's rural areas facilitated by Aceh's Governor Ibrahim Hasan and other prominent figures led to this victory.

ruling elites still wanted Soeharto to rule. No political entity, either civilian or military was brave enough to challenge his candidacy for president or his choice of vice-president. He had always deemed that the appointment of President and Vice-President had to be decided through unanimous decision of the MPR with no exception. Soeharto was more a Javanese King in his absolute kingdom instead of a president of democratic country, as evident during his administration, in which he and his regime used a lot of Javanese terminologies and concepts of authority derived from Javanese balance of macro and micro cosmos.

The regime conducted ideological indoctrination in the form of P-4 Seminar imposed on every bureaucrat, cleric and common person in order to create harmonious, well-balanced and unanimous thinking. The regime exploited the noble human manner to create artificial respect beneficial to its development policy and indoctrinated it to the people. Soeharto and his regime even went as far as dictating what people should or should not do. They propagated tolerance and acquiescence, prohibited the use of voting to reach decision, and emphasized heavily on consensus. Furthermore, they demanded the people to sacrifice for the sake of development, propagating that it was a sacrilege to criticize the government or its policies. In legislative bodies, anyone who so inclined to give even the slightest suggestion would be singled out for intimidation, recalled by his respective party, and out-casted politically and economically. The worst of all was the regime's vast use of politically correct euphemisms which tended to obscure things up rather than unveil them. For example, the regime used "indication of food shortages" to describe famine, "being secured" instead of being detained, and "price adjustment" for the increasing of the price, and so on.

Euphemism became common practice, not only in language, but also in political conducts to cover things up. Laws were manipulated to serve the highest bidder. People who expected justice were left disappointed. Due to the excessive control of the regime, however, only few were brave enough to stage protests but even these were to no avail. Interestingly, some protesters also concealed their disappointment, complaint and protests by using

euphemism or cynical jokes. The popular joke among all was when *Sri Mulat*, a well-known comedy group at that time, staged a show in the vicinity of Senayan (where DPR building is located) and jokingly complained that they were nowhere as funny as their "neighbor" was.

On certain limits, the government tolerated such cynical protests, as long as they did not cause unnecessary uproar. Truly, for the Javanese who are accustomed to such practice, euphemism can be used as a means of resistance against such repressive rule. However, for the non-Javanese, such as HJ Naro of PPP, a native of Bukittinggi, and his successor, Aceh-born Ismail Hasan Metaerum, who are generally more open and egalitarian, hegemonic rule was excruciatingly painful for their party. The then Chairman of PDI, Soerjadi, even had to endure the worst when, during the PDI Congress IV held in Medan in 1993, a group of angry crowds stormed the building and forced the government-permitted Congress to a deadlock.

Analysis conducted on the outcome of 1987 general election showed the amount of PPP's votes crashed down in 24 provinces, excluding three provinces, namely NTT, Irian Jaya (Papua) and East Timor where its votes had been infinitesimal from the start. Its votes plummeted extensively in NU-controlled areas, such as East Java, Central Java, West Java, and South Kalimantan. That NU had arranged for that nose-dive was almost self-evident. Despite being a political organization no longer, *Nahdlatul Ulama* did not prohibit the *nahdliyins* from expressing their political aspirations, either by staying with PPP or joining Golkar or PDI. In 1987, however, greatly disenchanted by the leadership of former Parmusi elements, NU members retaliated by deliberately deflating PPP's votes.

The re-establishment of the 1926 *Khittah*, declared in Situbondo in 1984, which saw NU's status changed to an organization with no formal tie to political party did not change New Order's view toward NU. It still regarded NU as a political bomb that could blow anytime. The rejuvenation of 1926 *Khittah* was not convincing enough for the regime, and as a result, the "de-NU-ization" movement was still being carried out. The peak of such negative campaign of the government reached its peak in 1994, during NU's 29th

Conference in Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, when the regime openly challenged the re-nomination of Gus Dur as the Head of PBNU. The government perceived Gus Dur, who had twice been chosen as the Chairman of NU, in 1984 and 1989 consecutively, as “uncontrollable and, therefore, must be suppressed.”

The New Order’s attempts to block Gus Dur re-election through the hand of Kassopol ABRI Lieut. Gen. Hartono and Minister of Home Affairs, Yogi S. Memet came to an abrupt end. The *muktamirin* (Conference attendee) insisted to reelect Gus Dur as the Chairman of PBNU for the third term, defeating the government-backed candidate Abu Hasan by a thin margin.

Ulama or *kyai* (ulama’s traditional and more intimate honorary title) and the *pesantren* system possessed great potentials in politics, both in quality and quantity. However, if such potentials were unleashed for mere personal interest, they would be fruitless. Every party that intended to gain the supports of *ulamas*, *pesantren* and *nahdliyins* in general had better be ready to embrace the value of *pesantren* tradition that was based on humility and balanced value: humble in the presence of Allah and fellow human and balanced in worldly and divine-related activities in life. Such was the creed of NU ever since it returned to the *khittah* and accepted Pancasila as the sole-ideology of the state. Indeed, the *ulamas* of both NU and Muhammadiyah, two mainstream Islamic groups in Indonesia, were pioneers in accepting the four pillars of Indonesia: the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, without whom Indonesia might as well have been an authoritarian and centralistic state.

Chapter 7

1992 GENERAL ELECTION: A FUNERAL FOR DEMOCRACY

Cultivating the Culture of Opposition

Entering the 1990s, the government established political development programs in order to increase the quality of socio-political organizations needed to improve and strengthen Pancasila Democracy. In its efforts to build political infrastructures, the government first fashioned a climate in which political parties (Golkar, PPP and PDI) and mass organizations could fully function in civic life based on Pancasila, 1945 Constitution and other applied Regulations. As the basic capital to build strong political power, political organizations and military performed their roles to strengthen democracy and create national stability. However, due to the tautness of the implementation, their efforts caused political suffocation instead. In response to the political stagnation that followed, demands for political openness and opposition (*oposisi*) system emerged.

The term *opposition* was not something unfamiliar for most of Indonesians at that time. Back in the day of parliamentary and liberal democracy, which lasted from 1946 to 1956, the term was already a part of Indonesia's politics. It was not until the New Order's reign that the term was alienated and tabooed. In this matter, the late Nurcholish Madjid once reminded that to revive the concept and incorporate it back to national politics was an urgent matter. Nurcholish, who was affectionately called Cak Nur, was known as "the nation's teacher" who had a passion for reflective thinking. One of his statements that reflected his thinking was the "Islam, yes, political Islam, no" catchphrase he made in 1978. A lot of his ideas attracted public debates and further discourses among observers. Similarly, his idea of opposition that he proposed during a seminar titled "The Perspective of Islam in Modern Indonesia" received mixed reactions from the government officials and political elites.

Cak Nur based his assessment on the opinion that political parties, especially PPP and PDI, were being politically castrated and reduced into

mere direct objects to be used and abused as the extended hands of the government. The regime deliberately designed the existence of parties not on different political platforms, but instead on a single platform based on Pancasila Democracy and its elements: Pancasila, kinship spirit, consensual agreement and mutual-cooperation. The Pancasila Democracy and its elements were at odds with the liberal democracy practiced in western countries. As a result, the New Order regime under Soeharto's version of Pancasila Democracy denied the concept of opposition party commonly found in liberal democracy to the point of non-existence. Hence, democracy in Indonesia became stagnant because it had lost its dynamic factors. The issue of opposition continued to decorate the discourses on Indonesian politics in the 1990s.

Cak Nur's reflection attracted a lot of comments. President Soeharto himself commented in response to his statement, followed by the Head of Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), Sudomo; Minister of Home Affairs (*Mendagri*), Yogie S. Memet and arrays of political elites. Soeharto, through the State Secretary, Moerdiono, argued, "Opposition party is compatible with neither Indonesian culture nor Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Furthermore, the basic philosophies of the nation are familial spirit, mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) and consensual agreement which clearly do not recognize opposition." By making this statement, he asked the entire nation to return to the characteristics he had pointed out.

Meanwhile, the Head of DPA, Sudomo viewed that "those experts who propose and agree with the opposition culture are those who do not appreciate the values implied in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Whoever wants to propose ground-breaking idea, he should revert to the underlying concepts of Pancasila, The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity)." Similar comment came from the *Mendagri* Yogie S. Memed who insisted, "Indonesia does not need any opposition party since the people have already enjoyed the benefit of political system of the New Order which is more benefitting than that of the Old Order. The people of Indonesia do not need opposition because all problems

can be solved by consensual agreement based on familial spirit and mutual cooperation." In regional levels, things were also the same in which all regional heads merely followed the policy Soeharto had outlined. By and large, those comments were typical and pretty much summed up Soeharto's New Order. No one was brave enough to confront his ideas.

In the same context, experts of constitutional law, among others Ismail Suny and Sri Sumantri proposed, "The 1945 Constitution is the reflection of indigenous characteristics of the nation which emphasize familial principles, consensual agreement and mutual cooperation." A consensus concerning the ideal leadership for Indonesia at that time was the authority on a central person, wise, as he is impartial to the people, able to lead and protect the people. He is the noble guardian of the people; he guards, protects and teaches the people so that they feel safe and secure. A leader has to be able to make his people feel safe, peaceful and calm. That was the ideal of leadership aspired by Prof. Soepomo who likened the relationship of leader and his people with a Javanese terminology of "*manunggaling kawulo gusti*" or the oneness of the leader and his subjects, like the bees with honey and the fish with water, the two are united and cannot be separated.

In the democracy system practiced by western countries, opposition is a certainty without which democracy does not function. The existence of opposition ensures that the administration established by the election winner does not stray from its initial promises during the campaign or stray from people's will. In other words, the existence of opposition is a mandatory byproduct of the democratic system itself. Therefore, the idea proposed by Nurcholish Madjid, that Indonesia was in need of opposition system in order to liberate political parties from excessive control and for the democracy to flourish, was an original and progressive thinking on his part. For this and his other achievements, the honorary title of "nation's teacher" for the late Nurcholish Madjid is duly earned.

In the context of opposition culture, two things were apparent. First, despite the incessant discourses toward implementing opposition system in Indonesian politics, no parties had enough courage to strive for it during the

entire reign of Soeharto (1967-1997). Political parties' position was still weak because of the reorganization and the subsequent indoctrination of P-4 and other restructuring programs.

Second, the socio-political structure in Indonesia at that time was simply unsuited to accommodate and support opposition culture (*Kompas*, January 11, 1990). The said structure comprised long chains of hierarchical positions that made difficult any attempt of socializing such system to the society. Worse yet, the grassroots were still under the impression that the government was always right. So, however wrong the government was, people were accustomed to acquiesce silently, even when their aspiration were denied.

Due to deep paternalistic pattern and non-egalitarian bureaucratic practices of the society, people always felt patronized by the government officials, even when the latter did not act condescending as they usually did. Therefore, for any opposition to emerge, it had to come from either political figures or prominent civilians or both. These sociological problems hampered the cultivation of opposition culture in Indonesia at that time. Nevertheless, as public discourse, the opposition issue kept continuing until the downfall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998, after which BJ Habibie stepped up as successor to that mentor of his.

Succession to National Leadership

Soeharto himself was the first one who threw the issue of succession. He did so during the Economy, Finance and Industry (*Ekuin*) Cabinet Meeting on May 2, 1989, when he was giving a lengthy account on Pancasila Democracy on its relation with the mechanism of succession to national leadership (*Suara Karya*, June 7, 1989). He maintained that the 1945 Constitution stipulated the people as the holder of the highest sovereignty in the NKRI. With due regards, people were the most important element in national politics. In practice, this sovereignty was bestowed upon their representatives in the DPR/MPR elected in the process and the implementation of general election. Therefore, the existences of

institutionalized elements of people in the implementation of general election were needed. Such was the pentennial national leadership whose mechanism is elaborated below.

General Election led to the formation of People's Representative Council (DPR), Provincial People's Representatives Council (DPRD I) and People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). The DPRD I facilitated the DPR in appointing the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), which together with the Group Delegates (*Utusan Golongan*) became parts of the MPR, Indonesia's highest authority. The duty of MPR as the manifestation of all the people of Indonesia in assuming their sovereignty was to formulate MPR Regulations (Tap MPR) comprising the Regulations on GBHN and non-GBHN. The MPR also held the power to appoint or dismiss the President and the Vice-President. Along with the appointment, the MPR also granted the President the authority to form his cabinet by appointing individuals he deemed fit for the positions of ministers. The President fulfilled his duty in formulating the Laws (*Undang-undang*) together with DPR, and other duties mandated in the GBHN with the assistance of the Vice-President and the Cabinet.

However, the above processes have no longer in effect since the post-*Reformasi* era in which the people elect all public officials (DPR, DPD and DPRD) directly in the elections. Both DPR and DPRD consist of the representatives of political parties while the DPD consists of four non-party individuals from each of the provinces. The joint assembly of DPR and DPD forms the MPR. The duties of the MPR are to inaugurate and dismiss the President and Vice-President, accept or refuse the President's accountability speech, formulate the MPR's Regulations, and amend or formulate the Constitution.

The DPR has a firm footing due to its duty in formulating the Laws together with the executive bodies. However, in pursuant to the presidential system adopted in Indonesia, the DPR cannot impeach the President, and in likewise manner, the President cannot dismiss the DPR. If there should be any violation of the Law or Constitution on the President's part, the solution is

for the DPR to propose to the MPR to hold a Special Session to address the matter. In the Special Session, MPR will hold the session against the President, its mandatary, whether or not to impeach him based on the allegation the DPR has proposed. Although the DPR is part of the MPR, such important decision has to be made by the authority of the MPR and not the other way around.⁷⁰

In the aforementioned meeting of *Ekuin* Ministers, President Soeharto elucidated the pentennial mechanism as part of political development based on pure and consequent implementation of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution in order to entrench national leadership succession mechanism in national civic life. He maintained that as long as the people accepted the 1945 Constitution, they had to protect, defend and apply it as a constitutional basis and reference to all aspect of civic affairs.

As such, the succession to Presidency was the MPR factions' responsibility. The factions were the extension of political parties participated in the election. They decided who would be nominated as president and vice-president candidates. However, in compliance with the Pancasila Democracy and pursuant to the fourth Principle of Pancasila, the candidacy would be decided through consensus instead of voting between the five factions in MPR, namely the PPP Faction, Golkar Faction, PDI Faction, ABRI-Polri Faction, and Regional Representatives (DPD) Faction. Another faction i.e. the Group Delegates (*Utusan Golongan*) was stipulated to be part of the Golkar Faction. However, since all factions had their own parent organizations, they had the right to nominate their own candidates for the president and vice-president positions. Theoretically, if each faction was to nominate a candidate for each position, there would be five presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

⁷⁰ In the Reformation era, if there should be any dispute between the DPR and the President, DPR should counsel the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) first, whether a Special Session of MPR, in which the President should give his accountability speech, is needed. If the Constitutional Court gives an affirmative suggestion, then the DPR should hold a plenary session to ratify it. The session should be attended by at least two-thirds of DPR members and the stipulation of which should be agreed upon by two-thirds of those who present before it is forwarded to the MPR. From the mechanism alone, it is difficult to impeach a president or force succession beyond the five-year mechanism.

Such procedures were expected to cover the legal-formal aspect of the succession. Whenever a question arose in regard of who-and-how aspects of the succession, the government only needed to refer it back to the above procedures without having to indulge into the details. The candidacy would be the factions' exclusive responsibility without anyone allowed to interfere in the process. Each political party, meanwhile, could start to groom each champion to be nominated by their respective faction in the MPR. Sudomo, the then Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security (*Menko Polkam*) intended to make this idea of Soeharto into a national consensus, especially if more than one presidential candidate emerged in the 1992 general election and 1993 General Session of MPR.

His idea inflicted reactions from the public. If this was to be the case, political parties would have the right to nominate its cadre as presidential candidate in the 1993 MPR General Session. Of course, whoever that candidate would be, he had to receive Soeharto's blessing first.

In response to this discourse, public debates ensued on whether or not MPR was a mere rubberstamp of the government. The majority of public regarded this whole consensus idea as a setback in the constitutional process. Apart from being regarded as non-educative, such consensus, which only involved a selected few of national political elites, would hamper the growth of democracy itself, especially the socialization of politics and the egalitarian political practices. If the government insisted to legalize the consensus into Law and stipulate it just as Sudomo had suggested, then the public's allegation that MPR and DPR were government's rubberstamps would be justified (*Kompas*, April 17, 1989). After all, the real issue regarding the succession to national leadership laid not on the formation of national consensus but instead on creating a competitive political climate in which any political recruitment could be performed more openly.

Although Indonesia now adopts a different political practice, to mention the previous system is pretty worthwhile in the study of Indonesian contemporary politics, serving as either documentation or an important part in the study of New Order's political system.

Concerning the Formation of ICMI

The Pan-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals or *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia* (ICMI) is a self-described name of an organization formed on the initiative of some undergraduates of Brawijaya University, Malang. It was formed in Malang on December 7, 1990, in a conference held on 6-8 December in which BJ Habibie was elected as its first Chairman.

The background for the formation of ICMI was the condition of fellow Muslims in Indonesia where many of whom had poor education and constituted as poor quality human resources. Departed from these conditions, undergraduate students of Brawijaya University had initiative to form an organization, which was expected to bring five virtues to the *ummah*, namely the quality of faith, quality of thought, quality of vocation, quality of creation, and quality of life. The establishment of ICMI was predicated by the gathering of Muslims scholars in Yogyakarta on the first semester of 1990 on the initiative of Dr. Imaduddin Abdulrahim, which intended to find a way to consolidate the *ummah* through the improvement of *dakwah*. Unfortunately, the authorities sniffed out this gathering and, driven by suspicion, dismissed it accordingly.

Far from out of nothing, the formation of ICMI coincided with the global and regional situations as well as the rise of contemporary politics' development in Indonesia. The late 1980s and the early 1990s saw the end of Cold War and trans-ideological conflicts. At the same time, the world witnessed the revival of Islam as an ideology in the eastern hemisphere and its potential as an alternative powerhouse to the world's civilization. In Western perspectives, "the revivalism of Islam is a serious threat to their hegemonic influence."

What have been projected as the clash of civilizations were part of the West's biased view toward Islam, in which Islam and its revival to power were viewed as direct threats to its world's domination. In February 1990, in the mosque on the vicinity of Brawijaya University, a group of undergraduate students started a small discussion to lament the unfortunate condition of

Muslims and the divisions of Muslim intellectuals. Muslim intellectuals were busy with their own group and affiliations. By disregarding each other, they created polarization of leaderships within the *ummah*. From this small forum sprang up an initiative to hold a sort of activities that could gather all those intellectuals into a symposium. The group then asked for a meeting with the University's Rector, Drs. ZA Ahmady M.P.A. and that of Malang Muhammadiyah University, Drs. A. Malik Fajar M.Sc. to ask for counsel regarding the matter. Drs. ZA Ahmady then suggested them to form a proposal for permit and the structure of the committee of the symposium in discussion. All parties agreed to use "The Contribution of Muslim Intellectuals in the Take-Off Era" as the theme of the symposium scheduled to be held on September 29-October 1, 1990.

A month prior to the scheduled symposium, the initiator group toured the cities of Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bogor to meet the would-be speakers of the symposium. Imaduddin Abdulrachim and M. Dawam Rahardjo whom they met in this chance suggested the formation of a national scale Muslim intellectuals' coordinating institution as the follow-through of the proposed symposium. Imaduddin, following his discussion with Dawam Rahadjo, recommended the group to meet the then Minister of Research and Technology (*Menristek*), Prof. Dr. Ing. BJ Habibie. Accompanied by Imaduddin, Dawam Rahardjo and M. Syafii Anwar, the five undergraduates went to meet BJ Habibie in Jakarta. Acting as the spokesperson, Imaduddin asked for Habibie's willingness to be appointed the head of the aforementioned coordinating constitution. Habibie's reply was affirmative. However, as an active minister, he needed the consent of Soeharto first before he could accept such position. Moreover, he gave two preconditions. First, he wanted the appointment to be augmented with legal announcement and, second, it had to be supported by other Muslim intellectuals. The letter of official announcement then was composed, with forewords from Dawam Rahardjo, stating the appointment of BJ Habibie as the head of coordinating institution of the national Muslim intellectuals. Dawam also composed a list of Muslim intellectuals from various disciplines of learning to whom the letter

would be distributed. The five undergraduates then circulated the letter to Muslim intellectuals in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, and Yogyakarta. Finally, 49 Muslim intellectuals supported the appointment of Habibie. During a meeting held in his residence on September 27, 1990, Habibie informed the involved parties that Soeharto had given his consent on the matter and, therefore, he officially accepted the appointment. It was also during this meeting that Habibie proposed to use ICMI or *Ikatan Cendekiawan Islam se-Indonesia* as the title of the coordinating institution.

In the days that followed, the embryo of ICMI gained momentum very rapidly. The initial idea of five undergraduates to hold symposium evolved into something greater and the rest was history. The symposium, which eventually was held in Malang on December 6-8, 1990, became a new starting point for Muslims in the New Order era. President Soeharto himself delivered the opening speech. No fewer than eight cabinet members attended the symposium, namely Minister of State Secretary, Moerdiono; ABRI Commander-in-Chief, General Try Sutrisno; Minister of Education and Culture, Fuad Hassan; Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sjadzali; Minister of Information, Harmoko; Minister of Environment, Emil Salim; Minister of Transportation, Azwar Anas; and the former Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare, Alamsyah Ratuprawiranegara. The Vice-President, Sudharmono did the honor by giving the closing speech. The symposium, which was followed by ICMI's official establishment, was indeed very special occasion for Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. Shortly after the symposium's closing ceremony, ICMI's first official conference began. Ahmad Watik Pratiknya and M. Amin Aziz led the conference. In his opening speech, Watik announced the rundown of the conference that went as follows: (1) the official declaration of the establishment of ICMI, (2) the official commencement of the conference which was going to be referred as ICMI's First Conference and (3) the inauguration of Chairman and the rest of ICMI's committee members. Thus, ICMI was officially established on December 7, 1990 or 20 *Jumadil Awal* 1411 H on Islamic calendar.

Like a wonder infant, shortly after its birth, ICMI was able to stake its claim as an important agent of change of the nation. The moment of its establishment soon was followed by achievements that grafted ICMI's position as the inspiration, booster and catalyst for the improvement of Indonesian Muslims and the rest of the nation (*Pikiran Rakyat*, November 29, 2005).

The establishment of ICMI swiftly augmented the ranks of Muslims in Indonesia. Acting as the mouthpiece of Indonesian Muslims, ICMI strived for their social aspirations, first by abolishing the prohibition of the use of *hijab* in public schools; a practice that had lasted since 1980s. In a record time of mere 6 months after its establishment, ICMI saw to it that, starting from 1991's new school term, the prohibition of *hijab* in public schools was no longer in effect. Meanwhile, in 1993, ICMI was also successful in lobbying the government to revoke the permit of government-sponsored lotteries, which had been opposed by Muslims all along, such as *Porkas* raffle (from English word "forecast") and Social Donation Prizes (SDSB). With these successes, Islamic values were revived nation-wide.

On a bigger scale, ICMI's contributions for the nation were quite outstanding. With the supports from other Muslim groups, ICMI initiated the establishment of *sharia*-compliant bank. As a result, a year later, a *sharia* law-compliant *Muamalat* Bank was established. It marked a new chapter in national banking by offering an alternative banking compliant to Islamic law. The banking system has been successful, as evident in the emergences of other *Sharia* units, even in the conventional banks. It has gained more popularity among Muslims and non-Muslims alike and proven to be beneficial for its clients, as displayed in the popular *sharia*-compliant People's Credit Bank (BPR), a micro-finance institution established to provide capital for small-scale industries.

With such groundbreaking achievements, ICMI was able to divert the cynical view toward its organization, which deemed it as a sectarian Islam. ICMI silenced its critics further by continuing to involve in nationalistic endeavors inclusively revolved around social themes, such as economy, human rights, education, culture, and so on. During its entire existence, with

its vast scope of activities, ICMI has been able to form various study forums, lobby the decision-makers, develop people's economy networking, publish print media, and grant scholarships.

In politics, ICMI held quite an influence at the beginning of the 1990s. The close relationship between Habibie and Soeharto enabled ICMI-initiated inspirations and ideas to perforate directly to the national decision-makers, thereby entitled it as a powerful trendsetter for government's policies at that time. In addition, following the 1992 general election, a lot of ICMI elites were appointed as cabinet members and government officials; elected as legislatures, included in the Group Delegates of the MPR; and involved in mass media (i.e. Pani Hardi). The involvement of numerous Muslim intellectuals from various disciplines and professions, including government officials, bureaucrats, and legislatures, in ICMI's committee hinted a big swing in Soeharto's view toward non-party Islamic group.

Under the leadership of BJ Habibie, ICMI prominent figures could speak their ideas un-buffered. With their distinct characteristics, Muslims held massive influences over Indonesia's politics and government. It seemed that Soeharto was trying to embrace both Muslim intellectuals, through Habibie and ICMI on one hand, and ABRI through Faisal Tandjung, R. Hartono and Syarwan Hamid et al. on the other. The effect of which was the "*ijo royo-royo*" ("All Green" or "Green-ization," referring to the color both Muslim and Military are associated with) phenomenon in the bureaucrats and DPR/MPR following the 1992 general election.

Gus Dur who had disagreed with the establishment of ICMI right from the start, argued that its existence in national politics would only strengthen the sectarian spirit because then every other element would want to establish organization of their own. Gus Dur's allegation was evident in the reactivation of Association of Indonesian Christian Intelligentsias (PIKI), a Protestant organization that had existed since 1963 and the Association of Indonesian Catholic Scholars (ISKA), a Catholic organization that was established in 1958 and reactivated in the 1990s.

The establishment of ICMI also inspired the Hindunese to form Indonesian Hindu Intellectuals Forum (FCHI), and the Buddhists to establish the Family of Indonesian Buddhist Intellectuals (KCBI) in 1991. Some years later, in 1995, an organization named Association of Pancasila Development Intellectuals (PCPP) was also established. Not only because of the name, the establishment of the latter inflicted public reaction since it was based in Purwokerto, a small city in Central Java, instead of Jakarta. All the more reason for Gus Dur, the Chairman of PBNU to condemn the existence of ICMI. He maintained that intellectuals should not have been grouped into formal organization or reduced into mere tools for primordial-based sectarian organization. Apart from the pro and contra around the establishment of ICMI under the leadership of Habibie and its existence as "political new comer," the organization was an interesting phenomenon in Indonesia contemporary politics in the early 1990s, similar to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) had been throughout the 1970s and 1980s, after Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani established it on September 1, 1971.

The period of 1992-1993, following the establishment of ICMI, was an important period in national politics. First, it was the period when the fifth general election under the New Order was held. Unlike the previous elections, though, the 1992 general election held strategic meaning to most Indonesians because for the first time they would elect representatives who had not involved in the physical struggle prior to 1945 Independence. Indeed, for the first time, the exponents of 1945 were being excluded from the list of legislative candidates. Thus, the People's Representative Council formed by the election that would determine the fate and the future of Indonesia was consisted of new generations entirely.

The 1993 MPR General Session was the second important event in which the MPR would stipulate the GBHN for the Second 25 Years Development Plan (PJPT II) and appoint the President and Vice-President for the new term (1993-1998). The second agenda pretty much hinted the influence of ICMI, both from its members in the government's executive and legislative bodies (bureaucrats) and its non-government members, including

retired ABRI generals such as Rudini and Achmad Tirtosudiro. Concerning the recent political situation at that time, many were expectant, for better or worse, that the General Session would alter the political configuration for future reference. The prominent role of ICMI in this event was raising some concerns toward the revival of sectarianism in Indonesia.

The Death of Democracy

There were no significant alterations to the implementation of the 1992 general election compared to the previous elections. The seat distribution system was calculated the same way as the 1987 general election. However, the outcome of the election held on June 9, 1992 was rather shocking, in which Golkar's votes decreased rather steeply. Compared to its 1987's victory, Golkar's votes decreased no less than 5.06 per cent, from 73.16 per cent to 68.10 per cent. The amount of seats it held in DPR also reduced by 17 seats from 299 to 282 seats.

In the election, the United Development Party (PPP) only gained one additional seat in the DPR, from 61 seats in 1987 to 62 seats. Although it saw a boost of votes in East and Central Java, the party endured heavy losses on other islands. It did not even have representatives in nine provinces, of which three of them located in Sumatra Island. In total, it won seven seats in Java, but lost six in Sumatra, hence the one seat mentioned earlier.

The party that was considerably successful in gaining representative seats in the outcome of 1992 general election was PDI. In the election, PDI was able to raise its tally into 56 seats, 16 seats more than what it received in 1987 or 32 seats more than its tally in 1982. The total tally for the 1992 general election showed that Golkar's votes decreased as much as 5.06 per cent, PPP's increased 1.04 per cent and PDI's increased 4.02 per cent as showed in the Table 9 below:

Table 9: Legislative Seats Apportionment in 1992 as compared to 1987 General Election

No	Parties	Votes (People)	Seats (1992)	% (1992)	% (1987)	Notes
1	Golkar	66,599,331	282	68.10	73.16	- 5.06
2	PPP	16,624,647	62	17.01	15.97	+ 1.04
3	PDI	14,565,556	56	14.89	10.87	+ 4.02
Total		97,789,534	400	100,00	100,00	

Source: *Kompas*, 30 Juni 1992; M. Sudibyo (1995), *Pemilu 1992 : Suatu Evaluasi*.

Aside from the outcome of the 1992 general election above, another dynamic that emerged was a “political turmoil” that took place during the campaign period in the city of Yogyakarta. Political situation had rendered an otherwise quiet and calm “Students’ City” of Yogyakarta as boisterous political arena. Public protests had characterized people’s movement in several regions in Indonesia during the Dutch’s colonial government. In the late 19th Century and the early 20th Century, even some were great enough to inspire others to stage similar movements, such as the *Ciomas* incident (1886), farmers’ uprising in Banten (1888), Ki Hasan Mukmin’s insurgent in Gedangan, Central Java (1904), and many others. No fewer than 100 uprisings had been recorded during the 19th Century. The movements have been categorized as centenarian movement commonly found in the transitional period at the turn of the century, in which people were hoping for justice to manifest in the forthcoming era (*Editor*, May 30 1992). Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo, an expert on people’s movements during the colonialism era, believes that such movements started when people were looking for balance in a socio-political recovery. “Political turmoil” that took place in Yogyakarta in 1992 of course was different from public movements that had taken place during the Dutch’s colonialism, but the reason was similar nonetheless i.e. political stifle imposed by the authority.

The clamorous 1992 campaign period, especially in Jakarta, Surabaya and Yogyakarta signaled public’s audacity to break out from political suffocation created by the New Order. In Jakarta and other major cities, PDI emerged as a new star player and became a new hope for the marginalized

people. The tension during the campaign period became unbearable. In response to such tension, in Yogyakarta, the Royal Highness Sri Pakualam VIII, the Governor of Yogyakarta and the Chairman of Provincial Election Committee (PPD I) at that time, issued a regulation to ban the common practice of motorized parades for all parties' sympathizers.

The issuance of such Governor's Regulation stirred a commotion among Yogyakarta citizens and caused the pro-democracy undergraduates to stage demonstrations, led by the undergraduates of *Gadjah Mada* University (UGM) and State Islamic Institute *Kalijaga* (IAIN Kalijaga; now State Islamic University or UIN Kalijaga). The regulation in fact was based on Presidential Regulation No.8/1992 on Electoral Campaign Implementation. However, in Yogyakarta the regulation was misconstrued into a practice of discrimination, since Golkar and its sympathizers were still allowed to hold a parade despite the ban. This discrimination eventually led the students to stage a dramatic protest by parading a *keranda* (a casket used to carry the dead in Islamic tradition) around the city of Yogyakarta.

The students' protest was a modification of culture of protesting in Javanese custom. During the Mataram-Islam Sultanate period, common people would let their body drenched in the heat of the sun on the *Kraton's* (Sultanate Palace) square as a form of protest, known as *pepe* (to dry). They would keep doing it until one of the palace liaisons asked them what their problems were and reported it to the Sultan who would either grant or dismiss the wishes of the protesters. In 1992, students performed the protest by parading a *keranda* as a "symbol of the death of democracy in Indonesia."

In chronological order, the whole commotion started on May 14, 1992. The Royal Highness Sri Pakualam VIII, the Governor of Yogyakarta, felt concerned with the incidents that had taken place during the campaign period involving traffic accidents and traffic laws violations; the burning and destruction of rival parties' attributes; and violence toward Golkar's sympathizers.

On May 19, 1992, Guruh Soekarnoputra, accompanied by PDI's Chairman, Soerjadi, was campaigning for PDI in *Alun-alun Lor* (Keraton's

North Square) in front of 300 thousands of PDI sympathizers who rallied on motorcycle parades on their way to, and out, the campaign arena. The next day, on May 20, an unknown group alleged later as paid thugs, pelted the building of IAIN Kalijaga with rocks. At 8 pm the same day, the Governor issued the Governor's Regulation (SK Gubernur) No. 0421/KPTS/DPD I/1992 on the Prohibition of Motor Parade during Campaign Period, effective immediately at 12 am on May 21.

On May 21 and 22, Yogyakarta was eerily quiet. Both PPP and PDI had hoisted down their entire flags and banners from the streets as sign of protest, while that of Golkar remained. At 11 pm, thousands of undergraduates from Gadjah Mada University, IAIN Kalijaga and other universities rallied in Gadjah Mada University's Boulevard. As the tension was raising, the students created a *keranda* and burned frankincense as if they were in a funeral procession. The students wrapped the *keranda* with white linen and wrote with big letters around it, "*Kematian Demokrasi Indonesia*" or "The Death of Indonesian Democracy." On the following days, the students staged free speech forum around university's sites, both in UGM and in IAIN Kalijaga, in which they condemned the violence used by the security forces toward parties' sympathizers and fiercely promoted *Golput* (non-party) movements. These students' movements in Yogyakarta marked a shift in anti-*status quo* movements that previously were dominated by the undergraduates of Jakarta-based Indonesia University (UI) and Bandung-based Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) (*Editor*, May 30, 1992).

In response to the crisis in Yogyakarta, the then ABRI Commander-in-Chief, General Try Soetrisno commented that what had happened in Yogyakarta; the protests, the violence, and the stripping of parties' attributes, were the responsibilities of all elements involved, including political parties, Provincial Election Committee, Provincial Election Supervisory Committee, Provincial Election Organizer Committee, and the security forces. He also suggested all elements not to fall into blame game against each other in these matters, because things that had happened were not due to one element's fault alone to begin with.

Meanwhile, the Minister of Home Affairs, Rudini, as the Head of Central Election Committee suggested the Provincial Election Committee in Yogyakarta to end the crisis in a quick fashion and impartially through law and consensus between all participants of general election. All parties' regional chairpersons agreed to end the crisis and continue the remaining campaign period. Their meeting with the authorities produced four points: (1) it was necessary for each party to respect the right, obligation and role of other parties in the election, (2) each political party had to control its sympathizers to avoid negative incidents, (3) all parties needed to communicate with each other to discuss problematic incidents that emerged in the campaigning period, and (4) informed and consulted each other upon any unwanted incidents during the campaigning period. However, Golkar forsook the agreement when the first chance appeared. Using money politics and orchestrated manipulations, it managed to hold campaigns during the quiet week untroubled. Furthermore, Golkar also influenced the authorities to pressure the cadres of PPP and PDI from holding other campaigns.

Violation on the Law on Election aside, with the significant increase of votes it received throughout the 1987 and 1992 general elections, the morale in PDI's camp could not be any higher. It once again established its claim as the marginalized people's party and the party for the youth; a perfect strategy to gain supports from its target voters altogether, namely the urban and rural area's poor-stricken people and the youths or first-time voters. The PDI also employed a unique hand gesture its sympathizers used to greet each other: the "*Salam Metal*" or *metal* sign (with *metal* refers to either *merah total* or metal music that was very popular among the youth of that day). The sign was identical with the ILY sign or "I Love You" sign in the US and other countries made by extending the index finger, little finger and thumb. This hand gesture was very popular among Indonesian youth because of its reference to metal music, and vastly employed by teenagers as a semblance of cool. Aside from that, the most obvious thing in PDI's campaigns was the simple, critical, blatant, and clear meaning words of its campaigners, far from

the obscure, ambiguous, and sometime meaningless euphemism of the regime and the majority of politicians at that time.

In a sharp contrast with PDI and its youth supporters, PPP chose a much calmer, peaceful and compromising approach in its campaigning strategy. It might have been caused by its own failure to brew new issues to convey ever since it held its Second *Muktamar* in 1989. The PPP lingered on the same issues it had always carried out in the previous elections. However, under the leadership of Ismail Hasan Metareum, PPP was able to represent a cool climate in such heated tension. Ismail Hasan Metareum had held the position of Chairman since its Second *Muktamar* that had also elected Matori Abdul Djalil as Secretary General. While the former came from *Muslimin Indonesia* faction (MI or Parmusi), the latter came from *Nahdlatul Ulama*. Such co-leadership between MI and NU was a reversion to the condition under the Chairmanship of HJ Naro (1985-1989) in which MI's faction was much more dominant, controlling all strategic positions of Chairman, Secretary General and Treasurer of the party.

According to *Buya* (an honorary title) Ismail, such power sharing was important to avoid other lethal divisions within the party, especially in its regional branches. The calm leadership of *Buya* Ismail gave the party new impression. The calm spirit also perforated to PPP's bottom-most structures and its respective cadres and sympathizers to the point where its voice were muffled completely during the raunchy 1992 campaign period. At that time, *Nahdlatul Ulama*'s deliberate attempt to deflate PPP's votes was still taking place, especially in various NU-affiliated regions.

An observer might have described PPP's overall performance at that time as being cooperative and accommodative toward the authority, the motive of which was none other than to impress Soeharto so that its cadres could be appointed into the cabinet. PPP even went as far as eagerly joined Golkar in re-nominating Soeharto for another term in hope of attracting more supporters (*Media Indonesia*, May 26, 1992). With Soeharto recent fondness of his favorite protégé Habibie, and of ICMI, the status of PPP as an Islamic party was its biggest advantage.

Given above facts, it was no wonder that PPP seemed to be less critical in its 1992 campaigns. Interestingly, PPP's calm impression somehow echoed in Golkar's performance. Led by Wahono as Chairman and Rachmat Witoelar as Secretary General, Golkar also performed more calmly. However, judging from its decreased votes, this kind of approach proved to be detrimental to this ruling party.

Ever confident with its previous landslide victories, Golkar received unexpected blow by losing 17 seats in DPR in the 1992 general election. Its domination as a ruling party also decreased in some provinces, although none was lethal enough. In details, these decreases took place in Central Java, with 13.75 per cent; Yogyakarta, 11.59 per cent; East Java, 12.38 per cent; West Kalimantan, 4.88 per cent; East Kalimantan, 6.11 per cent; Bali, 9.26 per cent; NTB, 4.86 per cent; Maluku, 7.8 per cent; Irian Jaya, 6.34 per cent; and East Timor, 11.06 per cent. Concerning the votes, Golkar's loss was PDI's gain, in which the latter was able to add another 16 seats in its seats collection in the DPR.

The losses of Golkar could indicate two things at once. First, that Golkar's supporters, especially the educated urban inhabitants, started deserting the party, and second, as said by Wahono, that Golkar was playing more fairly in the election. Another factor contributing to the losses, directly or indirectly, was the ability of PDI to wrap the recent topics at that time such as democracy and democratization, human rights and environmental issues into interesting campaigning packages for its supporters. Not only that, PDI was even bold enough to carry out the discourse on the limitation of presidential term. Whatever the reason might have been, the decreasing votes of Golkar could be regarded as a symptom of public weariness toward New Order regime under Soeharto.

In general, during its whole campaign, PDI was able to encourage the people to speak their mind openly and critically. Indeed, PDI represented a kind of counterculture movement, if not opposition, toward the mainstream regime in its campaigns in Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Semarang. By employing themes of political rejuvenation, PDI reminded the

people of the importance of the freedom of speech and political openness (*keterbukaan*). It also maintained that political cultures and ethics held important positions equal even to the institutions or the regulations; therefore, they should have existed for the sake of democracy.

Boldly highlighting the political situation at that time, PDI tried to convey an understanding to the public about the relation between shallow interests and established positions that triggered the materialistic behaviors. In such condition, it was hard for the individuals with established positions to let go of their political positions and economical possessions. Therefore, they would always tend to maintain the *status quo* under which they had prospered, including by deploying opportunistic measures. PDI also boldly criticized Soeharto's administration and the overall anti-democracy elements that gave birth to the dirty coalition of authority and businesspersons.

Under the leadership of Soerjadi-Nico Daryanto, PDI strived against the authoritarian, centralistic and hegemonic rule of Soeharto by using the image of Bung Karno. Judging from the effect it caused on its sympathizers during the 1992 campaign period, truly, the charisma of Soekarno was still influential. Megawati Soekarnoputri and Guruh Soekarnoputra, Soekarno's children, who had been with PDI since 1987 were able to hypnotize the mass by their presence alone. People's longing for a figure of Soekarno's caliber was unmistakable. In their eyes, Soekarno was not only the one who proclaimed their independence, but also "The Founding Father, The Grand Leader of Revolution, the Charismatic Leader and the Founder of Pancasila." At least such were the impression PDI tried to imprint in public mind in its campaigns.

The other thing PDI was focusing on in its campaign was the limitless power of the presidency/executive body, as evident by its ability to control the political recruitment process, a powerful resource to maintain its power. Even though the 1945 Constitution clearly stated that the presidential institution was equal in authority with other high institutions such as DPR, DPA, BPK and MA, in reality Soeharto had unlimited access to determine who would fill what position in other institutions. As has been mentioned earlier, a

hundred out of the 450 members of DPR were appointed directly by the president. Such reality held enormous strategic advantage in the effort to maintain the authoritative power (Gaffar, 1992).

The second most powerful resource in Indonesia's political power structure was the military or ABRI. There is no need to indulge in another debate on the relevancy of *Dwifungsi* ABRI aside from the fact that it was part of the nation's history and closely related to the establishment of the Unitary States of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). However, the predominance of ABRI within political process and management of the state, including its great share of seats in DPR and MPR, could not be denied. Together with civil bureaucrats, ABRI became the foundation upon which New Order was built. With such configuration, it was no wonder for Golkar to win the elections by landslide victories. Such spectacular victories were achieved mainly through cheats and manipulations. The change everyone was longing for would not be materialized as long as this political configuration remained. The chance finally arrived when Soeharto abdicated his presidency on May 21, 1998. Soeharto's demise of power meant the same thing for Golkar. It was brought low. At least for some time.

Chapter 8

1997 GENERAL ELECTION: THE LAST EPISODE OF NEW ORDER'S GENERAL ELECTION

PDI Disintegrates

Violence that broke out between fellow cadres of PDI during the Fourth PDI Congress in Medan, July 1993⁷¹ was among the bitterest incident of the entire political party history in Indonesia. The chaotic incident was a result of conflict mismanagement within PDI itself in particular and national politics in general. Soeharto allegedly disliked the leadership of Soerjadi due to his boldness in criticizing the government during the campaign period of 1992 general election and for his intention to nominate Guruh Soekarnoputra as presidential candidate in 1993 MPR General Session.

Whereas all people knew that as far as national leadership was concerned, there should not have been any other “sun” in the sky. This

⁷¹ The Fourth Congress of PDI was held on July 21-25, 1993, in Medan, North Sumatra and attended by 800 delegations. During the Congress, several names surfaced as the candidates of Chairman to compete with Soerjadi, namely Aberson Marle Sihaloho, Budi Hardjono, Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno, and Tarto Sudiro. Later, Ismunandar, then the Vice-Chairman of Jakarta's Regional Executive Council (DPD-PDI) was included in the list. The government-supported Budi Hardjono became a strong contender. In this phase, Megawati Soekarnoputri, whose position was not strong enough to enter the nomination, showed her support for Tarto Sudiro. The Congress began with the opening speech from Soeharto. However, a riot broke several hours later between a group of protesters led by Jacob Nuwa Wea and the Brimob (Police's Mobile Brigade) that stopped the protesters from entering the Congress. The Congress went uninterrupted until Soerjadi was reelected in acclamation as Chairman. However, before the executive board was formed, the protesters finally succeeded to breach in. Following the chaotic situation, the government interfered. To break the deadlock, Minister of Home Affairs, Yogie S. Memed proposed the forming of a board of caretakers, which was eventually formed in the formatter meeting led by Latief Pudjosakti, Head of DPD-PDI of East Java, on August 25-27, 1993. Following the failure of the Fourth Congress, Megawati's fame rose rapidly among the party's sympathizers who then supported her for the position of General Chairwoman. They perceived her as an able figure to unite the party. On August 11, 1993, party members from various regions, consisted of 100 members of 70 Branch Executive Council (DPC), visited her resident to show their supports, hoping she would nominate herself as candidate of Chairwoman in the upcoming Extraordinary Congress (KLB), scheduled to take place on December 2-6, 1993, in Surabaya. The discourse on Megawati's candidacy grew stronger ever since, much to the government's dismay. Soeharto's administration simply detested the idea and tried everything to prevent such thing from happening. In the Regional Executive Council Meeting on October 19, 1993, held as the preparation of the KLB, discourse to rule out her candidacy surfaced. Despite every attempt of the central government to block her candidacy, the will of the sympathizers to make her the Chairwoman of PDI was stronger. She was finally elected as *de facto* DPP-PDI Chairwoman for the term 1993-1998.

unwritten rule was widely known, but no one knew for sure for how long. Soeharto had completely regarded himself as a Javanese King and he would not tolerate any leadership that could rival his own. Soeharto did perceive himself as a king, as evident from the idioms he often used, such as *lengser keprabon* and *madheg pandhito*; two Javanese terminologies that mean, "Passing down the kingship to live as an ascetic." There had never been any other presidential candidates nominated by Golkar, PPP and PDI in the entire reign of New Order other than him. The vice-presidential position, however, was an entirely different matter. During Soeharto's administration, there were no fewer than six vice-presidents. In chronological order, those were Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Adam Malik, Umar Wirahadikusuma, Sudharmono, Try Sutrisno, and BJ Habibie. Just as Soekarno had been elected as President for a lifetime in the 1964 MPR General Session, Soeharto intended to hold his presidency for life. Unlike his predecessor, though, Soeharto maintained his position by cunningly having the MPR to reelect him as President in every General Session. Exploiting the loophole in the 1945 Constitution, which did not specify how many terms one could serve as president, Soeharto was reelected six times and spent 32 years as president.

The government had been instrumental in the appointment of the duo Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto as Chairman and Secretary General of PDI's Central Executive Council (DPP-PDI). Minister of Home Affairs, Soepardjo Rustam appointed both young and emerging politicians to hold the positions for the period of 1986-1993, following the deadlock in the Third Congress of PDI held in Asrama Haji, Pondok Gede, Jakarta, in 1986. In that occasion, similar to what PDI had experienced, conflicts arose during the process of electing its central leaderships. With the interference of the government, especially the Minister of Home Affairs, Soepardjo Rustam, whose responsibility included the formation of PDI's leadership board, Soerjadi and Nico were appointed to lead PDI.

Both men whom the government expected to be accommodative toward its policies did just the contrary. As a politician at that time, Soerjadi was among the few who were critical to government. As PDI's Chairman, he

tended to act uncooperatively, sometimes in the manner of a rebel toward the government. Through his statements in Senayan, in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of DPR, he often harshly criticized the government. His critiques sometimes even aimed directly to Soeharto (*Kompas*, 2004: 353). Among his boldly-proposed issues were the proposal to increase the education budget as much as 20 per cent of the overall National Budget, limit the presidential terms into two terms, implement direct election of president and vice-president, and revoke the automatic placement of ABRI Regional Commanders and Governors in the MPR. All of these proposals would be adopted later in the amendment of 1945 Constitution conducted in Reformation era. However, during Soeharto's administration, such proposals were simply outrageous. In 1992 general election, in even bolder action, PDI under Soerjadi prohibited its cadres to ratify the election results if there were any hints toward cheats and manipulations. With such conducts, no wonder if Soeharto likened Soerjadi's leadership to *kuda lumping*, a traditional Javanese horse dance performed in trance state.

Soerjadi's actions convinced the government to revoke its support for him. Through any possible means, government officials, both civil and military, involved openly and sometimes threateningly to oust Soerjadi from his post. For example, prior to the PDI's Fourth Congress in Medan, General Faisal Tanjung who held the position of ABRI Commander-in-Chief at that time, repeatedly warned PDI cadres through mass media not to elect an "unlawful person" as their leader. Such insinuation was aimed at Soerjadi concerning the allegation that he had involved, or at least had knowledge, in the kidnapping of some Jakarta's PDI cadres some times before.

As it turned out to be, PDI's Fourth Congress hit a deadlock, for which the public mocked PDI as Indonesian Deadlock Party (Partai Deadlock Indonesia) afterwards. Although the attendance of the Congress had elected Soerjadi in acclamation, the Minister of Home Affairs, Yogie S. Memet, as the government representative, refused to ratify the outcome of the Congress on makeshift reason. He said, "The government deems the election of Soerjadi as the Chairman of PDI is conducted far ahead of the scheduled time frame

and therefore, violates the standing orders." The election of Chairman should have been the party's internal affair with no other parties allowed to intervene, especially the government. However, as it turned out to be in this case, no Chairman could be elected without acknowledgement of the Minister of Home Affairs as the government representative. It was another ironic and tragic instance where manipulation was conducted in the name of democracy. Indeed, under the New Order regime, aside from Golkar and its supporting elements (military, bureaucrats, religious delegations etc), political parties were excess entities; mere disguises to be regarded as a democratic nation. As such, they were often being victimized and sacrificed politically, as evident from the dispute above.

The dispute did not stop there. During the Congress, a group of PDI cadres burst in and violently disrupted the Congress. The group was led by Jacob Nuwa Wea and consisted of PDI cadres loyal to "kelompok 17," the Group 17, headed by Achmad Soebagyo. Latief Pudjosakti and Alex Atmasoebrata, Head of Regional Executive Council (DPD) of East Java and DKI Jakarta, respectively, also allegedly involved in the breach. As a result, Vice-President Try Sutrisno cancelled his speech scheduled to take place in the closing ceremony. Such incident would have never happened without the involvement of "side ranks" (*"jajaran samping"*) i.e. security forces and government officials specifically orchestrated by the central authority in Jakarta. Interestingly, just a day prior to the Congress, the Military Regional Commander of North Sumatra, Brig. Gen. Pranowo had promised to secure the Congress at all cost, including by repelling any rioters or any parties that planned to disrupt the Congress. Pranowo had even set up three security perimeters around the location of the Congress coordinated by Ret. Marine Colonel Bambang Widjanarko. After since the deadlock of the Fourth Congress in Medan and its subsequent incidents, PDI was divided into two factions.

What was the role of the government, especially the Minister of Home Affairs, Yogie Suardi Memet as the trustee of national politics in that crisis? Due to its predominant influence and ability to intervene in an otherwise

internal affair of the parties, the roles of government in political parties' dynamics were always interesting to look at. There were undeniable truths that the government indeed held decisive role in political parties' internal recruitments, especially in determining who would get the positions of Chairman, secretary general and other top functionaries. This role was present in plain view in 1971 PNI's Congress, during which Ali Moertopo and his Special Op (Opsus) involved directly. At that Congress, Hadisubeno who was supported by Soeharto prevailed as PNI's Chairman despite PNI's cadres' majority supports for his rival Hadi SH. Similar thing happened in the election of Soerjadi-Nico as PDI's leaders in the PDI's Third Congress, in which the role of Soepardjo Rustam, the Minister of Home Affairs at that time, as Soeharto's mouthpiece was dominant. The government's rule of thumb in regards to the recruitment of political parties' leaders was not to elect individuals with radical tendencies, who would be too difficult to handle (*Republika*, August 6, 1993).

The PDI's Fourth Congress was doomed to fail before it even began with all the statements and insinuative warnings prior to the event. Shortly after ABRI Commander-in-Chief Faisal Tandjung had made his statements mentioned earlier, the Diponegoro Military Regional Commander Lieut. Gen. Soeyono and the Secretary of the State, Moerdiono were following suit. The motive behind these insinuations was the allegation that Soerjadi had involved in the kidnapping of Agung Iman Sumanto and Eddi Sukirman, two activists of Jakarta's DPD-PDI, by Alex Atmasoebrata's group following an internal dispute. Some of the military elites and the Minister of Home Affairs believed that Soerjadi "had known" about the kidnapping beforehand and therefore was an accessory to the incident. Following court order, Soerjadi had attended the trial and served as witness. Although the court had not made Soerjadi a suspect nor proved his involvement, the allegation remained among some elites, thus, the catchphrase "don't elect an unlawful person" made its way to the media prior to the Congress.

The internal conflict within PDI prior to and during the 1993 Congress reached critical point where it started to create division among the party's

cadres. Previously, in the heat of the moment, the sympathizers of Achmad Soebagyo's "kelompok 17" had occupied the secretariat building of DPP-PDI and sealed it. At the same time, the relentless discourses of "unlawful person", a divide and conquer tactic orchestrated by the regime's infamous "side ranks," only worsened the situation.

In response to the crisis of leadership, the Congress saw PDI was divided into two factions. The first faction was the PDI's regional delegations whose regions had been under systematic duress of the side ranks and therefore started to question Soerjadi's leadership. The second faction was the militant proponents of Soerjadi who, despite the obvious smearing campaigns, were insistent in their support for Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto. The second faction would later form the "*arus bawah*" movement, the diehard supporters of Megawati Soekarnoputri in the PDI Extraordinary Congress (KLB) and PDI National Consensus in November and December the same year. The second faction clearly stated their stance by openly rejecting the candidate proposed by the government through the Minister of Home Affairs and ABRI Commander-in-Chief.

The Congress Committee deliberately circulating pamphlets that described the criteria for a person to be validly regarded as an "unlawful person." This was of course an attempt to counter the allegation of government's officials. The pamphlets stated, "An unlawful person is a person who has committed a crime and has been proven so in court, for which he is the object of legal decision and under permanent legal force. Under an ongoing trial and pending verdict, that person cannot be considered as unlawful because it violates the presumption of innocence which is his legal right."

The government deliberately carried out the "unlawful person" issue to oust Soerjadi and Nico from their respective posts in PDI. Soeharto reportedly held grudge toward Soerjadi following the increase of legislative seats PDI had received and its overall achievements in the 1992 general election. This allegation was augmented by the opinion of Supeno Sumardjo, the Head of *17 Agustus 1945* Foundation, who shortly after a meeting with Soeharto

stated, "President Soeharto viewed that Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto have failed in leading PDI. They fail because they are unable to end the ongoing conflict within PDI and prevent the habitual deadlock in every Congress. It is feared that the internal conflict within PDI will affect the national stability and in turn will have a negative impact on national development process." This explained why they had to be deposed by any means, including by insinuations above.

The intention to oust Soerjadi also came from ABRI Headquarter, in which ABRI's Chief of Socio-Political Staff (Kassopol ABRI), Maj. Gen. Haryoto PS, explicitly said, "Soerjadi must be replaced." As part of the plan, ABRI Headquarter had groomed Budi Hardjono as its candidate to contest Soerjadi's leadership. However, the majority of the Congress delegations regarded Budi Hardjono as squeamish in character and unconvinced of his leadership skill, so they kept their support for Soerjadi instead. Finally, in acclamation, the Congress, represented by the Speaker, Dimmy Haryanto reelected Soerjadi as PDI's Chairman as well as the head of formatter committee who would choose the party's functionaries for the next term. The members of the formatter committee consisted of Heads of Regional Executive Councils (DPD) of South Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, Yogyakarta, Aceh, and Bali.

During the whole commotion, with the support of the cadres he had personally involved in the forming, Soerjadi was able to withstand the regime's barrage to topple him. Although his reelection was going to be revoked and the Congress was going to be officially regarded as a deadlock, it showed that he had succeeded in forming firm ranks of PDI cadres who would form the "*arus bawah*" movement, a prototype of civil society.

The young and emerging politicians who later would stand behind Megawati in her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) were the cadres that had come out of his tutelage, such as Ir Soetjipto, Sophan Sophian, Laksamana Soekardi, Kwik Kian Gie, Tarto Sudiro, Sutardjo Suryoguritno, Mangara Siahaan, Alex Litay, Erros Djarot, Roy BB Yanis, and Sukowaluyo Mintohardjo. Some of them would later parted way with

Megawati to head their own parties, such as Erros Djarot who would form Bung Karno's National Party (PNBK) and Laksamana Soekardi, Roy BB Yanis and Sukowaluyo who would join hand to form Democracy of Struggle Party (PDP). It is safe to say that PDI's increasing performance in the 1987 and 1992 general elections were direct results of the leadership of Soerjadi and Nico Daryanto and their close confidantes, such as Fatimah Achmad, BN Marbun, Marcel Beding, Markus Wauran, and Titi Yuliasih, with the supports of all the Heads of Provincial and Regencies Executive Council throughout Indonesia.

Why did the government conduct such all-out attempts on PDI? First of all, the government simply did not like the prospect of a bigger PDI for all the potential it had to become a direct threat to the New Order regime. There were a lot of political elites who feared that a bigger PDI would threaten their positions. As such, every time PDI held a Congress, interferences of the infamous "side ranks" would follow.

Second, to sabotage PDI was a risk-free political experiment attempt for the government and Soeharto's administration. Furthermore, to curb political elites' conflicts within PDI would not disturb national politics' dynamics whatsoever. Therefore, every event held by PDI always met deliberate disruption from the authorities. In contrast to PDI, as the New Order's hegemonic ruling party, Golkar had never received such treatment with Soeharto as the Head of its Board of Trustees.

Third, internal conflicts of PDI were part of political legacy it had inherited from PNI. Even within a year after the fusion of its supporting elements in 1973, PDI had been troubled with conflicts. Knowing this, the "side ranks" merely reawakened the seeds of the conflicts laying dormant in the party, prior to every congress it held.

Given these facts, it can be concluded that the deadlock of the Fourth PDI's Congress was not a failure on its own, but instead a result of sabotage attempt conducted by the government. After all, Soeharto himself had given the signal of his aversion toward PDI's internal conflicts. The manipulations to bring down Soerjadi were even conducted in plain view with the joint efforts

of military, through State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN), and the Department of Home Affairs.

These truths also dawned upon the majority of cadres who for that reasons rejected every Chairman candidate proposed by the Government out of spite. These anti-government sentiments grew stronger during PDI's Extraordinary Congress (KLB-PDI) held in Surabaya in November 1993, when Megawati Soekarnoputri came out as the *de facto* Chairwoman of PDI. Aberson Marle Sihaloho, a fanatic supporter of Megawati and an influential member of PDI, was the one who proposed the term "*de facto* Chairwoman" following the stalemate in PDI's Chairmanship. The majority of KLB delegations preferred voting to elect the new Chairman, while others preferred the formation of board of formatters. Due to diverse political interests, both factions simply could not be reconciled.

The majority of regional delegations wished Megawati Soekarnoputri to be the Chairwoman for the period of 1993-1998. The "*arus bawah*" group that supported her rather fanatically was a counter-culture movement vis-à-vis the government and its interference in the party's internal affairs. Their resentment toward the government had started since the annulment of Soerjadi's leadership in the Fourth PDI Congress in Medan that precipitated the division of PDI.

The internal conflict of PDI grew into a long-lasting polemic as well as an unlikely source of political education on the dynamics of political parties due to the media's incessant coverage. Due to the dominant role of the New Order regime, national political dynamics were inseparable from the role of the government as political supervisor. Therefore, all political development including the nascent of party's elite had to be accepted first by Soeharto's administration.

Megawati's ascent to PDI's Chairwoman of course was an anomalous phenomenon to that tenet. Her rise, which was supported by the grassroots sympathizers of PDI, allegedly worried Soeharto and his circles. She had never been projected to lead PDI, so he authorized all efforts to cancel out her Chairwomanship. However, all the efforts failed and Megawati

was officially inaugurated as PDI's Chairwoman in PDI's National Consensus in Jakarta, December 1993.

To save face from failing to prevent Megawati's ascent, Soeharto's administration took a drastic measure by delegating General Commander of Kopassus, Maj. Gen. Agum Gumelar and Jaya Regional Military Commander, AM Hendropriyono as arbitrators to resolve the conflict. It was through the arbitration of both generals that Megawati could ascend to the Chairwomanship. The arbitration also resulted in the formation of new functionaries' structure within PDI's Central Executive Council (DPP-PDI) the result of which disappointed some factions due to its compromising nature and failure in accommodating all of their aspirations.

With some considerations concerning national politics, Megawati Soekarnoputri's inauguration as the Chairwoman of PDI went undisturbed. It only took five minutes for Megawati to be officially elected as PDI's Chairwoman on December 22, 1993. She was elected by acclamation by 52 functionaries from 27 Provinces. She finally became both the *de facto* and *de jure* Chairwoman of PDI. In the formation of the members of DPP that followed, however, she was required to accommodate all the factions' aspirations, including those who had bitterly opposed her camp. She even included Ismunandar and Soetardjo Soerjogoeritno into the 17 members of DPP, both of whom had opposed her during the Extraordinary Congress, just a month earlier in Surabaya.

However, her Chairwomanship had political impacts and consequences that would stretch far and wide into national politics until it reached its peak in the bloody incident on July 27, 1996.⁷² The incident itself has often been

72 The Incident of July 27, 1996 was a violent takeover of the DPP-PDI Headquarter at Jl. Diponegoro 58, Central Jakarta. The pro-Megawati sympathizers were occupying the headquarter when the supporters of Soerjadi, who had been elected as Chairman in PDI's Congress of Medan earlier that month, stormed the place with the help of military and police force. Many versions arose on what really happened, one of which maintained that the Soerjadi's supporters were mere disguise of what really was a military's crackdown operation Soeharto had masterminded. Such statement was made by Sutiyoso, the then Commander-in-Chief of Kodam Jaya. The incident sparked further violence in several areas, such as Jalan Diponegoro, Salemba, Kramat, and Pasar Senen in Central Jakarta, where angry mobs looted and burned down several buildings and means of transportation. The government, through the Chief of Socio-Political Staff of ABRI (Kassospol ABRI), Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, blamed

described as the even that sparked the spirit of democracy in Indonesia and brought new hope toward the manifestation of civil society, democratic national politics, and supremacy of law and Human Rights.

According to Sutiyoso (2000), the then Jaya Regional Military Commander, the Tragedy of July 27, as it is known today, was a result of political initiative in response to PDI's internal conflict between Soerjadi's and Megawati's camps that began to affect national political condition. Indeed, at that time, the support for Megawati was growing stronger. This condition was feared to have negative impact toward Soeharto's administration. Such analysis then triggered the political initiative of the military and bureaucrats that resulted in the violence takeover of PDI's Headquarter located at Jalan Diponegoro 58, Jakarta.

Soeharto's administration wanted to end Megawati's leadership and in doing so supported the reelection of Soerjadi as Chairman in PDI's Congress held in Medan, from which it earned its name, in July 1996. From the total 37 DPP members, 16 of them supported the Congress, while the rest maintained their allegiance to Megawati. Why did Soerjadi take this apparent bait of the government in the first place? In an apparent miscalculation on his part, Soerjadi accepted this position because he thought Soeharto was still powerful enough to assume his presidency for 10 more years. Soerjadi could

the activists of *Partai Rakyat Demokratik* (PRD) or People's Democratic Party for the riots. Following the incident, the authority detained prominent members of PRD in Jakarta, namely Budiman Sudjatmiko, Garda Sembiring, Jakobus Eko Kurniawan, Ignatius Pranowo, and Suroso. Several others, namely Dita Indah Sari, Coen Hussein Pontoh and Mochamad Soleh were detained in Malang and Surabaya. The National Committee of Human Rights (*Komnas HAM*) reported that five people died in the riots; 149 suffered mortal and light wounds; 136 people were detained; and tenth others were missing. In its conclusion, *Komnas HAM* stated that heavy violations of human right took place in the incident and its aftermath. Soeharto's and his side ranks had devised the Medan Congress to topple Megawati by putting back Soerjadi as the Chairman of PDI. Such obvious ploy had enraged many people who then held a gathering in the Headquarter of DPP-PDI by inviting anti-New Order prominent figures and activists to speak in free forums, just prior to Medan Congress. The free forum had massive influence in waking people's critical view toward New Order's political conducts. In the violent takeover, people chose to resist instead of acquiesced (*Tempo*, 10/August/1996). According to Lt. Gen. Syamsir Siregar, the then Director of National Intelligent Body (BIN) and Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Syarwan Hamid as Kassopol ABRI and Soetiyo as the Commander of Kodam Jaya were the ones responsible for the incident since they were the ones responsible for the security of Jakarta areas (*Kompas*, 22 April 2000; Tim LIPI, 2001 : 143).

not be more wrong because as we know, in less than two years after the Medan Congress, Soeharto was forced from office.

Ever since the Medan Congress, the division within PDI had grown wider. On one hand there was the pro-Megawati faction; the embryo of her PDI-P party, and on the other hand there were Soerjadi's loyalists. The bloody event that took place on July 27, 1996, was nothing short of "a part of political game orchestrated by the ruling authorities and their accomplices." In the investigations that followed, General Faisal Tanjung, General R. Hartono, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar, and Lt. Gen. Syamsir Siregar, the director of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) were all but admitted their involvement in the bloody incident (*Kompas*, April 22, 2000). The incident also saw the rise of Megawati as the symbol and figurehead as opposed to the repressive authority of Soeharto's regime. This in turn would become instrumental in her future political career, in which she would be elected as Vice-President following the outcome of the 1999 general election and then as President in the same term, replacing Gus Dur.

Golkar's Political Dynamics

The bigger an entity the more complex it is to manage. This universal tenet applied to Golkar which had won five consecutive elections in the period of 1971-1992. Since its formation, with the supports it received from military and civil bureaucrats, Golkar always gained the upper hand in every competition with PDI and PPP. The same supports helped Golkar to grow, not only in numbers but also in aspirations. Due to various groups it sheltered, conflicts of interests between those groups' elites were inevitable (Maniagasi, 1994). In short, a direct link connected the increase in numbers of its cadres and the subsequent growth of aspirations and interests with the emergence of internal conflicts within Golkar.

These conflicts surfaced quite frequently. However, Golkar's internal meetings seemed quite effective in keeping those in check. Moreover, when Golkar's Board of Trustees headed by Soeharto began giving suggestions, not

a single individual would defy them. Such conflicts usually rose significantly toward Golkar's National and Regional Consensus (*Munas* and *Musda*), or prior to certain appointments of governor. Some elites, for instance, proposed that it would be best to appoint governors with military background, while some others preferred the candidates to be civilian/non-military. Another instance was in the brewing of Draft Laws (RUU) in DPR, when Golkar's TNI-Polri and *Karya Pembangunan* Factions were at odds with each other. Such internal frictions would further determine the distribution of power within Golkar's structure.

Throughout its reign (1966-1997), New Order regarded the development process as its ideological basis. When the New Order's First Phase of Long-Term Development Plan (PJPT I) was nearing its end and the Second Phase (PJPT II) was about to begin, another friction arose between two groups of Golkar. The first group insisted that the concepts of the Second Phase should have been synchronized with its predecessor's, while the second group proposed it to depart from different principles entirely as a sign of progress.

Although such discourse only took place among the selected few of Golkar's elites, the implication of which helped determining the power distribution within Golkar's overall structure. Whereas the first group represented *status quo*, the second group represented change and progress. To put together such divergence of values was among Golkar's biggest challenge as a ruling party.

Golkar's next big issue was its own self-assuredness toward its existence. This was closely related to its survival and the continuation of its political power which had been rather pompously set into the cycle of 25 years. The call for a change to that power scheme in order to anticipate the future was not unheard of within Golkar itself. Nevertheless, the influence of the pro *status quo* group, which stubbornly insisted Golkar to keep its single majority status in every election held, was greater. Among those who belonged to this group were figures such as Harmoko, Abdul Ghafur, Aulia Rachman, Syarwan Hamid, and BJ Habibie.

Meanwhile, the reformer group, which believed that innovations were keys to the future, maintained the importance of the existence of political rivals to which Golkar could test its mettle. That way, Golkar could avoid a literal semblance of “a fat elephant,” unresponsive and lethargic to all challenges that would come to its way. The proponents of this group were Rachman Tolleng, Wahono, Sarwono Kusumadja, Siswono Yudohusodo, Emil Salim, and Kharis Suhud.

Interestingly, the members of the first group seemed oblivious to the fact that the very term of “single majority” was a negative connotation in itself. The term started as a cynical remark of American scholars toward Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or PRI) in Mexico, which had always won the elections through manipulative ways since the 1940s, a long reign it coincidentally shared with Golkar. The prominent members of the *status quo* group, especially Harmoko, Abdul Ghafur and Syarwan Hamid would later earn derogatory nicknames such as “wall-faced politicians” and “long-tongued adventurers” for their conducts. For instance was during Golkar’s National Consensus in October 1997 when Soeharto asked a personal question whether the people still wished him to run as president for another term, Harmoko and Abdul Ghafur replied in affirmative. Unconvinced, Soeharto reportedly ordered everything to be rechecked just to ensure himself, to which Harmoko loudly answered, “It has been done.” Ironically, less than two months later, on May 21, 1998, Soeharto was forced from office.⁷³ Even more ironic, Harmoko as MPR’s Chairman and Abdul Ghafur as the Head of Golkar Faction were the ones who asked Soeharto to step down from his presidency, accompanied by Deputy-Chairman and

⁷³ It was done based on political calculation. Golkar announced the re-nomination of Soeharto in Golkar’s 33th Anniversary held in *Balai Sidang* Senayan on October 19, 1997. The honor of announcing the re-nomination was given to Harmoko as Golkar’s General Chairman. Soeharto asked Golkar to reconsider such decision, so that the public would not judge him as a cadre of Golkar who stood in a way of national succession, or an out of line cadre for having elected six times as President and still going for the seventh. This was the reason behind his suggestion to make a research on his reelection. He admitted that as a human, he was not perfect and therefore, he ought to introspect. He asked Golkar to find out the people’s will by March 1998. If Golkar’s research showed the people were unwilling to accept his seventh nomination, he would gladly *lengser keprabon, madheg pandito* (Rully, *Politik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era*, 2008, 94).

Chairwoman of DPR/MPR, namely Syarwan Hamid, Buya Ismail and Fatimah Ahmad who represented ABRI Faction, PPP Faction and PDI Faction respectively. Although these people represented the elements that supported Soeharto's presidency, they turned their back on him when he needed them the most. To this, Nurcholish Madjid unsympathetically likened Harmoko ⁷⁴ to a "slave," who needed to be clobbered for his cluelessness to what would happen even though hints were abundant (*Forum*, May 1998). Actually, during Golkar's 1997 campaign, Harmoko was the one who yelled the loudest against the limitation of presidential term. He maintained there was no need for such limitation on the basis that the 1945 Constitution itself did not regulate it either. On the discourses that followed, both Golkar and ABRI were strongly against the two terms limitation of presidential position (*Republika*, May 20, 1997). Just as they were responsible for Soeharto's seventh re-election, Harmoko and Abdul Ghafur were also took part in his downfall.

Three factors hampered the progress of the reformer group. First, the institutional predicament resulted from Golkar's own nature as mere vote-gathering machine to legitimize Soeharto's administration instead of a "real" democratic institution.

The second was the cultural predicament, in which a conducive climate needed to contain different opinions, as part of learning process for democracy to flourish, was simply absent from Golkar. All cadres were required to have total obedience, loyal to Soeharto as the Head of the Board of Trustees. No one else allowed to resisting his policy, except Soeharto himself. For example, even though Golkar's Central Leadership Council had ratified the list of legislative candidates, it would not pass without Soeharto's

⁷⁴ Prior to Golkar's Extraordinary National Consensus in October 1998, Abdul Ghafur and Harmoko had been asked to step down from their positions as the leaders of Golkar. They were deemed responsible for Soeharto's hurtful downfall, something that could have been avoided if they had been more perceptive in capturing people's aspiration in their capacities as the Speaker of DPR/MPR and General Chairman of Golkar, respectively. They failed to build Golkar, as Rachmat Witoelar, the former Secretary General of Golkar during the Chairmanship of Wahono, once put it. Furthermore, he said, "during 10 years of Harmoko's leadership, Golkar has been less than inspiring and therefore has lost its right to exist." From that perspective, Witoelar demanded Harmoko and Abdul Ghafur to step down. They had to carry the responsibilities of leading Golkar to destruction (Novianto et al., 2004: 22).

consent, as occurred in the revocation of the candidacies of Nafsia mBoi, Marzuki Darusman, and Anang Adenansi in the 1997 general election.

The third was psychological predicament that rendered the cadres uncritical. It was sourced from the predominant Javanese custom of over-politeness and strong patron-client relationship within Golkar. Any cadre dared criticizing the organization or his fellow cadres would be recalled right away, such as the case of Bambang Warih Kusuma. Interestingly, sometimes earlier, Harmoko had publicly promised that Golkar would not make recalling as part of its disciplinary action, which only proved that keeping promise was simply not Harmoko's strongest point (for which his name was made into the portmanteau of "*Hari-hari omong kosong*" or "Every Day I Lie").

Golkar imprinted four underlying objectives on its cadres, namely upholding the NKRI based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution; maintaining the unity and integrity of the nation including all elements therein; carrying out each stage of well-planned and continuous national development as the implementation of Pancasila; and preserving the national leadership in the hand of New Order under Soeharto as the development pioneer. Such were the "new ideology" imposed on every Golkar's cadre.

Therefore, winning the election as it did in the period of 1971-1997 was an essential precondition for Golkar to fulfill its objectives. Every general election held by New Order had distinct characteristics with each other. The election held in 1971, for example, was more like a political experiment for Golkar; a phase of "testing the water" for what would develop into total political domination, especially because its rivals, namely PNI, NU, Perti, Parmusi, PSII, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, Murba, and IPKI were more experienced by their participation in the 1955 general election. There are two common practices of political restructuring: before and after the election. New Order took the second on the basis that it needed to create national stability and repair the economy first. After all, to hold an election is a gamble for every newly formed regime because it can strip the regime from its new-found power right away. However, to represent itself as a democratic entity is also important for a regime to gain legitimacy and supports from national and

international communities. For this reason, New Order decided to hold its first election, but not before it had established national stability needed to improve the economy as a means to test people's aspiration before it moved on to the political restructuring.

In the early 1970s, political parties' rivalries solely manifested in structural level, in which each of the parties, especially the main contenders, namely Golkar, NU and PNI were busy consolidating their ranks. It was not until the general election in 1977 that the political mapping as planned by the regime began to take form. The political parties' fusions established in 1973— which saw the amalgamation of NU, Parmusi, Perti and PSII into PPP; and PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katholik, IPKI, and Murba into PDI— were also responsible in creating simpler political demarcations with Golkar as the ruling party. In the 1977 general election, it was evident that such political restructuring took a heavier toll on PDI than it did PPP.

The political restructuring saw the rivalries contained in inter-groups level, especially between Golkar and PPP. Nearing the 1982 general election, however, political system started its affinity toward hegemonic system. Golkar became far more dominant, controlling almost all aspects of government and national structure and infrastructures, while PPP and PDI were trailing far behind. At almost the same time, new entities arose. The role and influences of the economist group that until this time had been unchallenged were rivaled by that of the engineer group. It was also during this time political rivalries shifted from group rivalries to personal rivalries or from formal to professional level.

In 1987 general election, the full-fledged hegemonic system showed its peak result. Golkar's domination with the support of ABRI, civil bureaucrats, formal organizations, executives, and traditional group went fully unchallenged. Personal rivalries also increased, revolved around, and took direction at Soeharto as the epicenter of power. The rule of thumb was whosoever managed to stand adjacent to the epicenter would get tremendous benefit, both politically and economically. At the very least, those who were close to Soeharto would be respected beyond measure. This

condition continued until 1992 when Golkar's predominance was tainted, as showed in the outcome of 1992 general election, by the declines of votes it received in certain areas, especially in East Java, Central Java and Sumatera Island.

In the aftermath of 1992 general election and prior to 1993 MPR General Session, the hegemonic system had completely altered the political configuration of the Republic, from Geertz's tricothomy (*santri, abangan, priyayi*) into a political structure that resembled that of five petals flower (Imawan, 1997: 43-44). In this configuration, President Soeharto as the Head of State and the Head of the Government was the bud in the center, while each of petal attached to it was represented by ABRI, Muslims intellectuals from ICMI group, formal political institutions (political parties), traditional powerhouses, and business magnates respectively. By alternately switching to each one of these supporting elements, sometimes combining two or more of them, or using them altogether, Soeharto was able to strengthen his authority.

First, ABRI as a socio-political power through its *Dwifungsi* had been the regime's initial dominant factor. The military was described in the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) as the inseparable elements of dominant factor and basic capital of the state. However, unlike in previous times, it had taken more passive stance toward national matters since the 1987 general election, which was evident in its assuming of the supervisory role of *tut wuri handayani*.

Second, the intellectual group spearheaded by ICMI. Due to its close relation to BJ Habibie and, by extension, Soeharto, numerous ICMI's intellectuals and activists were able to get strategic positions within the government, People's Representative Council (DPR), People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), or regional governments. Its influences were quite phenomenal in influencing government's policies and the political dynamics of the state. In response to its Islamic background, the group, together with ABRI, was commonly linked

to "ijo royo-royo" phenomena (the green-ization or the greening of the government).

Third, formal group consisted of official political parties. Due to Golkar's domination in both executive and legislative bodies, PPP and PDI became the trailing second and third. Soeharto's administration kept both parties existed with neither significant influences nor real authority over national politics aside from being cosignatories of Laws and Regulations.

Fourth, the traditional, informal, non-party affiliated political actors and prominent members of society who gained influences nationally through religious mass organizations, NGOs and other independent bodies.

Fifth, the business magnates group consisted of loose groups of individual tycoons, conglomerates and industries moguls, driven by their economical interest, was Golkar's main supporters. So immense its influence was it could even dictate what policy the state should make, as seen in the Law on Oil and Gas, Law on Banking, Presidential Regulation on Clove Production Supporting Board (BPPC), National Car (*Mobnas*), etc.

With such immense supports, not to mention the illicit practices, it was no wonder Golkar could maintain its landslide winning in every election held by the New Order. Nevertheless, since Soeharto relinquished his presidency on May 21, 1998, the role of Golkar has changed dramatically. For some time, it was forced to "lay low by first changing its status into political party in its Extraordinary National Congress in October 1998."

Co-leadership of Buya Ismail - Tosari Wijaya

Just like Golkar and PDI, the United Development Party or PPP had its own dynamics. The factors that differentiate a political party from mere interest group or pressure group are that the former is striving for its members' aspiration while at the same time also striving to win the election. What will the party do for the people's sake after it has won the election? The election winner party sometimes neglects such underlying fundamental due to the ignorance of its elites. In its relation to politics, conflicts are essential things that emerge daily. It is the elites' duty to simplify those ongoing

conflicts so that they can be controlled within the applied political system. If such definition is going to be used to describe PPP, two prerequisites have to be met first.

First, as a political party, PPP had the main objective of winning the election, a goal that needed to be struggled continuously. Judging from its participations in the elections held during the New Order, PPP undeniably had met this first criterion.

The second criterion for a political organization to be regarded as a political party is its management. The management should not resemble that of traditional organization. While it did pass the first criterion, PPP had not yet fulfilled the second (Agus Salim, 1994). This, in turn can be used to explain why the efforts PPP had taken to win the election did not work up to the expectation. To understand this, we need first to look into the political dilemma of PPP during those years. Unlike traditional organization, political party has its own underlying logics and practices. These are not limited to the motivation and the objectives only, but also include the elements of conflicts, consensus, tactic, strategy, counter-strategy, and money politics.

The existences of those elements are confirmed, for example, in every effort taken by all parties during the election time. Not only that, those elements are also practiced in every event that requires political solution such as the election of party's Chairman. To win such position, every candidate is required to possess sharp political instincts by which he recognizes what it takes, and is willing to implement every practice possible, to ease and grease his way closer to the position, ahead of his rivals. Such are the source of aphorisms of politics as "the art of possibilities" and the "who gets what, when and how."

Nevertheless, it does not mean that one has to become a Machiavellian in every political achievement and position he pursues. Instead, it is a fact that in the more complex political situation, with the more advance education levels and various public aspirations, a political leader is expected to be more creative, flexible and professional in performing his duties. It means that to have a charismatic figure for the Chairman of political party is barely enough.

As the spearhead of the party, the person in discussion must also possess superb tactical and management skills in politics, a fact that all political cadres must fully understand.

The co-leadership of Ismail Hasan Metareum and Tosari Wijaya, meanwhile, did not show these characteristics, although, their leadership did feature such calmness Indonesia had never seen before in its political scene. Therefore, since their appointments in PPP's Third *Muktamar* held in Pondok Gede, Jakarta in August 1994, PPP could not do much against government's interferences.

This Islamic party also had a rather dire dilemma regarding its ideology, especially in the aftermath of the enforcement of Pancasila as the sole-ideology for every mass organization in Indonesia. Should it stick to its initial platform, an Islamic party, or should it be more open-natured to widen the social scope of its target supporters? A clear definition regarding its ideology was extremely important because if PPP were going to be a heterogeneous party, not exclusive to Muslims, it needed to alter itself first, restarting the whole thing over, which undeniably would be too costly to perform. As a compromise, Buya Ismail intended to recruit well-known figures into the party to increase its public image. This measure was a response to the appointment of Harmoko as Golkar's Chairman in Golkar National Consensus in October 1993 and Megawati as PDI's Chairwoman in PDI's National Consensus in December the same year. As admitted by Buya Ismail himself, the rise of both Harmoko and Megawati to their respective parties' highest leadership was a pinch of salt for PPP for its own lack of popular figures.

The benefits of a heterogeneous party, namely the range of issues it could carry and the vast scope of potential target supporters, were always tempting. That way, each issue and program PPP would carry out, could also interest other people beyond its Muslims-based supporters. Of course, it could no longer attract supporters by dwelling on religious issues (Islam) alone, which was proven futile, as evident during the 1970s and the 1980s when PPP was still a Ka'aba-bearing party. Exploiting religious issues as PPP had

done back then proved to be ineffective because PPP itself were in fact having trouble to give proofs to its supporters about its actual role and participation in the very thing it tried to accomplish, let alone its achievements.

To be a heterogeneous party did not mean that PPP had to adopt all logics and practices of a secular party that did not reflect religious spirit. But at the very least, Buya Ismail's camps could have learned to apply political practices which served both religious values and national interests altogether. As a party that had claimed to be an Islamic party right from the start, PPP could have emphasized more toward the moral and ethics' dimension of the religion. In other words, PPP should have been able to represent those moral and ethical values but not as a political representative of the religion itself (*Kompas*, January 4, 1998).

In that context, as it did not hold the position of ruling party, PPP should have served as moral supervisor (opposition) toward the authority. However, before it could serve its role as moral supervisor it needed to improve its own conducts first. In this respect, PPP should have performed clean politics, elegant and highly moral, by avoiding every low-standard political practice and money politics. These surely would have transformed PPP into religious-based party, able to uphold moral values against iniquities existed in the state.

All the points above need to be emphasized because during the early 1990s PPP was not the only coordinating institution for Muslims anymore. At that time, Golkar had had Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education (GUPPI), *Yayasan Amal Bahakti Muslim Pancasila* and DDI (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah* or Council for Islamic Preaching), respectively, while PDI had formed *Majelis Muslimin Indonesia* or Indonesian Muslims Council. Other than the organizations affiliated to the political parties, there have been also numerous Islamic non-political organizations, such as *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Muhammadiyah, ICMI and other profession-based organizations and NGOs. Numerous members of these organizations even actively involved in politics, most notably ICMI and its arrays of intellectuals. All of which marked the

political re-approach of the New Order vis-à-vis political Islam (not the religion itself), something that PPP needed to put into calculation.

Under such situation, the call for rational role and self-conduct were really in order to improve PPP as a modern political party. The party should not have lingered on its traditional base voters alone, but beyond as well. Therefore, whoever voted the party was doing so out of rational consideration instead of primordial relation and other psychological ties of the past. That way, the ideological obstacle it had had since the adoption of Pancasila would have vanished on its own.

Although PPP was no longer the only organization representing Muslims' aspiration, it had been formed by merging Islamic parties, namely *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Parmusi, PSII and Perti altogether. Therefore, despite its intention to be more open, all of its functionaries and supporters were Muslims. With such distinct status, PPP needed to be aware of its burden and responsibilities as the bearer of Muslims' aspirations, particularly that of its own members and supporters (*Kompas*, August 26, 1994). The same status should have encouraged its ranks of cadres and leaders to reflect Islamic value in every conduct they took, including to improve dynamically the democracy of the state. Such was the thought that led to the appointment of Ismail Hasan Metareum (MI) and Tosari Wijaya (NU) as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of PPP in its Third Congress in Jakarta, 1994.

The Last Episode of New Order's General Election

The period of 1997 general election started unofficially since the mid-1996 when the government officially opened the registration for voters. Covert campaigns of the three contestants even had started since 1995 with Golkar as the leading perpetrator. At that time, the Chairman of Golkar, Harmoko diligently held his infamous "cadres' gathering" in provinces all around Indonesia during his official tour as the Minister of Information. Similar gathering also conducted during the cabinet members' nation-wide *Safari Ramadhan* (official tours during the Holy month of Ramadan). No one can really tell whether the costs of such tours came from government's

budget or Golkar's own. Harmoko's favorite catchphrase back then was "every day is cadre-ization day." All cadres of Golkar echoed this spirit, triggering what was known as the "yellow-ization" (*kuningisasi*) phenomenon, referring to the ever-present color of Golkar. Even the then Army Chief of Staff, General R. Hartono himself joined Golkar campaigns, together with Soeharto's oldest daughter Madam Tutut (*Mbak* Tutut). In one of Golkar's campaign, Hartono sparked controversy by boldly claiming that "all ABRI personnel are Golkar's cadres" for which he was harshly criticized by political figures who deemed such remark as a proof of a declining democracy in Indonesia.

Although the government had loosened its tight grip on political matters, it was more than capable to conduct intensive interventions on political parties. In the process of determining legislative candidates for DPR and DPRD, for instance, the government required a special investigation (*Penelitian Khusus* or *Litsus*) conducted on each candidate by the joint bodies of Department of Home Affairs, State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) and even ABRI's Intelligence Agency (BIA). Although this practice triggered a lot of protests, the fearsome program remained. Under this mechanism, the government could revoke every candidate's candidacy on the basis that he did not pass the *litsus*, thus, the authority over legislative candidates was not solely on the hand of their respective parties as it should have been. Therefore, it can be concluded that even in this last general election under New Order regime, manipulations were still commonly found.

The voting day of 1997 general election was held on May 29, 1997. The results showed that Golkar gained back the votes it had lost in the previous election. Golkar's votes reached 74.51 per cent, highest ever in the history of New Order, increased 6.41 per cent compared to the 1992 general election. It saw an increase of 43 seats, gaining a total of 325 seats in the DPR. However, suspicion arose that this massive winning of Golkar was laden with manipulations and illicit practices. In comparison, PPP managed to increase its tally by 5.43 per cent while PDI's votes plummeted drastically following its internal implosion.

The votes PPP received were converted into 89 seats in DPR or 27 seats more than it had received in 1992. This increase was mainly sourced from its performance outside Java. Meanwhile, PDI, which had been overcome by internal conflict that led to the division of the party into pro-Soerjadi camp and pro-Megawati camp, lost a staggering 11.84 per cent votes. As a result, it had to lose 45 seats it had gained in the 1992 general election and only maintained 11 seats in DPR.

Table 10: 1997 and 1992 General Election's Seats Distribution in DPR

No.	Party	Votes	%	Seats	% (1992)	Note
1.	Golkar	84.187.907	74,51	325	68,10	+ 6,41
2.	PPP	25.340.028	22,43	89	17,00	+ 5,43
3.	PDI	3.463.225	3,06	11	14,90	- 11,84
Total		112.991.150	100,00	425	100,00	

Source: *Transparansi Indonesia*, June 9, 1999; *Tempo Interaktif*, March 19, 2004.

The 1997 general election was laden with protests. Public protesting took place in several regions. In Sampang Regency in Madura, for example, the angry protesters burned tens of ballot boxes because they could not tolerate the obvious manipulations anymore. When the government conducted re-voting in that area, the PPP sympathizers, whose party was the most aggrieved by the manipulations, refused and boycotted the event.

The bitter dispute between Soerjadi and Megawati and their respective supporters reached a new height. In response to the government's unjust and unconstitutional conducts against her legal leadership of PDI, Megawati openly declared on May 22, 1997, that she would not use her right to vote in the upcoming election (*Litbang Kompas*, 2004: 360). She did not, however, suggested her followers to do the same. Instead, she asked them to follow their own thought whether to participate in the election or not. The impact on this conflict toward PDI's votes was as devastating as it was instantaneous: its votes plummeted to 3.06 per cent from 14.89 per cent it had received in

1992 general election. The lost votes of PDI went to either Golkar or PPP, which explained the increase of votes received by both parties.

The general election in 1997 saw a shift in public's behavior in giving their votes. It shifted from traditional or primordial reasons to rational and socio-economical reasons. The conducts of civil bureaucrats, particularly those who had been against public interests, were also instrumental in determining one's vote.

In the period of 1971-1987, *priyayi*-based cultures and traditions had been instrumental to Golkar's winning. It is safe to say that during that time, the relation between the authority and its constituents resembled that of master and servants. Mass mobilization held central role in Golkar's victories. However, the floating mass concept applied in rural areas was no longer in full effect. Rural villagers were far more critical than they had been with the guidance of their respective *camat* and *lurah*. Urban inhabitants became bolder in presenting their ideas and stating their political allegiance, distancing themselves from the authority and mobilization as such. Under such circumstances, every disappointment and negative resentment toward the government was converted into either *golput* stance or refusal to vote for Golkar. In this respect, the performance of the government officials and its deliberate manipulations during elections influenced the fluctuation of Golkar's votes.

As many had predicted, during the reign of New Order, Golkar was too powerful for either PPP or PDI to outmaneuver. Soeharto was satisfied with the accomplishment of the 1997 general election because it went smooth and peaceful. However, judging from bad reviews it received, the 1997 general election was laden with deviation of democratic values New Order regime deliberately conducted. With the involvement of Department of Home Affairs, Golkar, and the military, the election was no more than an expensive ploy to maintain the authority over the interests of the state and the nation. This, however, proved to be a futile attempt because a year later New Order regime would crumble. No one could predict at that time that the 1997 general election would be the last election held by New Order regime. As the

history tells us, the 32 years reign of New Order regime came to abrupt end with the abdication of Soeharto.

Chapter 9

1999 GENERAL ELECTION: THE FIRST ELECTION IN REFORM ERA

Golkar's Munaslub

Nearing Golkar *Munaslub* (Extraordinary National Consensus) on July 9-11 1998, two elite groups contended for the seat of Golkar's Chairman.⁷⁵ Each of them claimed to be a reformer and accused the other as the status quo's proponent. Bitter rivalry between former Minister of Defense, Gen. (ret.) Edy Sudrajat, and Akbar Tandjung already took place from early on. For the very first time since its establishment as a governmental party in October 1964, Golkar suffered an internal conflict.

During the event, incriminating actions between the Board of Patrons and the DPP (Central Executive Council) emerged openly. The *Munaslub*, which was commenced by then President B.J. Habibie, turned into a fierce competition arena for the position of General Chairman following Soeharto's resignation a month earlier. The competition already started when the party conducted a vote to elect the chief coordinator and the head of the steering committee of the *Munaslub* and other functionaries.

The competition saw Akbar Tandjung emerged as the Chairman of DPP-Golkar for the period of 1998-2003. He received 17 votes from the DPDs (Regional Executive Council), thereby bested his competitor, Edy Sudrajat, who obtained 10 votes. Albeit disappointment of many Golkar cadres, especially from Edy Sudrajat's supporters, that was the consequence of a democratic election. Question arose as where did all those votes for Edy and

⁷⁵ The 1998 Reformation succeeded in dethroning President Soeharto, thereby shifting Golkar's relationship with power. Responding to the changing of public demands, Golkar tried to reposition itself in the *Munaslub*, first by stipulating the elimination of Board of Trustees, so that Soeharto no longer held any power in the party. Although at that time this party still occupied 74 per cent of seats of the parliament, it did not necessarily mean that Golkar was still the same as it used to be, especially in the presence of the newly emerging political elites and the increasing pressure from the media. Ever since, Golkar has made public demands as such as the beacon in making its policies (Rully Chairul Azwar, 2009, 128-129).

Akbar's sides come from? Was this election for Golkar's General Chairman democratic, or was it littered with money politics?

A closer look on the DPDs would reveal the basis of power of Edy Sudrajat, Akbar Tandjung and other candidates. Prior to the event, many had known that 10 DPDs, such as Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, were all in for Akbar.

His competitor, Edy Sudrajat was supported by 8 DPDs, namely, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). The supports for Edy, in fact, were far below the previous estimation of 17 votes. Unexpectedly, seven DPDs stayed abstain in the voting, namely Jambi, Bengkulu, Lampung, Yogyakarta, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and East Timor. Two DPDs of South Sumatra and Maluku gave their supports to both Akbar Tandjung and Edy Sudradjat, while the DPD of Maluku voted for Sultan HB X.

A relatively surprising shift in the map of power occurred in the *Munaslub*. Earlier that time, Edy's camp was confident of winning the competition since 17 (out of 27) DPD's chairpersons who came from KBA (Great Family of the Armed Forces) would definitely support them. These supports were verified. Thus, when Edy's camp held a campaign rally in *Wisata* Hotel, initiated by *Pepabri* (Armed Forces Veterans Association) and FKPKI (Communication Forum of Indonesian Veterans' Children), 15 chairpersons of the DPDs in discussion attended and confirmed their supports for him. Among *Pepabri* representatives were Brigadier General (ret) Hari Sugiman and Lt. Gen. (ret) Syamsir Siregar, former Chairperson of the BIA (Armed Forces Intelligence), while Indra Bambang Utoyo and Didiet Hariyadi attended as the representation of FKPKI. At the same time, not wanting to lag behind, Akbar's camp also held a campaign rally at *Pulau Dua* Restaurant in Senayan.

At that time, Golkar was divided into several factions e.g. the factions of B.J. Habibie, Akbar Tandjung, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, and H. Harmoko; that of Edy Sudrajat, Try Sutrisno, and Indra Bambang Utoyo; and that of

Sudharmono, Rachmat Witoelar, Sarwono Kusuma Atmaja, and Siswono Yudho Husodo. Edy Sudrajat and Sudharmono's camps shared the same objective in the *Munaslub*, namely to counter the joint-factions of Habibie, Harmoko and Akbar Tandjung. Although Habibie's faction promoted Akbar Tandjung, it supported other names as candidates as well, namely Fahmi Idris and Agung Laksono.

The *Munaslub* was not the first event for Akbar Tandjung to get into the spotlight. Earlier, his name already surfaced during Golkar *Munas* (National Conference) in October 1993, which saw Harmoko won the seat of Golkar's General Chairman. In the *Munas* held in October 1993, Akbar was promoted to contend against Susilo Sudarman, a candidate from KBA. At that time, as a young Golkar figure, he was deemed qualified to be the General Chairman of Golkar. In 1998, he was supported by B.J. Habibie who held the position of president as successor to Soeharto. It showed how serious the competition was even before the event took place. For the first time, tensed and heated atmosphere clouded the race for Golkar's Chairman. Up until then, when Soeharto had held the position of the Head of Golkar's Board of Trustees, Golkar's conventions and elections had always been quiet and calm for he had decided everything beforehand.

Golkar functionaries already engaged each other when the holder of the mandate of the Board of Trustees was about to be decided. The first plenary session that was held to confirm the schedules and regulations went without serious troubles. However, entering the session to elect the *Munaslub's* steering committee, a heated debate ensued (Novianto et al., 2004: 34-36). At that time, with his authority as the session's leader, Harmoko was going to decide seven persons to sit at the steering committee. As stated in the regulation, the committee should comprise one representative from the Board of Trustees, two representatives from the DPP, and four chairpersons of DPDs. Abiding that decision, Harmoko called forth a representative from the Board of Trustees to come forward with an official mandate. Replying Harmoko's call, Try Sutrisno delivered an envelope containing an authorization letter naming him as the representative of the

Board of Trustees, who in turn trusted Siswono Yudo Husodo as the Board of Trustees' mandate holder.

Yet at that very moment, the secretary of the Trustees, Akbar Tandjung, stood from his chair and approached the session's leader. He explained that the Board of Trustees had four Vice Chairpersons, thus he claimed the letter handed by Try Sutrisno was in lack of legitimacy. That discussion went on extensively and during the break afterwards, Akbar and Toni Hartono had to hold a meeting with Soeharto to clarify this matter and ask for counsel. Apparently, Soeharto had given the mandate to Try Sutrisno and appointed Siswono Yudho Husodo as the Board of Trustees' representative. Only then, the tension of the political drama among Golkar elites started to mild down.

The rivalry also spread outside the *Munaslub* arena, where the supporters of both the opposing camps held rallies. One group proclaimed their support for Edy Sudrajat and pleaded for Akbar's withdrawal. The other group declared their support for Akbar Tandjung and accused Edy Sudrajat of being Soeharto's crony and New Order's partisan. Moreover, a rumor of votes' trading also spread during the sessions of *Munaslub*. There was an allegation that Akbar shamelessly "allotted hundreds of millions rupiahs to DPD's chairpersons who were supporting him." Edy Sudrajat's camp suffered similar allegation of "distributing money for the same purpose, winning in the election of Golkar's Chairman." Another rumor engulfed the *Munaslub* arena, speculating that the Commander-in-Chief of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces), General Wiranto, and Minister of Home Affairs, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) TNI Syarwan Hamid, had instructed all ex-military chairpersons of Golkar's DPDs from across the country to give their support for Akbar Tandjung.

Judging from the result, that speculation might not have been too far off, the voting resulted in 17 votes in favor for Akbar Tandjung and 10 votes for Gen. (Ret.) Edy Sudrajat. In the end, Akbar Tandjung's camp came out as the winner of that fierce rivalry. This internal battle among Golkar's elites was in itself an interesting political phenomenon because as long as its existence, all decision-making had always been in the absolute authority of Soeharto. No

one dared to question the authority held by the Head of Golkar's Board of Trustees. His far-fetched authority also applied to non-Golkar affairs e.g. in the appointing of governors, deans of state universities, directorate and inspectorate generals of certain departments, ABRI Commander-in-Chief, and the chairpersons of PPP, PDI, or MUI; all of which required Soeharto's blessing and authorization. Such illustration displayed his highly centralistic rule.

Akbar Tandjung's victory in Golkar's 1998 *Munaslub* was due to three factors. The first factor was Team Akbar's proficiency in conducting their money politics strategy toward the attendants, especially the chairpersons and board members of the DPDs. Despite the difficulty to verify it and certain denial of those involved, the allegation could not be dismissed easily. "The giveaway was done openly," some confessed. Not stopping there, Team Akbar went as far as promising positions, ranging from deputy governor to mayor and local government officials, to DPD's chairpersons in return for their supports. Because Syarwan Hamid, one of Akbar's backers, was currently holding the post of Minister of Home Affairs and thereby had the authority to grant such positions, the promise was deemed plausible and thus was highly effective in gaining supports. In this case, Edy Sudrajat's campaign team simply could not bring better offers in terms of positions and money. Largely, the majority of the people remained convinced that money politics heavily saturated the competition for Golkar's chairperson. As outrageous as it is, such was the real phenomenon of Golkar's 1998 *Munaslub*.

The second factor was the widely-believed rumor, stating that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would not approve Golkar's chairperson who did not support Habibie's administration. The rumor allegedly brought up by a new DPR member, who recently met the IMF Director, Stanley Fischer, in his visit to the United States. The effect of the rumor was instrumental to Akbar's victory. In contrast, the rumor became a heavy blow to Edy Sudrajat, leading to his defeat.

As the third factor, the supports from President Habibie, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, and Minister of Home Affairs Lt. Gen. (Ret.)

Syarwan Hamid increased Akbar Tandjung's chance to win. Previously, Wiranto had made a statement that "Golkar's Chairman should not conflict with Habibie's presidency." As for Edy's camp, they had made clear of their resentment toward B.J. Habibie's administration. Even so, active military members were reluctant to stand opposed to B.J. Habibie, whose presidency and status as the Head of State entitled him as the Military's Highest Commander.

Conflict that engulfed Golkar's *Munaslub* was not a new phenomenon; almost all political parties had endured similar situation one way or another. To mention a few, PNI's Congress in Semarang (1971), PDI's Convention in Pondok Gede, Jakarta (1986), PDI's Convention in Medan (July 1993), PDI's Extraordinary Consensus in Surabaya (November 1993); PDI's Consensus in Jakarta (December 1993), and PPP's Conference in Jakarta (1989) were examples of such internal conflicts. Many factors took part in this particular election of Golkar's elite, and it showed that one would make use of his money and connections to achieve his political ambition of holding the post of president, vice-president, or other major positions in DPR or MPR.

The same scenario occurred in Golkar's 2004 *Munaslub* in Bali, when Akbar Tandjung and Jusuf Kalla went toe-to-toe for the Chairmanship. With the involvement of money and power of influence, Jusuf Kalla, who just had been inaugurated as Vice-President to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), became the victor in the competition. In 2009, similar rivalry took place in another *Munaslub* in Pekanbaru, Riau, when the "government-friendly" Bakrie defeated Surya Paloh who intended to keep the party away from Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration. With many of its cadres being ingenious in conducting political maneuver à la New Order's government, Golkar became so proficient in conducting similar approach. That being said, if in July 1998 Akbar Tandjung was the "golden boy" who won the Chairmanship,⁷⁶ then five years later, in October 2004 General Convention in

⁷⁶ Once elected as DPP-Golkar's Chairman for the period of 1998-2003, Akbar Tandjung deployed accommodative approach by embracing all factions in Golkar (Novianto, et al., 2004:55). Therefore, it was no surprise to find the amount of DPP-Golkar's functionaries grew, from 45 in Harmoko's era, to 138 under his Chairmanship. Later on, a total of 12

Bali, he became the "whipping boy" Jusuf Kalla defeated in the competition for the same position.

In this context, Habibie delivered an intriguing message in Golkar's 1998 *Munaslub* by stating, "Golkar has the ability to adapt to the reformation era and to address people's aspirations dynamically, for which Golkar needs to change its Articles of Association. There should be some reevaluations on the institutions of the Board of Trustees, Consultative Council, and Advisory Council, regarding their function, role and authority." Having said that, he implied that in order to keep its existence and prevent its supporter from leaving the party, Golkar should have the courage to change its strategy.

Realizing the authoritarian power of the Board of Trustees, members of Golkar managed to dissolve the institution in Golkar's 1998 *Munaslub*.⁷⁷ Ever since, Golkar's organizational structure has abandoned for good the old hegemonic authority in the hands of single person of Soeharto's era. The first thing Akbar did as the Chairman was trimming down the membership of Golkar's two main channels: the factions of Armed Forces and Bureaucracy. Even further, Golkar officially transformed into a political party just like any other parties. Quoting Yudhoyono, an Armed Forces top brass at that time, "The New Golkar is Golkar with the renewed spirit in accordance with the spirit of reformation. The Armed Forces will give the space for Golkar to grow into independent organization, capable of performing healthy competition." As it turned out to be, to separate Golkar from the Armed Forces that had nurtured it with "preserving care" for more than three decades—thereby turning it as "spoiled brat"—was not an easy task.

functionaries in support of Edy Sudrajat resigned, such as Indra Bambang Utoyo, Didiet Haryadi, Salim Said, Tjahyo Kumolo, Major General (Ret.) TNI Yudhoyono, Setiawan Djody, Wati Amir, and Krissantono.

⁷⁷ Under the leadership of Harmoko (1993-1998), the first civilian figure to Golkar, this *Beringin* Tree (Bayan Tree) party spectacularly won the 1997 general election by attaining 74.5 per cent of votes. Previously, DPP-Golkar's Chairman had always been from military: the first Chairman, Brigadier General Djuhartono (1964-1967); the second, Maj. Gen. Suprapto Soekawati (1967-1972); third, Maj. Gen. Amir Moertono (1972-1983); fourth, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono (1983-1988); fifth, Lt. Gen. Wahono (1988-1993). The Chairman with civilian background was initiated by Harmoko, for two periods (sixth and seventh), followed by Akbar Tanjung (eighth), Jusuf Kalla (ninth), and Bakrie (tenth).

The Election of Hamzah Haz

The Fourth National Congress of the PPP (United Development Party) on November 29–December 2, 1998 established Hamzah Haz as the Chairman and Alimarwan Hanan as the Secretary General for the period of 1998–2003. Hamzah Haz, whose background was from NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), outperformed AM Saefuddin who was eager to be General Chairman continuing the tradition of MI (Indonesian Muslims). The appointment of, and the trust bestowed upon Hamzah Haz to lead PPP prior to the 1999 general election marked the dominance of NU within PPP.

The PPP's Fourth National Congress took place ahead of schedule due to the demands of the reformation era as well as a preparation to the upcoming 1999 general election. In their case, PPP made the best possible use of the implementation of Congress in a dynamic macro-politics atmosphere to rejuvenate itself as part of major political forces in the state (R&D *Kompas*, 2004: 96). This rejuvenation was displayed in two things: First, PPP returned to its *Khittah* (Resolution) as an Islamic political party in accordance with its initial declaration on January 10, 1973. It was marked by the re-adoption of Islam as the sole-principle of the party. Secondly, PPP as a vessel for Muslims once again used the *Ka'bah* as its symbol in the 1999 general election.

For PPP, the election of Hamzah Haz and Alimarwan marked for the second time it was led by non-Javanese chairperson and secretary general. The first time was during the administration of Jhon Naro and Mardinsyah (1983–1987) who both came from West Sumatra. The election of Hamzah Haz as General Chairman was a new history for PPP. This was the first time in the last 15 years that an NU-affiliated figure won the election for the position of Chairman. The election of Hamzah Haz with his NU political background was an exceptional history, and at the same time showed NU's supremacy in the Fourth PPP's National Conference.

In the 1980s, a dispute emerged between NU's faction in DPR and Jhon Naro, an MI's politician, which led to the withdrawal of NU's politicians from PPP just prior to the 1987 general election. As Chairman, Naro was

replaced by Ismail Hasan Metareum. Buya Ismail's sympathetic leadership gave calm atmosphere which had been absent under HJ Naro's administration. Despite his affiliation to NU, Hamzah Haz tried to avoid revenge and sought to preserve the peace in PPP. One of his strategies was promoting democratization within the party and developing consolidation in order to unite the entire Muslims. In addition, Hamzah Haz determined to recruit his fellow NU's politicians scattered outside his party, such as in PKB, PNU, and PKU, although he admitted, it was going to be a difficult feat to perform. To do so, PPP had to have new constituents, especially from among Muslim youths, Islamic intellectuals, and other Islamic communities in urban and rural areas.

Hamzah Haz had already been widely known inside PPP and among political elites in Senayan (DPR). His career in this "Ka'bah" party had begun since the fusion of four Islamic parties, namely NU, MI, Perti (Islamic Education Movement), and PSII (Indonesian United Islam Party) that formed the party in 1973. As the result of the fusion, PPP's strength lay on the cultural diversities from which its respective elements sprang out. Consequently, when those elements separated themselves to establish their own parties, the amount of votes PPP received would plummet naturally. Such phenomenon crushed PPP in the 1999 general election as it did in 1987. Hamzah Haz fully realized the existence of many Islamic parties outside PPP, such as PKB (National Awakening Party), PNU (Nahdlatul Ummah Party), PKU (Awakening Ummah Party), SUNI (Indonesian National Unity Solidarity) Party, PBB (Moon Star Party), PUI (Islamic Community Party), Partai Islam Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim Congregation Party), PAN (National Mandate Party), and so on. All of them became parts of existing issues PPP had to cope with in the 1999 general election under his leadership. Observing such constellation, Hamzah Haz realized that Muslims would "disperse following any Islamic party that represents their respective Islamic views."

Actually, Hamzah Haz had already started his run for chairperson's seat of the Ka'bah party in the Third PPP's National Congress in 1994. At that time, Hamzah Haz was among the highly nominated chairperson's candidates,

along with Ismail Hasan Metareum and Matori Abdul Djalil (then PPP's Secretary General) who later became PKB Chairman with the support of KH Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur.

The rivalry of two NU figures, Hamzah Haz and Matori Abdul Djalil, divided NU's constituents into two camps, giving advantage to the MI's camp under the leadership of Ismail Hasan Metareum. In the last minutes, Hamzah crossed to Buya Ismail's camp, thereby opening a path for the latter to be the DPP-PPP's Chairperson for the period of 1994-1998.

In 1998, learning from their mistake in the Third PPP's National Congress in 1994, NU's faction sought an all out performance. Preventing the votes from splitting, they only nominated one candidate, Hamzah Haz. Therefore, the support for him poured in continuously. Major supports also came from some NU's charismatic *ulamas* (Muslim scholars), such as KH Alawy Muhammad from Madura, KH Idrus Marzuki from Kediri, and several other NU figures. Due to such immense supports, Hamzah Haz was able to defeat his MI's rival, Dr. AM Saefuddin, so convincingly. Previously full of confidence of winning, Saefuddin bitterly accepted the defeat. The victory of Hamzah Haz turned the tide within PPP that had seen MI repeatedly bested NU in the succession of Chairmanship.

Previously, AM Saefuddin openly showed his confidence by making a lot of remarks, especially concerning Megawati's presidential candidacy in the upcoming MPR's Extraordinary Session, scheduled to be held in November 1999. In one occasion, he gave cheeky remark toward her praying at a temple in Bali. His statement provoked harsh reactions from Balinese people, who condemned him in various newspapers and demanded him sent to trial for the considered insult toward Hindu, their religion that counts as official religion accepted in the Republic, alongside Islam, Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhism. Later on, during the tenure of Gus Dur, Kong Hu Chu also made into the list of official religion. Saefuddin, regardless of his motive, seemed objected by Megawati's presence at a Hindu temple in Bali where she did participate in "praying" at a Hindu praying ritual.

What was the highlight in the outcome of the Fourth PPP National Congress? Among others was the re-adoption of Islam as PPP's basic principle, replacing Pancasila it had adopted in pursuant to the 1983 GBHN (State Policy Guidelines) and the 1985 Law on Political Parties and Golkar. The issue of basic principle had triggered long arduous debate within PPP. The reestablishment of PPP as an Islam-based party would seemingly able to resolve the dilemma it had suffered in the last decade of the New Order era. But in truth, its establishment as an Islam-based party, among numerous Islamic parties, brought a new problem.

As an institution with spiritual mission in a profane political scene, PPP and its Muslims constituents would always have complex roles. A clear demarcation must separate political party from religious organization in the terms of religious visions and spiritual movements. That being said, as an institution based on spiritual community, PPP's mission has been simply to ascertain that religious principles have their proper place in the context of state politics.

However, a party's programs and vision which are enclosed in rigid religious values may well be incompatible within practical political scene and left behind as a result. Likewise, in the beginning PPP was managed under the guidance of *ulamas*, Muslim scholars, and other religious figures, and then, in PPP's development from 1980s onward, Muslim politicians began to take over. As the result, PPP suffered a crisis of legitimacy and identity, which was so apparent during the leadership of HJ Naro, Ismail Hasan Metareum, and even the leadership of Hamzah Haz and Suryadharma Ali that altogether spanned from the 1980s to the 2000s. Throughout the eras of those four leaders, the number of votes for PPP declined further and further, especially in the 2009 general election, where PPP's votes dropped drastically. In its 2007 *Rakernas* (National Executive Meeting) in Palembang, Suryadharma Ali even admitted openly that the poor performance was a result of PPP's declined legitimacy.

As complex as the legitimacy crisis are the problems related to the party's resources that have haunted PPP since early on. These problems

closely related to the four elements that served as PPP's forming elements, namely NU, MI, Perti (United Tarbiyah Muslims), and PSII (Indonesian United Islam Party). Ever since PPP's establishment, NU had been the most dominant element with its massive reservoir of *nahdliyin* that supplied the hardliner politicians who dominated PPP in the 1980s.

At that time, PPP seemingly grew to be the representation of Islam as a political wing vis-à-vis the government. In many ways, the New Order government under President Soeharto always tried to demolish Islamic hardliners. From the era of Admiral Sudomo as *Pangkopkamtib* (Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order) to that of Try Sutrisno as the Commander of the Armed Forces, the government saw to it that the surges always crushed. The Armed Forces did the crackdowns on the incidents that involved the Jihad Command, right extremists GPK (security disturbance groups) in Lampung and Haurkoneng, West Java, Warsidi and Warman's Groups, Amir Biki's group in Tanjung Priok, the hijackers of the DC-9 Woya in Bangkok, and so on. All of those reflected the New Order's penchant for nurturing *Islamophobia* and maintaining the status quo.

Other than that of NU and MI, the influence of other elements was insignificant due to their small numbers. The influence of MI grew bigger and more central due to HJ Naro's role in taming down the hard-line politicians inside PPP, especially who came from NU. With the backup from the government, he succeeded in banishing vocal and critical NU's politicians from the party. Initially, Naro's mission was successful, but later on, it backfired on him when he insisted to run for vice-president in the 1988 MPR General Session to compete against Sudharmono. Because of his bravado, Naro was ousted on Soeharto's command and replaced by Buya Ismail.

All the illustrations above lead to the domination of old politicians in the Fourth PPP's National Congress that eluded the party from fulfilling its long-term objectives. Admitted or not, these politicians also enjoyed the fruits of the development of the New Order era. In fact, they might have kept the status quo's mindset as Soeharto's supporters as well, judging from their reluctance to step aside to be replaced by the younger, more reformist

politicians. The direct effect of this was the dissensions that led to the foundation of PKB by NU's leaders in July 1998, and PBR (Reform Star Party) under the leadership of Zainuddin MZ, "Da'i of a million Muslims," later in 2003.

By extension, senior politicians of PPP also shared the responsibility on the prolonged economic crisis that hit in July 1997 for their constant support for Soeharto's presidency in every General Session, from 1973 until 1998. How could then those senior PPP's politicians claim to be reformists, condemning and demanding for Soeharto's resignation, while they had happily enjoyed three decades of living under New Order's shade? Such dilemma was haunting PPP in its preparation of the upcoming 1999 general election, in addition to the prospect of supporting B.J. Habibie in MPR's 1999 General Session. In the latter-mentioned occasion, another dilemma emerged concerning the presidential candidacy, whether PPP should give its support to Habibie the incumbent or to KH Abdurrachman Wahid (Gus Dur) who was supported by the "Central Axis" faction. Those dilemmas were clearly visible amid PPP's internal political dynamics at that time.

The Fall of President Soeharto ⁷⁸

⁷⁸ We need to remind ourselves of the history of Indonesian contemporary politics. The history of Indonesian politics is an asset invested in culture, yet it is also a burden with the ability of constraining (imprisoning) the nation. When the burden is too heavy, the bearer will stagger and so will the one being carried for too long. The ability of putting things behind is a liberating practice, just as setting on an adventure is not just to wander aimlessly, but rather an act of exploring the same freedom. That was what happened to former President Soekarno, "The Fire of Revolution" who was doused out "constitutionally". It has always been easier to dethrone a person of his caliber than entirely erase the memory of him from the people's mind. For whatever reason, he represented an exceptionally heavy historical burden for Soeharto. New Order regime could not make any step as long as that burden was still clinging in memory. Thus, slowly but surely, the name of the figure who proclaimed the nation's independence was being eliminated from the history books. The New Order regime's supporting elites obscured Soekarno's role in bringing the ideology of Pancasila into light (on June 1, 1945), downgraded his merits, downplayed his achievements and severely exaggerated his political blunders. In order for Soeharto's regime to be able to carry out and manage its politics, they saw to it that Soekarno's name stayed below ground with all his mistakes and all his greatness. However, history has always been rewritten as it shifted from one course to another to the point when Soeharto too, eventually, was forced from office on May 21, 1998, after reigning for 32 years. Reformation came violently, overwhelming the greediness of New Order's politics. The demonstrating students rallied their forces with the zeal of Paris citizens besieging the Bastille. B.J. Habibie then took the soft yet thorny

The monetary crisis that hit Indonesia in July 1997 prolonged into economic crisis and then transformed into political and multidimensional crisis in every aspects of Indonesians' life. Although the suffering it brought on people was bitter and painful, the crisis was also a blessing in disguise that urged for reformation⁷⁹ in all social aspects. The central focus of reformation was on how to accelerate the implementation of civil society and good governance of the state in civic life, by promoting the spirit of democracy, upholding the supremacy of law and human rights, eliminating KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), putting former President Soeharto and his cronies on trial, and accelerating the implementation of local autonomy.

One of the impacts of reformation on politics was a shift of paradigm, from centralized to decentralized government system, where people's participation in the making of public policies has increased. On the regional level, the logical consequence of such shift is the autonomous administration,⁸⁰ which is still in effect today. That autonomy system implemented in pursuant to the amendment of the 1945 Constitution has been expected to improve Indonesia political scene in the future.

The shift of paradigms, according to Amien Rais, constituted as a big leap.⁸¹ With the passing of the amendments, MPR had completed the

presidential seat, laden with problems as the legacy of Soeharto and his cronies that burdened his administration severely. (Kleden, 2004: 197-198).

⁷⁹ Soeharto's resignation on May 21, 1998 marked the beginning of the Reformation Era. The history of Indonesian contemporary politics recorded the success of the students in dethroning Soeharto who had been reigning for 32 years. Soeharto's ruling period had extended due to the support of formal organizations such as political parties, especially Golkar, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, professional organizations, business owners, religious groups, and traditional groups. Their supports had made him able to prolong his power for more than three decades. Additionally, the constitution and the laws on politics had made it possible for Soeharto to reign that long. Before the amendment, the 1945 Constitution stated, "the term of office for a president is five years with the chance of being re-elected," a constitutional loophole for a limitless tenure incorporated in President Soeharto's era.

⁸⁰ K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid enacted the implementation of regional autonomy on January 1, 2001, although the initial processes had been developed since B.J. Habibie's presidency.

⁸¹ The new paradigms include: (1) the implementation of direct presidential election, (2) the repealing of MPR's supremacy, (3) the annulling of the authority of the MPR to elect and dismiss the president, (4) the stipulation that MPR consists of DPR and DPD members, (5) the abolishing of appointees, especially from TNI-Polri; every MPR member should be elected through an election, (6) the stipulation stating that general election participants for DPR and DPRD membership are political parties and for DPD (Regional Representative Council) are non-party participants, four individuals for every province.

constitutional changes required by the reformation in accordance with the students' demands in May 1998. The reformation was a big step in democracy, especially in transforming the amended 1945 Constitution into a modern constitution, able to cope with the challenge of times. Thus, there would be a new and more democratic era, especially in regards of the elections of public officials and direct election for President and Vice-President.

The giant leap would eventually influence the political parties, because, after all, their presence is instrumental in developing democracy wherever democratic system is implemented. However, in the last couple of years, with the rapid growth of printed and electronic media as well as non-governmental organizations, parties' role in voicing people's aspirations has been reduced, although in terms of political representation and administration processes they have remained as the main institutional frameworks. That said, even if they only played a trivial role in such democratic transition, it was still an important one.⁸² However, before exploring all of that, we need first to learn the political settings that transpired in January to May 1998, before Soeharto stepped down.

After gaining Golkar's support for more than three decades, President Soeharto began to face rejection in form of waves of protests demanding political reform to resolve the aggravating economic crisis. Turning a blind eye, Golkar was adamant on re-nominating Soeharto in the 1998 General Session, in what would be his seventh consecutive presidency.⁸³ The street protests were getting more and more aggressive with the participation of university students, pro-democracy organizations, and NGOs. The trigger was the July 1997's monetary crisis that had made rupiah's value plummeted,

⁸² Dwight King (2002) stated that political parties need the support of the existing primordial groups in society, based on ethnicities, religions, races, and social classes. However, the loyalty of these groups should be gradually directed to the parties. Political parties should never underestimate the existence of various groups in the society; they must take the benefit from it in order to build stable relations with their supporters. Utilization of such relationship will enhance the stability of the parties, so that the existence of mass-based parties will accelerate democratic consolidation.

⁸³ Soeharto was named Acting President in 1967 MPR Special Session. After that, MPR appointed him as President for six consecutive times in MPR General Session, from March 1973 to March 1998.

staple goods' price soared high, and companies reported bankruptcy, causing thousands of labors and employees lost their jobs.

Practically, every economic sector was paralyzed, especially the sectors of property, banking, and manufacturing that used imported raw materials. Those conditions overshadowed the preparations of MPR General Session in March 1998. From January to March 1998, a series of demonstrations took place continuously at the DPR building. In festival-like fashions, the protesting students crowded the building in daring spirit. They declared unsparing demands, insisting on President Soeharto's accountability and refusing his candidacy for the seventh time.

Waves of demonstrations crowded the streets since January 9, 1998, when hundreds of youths under *Pijar Indonesia* (Center of Information and Action Network for Reformation) rallied at the Monument of 1966 *Tritura* on H.R. Rasuna Said Street, Kuningan, Jakarta. They unfurled banner that read "Vote New President, This Storm Shall Pass." The title of their demands, *Tritura 1998*, was a reminiscent of the demands of the same name held in 1966. They declared three petitions, demanding the government to: (1) lower the price of nine basic staple goods and stabilize the rupiah, (2) overhaul the cabinet, and (3) hold a new presidential election. Common people of any background then joined the action. In mid-January 1998, 16 youth organizations rallied to DPR, expressing their stance on the economic crisis that had gotten worse and turned into political crisis. In the economical context, the state was at the brink of bankruptcy, 32 banks had been liquidated and some had to be merged. About 50 young people from PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement), GMNI (The Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement), GMKI (Indonesian Christian Students Movement), FKGGMNU (NU Youth Communication Forum), PMKRI (Association of Catholic Students), KMHDII (Association of Indonesian Hindu Students), LBHN (Nusantara Legal Aid Institute), GAMKI (Christian Youth Movement Forces of Indonesia), PP (Pancasila Youth organization), IPNU (NU Students Union), Young Democrats, KIPP Indonesia (Independent Election Monitoring Committee), Puspipam (Center of Politics Studies and People Advocacy), and

Pijar Indonesia joined forces under the banner of FKPI (Indonesian Youth National Forum). They insisted on their demands, refusing the re-nomination of Soeharto and requesting a more democratic presidential succession (*Tempo*, January 24, 1998). Since none of MPR's factions agreed to meet them in dialogue, they decided to declare their statements in public.

Early in February 1998, tens of youths who called themselves People's Democratic Alliance (*Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat*) also held a rally at the parliament building. In their opinion, political reform was the only way to overcome the economic crisis since economic reformation would not be sufficient. By choice, Aldera (People's Democratic Alliance) did not declare their aspirations to DPR because they believed it would be in vain. They no longer trusted politicians in Senayan who could do nothing. Their statement of opinion, "Support Megawati, Support Reformation!" clearly showed Aldera's support for Megawati's 1998-2003 presidential candidacy.

The demands comprised four points, namely: (1) urging MPR/DPR not to re-nominate Soeharto as president; (2) supporting Megawati's candidacy as the President of the Republic of Indonesia; (3) supporting the national alliance of Megawati, Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X; and (4) implementing political reformation to resolve the prolonged monetary crisis. At the end of February 1998, there was an interesting new phenomenon. Up until then, demonstrations had been identical with students, labors, or NGOs, yet this time, the frequently called opportunistic and apathetic-toward-politics professionals showed their concerns and embarked on similar demonstration. Around 50 people from various professional backgrounds, such as entrepreneurs, graphic designers, *Astra* (spare parts manufacturer) employees, who joined forces under the MPD (Professional Society for Democracy), held a rally at DPR building, complete with their colorful banners that read, "Protest of the Middle Class."

They realized that the development strategy of the New Order regime had flaws that led to the monetary crisis in July 1997 and threatened their future. Many companies declared bankruptcy due to the economic crisis. Ary Mardjono, former Secretary General of DPP-Golkar and the member of the

Golkar faction in the parliament, held a meeting with some MPD representatives but could not promise anything, although he would forward their aspirations to the DPR's Speaker. At the same day, there was also another demonstration at DPR conducted by around 40 youngsters of *Jabotabek* Youth Forum. They unfurled banners and read out a statement of opinions demanding lower price of nine basic staple goods and an investigation into bad loans worth trillions of rupiahs. They refused Soeharto's nomination as president, demanded MPR to open the door to alternative presidential candidates promoted by the people, and demanded the government's accountability on the suffering the crisis created to people's life.

The brief illustrations above served as the precursors of the riots ensued during May 12 to 15, 1998, in which four Tri Sakti University's students, namely Elang Mulya Lesmana, Heri Hartanto, Hendrawan, and Hafidin Royan were killed as the victims of security apparatus' brutality. Meanwhile, waves of protests concerning monetary crisis and cancellation of Soeharto's nomination kept engulfing the DPR's building. According to various newspaper reports, around fifty groups and organizations of youth, students, and NGOs held rallies at DPR within that week.

What made these actions hold up for so long? The culprit was none other than the protracted monetary crisis that had grown into a multi-dimensional crisis. Association of Legal Aid and Human Rights of Indonesia (PBHI) later considered the crisis as the worst in the history of New Order era. At the same time the PBHI lawyers' held their protest, more than two hundred supporters of Megawati Sukarnoputri, Big Family of Street Vendors (*Keluarga Besar Pedagang Asongan*), and *Pijar* Indonesia were hoisting demonstration of their own.

In the paper on economic and political reform entitled "Let's Save Indonesia", PBHI (1998) critically analyzes the economic and political problems during the New Order administration which planted the seeds of the economic crisis calamity that led to "the bankruptcy of the national economy." As noted in the main points of that 26 pages paper, the protracted economic crisis was the result of the common practice of civilian and military

bureaucrats in maintaining patron-client relationship toward the entrepreneurs. In turn, the economic practices of such unholy alliance nurtured proliferation of corruption and collusion in the bureaucracy. Simultaneously, according to PBHI, this fact dismissed the statement of Golkar General Chairperson, Harmoko, who maintained that the impact of the economic crisis did not spread to villages.

Since the crisis was not abating, President Soeharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Indra Rukmana (Mbak Tutut), initiated the "Love Rupiah Movement," a movement that remained unpopular because the majority of people did not have the rupiah to begin with, let alone dollars to be exchanged into rupiah this movement was promoting. Parallel to the views of many scholars, researchers and students agreed that economic measures alone would not be sufficient to cure the multidimensional crisis at that time.

Political reformation, therefore, was essential. The emerging political reformation covered six points: (1) accelerating the implementation of civil society and good governance of the state, (2) fostering democracy and democratization spirit, (3) upholding the supremacy of law and human rights, (4) eliminating corruption and prosecuting former President Soeharto and his cronies, (5) attaining regional autonomy, and (6) amending the 1945 Constitution, in relation with direct presidential election by the people.

On May 14, 1998, after four Tri Sakti students were shot dead, the street actions reached its culmination in riots and amok that overwhelmed every corner of Jakarta, debilitating the Capital severely. The impact of the riots in Jakarta and other cities (Medan, Solo and Surabaya) saw two thousand people became casualties, hundreds of women raped, and trillions of properties looted, destroyed or burned down during May 14 to May 15, 1998.⁸⁴ President Soeharto's return on May 16, a day ahead of schedule, after attending the Summit of Southern of South Countries in Egypt, did not

⁸⁴ Based on the reports from the Joint Fact-Finding Team, established on July 23, 1998, there were three categories of mass rapes, namely: (1) rapes of which victims were citizens of various ethnicities, mostly from Chinese ethnic, (2) rapes committed through violence, abuse, and or assault, and (3) other sexual harassments. The announcement of the reports from the team had been made since B.J. Habibie's presidency, yet there has been no further clarification well until now. The way our leaders deal with such tragic issue is really upsetting.

improve anything. Beyond people's expectation, after he failed in reshuffling the cabinet, on May 20, 1998, Soeharto hosted a meeting with prominent Muslim scholars, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Gus Dur, Ali Yafi, Shafi Ma'arif, and so forth. In the afternoon following this meeting, as many as 14 ministers, led by Ginanjar Kartasasmita and Akbar Tandjung, declared their resignation from the cabinet.

On the same day, to commemorate the National Awakening Day (*Hari Kebangkitan Nasional*), Sultan HB X along with Gadjah Mada University Rector, Prof. Dr. Ichlasul Amal, assembled a gathering in North *Alun-alun* (the palace square) of Yogyakarta attended by hundreds of thousands of students and other elements. Eventually, nearly one million people with various backgrounds, students, bureaucrats, armed forces, police officers, teachers, farmers, merchants, labors, and even the porters from nearby Beringharjo traditional market attended this peaceful gathering, aptly named "the action of a million of peace". During the gathering, people living along *Malioboro* and *Panembahan Senopati* Street provided snacks, foods, and drinks for the protesters on their own initiative.

In Jakarta, Amien Rais and some fellow reformists, such as Adnan Buyung Nasution and Goenawan Mohammad, planned a long march from the Presidential Palace to DPR building, which was canceled due to security issues. The military, either from Kodam Jaya or from Kostrad, could not guarantee the safety of Amien Rais and other demonstrators. Thus, there was no long march. On the next day, on 21 May 1998, under a tense atmosphere, Soeharto declared his resignation as the President of Republic of Indonesia at 10.00 a.m. Indonesian Western Time Zone. The students and pro-democracy activists who had been sleeping at DPR/MPR building for days prayed to thank Allah SWT because finally President Soeharto willingly resigned, without any bloodshed and political conflict among people of the nation. Ever since, the era shifted from the New Order era to the Reformation era.

Post-Soeharto's resignation, it was impossible to hold back the political euphoria. University students and the press, who used to be under oppression, freely condemn anything related to the New Order. People

denounced the corrupt behaviors of former President Soeharto, Golkar, ABRI, and government bureaucrats.

B.J. Habibie, who took the presidential mantle following the resignation of Soeharto on May 21, 1998, became an easy target of relentless criticisms, highlighting his feebleness and his lack of leadership. His administration still reflected the pattern of the New Order as displayed in the handling of the corruption of former President Soeharto; the Bank Bali's graft case involving government officials, monetary authorities, and the private companies; the East Timor (disintegration) issue; and the bloody clash between security apparatus and students who opposed the Bill on Emergency Law, and so forth. The reputation of Habibie's administration was poor in the international level. There was a notion that he failed to restore better foundation for the national economy and make innovations to improve the society. It was as if Habibie merely concerned about his own group's interest in maintaining power.

Seeing this, the *Barnas* (National Front), led by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Kemal Idris, Prof. Dr. Sri Edi Swasono, and colleagues, sent a letter to President B.J. Habibie. In that letter, Barnas acknowledged that Habibie inherited the defects his "grand master," Soeharto, had initiated. However, not only did President B.J. Habibie involve in the defects, but he had also played an important role in initiating them. Since B.J. Habibie had received the "torch of power" from that mentor of his, automatically he had to share the responsibility."

Based on that assessment, *Barnas* concluded that President B.J. Habibie was not worthy to lead Indonesia in the long run. Speaking as Barnas' Chairperson, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Kemal Idris wished President B.J. Habibie would wholeheartedly accept that fact and decline the presidential candidacy proposed by Golkar Party at the 1999 MPR General Session. Meanwhile, in similar tone, Lt. Gen. (Ret.), Bambang Triantoro was unsure President B.J. Habibie would be able to lead the nation any further, since so many problems he handled remained unsolved to people's dismay.

Those descriptions showed President Habibie's weak leadership, especially regarding the trial of Soeharto along with his family and cronies in the corruption, collusion and nepotism cases. None of the perpetrators went through proper trial and went to jail, although the investigation against former President Soeharto and also his family and cronies was stipulated in the MPR Decree No.XI/MPR/1998, thereby became something President Habibie had to account for in the 1999 MPR General Session. With such clear stipulation, President Habibie's responsibility in handling Soeharto's corruption should have not been trifling or feeble. The MPR had given the mandate, so Habibie had to make the initiative. If the holder of the mandate did not make concrete step, people would demand for his accountability. That was the biggest weakness of someone who once proudly claimed as Soeharto's loyal protégé.

Consequently, Habibie's popularity plummeted, his credibility sank, and the people no longer trusted him to lead Indonesia any further, especially following a disgraceful leak of telephone conversation between him and the then Attorney General, Andi M. Ghalib, revealing the lack of seriousness in handling Soeharto's corruption case. Even more, the scandal of Bank Bali also drew the attention of domestic as well as international communities, causing the IMF and the World Bank "threaten not to grant any loans to Habibie's administration, if it cannot solve the Bank Bali's scandal thoroughly."

Another drawback of Habibie's administration was its inability to provide the people with the sense of security. Riot after riot, as happened in Pontianak, Ambon, Aceh, and East Timor kept going unchecked. The government never transparently revealed who the provocateurs and masterminds were. People were also furious toward the secession of East Timor from Indonesia, following the Referendum his administration recklessly initiated in 1999. Many people became casualties in the unrest that followed the Referendum.

His popularity sank further due to his inabilities in handling various crises owing partly to the disagreements he often had with his ministers. For example, the argument he had with the then ABRI Commander-in-Chief

Wiranto, concerning the deployed troops around his residence, which is still controversial today. Another example, the sharp differences he had with then Minister of Home Affairs, Syarwan Hamid, about the territory division in Irian Jaya (Papua) and Maluku. Habibie had asked Syarwan Hamid to solve the division before the 1999 general election took place, but Syarwan Hamid wanted to wait for the election instead. Because of his weak leadership, there was no reason to elect him as president in the 1999 MPR General Session. Insisting on his re-election would be a foolish act for it would surely trigger another turmoil that threatened the unity of the nation. After all, Habibie offered no “selling value,” either for domestic or international public, as showed in the poor nation-state management, especially in the terms of law enforcement. Apart from the flaws of his administration, it also left a good legacy, namely the freedom of the press that has lasted to this day.

By and large, the majority of newspapers and political observers concluded that B.J. Habibie’s administration had low credibility, weak governance, insufficient in the sense of priority, sense of security, and sense of crisis (CSIS Analysis, No. 3, Year 1999: 203). The conclusion served as an explanation as to why his government could not solve even a single problem thoroughly. Therefore, many mass organizations formed by NGOs and university students, not to mention *Barnas* and the like, demanded Habibie to resign immediately. In the 1999 General Session, the majority of MPR members rejected President Habibie’s accountability speech and moved on with the voting that brought forth Gus Dur as the President to succeed him.

The First Election in the Reformation Era

Due to the political euphoria and great public pressure, the general election was held on June 7, 1999 instead of April or May 2002 as scheduled earlier. What was behind the rush, one might ask at that time. To gain back legitimacy, that was. At that time, no one—including from the international communities—trusted the government and state institutions resulted from the 1997 general election anymore. Therefore, MPR then held General Session in

November 1999 to elect President and Vice-President based on the results of the election conducted in June.

To hold the general election ahead of schedule would mean replacing the members DPR, DPRD, and MPR ahead of their service period, and even B.J. Habibie himself had to shorten his presidential term, which supposedly ended in 2003. Such policy by the president had never existed throughout the history of the New Order era, or Indonesia for that matter. As noted somewhere, instead of rushing down the election, there was the delaying of the election in the early years of New Order era. Scheduled to take place in 1968, the election was delayed twice. First it was delayed to 1969, due to lack of preparation, and again to June 1971 partly because Golkar was wary of the possibility that the older parties, such as PNI or NU, would defeat it.

Prior to the rushed general election in 1999, the government first submitted the Bill on Political Parties, the Bill on General Elections, and the Bill on the Structure and Position of MPR, DPR, and DPRD. Department of Home Affairs specifically formed Team 7, headed by Prof. Dr. Ryaas Rashid, the Rector of the Institute of State Administration, to prepare those Bills.⁸⁵

After the DPR passed those Bills and ratified them into Laws, the President formed the KPU (National Elections Commission), comprising representatives from political parties and government officials. One huge difference that distinguished the 1999 general election from the elections during New Order era (1971-1997) was the numbers of parties participating in the election due to multi-party system it adopted, following the freedom to form political parties granted by the reformation. It was similar to what

⁸⁵ During the 18 months of B.J. Habibie's presidency, DPR successfully finished 17 bills. (1) Bill on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices, (2) Bill on Consumer Protection, (3) Bill on Central Bank, (4) Bill on Regional Government, (5) Bill on Referendum, (6) Bill on the Implementation of Clean and Corruption-free Government, (7) Bill on Balancing Central and Regional Financial, (8) Bill on the Ratification of Abolition of Ethnicities and Discrimination, (9) Bill on Human Rights and National Human Rights Commission, (10) Bill on the Cancellation of Act No. 11 1963 on Subversion Elimination, (11) Bill on Alteration of Penal Code relating to Crimes against State's Security, (12) Bill on Arbitration, (13) Bill on Corruption Elimination, (14) Bill on the Establishment of Second Level Regions, for 7 municipalities, (15) Bill on the Management of Hajj Pilgrimage; (16) Bill on Foreign Exchange Traffic, and (17) Bill on State Budget. Outside those bills, the government proposed other bills, namely: (a) Bill on Oil and Gas, (b) Bill of Forestry, (c) Bill on Construction Services, (d) Bill on Telecommunications, and (d) Bill on Foreign Relations (Kompas, February 13, 1999; Analysis, No. 3, 1999: 221).

happened in post-independence era right after Bung Hatta released the Government Edict in November 1945, which resulted in the foundation of more than 49 political parties. Now, in the advent of the 1999 general election, no fewer than 161 parties were registered to the Department of Justice and Human Rights. After the screening and verification process, KPU admitted 48 of these parties to participate in the 1999 general election.

In general, those new parties shared the same view that the condition of the nation had grown worse nearing the end of New Order regime. Among the indicators were: (1) the failure in developing a populist democracy, because government's policies had not touched the grassroots level; (2) failure in preserving law, justice, and human rights; (3) centralized governmental system, in which Soeharto monopolized all the decision-making process; (4) failure in managing the party system that made Golkar grew into a hegemonic party.

The regime had directed the people to serve the leaders and at the same time support the party, a practice that in turn became the backbone of an undemocratic government. The above indicators were augmented with (5) the failure in socio-cultural system, as reflected in the failure of the national education system, and (6) lastly yet importantly, the failure in building an economic system, as reflected in the widening of socio-economic disparities. Next to those six indicators, the existence of foreign debts also burdened the state because its management had been unfocused and inefficient, not to mention the leak of distribution amid the corruption of the New Order's government. With that many problems, it was unsurprising that people were literally racing to convene a party of their own in hope of turning the tide. However, as the time tells us, even these new parties would fail to relieve the nation from the convoluted situation at that time. Quite on the contrary, the existences of so many parties have prolonged the political disputes even until now.

As recorded in Indonesian political history—specifically its general elections history—other than PM Burhanuddin Harahap's administration in 1955, the only government able to hold a general election as soon after a

transition of power was the government of post-Soeharto/reformation era. As the successor of former PM Ali Sastroamidjojo, Burhanuddin only needed a month after his inauguration to hold a general election, although all the preparations had been conducted by the previous administrations. In similar fashion, President Habibie only spent 13 months from the time he had succeeded Soeharto to organize the election successfully.

Despite the short preparation, the voting day of June 7, 1999 was right on schedule, and the nation-wide voting process was considered democratic. Incidents occurred throughout the general election process, causing the deaths of 151 people (*Media Indonesia*, June 2, 1999). The causes of that many casualties were mostly traffic incidents. Other incidents involved minor violence toward Golkar's supporters by other parties' sympathizers. However, other than the damage of properties, these incidents did not cause any death casualties. Based on the reports of Central and Regional *Panwaslu* (Election Supervisory Committee) and police records, 7.900 traffic violations took place during the election process, while other violations, such as unpermitted demonstrations reached 520 cases (*Media Indonesia*, June 15, 1999).

Giving legal sanctions for such violations during the campaigns was quite dilemmatic and time-consuming for the police, because the people they had to cope with were induced in political euphoria. However, the bloody riots everyone seemed to have anticipated earlier were non-existent. As for the campaign strategies, they had yet to change and still did not conform to the expectation of higher quality campaigns that put more priorities in dialogues about the parties' platforms or programs. All kind of festivities still dominated the campaigns, accentuated by political slogans and allegorical promises amid the rows of roaring vehicles. In all, the election went peacefully, with no significant chaos or disturbance. Some incidents did occur in a few regencies. Three regencies in Aceh had to host a re-election due to security issues. Meanwhile, the regions of Sibolga, North Sumatra, Irian Jaya and Maluku held the voting behind the schedule due to some delays in the equipment delivery and floods-related problem.

In the contrary to the trouble-free voting process, the votes counting and distribution of seats in DPR, DPRD I, and DPRD II were full of twists and turns, in which some parties were conflicting each other. In the vote counting, 27 parties, mostly the medium and minor ones, refused to sign the minutes of proceeding of the results, alleging that fraudulence and dishonesty had taken place in the general election. They expressed their rejection in a plenary meeting at the KPU.

Table 11: Parties Refusing to Sign the Results of 1999 General Election

No.	Political Parties	Votes	Percentage
1.	Partai Keadilan	1,436,585	1.36 %
2.	PNU	679,179	0.64 %
3.	PBI	364,291	0.34 %
4.	PPDI	655,052	0.62 %
5.	PPIM	456,718	0.43 %
6.	PNI Supeni	311,137	0.29 %
7.	Krisna	369,719	0.35 %
8.	Partai KAMI	289,489	0.27 %
9.	PKD	216,675	0.20 %
10.	PAY	213,979	0.20 %
11.	Partai MKGR	204,204	0.19 %
12.	PIB	192,712	0.18 %
13.	Partai SUNI	180,167	0.17 %
14.	PNBI	149,136	0.14 %
15.	PUDI	140,980	0.13 %
16.	PBN	111,629	0.11 %
17.	PKM	104,385	0.10 %
18.	PND	96,984	0.09 %
19	PADI	85,838	0.08 %
20.	PRD	78,730	0.07 %
21.	PPI	63,934	0.06 %
22.	PID	62,901	0.08 %
23.	Murba	62,006	0.06 %
24.	SPSI	61,105	0.06 %

25.	PUMI	49,839	0.05 %
26	PSP	49,807	0.05 %
27.	PARI	54,790	0,05 %

Source: KPU, in M. Sudibyo, *Analisis* No 3, 1999, p. 217

In response to the rejection, KPU Chairman Rudini presented the reports of the meeting to President B.J. Habibie, who then gave them to *Panwaslu* with an order to evaluate and asses the rejection. *Panwaslu* finally released a recommendation that the 1999 general election was valid and had no significant errors. Therefore, a re-election was unnecessary. On July 26, 1999, President Habibie declared the validity of the results of the 1999 general election.

Following the president's approval, PPI (Indonesian Election Committee) began its task of distributing the parliamentary seats. In this stage, conflicts among the participating parties were arising and the process of the distribution of seats went in fits and starts. Islamic parties, which had made *stembusakkoord*,⁸⁶ rejected the distribution made by PPI's Working Committee, especially regarding the distribution of leftover seats. The apportionment PPI's Working Group had made showed the Islamic parties with *stembusakkoord* only got 40 seats, while the eight Islamic parties in discussion argued that they were entitled at least 53 of the 120 leftover seats.

The disagreement eventually was brought before the KPU to be resolved. To resolve it, KPU offered two options the parties needed to vote on, either to make the distribution in pursuant to the *stembusakkoord* or to ignore the *stembusakkoord* entirely. Only 12 parties advocated the first option, while 43 parties were in favor of the second option. Around eight

⁸⁶ *Stembusakkord* (SA) is an agreement on merging the leftover votes among parties in an election to be transferred to certain parties. Typically, the leftover votes will be transferred after the first stage of seats allocation based on the voters' divisor number. *Stembusakkord* must be carried out a week prior to the voting day with the knowing of the National Elections Commission. For example, after the calculation based on voters' divisor number is made, two or more parties that conduct SA for the leftover votes can receive extra seats based on the most leftover votes. In 1999 general election, eight Islamic parties (PPP, PK, PNU, PKU, PBB, PUI, PSII 1905 and Masyumi) did *stembusakkord* to gain membership in DPR, DPRD I and II. In the history of Indonesian elections, *stembusakkord* first occurred in the 1987 general election between Golkar and PDI.

parties walked out, thus the distribution of seats was conducted by disregarding the *stembusakkoord*.

After acquiring KPU's decision, PPI finally announced the distribution of seats on September 1, 1999. The distribution saw five major parties, namely PDI-P, Golkar Party, PKB,⁸⁷ PPP, and PAN⁸⁸ acquiring 417 seats or 90.26 per cent out of 462 contested seats. The results of 1999 general election were comparable to that of the 1955 general election. In 1955, five political parties emerged as winners of the election with PNI ranked first. That said, in Geertz's context, the winner in 1955 was the *abangan* or the nationalist group. The same thing occurred in 1999 general election, where five major parties, namely the PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PPP, and PAN, dominated the top rank. Once again, the *abangan*, now represented by PDI-P, was superior to its counterparts i.e. *priyayi* (aristocrat), represented by Golkar, and *santri* (religious group), represented by PKB, PPP, and PAN.

Regardless of whether it happened by chance or not, it obviously confirmed the nationalist group's superiority over the Islamic political groups in national politics. Notwithstanding with the status of Muslims as the largest community in Indonesia, the history of the Republic proves that nationalist groups have always been superior to the Muslim-based parties. It may as well

⁸⁷ K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, K.H. Mustofa Bisri, K.H. M. Ilyas Ruchiat, K.H. Muhith Muzadi, and K.H. Munasir Ali declared the National Awakening Party (PKB) in Ciganjur, July 23, 1998. The first Chairman of Tanfidziah (Executive body) was Matori Abdul Djalil who, due to internal conflict in PKB, was later replaced by Alwi Shihab. The Chairman of Majelis Syuro (Consultative Body) was K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid. PKB was characterized by the values of struggle, nationality, openness, and democracy.

⁸⁸ National Mandate Party (PAN) came into being with the work of some reformist leaders under the banner of People's Mandate Assembly (MARA), who committed to the reform movement initiated by the students. There were more or less 50 figures attending the declaration of MARA at News Café, Jakarta, on May 14, 1998, such as Dr. H. Amien Rais, Goenawan Mohammad, Dr. Rizal Ramli, Albert Hasibuan, Dr. Daniel Sparingga, Arifin Panigoro, Faisal Basri, and Toety Heraty Noer Hadi. MARA grew into a reform movement that strongly criticized Soeharto, especially after Amien Rais being dispelled from Pan-Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) for criticizing Soeharto on the matter of Busang gold mine. In PAN's declaration in Bogor, August 23, 1998, it was mentioned that the birth of PAN was part of a big effort to build a civil society with the ability to withstand the grip of civil and military bureaucracy and the barrage of big capitals. Through their works, PAN wanted to develop Indonesia with independent individuals, solid social organizations, and autonomous administrative units. Other than PAN and PKB, there were many reformist parties founded in the period 1998 to 1999, such as the Justice Party (PK), Crescent Star Party (PBB), United Democratic Nationhood Party (PPDK), New Indonesia Party (PIB), and so forth. They gained too few votes, so they did not qualify the three-percent threshold, unlike Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP.

be assumed that it has always been difficult for the Muslims-based parties to best the secular nationalist-based parties.

The results of 1999 general election can be a factual illustration. PDIP won 35,689,073 votes (33.74%) and captured 153 seats in DPR. Golkar Party obtained 23,741,758 votes (22.44%) and captured 120 seats in DPR. PKB obtained 13,336,982 votes (12.61%) and captured 51 seats in DPR. PPP obtained 11,329,905 votes (10.71%) and captured 58 seats in DPR, or 31 seats less compared to what they got in 1997 general election. PAN, as the newcomer, got 7,528,956 votes (7.12%) and secured 34 parliamentary seats. In addition to these five major parties, some old parties still existed, one of them was PPDI (Indonesian Democratic Party of Enforcement) formerly known as PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party); its votes plummeted and it only captured two seats in DPR, nine seats less compared to that of 1997 general election. Concerning the middle and minor parties, due to their lack of funds, facilities, and infrastructure, it was difficult for them to get significant amount of votes, especially when they had to compete with the caliber of Gus Dur, Megawati, Amien Rais, Akbar Tanjung, and Hamzah Haz. In other words, to acquire votes without having the luxuries of enormous financial support and charismatic figures has always become an arduous thing to do in Indonesia.

Table 12: Seats Distribution Based on the Results of 1999 General Election

No.	Political Parties	Votes	Seats *	Seats**
1.	PDIP	35,689,073	153	154
2.	Golkar	23,741,749	120	120
3.	PPP	11,329,905	58	59
4.	PKB	13,336,982	51	51
5.	PAN	7,528,956	34	35
6.	PBB	2,049,708	13	13
7.	Partai Keadilan	1,436,565	7	6
8.	PKP	1,065,686	4	6
9.	PNU	679,179	5	3
10.	PDKB	550,846	5	3

11.	PBI	364,291	1	3
12.	PDI	345,720	2	2
13.	PP	655,052	1	1
14.	PDR	427,854	1	1
15.	PSII	375,920	1	1
16.	PNI Front Marhaenis	365,176	1	1
17.	PNI Massa Marhaen	345,629	1	1
18.	IPKI	328,654	1	1
19.	PKU	300,064	1	1
20.	Partai Masyumi	456,718	1	-
21.	PKD	216,675	1	-
22.	PNI Supeni	377,137	-	-
23.	Krisna	369,719	-	-
24.	Partai KAMI	289,489	-	-
25.	PUI	269,309	-	-
26.	PAY	213,979	-	-
27.	Partai Republik	328,564	-	-
28.	Partai MKGR	204,204	-	-
29.	PIB	192,712	-	-
30.	Partai SUNI	180,167	-	-
31.	PCD	168,087	-	-
32.	PSII 1905	152,820	-	-
33.	Partai Masyumi Baru	152,589	-	-
34.	PNBI	149,136	-	-
35.	PUDI	140,980	-	-
36.	PBN	140,980	-	-
37.	PKM	104,385	-	-
38.	PND	96,984	-	-
39.	PADI	85,838	-	-
40.	PRD	78,730	-	-
41.	PPI	63,934	-	-
42.	PID	62,901	-	-
43.	Murba	62,006	-	-
44.	SPSI	61,105	-	-
45.	PUMI	49,839	-	-
46	PSP	49,807	-	-

47.	PARI	54,790	-	-
48.	PILAR	40,517	-	-
Total		105,786,661	462	462

Source: KPU, in *Tempo Interaktif*, March 19, 2004.⁸⁹

*Without The *Stembusakkord*

**With The *Stembusakkord*

In observing the results of 1999 general elections above, we may highlight some significant factors that affected the number of votes (seats) the parties received. First factor was the stature of the party leaders. Figures like Megawati Sukarnoputri from PDI-P, Gus Dur from PKB, Amien Rais from PAN and Akbar Tandjung from Golkar had had decisive role in determining how many seats their respective parties captured. In no way could lesser parties lacking in big names gain significant votes against these parties. Take the cases of PDI-P's performance in Bali and Central Java, or PKB's in East Java, for example; in those areas, both parties were able to best Golkar whose image coincidentally was at its lowest point following the New Order's downfall. The victories of PDI-P and PKB over Golkar at regional levels owed no small part to Megawati and Gus Dur's charisma as the figures who bravely opposed Soeharto's regime and rejected Habibie for his portrayal as the successor of the New Order.

The second factor was the primordial spirit based on ethnicity, race, religion and group. Golkar's victory in *Iramasuka* (a portmanteau of Irian, Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan) regions, for example, was closely related to such primordial spirit. Other examples were the victories of PPP and PKB in Madura and East Java's "horseshoe" regions—comprising Pasuruan, Probolinggo, Lumajang, Jember, Situbondo, Bondowoso, dan Banyuwangi—known as the pockets of Islam. The fanaticism of people in Bali and some areas of Central Java toward Megawati's leadership in PDI-P, since she is the daughter of Bung Karno, was another example. Such primordial bond was so

⁸⁹ The number of votes acquired by parties that did not generate seats in DPR reached 9,700,658 votes or 9.17 per cent of total valid votes. If the seats distribution was based on combination system, there would have been 37 parties securing DPR seats, with only 706,447 votes or 0.67 percent of total valid votes did not generate seats. In 1999, six major parties won more than 10 DPR seats, 15 parties gained between 1 to 7 seats, and 27 parties got no seat in DPR.

apparent in the 1999 general election. As for the educated urban voters, they would make an assessment about which parties were offering rational and visionary platforms before they made their decision, even though in the end, the parties of their choices were bested by PKB, PPP, PAN, and PDI-P with their large number of traditional voters.

The third factor was the lack of good education and development in some regions that gave plenty of room to perform manipulative mass mobilization. No criticisms about Golkar would matter in such areas, even when reformation had taken place, thus Golkar could attain significant number of votes, as it did in Papua (Irian), Maluku, NTT, Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. Those regions have been renowned as Golkar's basis. Nonetheless, the role of Golkar's figures like Baramuli, Jusuf Kalla, B.J. Habibie, Marwah Daud Ibrahim and other native South Sulawesi figures remained dominant in boosting the party's performance.

Minor parties' insufficient financial resource to accommodate their campaigns was the fourth factor. In any case, the number of votes received always corresponded directly to the amount of money "distributed." The more a figure shared the money, the more likely he/she won an election, especially in areas outside Java. Campaigners of some parties even insisted for the sympathizers to receive the money. The constituents, most of whom were rickshaw drivers, *ojelek* (motorcycle-taxi) drivers, street vendors, labors, and farmers or anglers, would surely accept the staple goods and money the parties were distributing. The party with the most "donation" would be the choice of those constituents. That condition contrasted with the campaign atmosphere in campuses or urban areas where the residents have been known to be more critical and bold. Even if they received the money that was being offered, they would still opt for their own choices, so the money would not make any difference. By any means, for political parties, money politics has continued to play a significant role in gaining votes.

Besides the factors mentioned above, what was it that made the phenomenon in the 1999 general election, especially regarding the victory of nationalist groups over Islamic political groups, so interesting? With that

victory, history had repeated itself. In 1995, PNI was able to defeat two Islamic parties, Masyumi and NU, while in 1999, PDI-P bested PPP, PKB, PAN and the PBB. This way, we might as well say that the political canvass has not changed significantly.

After the 1998 Reformation, *Dwifungsi* (dual-function) role of the ABRI changed diametrically. In the past, by employing the *Dwifungsi*, the Armed Forces could enter every sector of politics, economy, social, culture, and law and defense. Yet, ever since the 1999 election, the ABRI (TNI) has fully dropped their *Dwifungsi* role. The role of ABRI (TNI) has been restored back to defense and security function, changing its role entirely. That restoration affected 2004 general election in which not a single ABRI (TNI) member acquired a seat in DPR, DPRD, or MPR, as it had always been in the past. This change underlined the differences between the general elections in the reformation era and the elections during the New Order era, from 1971 to 1997.

As Emil Salim pointed out (*Media Indonesia*, July 26, 1999), "what was expected at that time was the trustworthiness of the reformist parties' leaders, like the "Ciganjur group"—Gus Dur, Amien Rais, Megawati, and Sultan Hamengkubuwono X—in encouraging parties to unite, set the sail and deliver the ship of Indonesia carrying the spirit of reformation and people's aspirations to the island of hope." Unfortunately, that hope has faded away; the people of Indonesian are merely expecting for "Godot," waiting for something that will never materialize.

That is the real phenomenon of contemporary politics in Indonesian today, which has taken place ever since the reformation. By embracing multi-party politics, political conflicts have never ceased, they have become more intense, especially prior to and after an election. This condition is a reminiscent of Indonesian political atmosphere during the period of 1946-1956 under the Parliamentary and Liberal Democracy era.

Chapter 10

2004 GENERAL ELECTION: GREAT LEAP OF DEMOCRACY

Post-Reformation Parties' Dissensions

In the period between the 1999 and 2004 general elections, public opinion on political parties' images was growing worse and worse. Political parties were supposed to be able to accommodate and articulate people's aspirations such as resolving social conflicts, yet they were bickering over their own internal conflicts. Even more, some political parties fragmented and suffered inter-elites' internal conflicts. In PDI-P, for instance, the internal dissension already took place right after the 1999 general election, when Eros Djarot declared the establishment of Indonesian Axis (*Poros Indonesia*). This affair drew public attention and received extensive coverage from the media. Although initially Eros Djarot instituted it as a cultural movement in form of interparty organization (*Kompas*, 2004: 7), many observers believed what he did was a reaction out of his disappointment toward PDI-P Congress in Semarang, in which he was banned from entering the location, thereby obscuring his chance as a representative of South Jakarta's DPC to become PDI-P's functionary at DPP level.

Reportedly, PDI-P elites felt "irritated with Eros for his eagerness to replace Megawati Sukarnoputri as the party's Chairperson", yet many thought that Eros and Megawati had cordial relationship since the incident of July 27, 1996. Apparently, a "conflict" emerged between Eros and Megawati just prior to the Semarang Congress that encouraged Eros and several politicians to declare PNBK or *Partai Nasionalis Bung Korno* (Bung Korno Nationalist Party) on July 25, 2002, which later on was renamed into *Partai Nasionalis Banteng Kemerdekaan* (National Freedom Bulls Party). Prior to PNBK's establishment, Prof. Dr. Dimyati Hartono who, like Eros Djarot, had had good relationship with Megawati following the July 27 incident, already made the declaration of PITA (Indonesian Motherland Party) on February 11, 2002. Following their path, Rachmawati Sukarnoputri declared Pioneers Party (PP) on August 29,

2002. Then, in 2006, Admiral Sukardi, Roy BB Yanis, and Sukowaluyo Mintohardjo created another fraction in PDI-P by declaring Democratic Struggle Party (PDP). All of those fractional parties branched out from PDIP-P whose predecessor—the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)—was a fusion of PNI (Indonesian National Party), Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party), the Catholic Party, IPKI, and Murba (Mass Consensus Party).

Similar dissension also befell PPP (United Development Party), where disintegration that led to the establishments of fractional parties took place after the postponement of *Musyawarah Kerja Nasional* of PPP or *Mukernas* (party's national leaders meeting). Supposedly held in 2003, the *Mukernas* was delayed as late as after the 2004 general election. The delay created discontents, especially among young cadres who then embarked on a movement with the intention to secede from the party. According to those who opposed the postponement, the delay was a violation to the party's bylaws as well as a disregard for the aspirations of PPP's younger generation. This turbulence triggered the foundation of PPP *Reformasi* (United Development Party of Reform), which then, under the leadership of Zainuddin MZ, changed into PBR (Reform Star Party) in its first *Muktamar* (National Congress). Long before PBR's establishment, NU leaders, namely Gus Dur and Matori Abdul Djalil already declared PKB (National Awakening Party) on July 23, 1998, following Matori's defeat to Ismail Hasan Metareum in PPP's *Muktamar* in Jakarta.

Not even Golkar Party could avoid similar dissensions. Following the internal conflicts in the post-1998 *Munaslub* (Extraordinary National Congress), the late General (Ret.) Eddy Sudrajat then formed PKP (Justice and Unity Party). Failed to pass the parliamentary threshold in 1999, it changed its name to Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI) prior to the 2004 general election. Similar conflict also gave birth to another fragment of Golkar, namely the *Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa* (PKPB) or Concern for the Nation Functional Party. Established on 6 April 2002, the party claimed to uphold the New Order's legacy and succeeded in claiming its place as the participant of the 2004 general election. The leading figures of PKPB were

former Army Chief of Staff, General (Ret.) R. Hartono, Ary Mardjono, Ismael Hassan SH., KH Achmad Zabidi, and H Sanusi Almariz. Indeed, at that time, due to the disappointment toward Golkar under Akbar Tandjung's leadership, dozens cadres of Golkar's DPP and DPDs in some areas resigned from the party.

Before and after the 1999 general election, the political situation in the state was slightly disquieting for those who had held significant and strategic positions during the New Order era. Similar uneasiness was shared among Golkar's high officials whom Akbar Tandjung and associates had deliberately deposed. As the holder of the party's highest authority, he intended to separate the party from the previous image of Golkar as Soeharto's main supporter. Disconcerted, the deposed members tried to regain the leadership of Golkar in retaliation fit. Rumors began circulating about certain Cendana-backed group that planned to knock Akbar Tandjung off his position as Golkar Chairman. Knowing this, however, Soeharto suggested R. Hartono and his entire cohorts to form a new party instead, which led to the establishment of PKPB, a party proclaimed to be Golkar's successor and the "offspring" of the New Order.

In an unstable and complex situation, Golkar under Akbar Tandjung's leadership was a party entering a new phase, where its old tenet as hegemonic party in a single majority political system would no longer work under the free and independent political atmosphere.⁹⁰ Therefore, to cope

⁹⁰ Rully Chairul Azwar, in *Politik Komunikasi Partai Golkar di Tiga Era* (Golkar's Political Communication in Three Eras, 2009) conducts an in-depth study on Golkar's pattern of political communication in three different leaderships, namely the era of Harmoko (1993-1998), Akbar Tandjung (1998-2004), and Jusuf Kalla (2004 -2009). During Harmoko's era, Golkar was known for its hegemonic status as the ruling party. At that time, it employed an uncompetitive political structure as shown in the absence of regeneration's mechanism in terms of leadership, and yet to realize the importance of image selling (marketing). In Akbar Tandjung's era, Golkar was excluded from the ruling authority so it could freely play its political roles. In this era, Golkar did not employ a political communication against the market. In the contrary, it leaned toward market-oriented political communication and transformed into a market-oriented party (MOP). By the time Jusuf Kalla held the leadership, the relation between Golkar and political power had shifted due to Jusuf Kalla's position as Vice-President. Once again, Golkar became part of the ruling power albeit not playing the central role. In this era, Golkar perfected its political communication by applying the approaches of Market-Oriented Party (MOP) through diversification at national and local levels. Every weakness found in national level concerning its political position was patched up at local level.

with the demand on hand, Golkar Party made some adaptation by morphing into a market-oriented party under the motto of *Golkar Baru* (New Golkar). *Golkar Baru* also underwent some fundamental changes toward its products and internal policies stipulated in past events, such as the 1989 *Munaslub* and the 1999 MPR General Session. Golkar redesigned and renewed political products related to its Articles of Association/Bylaws, leadership, symbols, jargons, and policies. In addition, Golkar assumed a low profile standpoint and stayed away from making unpopular policy. Ever since, Golkar has transformed into an independent, receptive, and functional-oriented party, a set of qualities that explain its tendency to take side with the government and steer clear from becoming an opposition party.⁹¹

Henceforth, with eight parties branched out from the three New Order era's parties—Golkar, PPP, and PDI—plus sixteen new parties, there were a total of twenty four parties contesting in the 2004 general election. Based on the data recorded, more than 160 parties had been established toward the implementation of the 2004 general election. However, only 24 of which were verified by the KPU. Party's internal conflict was not a new phenomenon existed exclusively within this period. Back in the New Order era, political parties had already suffered from similar phenomenon. Of course, the internal conflicts were different then. In the New Order era, conflicts among parties' elites, of which the outcome tended to benefit Golkar, occurred as results of immense pressure from the ruling class. In post-reformation era, however, parties' fragmentation happened because of the competition for power among parties' elites during the *Munas*, *Muktamar*, or Congress, driven by covetousness to maintain or capture positions in the party or in the executive and legislative bodies.

⁹¹ Still according to Rully (2009: 149), there were some important events that marked the dawn of a new chapter in Golkar's relationship with power in post-2004 era and such political position had never existed in previous eras, either in the era of Harmoko (hegemonic party) or that of Akbar Tandjung (Market-Oriented Party). It brought Jusuf Kalla's administrative era (2004) into a unique position where market-oriented approach was no longer applicable. Jusuf Kalla was the Vice-President then, so Golkar was not as free as it had been during the times of Megawati's presidency, when Golkar had more chance to act because it was not part of the ruling power.

According to Ramlan Surbakti (2004), a closer observation will reveal that there have been five weaknesses of the parties established in the post-reformation era. First, their ideologies have been impractical and utopian at best, making it difficult to determine the patterns and direction of their public policies, let alone distinguish one party's programs from another's. For example, in their campaigns, they all have brought up the issues of fighting corruption, eliminating poverty, reducing unemployment, and providing jobs, so it has been hard to differentiate Islamic parties from the nationalist ones and vice versa. Most parties have opted to promote nearly identical, too general, and normative programs and platforms.

Secondly, their internal managements have been managed less democratically so they resemble more of a committee, albeit formal, than organizations that actually exist as political movements. This has been in contrast to what happened in the 1950s until the first half of the 1960s, when party organizations' dynamics were vibrant and lively. Moreover, parties' elites have inclined to regard differences in opinion as unthinkable. Therefore, it has been difficult for parties' elites to accept different opinions and many times such differences have resulted in harsh penalties for the perpetrators, like warning and recalling. For that reason, it has been unsurprising that the parties have always molded their cadres to be obedient and loyal to their leaders.

The following example shows the phenomenon of dissension that plundered Golkar party around 2004 general election. The frictions began with principle differences among Golkar leaders regarding which candidates the party should give its support to in the Second Round of 2004 Presidential Election. The majority of Golkar elites, led by the Chairman, Akbar Tandjung, preferred the pair of Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi, while the camp of Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman favored Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (SBY-JK).

The feud began as early as August 2004 during the Golkar *Rapimnas* (National Executive Meeting). The *Rapimnas* was held openly and each of the DPD's chairpersons had the right to announce his/her opinion as to which

candidates he/she would give his/her support to, as inputs for Golkar's DPP under Akbar Tandjung's leadership in making its own decision.⁹² From the result, the *Rapimnas* decided that Golkar Party would give its support to Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi. Some DPD and DPP's leaders attending the *Rapimnas* deemed this decision as unacceptable. Some elements, most notably the camp of Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman, argued that by accepting such decision the party did not fully appreciate the regional leaders' aspirations. Thus, they created a forum that called for the restoration of the party and conducted opposing maneuver against the decision of Golkar's DPP, which then resulted in their dismissal from the membership of Golkar Party.

Golkar finally annulled Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman's dismissal in December 2004, in its National Consensus in Bali. In the election of Chairman held in the same occasion, Jusuf Kalla, who had just been inaugurated as the Vice-President, defeated Akbar. With Jusuf Kalla's victory, Akbar's position and influence began to plummet, while Fahmi Idris and Marzuki et al. emerged triumphant. That was what political realm is all about: it is never free of conflicts of interests, in which present's friends might become tomorrow's foes and vice versa.

What happened between Megawati and Gus Dur is a clear example. They were known to have cordial relationship with each other, especially when Gus Dur held the position of President and Megawati Vice-President. However, after the Central Axis (*Poros Tengah*) in DPR deposed Gus Dur from

⁹² Chronologically, the turmoil in Golkar began at *Rapimnas* (National Leaders Meeting), 14-15 August 2004, which was attended by 32 DPDs delegations and Golkar Party's DPP. On August 19, PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PDS, and PBR established the National Coalition (*Koalisi Kebangsaan*). On August 21, the National Coalition formed the organizational structure in order to make the pair of Mega-Hasyim as the election's winner. On August 31, Fahmi Idris and Marzuki Darusman initiated the establishment of Golkar Party's Reform Forum (*Forum Pembaharuan Partai Golkar*). On September 2, DPP- Golkar's Chairman, Akbar Tandjung warned that disloyal cadres that created the Forum would receive organizational sanction. The young cadres of Golkar Party demanded the DPP to dismiss Fahmi Idris and Marzuki et al. from the party's board. On September 3, the supporters of Golkar Party's Reform Forum held protest rally at Hotel Indonesia Boulevard. They accused Akbar and other party leaders for having manipulated the party to benefit themselves in supporting Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi in the second round of 2004 Presidential election. On the same day, Youth Movement for Golkar Party's Rescue urged Golkar's DPP to dismiss Jusuf Kalla, Fahmi Idris, and Marzuki et al. with the allegation of betrayal against the party. Thirteen party cadres received warning letters from Golkar's DPP, stating that if they did not apologize, the DPP would take strict action by terminating their positions and memberships in Golkar.

his presidency, their relationship began to dwindle. Both were estranged and even hostile to each other. A few months later, however, they were comrades once again and often held meetings with other figures such as Try Sutrisno, Akbar Tandjung, and Wiranto. In the period of 2005-2006, all these national figures even successively hosted meetings in their respective abodes, starting at Wiranto's residence, then Megawati's, Gus Dur's, and Try Sutrisno's. Another example was the conflict between Taufik Kiemas and Yudhoyono in the advent of the 2004 presidential election, in which Taufik Kiemas criticized SBY as a "childish general." Yet, since October 2007, they have embraced each other again. That side of politics makes it known as "The Art of the Possibilities."

A similar fragmentation inside PPP also attracted media's spotlights at the time. It began when the DPP (Central Executive Council) of PPP sacked six central executive members accused of violating the party's policy. When Surya Dharma Ali, Bachtiar Camsyah, and Zarkasih Noor et al. sounded the idea to hold *Silaturahmi Nasional* or *Silatnas* (National Gathering), a rumor swirled that party's functionaries refusing to comply to DPP-PPP's decisions would receive sanctions. The idea of *Silatnas* itself derived from several party functionaries with the purpose of assessing PPP's performance for future reference to prevent their supporters from leaving the party. On the other hand, the DPP board members argued that the *Silatnas* was merely an effort of some party members to overthrow Hamzah Haz. During the *Silatnas*, the disappointments of some cadres were exposed and there was an urge to call the *Muktamar* (National Congress) sooner than its original schedule (2005) so that new functionaries could be elected. It was somewhat ironic that, while political pressures as seen in previous era no longer restrained the national politics, PPP had yet to free itself from internal conflict of interests.

The crisis got worse it even resulted in the emergence of a rival-party following the decision of the 2001 *Mukernas* that stipulated the *Muktamar* to be held in 2004, after the general election. The *Mukernas* created a feud between Zainuddin MZ and Jafar Badjeber et al. against Hamzah Haz and the rest of DPP-PPP's functionaries. Zainuddin et al., the initiators of PPP-

Reformasi, demanded the *Muktamar* to be held in 2003 in pursuant to the decision of the 2001 Extraordinary *Muktamar*. After no agreement came out of a long debate, Zainuddin M.Z. who was known as the *Da'i* of a million *ummah*, and Jafar Badjeber, Chairman of PPP's Branch Executive Council of DKI Jakarta, dissented and founded PPP-*Reformasi*, which was renamed into PBR (Reform Star Party) in its First *Muktamar* in Jakarta on January 27, 2002. Zainuddin MZ and Jafar Badjeber's withdrawal that affected PPP at regional and branch levels also served as a symbol of PPP's dissension in the post-reformation era.

The PDI-P also suffered similar crisis around April 2005 to August 2006, when the Purification and Renewal Movement initiated by Laksamana Sukardi, Suko Waluyo Mintoharjo, Roy BB Yanis, Arifin Panigoro, and Sophan Sophiaan triggered internal dispute in PDI-P. Approaching the Congress in Bali (2005), a discourse surfaced concerning the need of internal reconstruction within party. The initiators of the movement held a rival congress but that movement finally came to a halt due to their inconsistency. Being concerned about the failure in the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, they recommended Megawati not to re-nominate herself in the 2009 presidential election, but to give the chance to younger cadres. Instead of affecting PDI-P's Congress in Bali, such demand of renewal only made the initiators expelled from the party, thereby creating some frictions at the grassroots level, like in Semarang, Blitar, DKI Jakarta, Bali, and Yogyakarta.

There was a dilemma in PDI-P. Many a time, demands similar to the one mentioned above were being downplayed by its own initiators into mere discourses when it came to face Megawati in person, or mere ploys to get into DPP's boards in the outcome of particular congress. Only a few party elites did actually dare to say "no" to Bung Karno's daughter. Most of them preferred leaving PDI-P to found a new party than did such thing, as what Dimyati Hartono did by declaring PITA (Indonesian Motherland Party) on February 11, 2002, which unfortunately failed to pass the verification for the 2004 general election. In the meantime, PNBK under Eros Djarot's leadership became a stern opposition when Megawati succeeded Abdurrahman Wahid as

President. Some PDI-P members also dissented by joining *Partai Pelopor* (Pioneer Party) led by Rahmawati Sukarnoputri, Megawati's younger sister. Learning from such situations, all party elites including Megawati and DPP's board elected in Bali Congress should have realized that what PDI-P required was an internal reform and a non-feudalistic leadership that was eager to embrace all existing factions within the party.

How about the dissensions of PKB? Since Gus Dur established this NU-affiliated party with the supports of many *Kia'is* and *Ulamas* in Ciganjur on July 23, 1998, it has twice suffered fragmentations. One of them was Matori Abdul Djalil's "treachery" by supporting Megawati in the 2001 MPR Extraordinary Session (SI-MPR) to succeed Gus Dur who had had conflict with DPR, as president. In doing so, Matori Abdul Djalil, the then PKB's Chairman, disobeyed Gus Dur who had instructed him not to attend the Extraordinary Session. The entire PKB's Faction in MPR had agreed not to attend what Gus Dur described as a violation of the 1945 Constitution. Matori, however, unheeded the instruction and later argued that he only attended the session as demanded by his duty as the member of the MPR's Board of Speakers.

The party's elites deemed such argument unacceptable, especially Gus Dur and NU's elderly *Kia'is*. The *Syuro* Council, led by Gus Dur, then removed Matori Abdul Djalil from his position as General Chairman and revoked his membership from PKB. The *Syuro* Council then appointed Alwi Shihab as temporary Chairman of PKB. Thereafter, the feud continued between Matori and Alwi Shihab's camps to the point when it was brought before the court following Matori's removal as MPR's Vice-Chairman (Rinakit and Swantoro, 2005: 613). Matori's appointment as the Minister of Defense and Security by Megawati heated the tension in regards of whose camp the replacement of his position as MPR's Vice-Chairman should have come from, whether his own or Alwi Shihab's. Fortunately, Amien Rais as MPR's Chairman could bridge the gap between these two conflicting camps. Matori's PKB finally accepted the appointment of *Kyai* Cholil Bisri to fill the vacant position, although unfortunately, this modest and charismatic *Kyai* passed away not long after.

The second breakup pitted the camp of Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf, as PKB's Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, against DPP-PKB under Muhamimin Iskandar and Ali Maskyur Musa who pocketed Gus Dur's support. The cause of this breakup was Alwi's double positions as PKB's Chairman and *Menko Kesra* (Coordinating Minister on People's Welfare) in SBY-JK's cabinet. Initially, Alwi had been elected as an MP from PKB faction, but later on, by making concession to support the pair of SBY-JK in the second round of presidential election, he was rewarded with the position of *Menko Kesra*. Since Gus Dur as the Chairman of PKB's *Syuro* Council had previously announced PKB's neutrality in the 2004 presidential election, such approach was deemed as out of line. The conflict led to Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf's removal from the party.

Meanwhile, the third weakness is the lack of public accountability displayed by the parties. Turning into busy bees in the advent of an election and into hibernating bears thereafter as they have always been, only events such as *Munas*, *Muktamar*, or Congress can make them active once again.

The fourth is the propensity of parties' elites in craving for power as if nothing else matters. As a result, whenever they fail to grab power, more often than not, they will inconsiderately form new parties to compete against their previous ones, an approach of gaining and maintaining power that still exists even today. Alternatively, the losing chairperson's candidates go straight to the trashcan, figuratively speaking, causing most of them to suffer from post-power syndrome because they are unwilling to leave their organizational position in their parties. Such insatiable lust for power is often made worse by the diverse backgrounds in political ethics and cultures, which often induce the fragmentations within a party. By any means, people no longer join a party to make it prosperous, but instead to become prosperous through it.

The fifth weakness is the highly bureaucratic nature of parties. During the preparation of the 2004 elections, all parties linearly grew more bureaucratic, thereby transforming their elites stationed in both government and parliament into bureaucrats. Since the parliament (DPR) has always been

consisted of Parliamentary Factions as the extending hands of political parties, the Factions are identical with the parties themselves (R & D *Kompas*, 2004: 19). As a result, parties' bureaucracy infiltrates and influences the parliament whereas it should have acted independently, as was the case in 2004. What is more, parliament has transformed itself into bureaucrats-creating machine, thereby overlooking the fact that politics is about idealism that goes beyond who get what, when, and how.

Besides the aforementioned weaknesses, each political party has not yet improved its organizational system that often prioritizes its leaders' interests over its members' sovereignty and benefits certain individuals or groups more than itself as an organization (Surbakti; 2006).

Furthermore, the existing parties still have not carried out their fundamental functions related to political education, political communication, political recruitment, political aggregation and articulation, and active contribution in solving societal conflicts. Political education is important because it teaches people that as far as sovereignty is concerned, theirs are not limited to casting their votes in the legislative, presidential or local elections, but it is forever theirs as long as democratic government is present.

Within this context, we can also consider political education as a process to introduce political values from one generation to the next. During the process, that education will show right from wrong in terms of political rights and obligations, as well as in the path to be taken in achieving a political goal. Having that knowledge in their privilege, people would be able to articulate their interests. However, because such individual interest is a rather complex matter, a desire to accumulate different interests into a same design finally emerges. The effort to unify those interests is feasible with the facilitation of either interest groups or pressure groups to the point when the aggregation of interests of the individuals involved can be fully achieved.

Political parties, by following their ideological principle, then formulate such variety of interests into political platforms and programs they will offer in the electoral campaigns. The goal is to attract more constituents in order to

get the votes needed to win the election.⁹³ A process like this involves the elements of political education as well as political communication. In the next process, parties delegate their representatives as members of parliament whose duties are to listen, accommodate, and advocate people's aspirations.

Besides performing political education, parties have to build communication with their supporting groups, including by holding gathering events with other parties. Public political communication is achievable through particular events designed for a specific group such as seminars, gatherings, party's anniversary, and so forth. Good relationship among parties is highly necessary to nurture the values of partnership and equality in politics.

In addition, parties also have other roles such as (1) providing an institutional bridge between people and government; (2) processing and producing policies on behalf of the constituents to be carried out by the government formed by the winning party; and (3) creating the process of regeneration and recruitment of public officials. The recruitment in discussion is reflected in the legislative and presidential elections, as well as in local elections held to elect governors, regents and mayors. It all has rooted in parties' main function as regulator that bridges people and government in national level, regardless of political system a state adopts, whether democratic⁹⁴ or authoritarian.

⁹³ The results of Maswadi Rauf's research (2002) confirms that many parties still rely on primordial sentiments rather than platforms and programs in attracting the masses. They have been incapable of putting forth political and economic issues rationally, and keep utilizing primordial sentiments instead. Some parties, both religious and nationalist, still rely on the charisma of its leaders and the traditional constituents.

⁹⁴ Dahl (1989) draws the limits on democratic political system. For him, a political system is democratic if it meets the following requirements: (1) government's policies are under the control of elected officials based on constitution, (2) the officials are elected in an independent, fair, and just election process, (3) every citizen considered as adult by law has the right to vote in the election of public officials, (4) on the other hand, every citizen considered as adult by law also has the right to nominate him-/herself in an election as public officials' candidates, (5) every citizen is entitled the right to express his/her opinions, including criticizing government officials in terms of social, economics, politics, and other issues, (6) every citizen has the right to obtain alternative information which is not limited to information from the government or a certain group only; and (7) every citizen has the right to make association, to assemble, and to establish political organization, CBOs, NGOs, and other organizations. The purpose of the aforementioned requirements is to contribute to government's policies through competitive election in a well-ordered, systematic, and non-anarchistic process.

Furthermore, the parties also have their function in containing conflicts, namely to manage and resolve societal conflicts. However, regarding their external role, parties also take parts in conflict, especially during an election or in a decision-making forum such as MPR, DPR and DPRD. Thus, by recognizing their functions, parties are able to aggregate and articulate various different interests into public policies. By carrying out these functions, the parties actively play its role in the process of conflict resolution. Therefore, the parties need to formulate their Articles of Association as their guidelines in performing their role as part of the conflicts and the ones responsible in settling them.

Therefore, now is the time for political parties to put forth people-friendly platforms and programs, not the ones based on ideology or charismatic leaders, as we saw in the past. That being said, what qualify as prospective political parties are the ones that emphasize vision and concrete and realistic platforms and programs instead of primordial sentiments and charismatic party leaders. Such vision is important for parties so they can strive forward. Only by having exceptional vision, a party can raise a collective dream about future prosperity.

The vision of a party should at least imply two things; (1) a conceptual framework based on thorough and comprehensive planning in order to determine the objectives and how to achieve them, and (2) an emotionally inspiring and encouraging aspect to boost party's working ethos in the sake of the common welfare it idealizes (*salus populi suprema lex*). In addition, the vision of a party has to be solid, trustworthy, and appealing in its prospect. That vision must bridge the present to the future so it should be realistic and idealistic. Realistic means it is based on reality and achievable. The idealistic comes in the sense that it must reflect high standard of aspirations in order to urge party leader and cadres striving to do their best in achieving the outlined ideals, especially concerning the welfare of its members in particular and the people in general.

The challenges faced by political parties in 2004 general election were the lack of institutionalized procedural aspects of democracy in their

organizations and their irresolution in instilling ideology as part of political struggle (Dhakiri: 2002). Even more, considering their main functions, the parties are obliged to resolve conflicts in society, take part in the conflict, and develop democracy further. In that context, the government has an important role in developing the structure of modern and rational political parties in the future. Vague laws on political parties on top of weak law enforcement only serve the images of the parties to plummet in people's eyes.

In addition, weak social control over political parties makes parties wobble more and more out of control. People have witnessed it many a time in DPR's sessions discussing on certain bills, where most of the time parties' elites overlook people's aspiration and involve themselves in money politics instead. Therefore, it is duly justified if allegations emerge, condemning the parties as the ones responsible for the damages of the national political system and the failure in valuing the spirit of reform.

That is why the following actions are necessary: (1) involving the state in constructing high-quality regulations (laws) to encourage the process of democratization of the party, and the formation of civil society and good governance; (2) applying concrete and realistic reconstruction of parties concerning their visions, plans, and programs, including by creating transparent and public welfare-oriented platforms; (3) encouraging the role of social control over their representatives in legislative and executive bodies; (4) accomplishing the implementation of democracy where power is in the hands of the people implemented through their representatives via democratic elections. All of those urge for a firm implementation of *trias politica* in the future (Soedarsono, 2004).

Great Leap for Democracy

Legislative election marked the first stage of the 2004 general election. It involved 24 political parties and was held on April 5, 2004. The objectives of this election were to sort out political parties as a prerequisite for presidential election and to elect the candidates nominated for DPR, DPRD, and the non-party DPD. Parties obtaining at least three per cent of

parliamentary seats entitled to nominate its candidates to participate in the first round of the presidential election.

In 2004 general election, the number of invalid votes recorded was about 10 million (8.81%) out of 124,420,339 voters. Observing the data further, we can learn that there were more or less 34,642,845 (23.36%) people, out of 148,039,000 prospective voters, who either did not exercise their voting rights or damaged the ballots.

It was in 2004 general election that people for the first time could directly vote presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Amien Rais, the then Speaker of MPR, described it as "a great leap for democracy." Throughout the 2004 general election, the implementation of legislative as well as the first and the second round of presidential elections went fairly, justly, and democratically. The presidential election itself was historical for Indonesian people who had never experienced a "non-stormy and non-bloody" national leadership succession. The legislative election elected 550 DPR's members and 128 DPD's members. From the 550 elected legislatures, 492 (89.45%) were men and the remaining 58 (10.55%) were women. Out of 550 members, 361 (65.63%) had bachelor's, master's, or doctoral academic degree while the remaining 189 (34.37%) had high school background.

From an evaluation on the implementation of 2004 general election, we will find at least five major flaws. First, the proportional representative election system with an open registration turned out to be insufficient in improving the proportion of women and minority groups' representatives in the parliament. As noted, out of the 30 per cent quota for female representatives, only 58 individuals (10.55%) were elected, in contrast to the 492 (89.45%) elected male members. The percentage of the elected female members was even fewer than that in the 1987 general election that reached 13 per cent. In 2004 legislative election, many candidates whose votes actually far beneath the voters' divisor number (*Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih-BPP*) were elected owing to their sequential numbers, with only two exceptions, namely Hidayat Nur Wahid from PKS, for Jakarta II electoral area, and Saleh Djasit from Golkar Party for Riau electoral area.

Secondly, 2004 general election did not capture public preferences comprehensively, which means that the open list system had failed to inform the voters about the detailed background of prospective candidates each party was promoting. As the third flaw, the result of the open list system in 2004 general election had not yet reflected simple pluralistic representation compatible with, and required by, the presidential system (CSIS, 2004: 1). As we know, the 2004 elections system required parties to pass the electoral threshold in order to gain legitimacy to enter and compete in the next phase.

Fourth, running out of time, the KPU (General Elections Commission) fell short in preparing all the needed instruments for the election such as ballots, ballot boxes, envelopes, marking ink, and so forth. As a result, KPU's leaders and some of its members had to present themselves in front of the authorities on allegation of violating the laws. To name a few, they were KPU's Chairman Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, KPU's members Mulyana W. Kusuma, Rusadi Kantaprawira, and Daan Dimara, and KPU's Secretary General. In some areas, many KPU's members also had to face local authorities' investigations for similar cases. Although the provisioning of goods and services was justifiable according to Presidential Decree No. 80/2003, the KPK (Committee of Corruption Eradication) perceived it differently, hence the legal processes against KPU leaders and members.

The fifth flaw was the weak supervision on the electoral campaigns. The KPU, government officials, as well as police force were generally irresolute in controlling the campaigns and enforcing the campaign's regulations. Violent clashes between PDI-P and Golkar supporters in Bali and in Yogyakarta proved that propensity. Such physical clashes between two major parties' supporters showed us that our nation's politics was degenerating.

In addition, we can at least discover some factors that significantly affected parties' achievement in terms of votes/parliament seats in the 2004 elections, such as: (1) leading figures, (2) programs and platforms, (3) campaign issues, and (4) money politics—although the latter has been hard to prove. Even common people understood that "no money means dead end."

For each campaign, all parties had to distribute free t-shirts, attributes, lunch packs, and travel allowance which could cost fifty thousand rupiahs per attendance in the case of the well-established parties, or ten to twenty five thousand rupiahs for lesser parties. Whatever the amount of money was, it had a major influence in parties' performance in the election.

Based on the amount of votes they received, the parties participated in the 2004 elections were classified into top rank parties that passed the parliamentary threshold, middle rank parties, and low rank parties. Seven parties passed the threshold and at the same time came out as winners, namely *Partai* Golkar with 128 parliamentary seats (21.58% of total votes), the PDI-P with 109 seats (18.53% of votes), PKB with 52 seats (10.57% of votes), PPP with 58 seats (8.15% of votes), *Partai Demokrat* with 57 seats (7.45% of votes), PKS with 45 seats (7.34% of votes), and PAN with 52 seats (6.44% of votes).

Ranked in the middle were PBR (Reform Star Party) with 13 seats (2.44% of votes), PBB (Crescent Star Party) with 11 seats (2.62% of votes), PDS (Prosperous Peace Party) with 12 seats (2.13% of votes), and Nationhood Democratic Party (PDK) with five seats (1.16% of votes). Meanwhile, the remaining 13 parties occupied the low rank.

The data shows that the seven top parties secured about 45 to 128 DPR seats each. Four other parties obtained about 5 to 13 seats, namely PDK (5 seats), PBB (11 seats), PDS (12 seats), and PBR (13 seats). Six parties got one to two seats, namely PNI (1 seat), PNBK (1 seat), PKPI (1 seat), PPDI (1 seat), PKPB (2 seats) and Pioneer Party (2 seats). As for the remaining seven parties, they did not acquire any seat in DPR.

Table 13: Parliamentary Seats Acquisition in 2004 General Election

Sequential Number	Name of Parties	Votes Acquired	Votes in %	Seats Acquired
1.	PNI Marhaenisme	923.159	0,81 %	1
2.	Social Democrat Labor Party	636.397	0,56 %	0
3.	Moon Star Party	2.970.487	2,62 %	11

4.	Independence Party	842.541	0,74 %	0
5.	United Development Party	9.248.764	8,15 %	58
6.	United Democratic Nationhood Party	1.313.654	1,16 %	5
7.	New Indonesia Alliance Party	672.952	0,59 %	0
8.	National Freedom Bull Party	1.230.455	1,08 %	1
9.	Democratic Party	8.455.225	7,45 %	57
10.	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party	1.424.240	1,26 %	1
11.	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party	855.811	0,75 %	1
12.	Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party	895.610	0,79 %	0
13.	National Mandate Party	7.303.324	6,44 %	52
14.	Concern for the Nation Functional Party	2.399.290	2,11 %	2
15.	National Awakening Party	11.989.564	10,57 %	52
16.	Prosperous Justice Party	8.325.020	7,34 %	45
17.	Star Reform Party	2.764.998	2,44 %	13
18.	Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle	21.026.629	18,53 %	109
19.	Prosperous Peace Party	2.414.254	2,13 %	12
20.	Party of Functional Groups (Golkar)	24.480.757	21,58 %	128
21.	Patriotic Pancasila Party	1.073.139	0,95 %	0
22.	Indonesian Unity Party	679.296	0,60 %	0
23.	Regional Unification Party	657.916	0,58 %	0
24.	Pioneers Party	878.932	0,77 %	2
TOTAL		113.462.414	100,00 %	550

Source: *KPU Hasil Pemilu 2004* (KPU Result of 2004 General Election)

In addition to the problems stated above, a phenomenon emerged as the interesting highlight of the 2004 general election. It was Golkar's victory over PDI-P, the election winner of the 1999 general election. Bested in 1999, Golkar regained the throne by winning the election in 2004. Golkar, which previously had become the political vehicle of New Order regime, was able to obtain 128 (23.3%) from the available 550 parliamentary seats. Yet, it was no longer possible for Golkar to regain the position it had had during the New Order era, when it had controlled more than half of parliamentary seats for more than three decades, forcing any policies that fitted its interests. However, having a majority amount of parliamentary members has always been a privilege because it gives a psychological sense of being an election

winner, as Golkar was that year. At the very least, if it built a coalition, it would gain the upper hand as long as its affiliated legislatures were proficient.

Experience has become one of main considerations for a party in nominating a candidate. The longer a party member sits in legislative board, the more apt he/she will be in performing his/her duties in both the making of regulations and the lobbying of fellow parliamentary members. Many people would dismiss such assumption, because aptitude does not correlate linearly with the period of tenure. Nevertheless, political practices in Senayan (MPR/DPR) have never been far from such condition.

The following details of Golkar's, PDI-P's, and PPP's representatives seating in DPR based on 1999 and 2004 general elections serve as further illustration. As it turned out to be, half of Golkar's representatives elected in the 2004 election were "veterans", former DPR's members of the period of 1999-2004 during which they either served for the whole period or acted as replacements. More than 78.9% of Golkar representatives in the period of 2004-2009 had previously become members of DPR or seated in regional legislatures in the province or district/city levels. These veterans were mixed with newer members from various backgrounds.

Likewise, the trend of nominating "veterans" as candidates occurred in PDI-P. After it had won the 1999 general election, PDI-P performed confidently as entitled by its status as election winner. In 1999, PDI-P led the race by gaining 154 (33.3%) seats. However, the number of votes they received in 2004 plummeted, partly because the widely-shared opinion that Megawati had failed her duty as President. In the 2004 legislative election, the number of DPR seats secured by PDI-P decreased to 109 seats (19.8%) only, nearly half of which were occupied by "familiar" names.

The same "tradition" appeared within PPP. Out of 550 available DPR seats, this party secured 58 (or 10.5%) seats, of which more than 60 per cent were occupied by familiar figures who had already served in Senayan in 1999-2004. The percentage even reached no less than 65.5 per cent, if those who had served in DPRD were taken into account.

Although came out as the winner, Golkar or the Banyan Tree Party actually suffered stagnation, even setback. In the 1999 election, this party got as much as 22.5 per cent of votes, while in the 2004 the number fell to 21.6 per cent. Taking its failure to deliver its presidential candidate to the second round⁹⁵ into consideration, clearly, Golkar's political machine was "stuck or heavily dysfunctional" back then.

The storm inside Golkar was still raging in 2005. Due to its close relationship with central authority during the New Order era and the widely-known corrupt practices of that era, not so few of Golkar's prominent figures had to present themselves in front of law apparatus. Not to mention the allegations whistled by some cadres toward their fellow members concerning money politics, colloquially termed "nutritional improvement," which has become common phenomenon during every *Munas* (National Conference), especially nearing the election of General Chairman. Figuratively speaking, like a boxer, Golkar did win the election, but was battered and bruised all over (Imawan, 2004). Golkar members quickly realized that whatever problems they were facing lay on its institutional level. Surprisingly, instead of focusing on more pressing matter as such, during the 2004 *Munas* in Bali, the attendees still let themselves drawn into the petty competition for general chairperson's position. In that occasion, supported by Aburizal Bakrie, Surya Paloh and Prabowo, Jusuf Kalla won the competition, bested both Akbar Tandjung and Wiranto.

Even more questionable, veteran figures still dominated the list of Golkar's chairperson candidates. The majority of candidates were born in the 1940s. Their close relationship with former President Soeharto who had been

⁹⁵ In 2004, there were three elections, namely the legislative election (DPR, DPRD I, II, and DPD), then the first and the second round of presidential elections. In the first round of presidential election on July 5, 2004, there were five pairs of president-vice candidates, namely (1) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (got 36,070,622 votes or 33.58%), (2) Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi (got 28,186,780 votes or 26.24%), (3) Wiranto-Sallahudin Wahid (23,827,512 got votes or 22.19%), (4) Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusodo (got 16,042,105 votes or 14.94%), and (5) Hamzah Haz -Agum Gumelar (got 3,276,001 votes or 3.05%). In the second round of presidential election on September 20, 2004, SBY-Kalla became the winners with 69,266,350 votes (60.62%), while Mega-Hashim only got 44,990,704 votes (39.38%). In 2004 election, Indonesian people for the first time directly elected president and vice-president, which was possible due to the reformation the students strived for in 1998.

the central figure in Indonesian politics and the holder of ultimate authority in Golkar's internal structure is indisputable. They all had undergone the test of accomplishment, dedication, and loyalty, in addition to the signature indoctrination of the regime which clearly positioned them as Soeharto's political products. Therefore, it is simply ridiculous when they declared themselves as reformists who had never supported Soeharto.

The fact that 65 per cent of voters in 2004 general election were born around the 1960s to early 1980s gave Golkar a very strong message that the party needed to conduct regeneration in their leadership. In preparation to the 2009 elections, Golkar had to maintain the golden momentum it had in the outcome of 2004 general election. Regeneration was the key.

Golkar, which in its prime claimed to be the agent of development, had grown weaker ever since it no longer had any access to the center of power. Its determination to be a balancing force to SBY's administration was straight from the book and uninspiring because the elites' mindset remained unchanged. They still relied on the same old pragmatic, power-oriented mindset. However, in coping with the interest of SBY's administration, that kind of mindset was highly beneficial, especially with Jusuf Kalla's benefitting position as Vice-President.

Having its organizational system had not significantly transformed, the figure of Chairman remained as the most authoritative in determining the party's actions, which was even more evident ever since Jusuf Kalla took the helm as Golkar's Chairman. Eventually, Jusuf Kalla's position would be a thorn in Yudhoyono's flesh, especially in regards of the succession in 2009. Not only that, by taking the mantle of chairmanship, and at the same time serving as vice-president, Jusuf Kalla obliterated the collective dreams of having the direly needed checks and balances mechanism in the state governance. That being said, "we have returned to Soeharto's political system in its new form" (Imawan: 2004).

At first, this set-up was seemingly beneficial to President Yudhoyono. But for him it was like sitting on the back of a running tiger, figuratively speaking, clinging hopelessly without knowing where it would take him,

knowing the tiger would attack him the first chance he jumped off its back, while to direct its course was next to impossible. He needed the support and network of Golkar in DPR badly, because his Democratic Party was no match for PDI-P under Megawati. It would be a suicide for SBY if he broke the relationship with Golkar, because since early on PDI-P had already proclaimed itself as opposition to his administration.

If PDI-P had been successful in playing its role as opposition, then its image as "grassroots' party" would have been justified, and PDI-P would have remained in the position it had received in 1999 general election. Conversely, if the role Megawati had promised to play was in vain throughout the five years period, then it was impossible for PDI-P to expect similar results like in 1999. The 2004 presidential and legislative elections clearly proved it. The PDI-P failed miserably.

Admittedly, Megawati had once grasped an excellent opportunity when she became President succeeding Gus Dur, following his dispute with DPR. If only the grassroots society had considered Megawati's presidency successful in improving their welfare, probably SBY would have failed to displace her. Typically, in almost all developing countries, incumbent candidate has always had the upper hand and is likely to be reelected. Unfortunately, PDI-P let such excellent opportunity to pass. At least, during her tenure, the grassroots society, PDI-P's largest constituents, had yet to gain sufficient improvement regarding their prosperity. That being said, Megawati's promises to improve people's welfare, reduce unemployment, and eradicate corruption were mere rhetoric.

Direct Presidential Election

In the aftermath of the legislative election, parties that gained more than or equal to three per cent of parliamentary seats were allowed to nominate a pair of president and vice-presidential candidates to enter the first round of presidential election. If a pair of candidates received more than 50 per cent of votes, they would automatically be the president and vice-president. However, if no pair reached that threshold, a second round would

be conducted for the two pairs of candidates with the most votes. On July 5, 2004, five pairs of candidates competed in the first round of presidential election. The result announced on July 26, 2004 showed that there had to be a second round since no pair received more than 50 per cent of votes.

The followings were the five pairs of candidates eligible for the first round of 2004 presidential election whose parties obtained more than or equal to three per cent of parliamentary seats. They were Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid (candidates from Golkar Party), Megawati Sukarnoputri and KH Hasyim Muzadi (candidates from PDI-P), Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo (candidates from PAN and PPDI), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (candidates from Democratic Party, PBB, and PKPI), and lastly Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar (candidates from PPP). KPU announced the result of the first round of presidential election on July 26, 2004. The result was as follows:

Table 14: The Results of the First Round Presidential Election

Sequential Number	Candidates of President And Vice President	Votes	Percentage
1.	H.Wiranto,SH. H. Salahuddin Wahid	26,286,788	22.15%
2.	Megawati Soekarnoputri KH. Hasyim Muzadi	31,569,104	26.61%
3.	HM Amien Rais Siswono Yudohusodo	17,392,931	14.66%
4.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	39,838,184	33.57%
5.	Hamzah Haz Agum Gumelar, M.Sc.	3,569,861	3.01%
TOTAL		119,656,868	100,00%

Source: Electoral Commission: The Result of the First Round of 2004 Presidential Election

From the results of the first round of presidential election above, not a single pair of candidates got more than 50 per cent of votes, so it was necessary to hold the second round. The second round would nominate two

pairs of candidates who had received the most votes in the first round of presidential election. It was decided that this election took place on September 20, 2004. The two pairs of president and vice-president candidates nominated in the second round of 2004 presidential election 2004 were Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (nominated by PDI-P, Golkar Party, PDS, PBR, and PPP) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (nominated by Democratic Party, PBB, PKPI, and PKS). The result was as follows:

Table 15: The Results of the Second Round Presidential Election

Sequential Number	Candidates of President and Vice-President	Votes	Percentage
2.	Megawati Soekarnoputri-KH. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi	44,990,704	39.38%
4.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-H. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	69,266,350	60.62%
TOTAL		114,257,054	100.00%

Source: Electoral Commission: The Result of the Second Round of 2004 Presidential Election

Observing the result, we can see that the amount of invalid votes in the first round of presidential election was approximately the same as in the legislative election i.e. around 10 million votes. In addition, we can observe that the amount of *golput* increased, reaching around 34 million voters (22.56%) from the total of 150,644,184 voters.

Based on the results of the second round of presidential election, as the winning pair, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla were inaugurated as the President and Vice-President of Republic of Indonesia for the period of 2004-2009. The Speaker of MPR performed the inauguration on October 20, 2004. It was the first presidential inauguration attended by friendly countries' leaders, such as Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Malaysia PM Abdullah Badawi, East Timor PM Mari Alkatiri, the Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, Hassanal Bolkiah, and five delegations from other friendly countries. Former president Megawati Sukarnoputri performed a controversial act by refusing to attend

the inauguration ceremony. At 23:50 pm the same day, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) announced the structure of his cabinet and named it United Indonesia Cabinet. Hereafter, President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla ran the government for the next five years, facing many challenges and political dynamics, until their tenure ended on October 20, 2009.

Chapter 11

2009 GENERAL ELECTION: THE MOST TERRIBLE AND UNPROFESSIONAL

The Political Year

Political frenzies appeared predominantly on mass media advertisements throughout the year 2008. Many new political parties emerged and started to build their self-images through printed and electronic media as an addition to that of the already established political parties, such as Golkar Party (*Partai Golkar*), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*), National Mandate Party (PAN), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), United Development Party (PPP), National Awakening Party (PKB), and so forth.

Not a single day passed without parties and party's leadership related news. All parties, Golkar, Democrat Party, PDI-P, PAN, PKS, PPP, PKB, People's Conscience Party (Hanura), Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), the National People's Concern Party (PPRN), *Nahdlatul Ummah* Awakening Party (PKNU), Sun of the Nation Party (PMB), Indonesian Youth Party (PPI), Indonesian Union Party (PSI), National Front Party (Barnas), Sovereignty Party (PK), the Republican Nusantara Party (RepublikaN) and so forth, competed to gain the spotlight.

Therefore, even though the year 2008 had been declared as the "Visit Indonesia Year," President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono claimed the year as "political year" for the Indonesian people. Although without clear precedent, political escalation continued to heat up in 2008. Political escalation as such was deemed logical with the preparation of the 2009 election in sight.

Claiming the year of 2008 as an explicit political year was counter-productive. Political elites made the political year's hypes to justify their negligent in managing the country as they were supposed to do. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who came from different parties, began their preparation to compete in the 2009

presidential election. No fewer than eight members of the United Indonesia I Cabinet who also served as general chairpersons of political parties also joined the competition. The members of Rainbow Coalition started to show their true colors in the mid-political year of 2008.

Each party's efforts to hoist its own color gave the impression that political elites had abandoned the axiom of "united we can" and replaced it with "divided we still can." That was why, far before the presidential election of 2009, Jusuf Kalla had signaled that he would part way with Yudhoyono after the latter had declined his intention to pair up in the re-nomination. Since then, the SBY-JK duo had broken the partnership to compete as separate candidates in the presidential election of 2009.

Political atmosphere in the national level grew livelier due to the dynamics of local politics generated by local elections at provincial, district and city levels. By the end of 2008, at least 150 local elections had been held to elect governors, regents and mayors. In average, there were no fewer than two local elections per week in the period of 2007-2008. During this period, commotion erupted concerning Fixed Voters List (DPT) in the election of the Governor of East Java, in which the voting in the districts of Bangkalan and Sampang, Madura, had to be retaken. In such rushed conditions, political elites simply had no time for thinking about people's fate they should have been doing. They were just busy scheming strategies on how to seize and retain power in both the national and local levels. In an ironic fashion, as a caricature once portrayed it, the elites seemed very busy during the pre-election period but sleep soundly thereafter, oblivious to people's needs.

Approaching 2009, the elites intensified their efforts to gain people's sympathies as many as they could in hope of earning their votes in the legislative election. Such efforts were done solely for their egoistical interests to become election's participants, win seats in the parliament or roll as presidential candidates. As a result, they simply neglected the obligation to strive for people's aspiration.

Elite's attention on the economic agenda became less, if there was any in the first place. Concerning that, it has remained a possibility that the

government deliberately lowered its economic targets of 2008 fiscal year as a hidden political agenda so that it was able to achieve something even with fewer efforts. The feigned success of the government then was made into campaign's jargons, portraying it as successful in maintaining national economic stability and fundamentals and improving people's welfare by reducing poverty and unemployment rates. Indeed, when global economic crisis disrupted many countries in 2008, thereby suppressing their economic growth, Indonesia's economy grew positively, a statistic President Yudhoyono quoted ever so often.

Political journey had lost clear direction due to momentary interests that fettered the common sense of the leaders, either to achieve the status of participants in the 2009 election or to preserve their authority. The conflict of interests clearly displayed in the discussions on Draft Law of Political Parties and Draft Law of Election in the political year of 2008. Compromises that were made to bridge short-term pragmatic interests of elites clogged the democratic process ultimately (*Media Indonesia*, March 1, 2008). In addition, the Draft Law of Election failed to establish a simple party system needed to strengthen the ideal presidential system. A presidential system can only work effectively if it is supported by a simple party system. A small amount of parties will surely reduce the fragmentation rate, especially with the limited availability of factions in the DPR.

The failure to build a simple party system originated from a compromise that allowed all parties which had obtained legislative seats in the previous election (2004) to participate in 2009 general election, ignoring the three per cent electoral threshold as stipulated in the Law No. 12 of 2003 on General Election. Thus, nine political parties, namely Reform Star Party (PBR), National Democratic Party (PDK), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), Indonesian Democratic Enforcer Party (PPDI), Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB), Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), National Party Populist Fortress (PNBK), Indonesian Marhaen National Party (PNI Marhaen), and the Pioneers Party gained free passes to participate in the 2009 general election despite only having one seat in the

DPR. They followed the footsteps of seven major parties that had surpassed the electoral threshold, namely Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PKB, the Democratic Party, PKS, and PAN.⁹⁶

The compromise reached its peak when parliamentary threshold (PT) was fixed at 2.5 per cent of the parliamentary seats, resulting to insignificant changes to the composition of the parliament. Only by having a small number of parties in DPR, a more simple yet firm coalition of majority in parliament can be formed to ensure the stability and effectiveness of presidential system. Because only then checks and balances between legislative and executive bodies can be carried out more effectively.

Hence, the 2008 Draft Law of General Election failed to encourage the implementation of simple party system comprising solely the ruling and opposition parties. It also failed to end the practices of political horse-trading (money politics) between the executive and legislative bodies. Money politics was prominent and the constitutional rights of the Council, such as legislation, budgeting, and monitoring were predominantly used to gain profit. Political boundaries between pro-government and opposition parties became blur, save for PDI-P which always positioned itself as opposition party. Rather interestingly, political parties whose members were involved in the cabinet often behaved as opposition as well. As a result, the Democrat Party, through their faction in DPR, often complained of feeling betrayed by other members of the coalition, especially regarding the issues of Sidoarjo mudflow, Iran's

⁹⁶ PAN, which has been known as a reformist party, had their votes dropped in three elections (1999, 2004; and 2009). In the 1999 general election, PAN obtained 7,528,956 votes or 7.12 per cent of the total votes. It was in the fifth place after PDI-P (33.74 per cent), Golkar (22.44 per cent), PKB (12.61 per cent), and PPP (7.12 per cent). This first election of the reform era saw PAN delivered 34 representatives to sit in DPR. Its Chairman, Amien Rais, was even elected as the Chairman of MPR for the period of 1999-2004. In 2004 general election, vote for PAN was decreased into 7,303,324 votes (6.44 per cent) of the total votes. Its position dropped, from the fifth place in 1999 to the seventh in 2004 election. In the latter, the newcomer Democrat Party achieved the fifth position with 7.45 per cent and PKS, which held the seventh place in 1999, followed with 7.34 per cent. Despite the decline, PAN's seats increased to 53 seats, while PKS won 45 seats in DPR. In 2009 legislative election, PAN's votes plummeted once again to 6,254,580 votes or 6.01 per cent, for which it gained 48 parliamentary seats (*Kompas*, January 7, 2009). Almost all the parties that qualified for Senayan in 2009 had their votes decreased, except for Democrat Party. The results of 2009 election saw nine parties eligible for Senayan, including the successful newcomers, *Hanura* and *Gerindra*.

nuclear plant, the rise of fuel prices, the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists, Fixed Voters List-related problems in general election, Century Bank Scandal and the Special Committee of Tax Mafia Eradication.

However, no matter how urgent the simple party system is needed, it cannot be imposed by force as it had been during the New Order era, but it must be naturally regulated. That was the initial function of parliamentary threshold in the Draft Law of Election. If the parliamentary threshold was fixed at 5 per cent, only about five to six political parties would have been qualified for Senayan.

A coalition will become more effective if it comprises no more than six parties. Too many parties mean too many interests and that means rowdy political atmosphere more prone to conflicts. The presidential administration will be ineffective, leading to another form of New Order's single majority with the absence of opposition parties.⁹⁷ The threat of hegemonic rule may rise once again because every policy is in the hand of the President and the Joint Secretariat (of Coalition).

Other than the decline of minor parties, history has also noted their tendencies to force their opinions in the discussion of the Draft Law of Election, Draft Law of Political Parties, and the Draft Law of Presidential Election. On the other hand, major parties seemed to support such attitude by promising them their loyalty. Regarding the matter, the government and legislative body resulted from 2004 general election were simply clueless in designing an accountable system of democracy for the triumph of the nation in the future (*Media Indonesia*, March 3, 2008).

Beyond the discussion of the Draft Law of Election, disguised campaigns began to crowd out political atmosphere. Aside from the big printouts of candidates' profiles on street billboards, nothing much surfaced

⁹⁷ In New Order's elections, from 1971 until 1997, Golkar always became the single majority by winning the lion's share of votes, which ranged from 62 per cent to 73 per cent. In the present time, to repeat its history as single majority, Golkar has formed a coalition with Democratic Party, which had won 60.80 percent of the votes in 2009 presidential election. With the support of the seats of PKS, PAN, PPP, and PKB currently in the parliament, Golkar became single majority once again, or rather a single coalition. However, in the coalition, Golkar and PKS often opposed the Democratic Party, PAN, PPP, and PKB in the voting during the Parliament's plenary session concerning the tax special committee.

on public space other than criticisms about the sources of poverty and unemployment data the government had used to proof its success. Politicians were all just talking about themselves and not focusing on concrete action to overcome poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment of the people. Whenever political campaigns get down to pitting one discourse against another, as what happened at that time, people will suffer, feel neglected and confused. So much was the 2008 as a political year for the party's elites.

However, the year 2008 was also the last chance for the people to take notes on political parties' performance upon which they could build their choice before the legislative election and the presidential election took place on April 9 and July 8, 2009.

In the span of five years, only so many times people have the chance to use their right to vote. Their choice will contribute in the journey of the state and the nation in the next five years. Therefore, once they use their right to vote, regretting any wrong decision therein will be useless.

Other than the issues described above, the issue of problematic Fixed Voters List (DPT) had triggered political tensions throughout the preparation of legislative and presidential election in 2009. The issue escalated sharply just three days before the presidential election took place on July 8, 2009. All of this sourced back from the unprofessionalism of the KPU or the National Elections Commission in handling the DPT in a transparent manner. Curiously, the Commission even denied the enquiries of legislative candidates and several NGOs or other election-related activists who intended to investigate the DPT-related problems.

The Worst Election⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Many critics deemed the 2009 general election as the worst election ever in Indonesia. Such opinion came from 13 political party leaders who gathered at the residence of the Chairwoman of the PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Representing other figures, the Chairman of Hanura, Wiranto, stated, "Poor implementation of the 2009 election can be seen from the frauds that have occurred (in the election), as well as the problematic DPT that caused so many residents lost their political right to vote. It has violated human rights as well as the constitution, especially when almost all of the frauds have been done systematically." The parties' leaders accused that the Election Commission had acted in biased manner by siding with a particular political party in performing its duties. Other than Megawati and PDI-P's

Blame game took place between the government and National Elections Commission concerning the problematic DPT. But actually, such problem rooted in people's own lack of awareness regarding the official reports on births, deaths, move-outs and move-ins they should have submitted, which accumulated into severely outdated list of population. On the other hand, however, the Commission whose job included the updating of the Temporary Voters List (DPS) data did its duties unprofessionally and in questionable manner.

According to Sri Moertiningsih Adioetomo (*Kompas*, April 14, 2009), Law No. 23 of 2006 concerning Population Administration and Regulation No. 37/2007 require the residents to submit reports of population-related occurrences on yearly basis, such as move-outs, move-ins, change of address and residential status. Such reports are the basis of the issuance of family cards, ID cards, and so forth.

The high mobility of the populace has not been supported by the awareness of making accurate residential reports as required by law. Under different reasons, residents have been reluctant to keep their identity cards (KTP) actual with their current abode. Under the *de jure* system applied, these people lost their chance to vote on their current residential area. Alternatively, to be able to vote they had to return to their previous residence. This happened to Katon Bagaskara, a well-known singer who lived in Jakarta at that time, but had to give his vote in Bekasi in accordance with his identity card.

Based on similar precedents all over the country, *de jure* population administration system should not have been applied. Given that the Population Administration Act passed no sooner than 2006 and regulated

officials who acted as the host, other figures also attended the gathering, namely KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Prabowo Subianto, Sutiyoso, Rizal Ramli, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, M.S. Kaban, Bursah Zarnubi, Wiranto, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. Gus Dur maintained that the poor election reflected an incompetent government. In similar fashion, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Gerindra, Prabowo Subianto, judged the elections as undemocratic and full of frauds that ruined both moral and democratic values. He even went as far as labeling the 2009 general election as the worst election ever throughout the history of elections in Indonesia, and that was very embarrassing (*Media Indonesia*, April 14; *Kompas*, 14, 21 April 2009).

even much later in 2007 in the Government Regulation No. 37/2007, the time to inform wider communities and prospective voters (aged 17 and over) that reporting one's status of residence was necessary to obtain the right to vote was very limited indeed. In addition, the government also failed to apply the active *stelsel* (system). The institution in charge simply handed the incomplete demographic data to the National Elections Commission to be updated. The updating processes of potential voters list (DP4) to temporal voters list (DPS) itself seemed very diverse and lacked of standardization, in which they all depended on the initiative of local RT/RW (Head of Neighborhood). While some government officials did go door to door directly to collect the voters' data, many residents did not recall being contacted or visited in such data collection, not even in the compiling of extended temporal voters list that followed.

The inflating numbers of total voters to 171 million people (demographic data in 2009 only showed as much as 161 million), most likely was due to the duplication of names and addresses of voters using different Main Number Population (*Nomor Induk Kependudukan*), even if the difference was only one out of the 16 digits numbers (Sri Moertiningsih Adioetomo: 2009). The duplication or removal of voters' names in the DPT reoccurred prior to the presidential election. As a result, millions of ID'ed citizens who otherwise had the right to vote were unregistered and lost their voting right. Such situation occurred in various regions all over the country, in both Java and outside Java. Many of these unregistered voters insisted to come to the polling places on 9 April, carrying proofs of their personal and residential identities, such as ID card (KTP) and Family Card (KK). However, their efforts were ruled out. Administrative glitch had robbed their political right. They were neglected. Amid the joy of the winning candidates, when the parties were busy concocting the coalition plans in preparation of the presidential election, their fellow citizens had lost their political rights.

Eep Saefullah Fatah (*Kompas*, April 14, 2009), described the whole commotions concerning DPT as "The Sin of 2009 General Election." He noted four crucial issues: First, many understood that DPT-related problems were

results of KPU's mistakes and its mistakes alone. The KPU indeed had a big part in creating the problems. However, they were hardly the Commission's mistakes alone. Minister of Home Affairs who oversaw the data collection and population administration and the President as the highest authority of government administration should have held their share of responsibility.

Second, DPT-related problems were understood as administrative problems. This was incorrect. Problematic DPT was not only an administrative problem, but also denial of people's political rights. Those who understood it as mere administrative glitches did not understand the seriousness of the situation. The fulfillment of the political rights of all voters has always been the most important part in a democratic election. Therefore, any deficiency in this department means the election is unsuccessful, or worse, a failure.

Third, the questionable DPT was understood as the origin of the problem. Actually, the entire mess was a logical consequence of the nature of population administration itself. It was not a cause, but a result. None of the four presidents in the reformation era was able to arrange a decent population administration. The low accountability of the voters' data had damaged the last three legislative elections (1999, 2004, 2009), one presidential election (2004), and more than 450 local elections in the last decade. The denial of the right to vote of the otherwise legal voters, who amounted to approximately 49 million people in the legislative election on April 9, was just the culmination of the DPT-related problems.

Fourth, many parties regarded the DPT-related problems as the reason for their losses in the election. Still, it was difficult to find the link between the debacle and the amount of votes each political party received. No single theory could prove whether the problematic DPT consistently profitable for one party while harming the others or vice versa. Arguably, the DPT-related problems also acted as the scapegoat of some political parties to hide their inability to admit defeat in the election.

Therefore, other than the KPU, the government and the parliament should also have been responsible for the DPT-related problems in 2009 general election, for which it was considered as the worst election in the

history of Indonesian elections.⁹⁹ Their responsibility lay on the quality of political laws, which have been laden with inter-parties' horse-trading politics. Thus, many a time, the laws have only accommodated the short-term interests of major parties. As lawmakers, the government and DPR have ignored the urgency of institutionalizing a simple, easy to implement electoral system that guarantees the political rights of the people.

Another negligence of the government, according to Syamsuddin Haris (*Kompas*, April 13, 2009), was the slow disbursement of funds needed for updating the temporal data of voters into the final fixed list, procuring election's logistics, and socializing the election. The KPU had complained about this issue since early on, but failed to convince the government and the parliament about the importance of such funding. Nevertheless, the truly biggest faux pas of the government was the poor performances of bureaucracy concerning population data and population administration used as the basis for the Commission to prepare the temporal and fixed list of voters.

Therefore, it was unsurprising that the level of people's participation in 2009 general election was lower than in the 1999 and 2004 elections. It was estimated that approximately 30 to 39 per cent of voters were not using their right to vote. While for some, it was because they were not listed in the DPT, others did so deliberately driven by solidarity toward the unlisted citizens and disappointment with the format of election that did not respect the political rights of citizens as guaranteed by the constitution.

Another source of commotion in the 2009 election was the change in voters' data collection system, from passive to active *stelsel*. If in previous elections the election officials (*Pantarlih*) came to the voters, now the voters

⁹⁹ The Chairwoman of PDI-P, Megawati Sukarnoputri protested vigorously against the alleged manipulation of the DPT in 2009 elections. According to her, all DPT-related problems were form of deceit instead of mistake. She demanded all cadres and sympathizers of the PDI-P to move against this political twit on the basis that the manipulation of DPT could cause a citizen to lose his/her right to vote. She determined to lead PDI-P to put political pressure to resolve the problems sooner than later for its potential to create polemics in the future. If it was prolonged, it could delay the implementation of 2009 election, thereby harming the democratic process.

had to go to the officers or the officers of RT/RW to register their names. This change was considered too progressive, especially in remote areas outside Java whose bureaucracy was of poor quality. People were reluctant to go to the nearest officials just to check whether their names included in the list of provisional voters (DPS) or not. For future reference, the system of passive *stelsel* has to be re-implemented so that the political rights of the people as guaranteed by the constitution can be better protected and exercised optimally.

Improving the electoral system is most crucial so the nation does not exhaust their energy and enthusiasm on procedural element of the election alone. Otherwise, when will the majority of people finally earn justice and welfare, if the state cannot protect even their most fundamental political right? Needless to say, the state should guarantee and protect the political rights of citizens, especially in the election.

For a comparison, in 2004, both the legislative and presidential elections were considered as the most democratic elections for which many countries praised Indonesia as a truly democratic country, the third largest after the United States and India. Although discontents were not unheard of, the elections in post-reform era (1999 and 2004) showed that Indonesian-style democratic feasts were free of intimidation in line with the spirit of freedom of assembly, expressing opinions, and organizing and forming political parties. Manipulations occurred neither in the process of structuring the electoral areas nor in the grouping of people. Moreover, no coercion and intimidation were used to exclude citizens in the process of election.

However, such progress did not guarantee the protection of political rights of the people by itself. A decade and two elections after the *Reformasi*, bad precedent that deserved the attention of all democratic elements took place in the form of electoral manipulation that threatened people's political rights (*Kompas*, April 18, 2009). In 2009 general election, everyone could see the removal of civil rights happened on so massive a scale. The Election Supervisory Board (*Bawaslu*) and other components of society including the NGOs found that millions of legal voters were either unregistered or double-

registered. They also found the names of children, deceased people and active military members in the fixed list of voters. Electoral confusion in 2009 occurred not only because the obvious lack of professionalism of the National Elections Commission but also due to the poor performance of the Department of Home Affairs in managing the election-related data.

The National Elections Commission's questionable performances became the main feature of the 2009 general election. Whatever happened was not simply a violation of the regulations, but it was a deliberate manipulation or fraud. What resembled an administrative mismanagement of electoral system was actually an attempt to rearrange the ramshackle and uncontrolled system. Murkier still, concerning the erroneous implementation of the election, the government, especially the Department of Home Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs, seemed to act partially in favor of the ruling party.

The denial of civil rights was not difficult to prove. It did not require accurate facts to make it evidentiary. The surge of protests from various community groups, the alliance of political parties into coalition, and the numerous filed legal actions from various civic organizations showed that the losses suffered by significant amount of people were true and visible. In conclusion, what happened was not merely a matter of messy population administration as those who responsible portrayed it, but a deliberate manipulation. Anyone might easily conclude that the rigged election similar to what had happened during the New Order's era was taking place once again.¹⁰⁰ The numbers of abstained voters or *golput* in 2009 general

¹⁰⁰ Judging from the problems concerning the temporary and fixed voters list, the ever-changing regulations, complicated electoral system, and obscured vote counting mechanism, almost all would agree that the 2009 election was chaotic at best. Such opinion has been augmented recently by the unraveling of forgery of Constitutional Court's decree by its own clerk involving additional votes for Hanura in South Sulawesi I electoral area. Based on the investigation of the Special Committee of General Election Mafia of the DPR's Second Commission, the decree numbered 112 dated August 14, 2009 was unknowingly delivered to Choirul Anam, a staff of KPU's Chairman, and used as the basis for seat allotment to Dewi Yasin Limpo of Hanura on September 2. Meanwhile, another decree with the same number but dated August 17 the Constitutional Court later stipulated as the real one was sent to KPU's Chairman, Hafiz Anshary. The KPU then rectified its decision in its plenary session on September 15 and gave the seat in discussion to Mestariyani Habie from Gerindra instead. For unknown reason, the decree dated August 17 was handed to KPU's commissioner, Andi

election increased sharply, reaching the estimated number of 49 million to 67 million voters. The amount is the largest the nation has ever seen. Meanwhile, the total recapitulation of valid votes Democrat Party, PDI-P and Golkar Party received only amounted to 51.3 million votes, far below the highest estimation of *golput* at 67 million, or nearly equal with the lowest estimation.

Anyone at that time had every reason to feel concerned with the high rates of abstained voters, the highest yet since 1955. As comparisons, in the legislative election on April 5, 2004, the amount of *golput* amounted to 15.93 per cent of total voters, while in the presidential election of the same year it was recorded at 21.77 per cent in the first round and 23.37 per cent in the second round (*Kompas*, May 11, 2009). Even with those facts, just three days after the 2004 elections had taken place, a number of European Union's election observers provided an assessment that the legislative election of 2004 was the most democratic election in Indonesia, similar to that of 1955.

If an election loses its significance, the legitimacy of the election winner will become another problem that has to be addressed. Whenever the resulting predicament has escalated to legitimacy matter, it will eventually lead to conflict between political forces. Such argument resides behind the urge to take DPT-related problems of 2009 legislative election before the law. It is very upsetting that the problematic DPT in the 2009 election has been left hanging without further inquiry and investigation. Such omission bears the accusation that the state officials are not independent and neutral.

The fact that the unresolved DPT-related problems have reduced the degree of democratic life in Indonesia should have been intensified into public

Nurpati, through her driver Aryo at one local television station, JakTV. According to Aryo and Mastur, Andi's other staff, she ordered the letter of decree to be kept as archive. This letter was received following KPU's enquiry to Constitutional Court regarding its decision on the seat's allotment in discussion. The enquiry was composed by Sugiharto, Andi's staff, on her order. The Special Committee of General Election Mafia of the DPR's Second Commission has been hopeful that the forgery case can unravel other manipulations throughout the 2009 election. According to Budiman Sudjatmiko, its member from PDI-P, the Special Committee has received 26 complaints in its proceedings, related to money politics, false stipulation of DPR and DPRD's membership and the dismissal of Constitutional Court's decrees (*Kompas*, July 16, 2011). Additionally, the incumbent Chief Justice Mahfud MD even hinted 16 of similar cases of document forgery.

awareness. Democracy has become less credible. As long as DPT-related problems stay unresolved, anyone can see that the reforms are moving backwards. Under such condition, it is only logical if everyone feels concerned (*Suara Karya*, April 25, 2009). This precedent also means that political parties have failed to implement the reforms in the current democratic transition.

The 2009 Electoral Campaign

In addition to the above issues, we need to look at one of the important and strategic stages in the 2009 general election, namely the electoral campaign. Similar to previous elections, 2009 electoral campaign still involved mass mobilization during which all campaigners were selling lip services wrapped in festivities. In almost all campaigns, each party only allocated 20 per cent of the allotted time to present its political programs, and used the remaining 80 per cent to entertain the sympathizers with *dangdut* performances.

Based on National Elections Commission's Regulation No. 19/2008 on Procedures of the 2009 Electoral Campaign, the campaign began three days after the election participant parties were ratified on July 12, 2008. Meanwhile, the Law No. 10/2008 on Elections of the DPR, DPD, and DPRD Members changed the campaign significantly (*Kompas*, April 25, 2008). In pursuant to the Law, the campaign period was set to be nine months long, not including the general assembly of each party. Still according to the same Law, the campaign period began three days after the electoral candidates had been set. The participants of the election were established in the period of June 29 until July 3, 2008. The Commission set the date of April 9, 2009 as the voting day of legislative election with the period between July 8, 2008 until April 1, 2009 served as the campaign period. During the nine months campaign period, the parties were only allowed to rally their sympathizers in the period between March 13 and April 1, 2009.

Basically, electoral campaign is an attempt to socialize each party and candidate's platforms and programs to the public in hope that they will be interested enough to vote for them. In that context, every measure the

government took to promote its development programs to the public, and at the same time, informing them about the steps it had taken to achieve its goals could be construed as a campaign. Likewise, every news media's coverage concerning parties and the political measures these parties had planned to resolve people's predicaments could also be interpreted as a campaign. Regarding this, the Commission's Act had required the mass media to provide fair and balanced coverage and time allocation for every election-related news and interview they made, including the advertising campaign of every election participant.

The nine-month campaign period was deemed able to eliminate the allegation of "early start" that usually emerged on the government's part. However, without clear regulation as it was, it led to some questions concerning the effectiveness of government's performance during the campaigning period. Everyone seemed concerned that the active ministers or members of DPR, who held the position of party leaders, would be too busy campaigning instead of doing their official duties.

Three things political parties should have considered for successful electoral campaign in 2009: First, the quality of the campaign, especially concerning the theme and contents presented in each campaign. The audiences should have been the ones who decided whether the contents were sufficient or not, not the campaigners and parties' elites. To pass as sufficient, the contents should have discussed about the situation and condition people had been facing in their respective regions. Had the parties prepared beforehand about everything they needed to know concerning the areas they were going to visit in campaign, for example South Sumatra, West Java, South Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Maluku, or Lampung, the campaigners would have known everything about each area that could be developed for the good and welfare of the local people in the future.

The level of usefulness, significance, factuality, reliability, accuracy, and actualization determined the quality level of campaign materials. The higher the level of each characteristic, the higher the quality of the information would be. In such cases, Gerindra, Hanura, and Partai Golkar

delivered their messages relatively better compared to PDI-P, PKS, PPP, PKB, and *Partai Demokrat*.

Second, the level of each campaigner's credibility according to popular opinions toward their status as the liaison of each political party. Each campaigner's ability in conveying the messages and presenting party's programs to the constituents would either boost or deflate the credibility level.

Third, the rational, educative and constructive level of political campaign materials. Each party was expected to develop themes and materials that could improve the quality of the election. Therefore, the campaigners should have become the spearhead of the culturing process of these values to the societies. Had a good combination of these three factors been found in each party's campaign, the quality of the 2009 election itself would have been improved greatly.

In due course, the campaign urged the competing parties and candidates to enter the race of finding strategic places to put the billboards, pamphlets, banners, and flags well before the voting day. Because there were only so many strategic places available, certainly, conflicts among the parties and legislative candidates were inevitable.

“Conflicts over public spaces” between candidates and political parties existed in the destructions of campaign props, portraits, and billboards; the displacements of props and images; and even in inter-candidates sabotages. All of those vandalisms were unnecessary. The primary point of an electoral campaign is to mobilize voters and the participation of which is not exclusive to political parties and actors alone. For the people, an electoral campaign period is an important moment to overview the capability of the parties concerning their roles and functions as well as a process that put the community as the evaluators of political process itself.

For political parties, an electoral campaign is a periodic political activity to introduce political programs and promises to the communities as their prospective base constituents, to make their political statements and actions known, and to convey other campaign-related issues they see as vital for their

struggle. Electoral campaign's classical functions lie on each party's efforts to convince voters (constituents) through its vision, missions, and programs. The implementation of electoral campaign in 2009 general election was relatively smooth, peaceful, and orderly. The difference rested on the quality and quantity of the campaign attendees of the major parties endowed with massive funds with that of smaller parties with their relatively insufficient funds. Due to their massive funds, major parties did not find any difficulties in dominating the airtime and newspapers' advertorials. As opposed to their wealthy counterparts, minor parties' ads rarely appeared on electronic media.

During the three-week mass campaign period (March 13-April 1, 2009), no party stated its commitment to uphold the supremacy of law, people's sense of justice, and human rights in comprehensive manners. Judging from their statements during the campaign, the issues and discourses on welfare, the reduction of poverty and unemployment rates, and fighting corruption seemed to be the main themes carried out by many political parties, in addition to the central theme of people's economy.

If people's welfare is considered a major part in the grove of economic-social-culture, many political parties simply have not set their perspective in the paradigm that "live in prosperity" is an underlying right of the citizens the state has to grant them with. Assurance of human rights in the scope of civil and political rights has been less than audible and only got insignificant attention from the political parties. In addition, the state should uphold people's welfare in the manner Marcus Tullius Cicero once stated in ancient Rome, "*Salus Populi Suprema lex.*" People's welfare shall be the supreme law. That is what the founding fathers had actually fought for, namely "to achieve a society, just, thriving and prosperous."

Parties' decision to raise welfare issue in their campaigns more or less was influenced by its ability to attract people's supports for its relation to their livelihood and daily economical needs. However, the promises of prosperity political parties were offering were not fully quantified on rational arguments. Many of such promises were blatant lip services that only gave false hope to the poor. Some parties appeared to present the concept of welfare

thoroughly, but the rest were just empty promises that interested no one in particular. Had it not been for the free giveaway of t-shirts, staple goods or money, the citizens (constituents) might not have attended any campaign.

Unfortunately, amid the demoralization and de-legitimatization caused by corrupt legislators, the discourse of eradicating corruption became another empty promise that lacked real action to support it. Although all parties had previously vowed in front of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK-*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*), not all political parties repeated their anti-corruption pledge before their prospective voters. Beyond that, the decision to allocate 30 per cent of available seats to female candidates in the legislative nomination stage did not have any real implication toward the protection of women's rights. In fact, no party applied this provision. Observation of electoral campaign showed that only Democrat Party and PDI-P expressed their commitments to improve women's role in politics, while other political parties, such as PKS, PAN, PKB, PPP and Golkar preferred to give minor attention to the issue.

The Results of 2009 Legislative Elections¹⁰¹

The outcome of the legislative elections followed by 38 national political parties and 6 Aceh's local parties was as follows:

¹⁰¹ According to Election Commission Data of May 9, 2009, out of 171 million legal voters, valid votes in 2009 general election amounted to 104,099,785 votes. From that outcome, nine political parties succeeded in meeting the required parliamentary threshold, and thus qualified for the People's Representative Council (DPR) with the support of 85.05 million voters (49.66%). As for the remaining 86.22 million (50.34% of votes); they were not represented by the 560 members of DPR. From these votes, about 19 million votes (11%) went to 25 parties which did not pass the parliamentary threshold. Hence, these 19 million voters did not have representatives in DPR. No fewer than 66.9 million voters, or more than 39 per cent of total voters, did not vote correctly. These numbers included those who, one way or another, had been involved in the problematic DPT. Judging from the measly 49.66 per cent of the votes represented in DPR, the legitimacy of 2009 general election was the lowest in the reform era. The data showed that, by pocketing 66.9 million votes out of 104,099,785 total valid votes, *Golput* was the real winner of the 2009 election. It also showed that the number of voters, which supported and were represented by the nine parties qualified for Senayan, were smaller than those who were not represented.

The Results of Legislative Election 2009

No.	Political Parties (Sequential Number)	Number of Votes	%
1	Democrat Party or <i>Partai Demokrat</i> (31)	21,703,137	20.85%
2	Functional Groups Party or <i>Partai Golkar</i> (23)	15,037,757	14.45%
3	Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle or PDIP (28)	14,600,091	14.03%
4	Prosperous Justice Party or <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (8)	8,206,955	7.88%
5	National Mandate Party or <i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (9)	6,254,580	6.01%
6	United Development Party or <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (24)	5,533,214	5.32%
7	National Awakening Party or <i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (13)	5,146,122	4.94%
8	Great Indonesia Movement Party or <i>Partai Gerindra</i> (5)	4,646,406	4.46%
9	People's Conscience Party or <i>Partai Hanura</i> (1)	3,922,870	3.77%
10	Crescent Star Party or <i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (27)	1,864,752	1.79%
11	Prosperous Peace Party or <i>Partai Damai Sejahtera</i> (25)	1,541,592	1.48%
12	Ulama National Awakening Party or <i>Partai Kebangsaan Nahdlatul Umat</i> (34)	1,527,593	1.47%
13	Concern for the Nation Functional Party or <i>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa</i> (2)	1,461,182	1.40%
14	Reform Star Party or <i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (29)	1,264,333	1.21%
15	National People's Concern Party or <i>Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional</i> (4)	1,260,794	1.21%
16	Indonesian Justice and Unity Party or <i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</i> (7)	934,892	0.90%
17	Democratic Renewal Party or <i>Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan</i> (16)	896,660	0.86%
18	National Front Party or <i>Partai Barisan Nasional</i> (6)	761,086	0.73%
19	Indonesian Workers and Employers Party or <i>Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia</i> (3)	745,625	0.72%
20	Democratic Nationhood Party or <i>Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i> (20)	671,244	0.64%
21	Archipelago Republic Party or <i>Partai Republika Nusantara</i> (21)	630,780	0.61%
22	Regional Unity Party or <i>Partai Persatuan Daerah</i> (12)	550,581	0.53%
23	Patriot Party or <i>Partai Patriot</i> (30)	547,351	0.53%
24	Indonesian National Populist Fortress Party or <i>Partai</i>	468,696	0.45%

	<i>Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> (26)		
25	Sovereignty Party or <i>Partai Kedaulatan</i> (11)	437,121	0.42%
26	National Sun Party or <i>Partai Matahari Bangsa</i> (18)	414,750	0.40%
27	Indonesian Youth Party or <i>Partai Pemuda Indonesia</i> (14)	414,043	0.40%
28	Functional Party of Struggle or <i>Partai Karya Perjuangan</i> , formerly <i>Partai Pakar Pangan</i> (17)	351,440	0.34%
29	Pioneers Party or <i>Partai Pelopor</i> (22)	342,914	0.33%
30	Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion or <i>Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (32)	324,553	0.31%
31	Prosperous Indonesia Party or <i>Partai Indonesia Sejahtera</i> (33)	320,665	0.31%
32	Indonesian National Party Marhaenism or PNI <i>Marhaen</i> (15)	316,752	0.30%
33	Labor Party or <i>Partai Buruh</i> (44)	265,203	0.25%
34	New Indonesia Party of Struggle or <i>Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru</i> (10)	197,371	0.19%
35	Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party or <i>Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Umat Indonesia</i> (42)	142,841	0.14%
36	Indonesian Unity Party or <i>Partai Syarikat Indonesia</i> (43)	140,551	0.14%
37	Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party or <i>Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (19)	137,727	0.13%
38	Freedom Party or <i>Partai Merdeka</i> (41)	111,623	0.11%
39	Aceh Sovereignty Party or <i>Partai Daulat Aceh</i> (36)	0	0.00%
40	Independent Voice of the Acehnese Party or <i>Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh</i> (37)	0	0.00%
41	Aceh People's Party or <i>Partai Rakyat Aceh</i> (38)	0	0.00%
42	Aceh Party or <i>Partai Aceh</i> (39)	0	0.00%
43	Aceh Unity Party or <i>Partai Bersatu Aceh</i> (40)	0	0.00%
44	Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party or <i>Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera</i> (35)	0	0.00%
	Total	104,095,847	100%

NINE POLITICAL PARTIES QUALIFIED FOR SENAYAN

Political Party	Seats of DPR 2004	Seats of DPR 2009	Seats Rise (+) / Fall (-)	Percentages Rise (+) / Fall (-)
Partai Demokrat	55	148	+ 93	+ 169
Partai Golkar	128	106	- 22	- 17,2
PDI Perjuangan	109	94	- 15	- 13,8
PKS	45	57	+ 12	+ 26,7
PAN	53	46	- 17	- 32,1
PPP	58	38	- 20	- 334,5
PKB	52	28	- 24	- 46,2
Gerindra	*	26	*	*
Hanura	*	17	*	*
PBB	11	0	-	-
PBR	14	0	-	-
PDS	13	0	-	-
Other Parties	12	0	-	-
Total	550	560	*	*

Source: KPU, May 9, 2009

The outcome of 2009 legislative election was consistent with the electoral tradition in which it showed different political configuration as expected in every election. It also showed that the legislative power was able to alter the political constellation. In 2009, Democrat Party became the phenomenal political power by taking over the leading position in the political race. Positioned at the top five positions in the 2004 general election, in 2009, Democrat Party was able to defeat both Golkar and PDI-P, the winning parties of 2004 and 1999 general elections, respectively, and came out as the election's winner. Interestingly, almost all well-established parties such as Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PAN, and PKB had rather unsteady electoral performances under current political situation at that time.

On the other hand, Gerindra and Hanura had quite phenomenal achievements as newcomers; they were able to compete with older parties, such as the PBB, PDS, PBR, PNBK, PKPB, PDK, and PPDI, and even defeated them, ousting them out of parliamentary building.

Yet another interesting phenomenon, 29 political parties failed to get any seat in DPR because their votes did not meet the 2.5 per cent parliamentary threshold. If the votes they received were combined together, they amounted to 25 per cent of the total valid votes equal to 18 million votes. All of that votes were gone to waste, and so did the aspirations of the people to whom they belonged. Regarding this matter, it was only natural that accusations of partiality toward certain voters and their political preferences haunted the implementation of the legislative election of 2009.

The public in general and all the 29 political parties in particular questioned such decision to no avail because the DPR and KPU were unable to provide satisfactory answers. Lawsuits toward the implementation of 2009 legislative election became the only resolution for such unanswered questions, ignoring the explanation of KPU Chairman, Abdul Hafiz Anshary, who had stated that the establishment of votes and seats for DPR ratified on May 9, 2008 was valid and could not be annulled. Soon after the provision of seats had been established, lawsuits started to pour in, even from parties qualified for Senayan such as PDI-P, PPP, PKB, Gerindra, and Hanura.

The feeling of being treated unfairly widespread rapidly. Such feeling was duly earned since to disregard political aspirations of tens of millions as such was a political abomination by itself. Such thing did not have to happen in the first place. As stipulated in Article 43, paragraph (1), item b of Law No. 2 / 2008 on Political Parties, and Article 2002 and 2003 of Law No. 10/2008 on General Election, it was possible to accept such amount of votes as valid. By ignoring the need to protect such amount of votes from being discarded, the government has created a time bomb to blow in the future.

Public disappointment over the messy implementation of 2009 legislative election, especially the decision to throw away tens of millions of votes, should not have been ignored. The issues should have been addressed and resolved properly. Not for blaming purpose, but for improving the mechanism of absorbing people's aspirations and giving the response they deserve. If such disappointment is left unanswered, people's trust toward the meaning and purpose of the election will dwindle.

Therefore, the Law on Election, in any way, should be enhanced to serve long-term objectives, unlike in the last decade in which it has been constantly changed every five years. Provision that gives the KPU the right to destroy the ballot papers should be considered to be eliminated. There should also be a mechanism to utilize the votes of political parties which fail to meet the parliamentary threshold, other than to let them burn away. General election in 2014 should be more honest, fair, dignified, and democratic. In order to restore people's trust on the mechanisms of the election, all problems that emerged in the process and the implementation of the 2009 general election must be resolved fairly and thoroughly.

The victory of the Democrat Party, as well as the phenomena of the emergence of Gerindra and Hanura, had been predicted before the election was held. The emergence of the Democrat Party as the winner of the election can be explained in the following factors. The certain biggest factor is the prominence of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono whose figure is inherent to the Democrat Party. "Yudhoyono Factor" became the most significant force in influencing the drastic increase of Democrat Party's votes in 2009. It can be said that SBY is Democrat Party and vice versa, as Gus Dur had been with NU and PKB when he had held the position of Chairman of PB-NU and PKB (pre-internal conflicts). The Democrat Party's voters acted as the bridge that delivered Yudhoyono as the seventh President of Indonesia. Not only succeeded in attracting new voters and repeat-voters, but "Yudhoyono Factor" also attracted other parties' constituents, such as that of Golkar, PDI-P and PKB, whose parties were experiencing internal divisions, to vote for Democrat Party.

Such condition was reinforced by the lack of political loyalty of the constituents in both urban and rural areas, in which they were likened to butterflies that seldom perched on just one flower (*Kompas*, April 10, 2009). Golkar and Islamic parties, mainly PPP and PKB, were the most affected by these swing voters. In closer look, the characteristics of cross-parties constituents, especially those who crossed to Democratic Party, were similar to each other. They usually came from the educated middle-upper class most

common in urban areas who regarded party leaders' records of accomplishment and achievements as instrumental factors that influenced their political allegiance. Their occupations were varied, ranged from homemakers and civil servants to private employees and entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, it can also be ascertained that the rising popularity of Democrat Party was the escalation that had occurred since 2004 general election. On its first election (2004), by securing 7.45 per cent of votes in legislative election, the party shot off to the mid-table position from which it was able to deliver its founding figure to the highest position in the state as the President. The party's popularity escalated once again when Yudhoyono's administration received positive appreciations from the people, especially regarding its efforts to eradicate corruption. The lower and middle classes were also benefited from its programs, such as direct cash assistance (*Bantuan Langsung Tunai*), health insurance program and credit grant for the poverty-stricken.

With all the advantages it had pocketed, the Democrat Party was able to expand its influence in 2009 legislative election. If in 2004 the party was only able to attract the urban communities, in 2009 general election it was able to widen its influence to rural areas, which have always been the basis of traditional parties as well as the largest reservoir of constituents in the state.

The emergences of Gerindra and Hanura, led by General (Ret.) Prabowo Subianto and General (Ret.) Wiranto, respectively, have given new color in Indonesia's political life. Gerindra and Hanura, both were first-time participants in the election, were able to shake the positions of mid-table parties, such as PPP, PKB, PBB, PBR and PDS, through their vigorous barrage of pro-people ads. As the results, votes of those mid-table parties declined sharply. Being qualified for Senayan, Gerindra and Hanura were capable of ousting PBB, PBR, PDS, PDK, PNBK, PKPB, and PPDI from their seats in DPR.

In 2009 electoral campaign, Gerindra was able to attract constituents who had expected a change. It had significant amount of sympathizers, ranged from farmers, anglers, traditional community members to street

vendors and job seekers. To these groups, the new hope Gerindra had been campaigning was quite promising.

Actually, the emergence of newcomers such as Gerindra and Hanura and their rapid ascensions to the respectable mid-table positions in the outcome of election were repetition of similar phenomena found in the reform era's elections. Before them, the success of Democrat Party and PKS to alter the mid-table configuration PKB, PPP, and PAN had occupied caught everyone by surprise in 2004 elections.

Even earlier, PKB and PAN were two groundbreaking parties able to alter the constellation of mid-table position in 1999 general election. The shift of votes' proportions for each party that constantly appeared in each general election of the reform era can be seen as a process of rejuvenation in the midst of public distrust toward political parties (*Kompas*, April 4, 2009).

Another prominent phenomenon on the outcome of election of April 9, 2009 was the decline of votes received by Islamic parties such as PKB, PPP and PAN, which also led to the depositions of PBB and PBR out of DPR. Other than the DPT debacle that caused 49 per cent of votes had gone to waste, such decline became another source of concern for a lot of people. Although Muslims constitute 90 per cent of Indonesia's population, the fact showed that the parties with Islamic ideology and supporters, save for PKS, had their votes dropped sharply in 2009. Interestingly, in contrast to their nationalist counterparts, Islamic parties have never become major political force in Indonesia. As we know, nationalist parties such as PDI-P, Golkar, and Democrat Party became the election winner in 1999, 2004, and 2009, respectively, a status PNI had also achieved some decades earlier. Excluded from the calculation were Golkar's victories in New Order's elections (1971-1997).

The legislative election in 2009 reaffirmed that fact. Parties with Islamic ideology, such as PPP and PBB, or those based on Pancasila but having a majority of Muslim supporters e.g. PAN, PKB, PBR, PKNU, and PMB only ranked in the middle and lower part of the table. Some of them had their votes plummeted due to the internal conflicts. The conflicts later turned into

dissensions that gave birth to new parties that eventually undermined the parent party, as in the case of PAN with PMB, PKB with PKNU, following the strife between the camps of Gus Dur versus Muhamin, or PPP with PBR. Internal conflicts have weakened the position of Islamic parties more than anything else has.

The votes of all Islamic parties mentioned above were below that of the Democrat Party, Golkar and PDI-P. The total amount of Islamic parties' votes that passed the parliamentary threshold amounted to 24.15 per cent, comprising 7.88 per cent of PKS, 6.01 per cent of PAN, 5.32 per cent of PPP, and 4.94 per cent of PKB, all of which were significantly lower than the votes they received in 2004.

It was not the first time that Islamic parties failed to win majority supports. Since the first election in 1955, history of elections in Indonesia has confirmed such failure. In the 1955 general election of Old Order's era, represented by Masyumi, NU, Perti, PSII and *Tarekat Islam*, Islamic parties only won 44 per cent of parliamentary seats equal to 39 per cent of the votes. Such percentage has been difficult to exceed. If in New Order's elections (1971-1997) the percentage ranged from 15.97 to 29.29 per cent, in the reform era's elections it was recorded to be 37.59 per cent (1999), 38.35 per cent (2004) and 24.15 per cent (2009), respectively.

This indicated that, compared to their performance in the 1950s, Islamic political movements have become increasingly less popular as the basis of national political movements. As if to confirm this, only in the post-reform era Islamic parties were unable to place their representatives within the top three parties, a position they had always occupied since the 1955 general election. Moreover, in 2009 presidential election, no Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates came from Islamic parties. As comparison, there were several Islamic figures who became candidates in 2004 presidential election e.g. Hasyim Muzadi, the then Chairman of PB-NU, was nominated by PDI-P as vice-presidential candidate to Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Salahuddin Wahid, PB-NU's functionary, was nominated by Golkar to run as Wiranto's vice-presidential candidate. In addition, Hamzah Haz and Amien

Rais, Chairman of PPP and PAN, respectively, were also nominated as presidential candidates by their respective parties.

Two Islamic parties occupied the top three in 1955 general election. In that first election, the Indonesian National Party (PNI) Bung Karno had founded gained 22.32 per cent of votes. Masyumi, under Moh. Natsir, followed in the second place by securing 20.92 per cent of votes, and NU, under Wahid Hasyim gained 18.41 percent votes. Meanwhile, in 1999, PDI-P secured 33.74 per cent of the votes, *Partai Golkar* received 22.44 per cent of the votes, and PKB acquired 12.61 per cent of the votes, thus completed the top three in 1999 general election.

Similarly, in 2004 general election, *Partai Golkar* as election winner won 21.58 per cent of the votes and was followed by PDI-P with 18.53 per cent and PKB with 10.52 per cent. Although in 2004 PKB acquired more votes than PPP, especially in East Java, PPP's parliamentary seats were bigger in numbers because its votes spread more evenly outside Java. The outcome of 2004 election saw PPP acquired 58 seats and PKB 52 seats in DPR. Such phenomena displayed that Muslim constituents have gradually departed from Islamic parties since the 1999 general election.

Given this fact, it seems that many Muslims have grown weary toward the presences of religion-based political parties and may have been led to such attitude by the campaign promises these parties have never fulfilled. Even the members of *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, two biggest Islamic communities in Indonesia, seem reluctant to give their supports to political organizations that clearly strive for the enactment of Islamic law in the public domain. Such thing is reasonable due to the increase of influence of modernization, changes in economy, educational advancement, urbanization, foreign culture and other factors. Arguably, such condition is deemed beneficial for the development of democracy in Indonesia.

Therefore, to lure the Muslims to support Islamic parties or parties with strong Islam affiliation has been increasingly difficult. Muslim constituents have been more interested to join nationalist parties, such as

Democrat Party, Golkar Party, PDI-P, Hanura, or Gerindra whose programs are more relevant to their daily life.

According to Syaiful Mujani (2009), the strong political secularization toward Muslim constituents will deflate the popularity of Islamic parties even further. Consequently, the level of loyalty of Islamic parties' partisans will also decline. It is even speculated that the prospect of Islamic parties will continue to dwindle in Indonesia's future elections.

What happened to PPP and PKB in three post-reform's elections were the most striking phenomena. During the New Order era, the forming elements of both PPP and PKB were united as one party (PPP). In 1999 general election, PPP and PKB received 10.71 per cent and 12.61 per cent of the votes, respectively. In the 2004 elections, their votes dropped to 8.15 per cent and 10.57 per cent, and in the last election, their votes dropped once again to 5.2 per cent and 5.10 per cent, respectively. In addition, due to the crippling internal conflicts, many *nahdliyins* have withdrawn their supports for PKB.

The rapid expansion of Democrat Party in Java and outside Java has also undermined PKB's influence in those areas. *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN) meanwhile suffered similar decline after Amien Rais passed the leadership to Soetrisno Bachir, who is considered weaker in character. Meanwhile, PKS that had portrayed itself as a solid party turned out to be the same. Aiming for bagging 20 per cent of votes in the 2009 election—due to wrong strategy or simply being overly ambitious—PKS only won 7.88 per cent of votes.

What have been the weaknesses of Islamic parties during the downturn period and why have they happened? The failures of Islamic parties, according to Bahtiar Effendy (*Republika*, May 25, 2009), have been resulted from three things. *Firstly*, the Islamic parties have been unable to convert their ideological identity into real executable programs. As a result, the public have not seen any real differences between them and the secular nationalist parties.

Secondly, some Islamic parties have had internal divisions caused by conflicts between the parties' elites. These conflicts have eluded the parties in

mobilizing significant amount of supporters. Now and then, the public also sense the inconsistencies of Islamic politicians, who have preached about Islam, especially its emphasis on the spirit of Islamic unity and its status as *rahmatan lil alamin*, but seem reluctant to unite with their political contemporaries.

Thirdly, the intellectuals and practitioners of Islamic parties have failed to comprehend that the recent political atmosphere has changed significantly from the highly ideological 1950s and 1960s. Due to such situation, the attitude of the nation and the spirit of state administrators have grown more pragmatic.

Religion-based political parties have often signaled the flimsiness of their ranks. The majority of them have been vulnerable to conflict of interest and internal conflicts. Overtime, there have been no real distinctions between Islamic and non-religion based parties. Not so few of their elites have also sunk into political pragmatism by practicing immoral, strife-causing political measures and money politics, and indulging in other negative behaviors. Such phenomena have displayed to the public that these parties have failed to uphold the noble spirit of religion and even smeared their own image as Islamic parties. Allegation that Islamic parties have abandoned their traditional constituents to pursue their ambitions in acquiring as many voters as possible has also emerged. Feel neglected, their traditional constituents have chosen to turn their back against them in favor of other parties.

In addition, the characteristics of modern voters who are more pluralistic, rational and critical have called for new political breakthrough. In that light, a voters-friendly, rational-based approach is suitable as an alternative (*Suara Karya*, 15 May 2009). Public awareness and people's political involvement need to be carefully charted to keep up with the level of education, the availability of political institutions, and the accessible transformation of values. In that sense, using religious symbols and issues is currently considered less contributive for long-term democratic development. Such condition has arisen because people feel fed up with the surge of merely verbal and rhetoric political promises. Religion should have become the spirit

to promote commitment, dedication, achievements and noble morality in politics, not empty promises.

In 2009 legislative election, three parties incised notable achievements. First party was the Democrat Party which came out as the winner by improving its rank from the fifth in 2004 general election to the first in the outcome of legislative election of April 9, 2009. The success of Democrat Party could not be separated from the role of its Chairman of the Board of Trustees, President Yudhoyono.

The second party was PKS, which increased its rank from the seventh in the 2004 election to the fourth in the 2009. Furthermore, many of its young cadres have occupied elite ranks, both in central and regional levels. The predominance of the younger generation has made PKS's inner dynamics slightly different compared to older parties such as PPP, PDI-P, and Golkar.

The third party was Gerindra, a newcomer that immediately occupied the eighth position in the electoral table. Gerindra would have outranked PKB had it been able to acquire three seats that separated both parties. Other than these three parties, the rest of the parties that passed to Senayan, namely Partai Golkar, PDI-P, PAN, PPP, and PKB, had their amount of seats declined. Meanwhile, Hanura, another newcomer, became the ninth party that succeeded in gaining parliamentary seats.

Not only the Islamic parties, but Golkar and PDI-P also suffered from significant votes' deflation. According to Syamsuddin Haris (*Kompas*, 20 April 2009), the decline of votes of Golkar was due to four factors.

First, the vulnerability of the development ideology it had monopolized since Soeharto's era. People perceived the development was no longer Golkar's achievement, but President Yudhoyono's. Therefore, it was he instead of Golkar who they perceived as the rightful earner of their votes. Hence, they voted for Democrat Party in which he has been the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

Second, the dysfunction of the Golkar's infrastructures and political machinery, including the mass organizations it had utilized as its votes gathering machine. In contrast to the era of President Soeharto, many

support organizations of Golkar have been weakened due to the decreasing flow of funds.

Third, the migration of military-related constituents to other parties especially those that had been set up by ex-military officers, such as Democrat Party, Gerindra and Hanura. This included the migration of Partai Golkar's main voters, such as civil servants, teachers and members of farmer and angler's unions to those same parties.

Fourth, *Partai Golkar* failed to attract more constituents from eastern parts of Indonesia. Moreover, Jusuf Kalla, in his capacity as Vice-President had virtually neglected the development of the majority of eastern parts of Indonesia by only focusing on certain provinces. Such policy resulted in sharp decline of Golkar votes in these areas.

The decrease of the votes made Jusuf Kalla, then the General Chairman of Golkar Party, to let go of his presidential ambition, and forced him to consider forming a new coalition with the Democrat Party. Previously, Golkar had made a pledge, if it had won the election and its votes had been higher than that of Democrat Party, Jusuf Kalla would have stepped up as presidential candidate and not just a companion of Yudhoyono as in the case of 2004 election. However, with the amount of votes it received in 2009 legislative election, Golkar had to surrender such ambition. Unfortunately, by the time Golkar realized its faulty strategy, Yudhoyono had chosen his running mate. The defeat of Golkar and PDI-P in the hand of Democrat Party surprised many observers who previously had favored either Golkar or PDI-P to become the first and second best parties in the outcome of the election.

Regardless of each party's final position, the implementation of 2009 general election was peaceful. No one would mind if the credits for such achievement went to the voters. The implementation of legislative election was likened to national feast where everyone mingled in kinship, thus made the election far from intimidating (*Kompas*, April 10, 2009). The fatal political violence a number of political elites had predicted simply did not happen.

Some security problems did occur in Papua. However, they were not something police force could not handle, so they did not cause any trouble

toward the election process. Problematic DPT, which drew a lot of protests from political parties and candidates, eventually could be resolved properly. Political maturity demonstrated by the people during the 2009 election was worthy of appreciation from the political elites, members of DPR, the President, and especially members of the National Elections Commission.

All the problems that arose and the disappointment of political elites at the completion of votes' counting process should have been solved within the frame of democracy so as not to burden the people. Only through democratic efforts, the political maturity and the spirit of unity in diversity of Indonesia can find their proper place.

Political Dynamics of the 2009 Presidential Election

Approaching the presidential election (*Pilpres*) scheduled on July 8, 2009, political dynamics in the country, especially in Jakarta and major cities, increased rapidly. In March, prior to the legislative election, the printed and electronic media discussed incessantly about the statement of Jusuf Kalla (JK), Chairman of Golkar, who had just agreed to step up as presidential candidate at the insistence of the Regional Executive Councils (DPD I) of the banyan tree party.¹⁰²

Actually, there was nothing out of extraordinary with JK's willingness to be nominated as presidential candidate by the chairpersons of Golkar's DPDs. According to Effendi Gazali, JK welcomed such supports for four reasons.

¹⁰² Jusuf Kalla's willingness to become presidential candidate rejuvenated Golkar's machine once again (*Tempo*, April 5, 2009). Before this became certainty, some Golkar elites had faced a dilemma over JK's position as Vice-President, a position with which they had not been satisfied. The presidential candidacy of JK thereby relieved the internal feuds among Golkar's elites. Some factions within Golkar, which had groomed their own nominees, began to unite, including those who had supported Sultan HB X as potential presidential candidate. Since March 2009, JK had visited other political elites on regular basis, especially General Chairman of PDI-P, Megawati, and PPP's Chairman Suryadharma Ali, with whom he wanted to build a "Golden Triangle" alliance. On the other hand, Golkar decided not to abandon its relationship with SBY and his Democrat Party. Golkar's double-dealing maneuvers were not considered unusual. On any account, when it was established in October 1964, Golkar was designed to be the ruling party. Hence, its status as a powerful hegemonic party since the 1977 general election. The *kekaryaan* platform it has promoted has "genetically" transformed it into a party with constant craving for power. Therefore, even though JK no longer held the position of Chairman of Golkar and was replaced by Bakrie (October 8, 2009), Golkar has remained close to SBY, with whom it dare not be in distance, let alone an opposition.

First, the friction-infested Golkar had wanted him to be presidential candidate or Yudhoyono's running mate in the first place. Second, President Yudhoyono and the Democrat Party as Golkar's main ally in the government had begun promoting their self-images by excluding Golkar from the picture. Third, if the votes of Golkar in 2009 election were lower than the amount Akbar Tandjung achieved in 2004, JK's position as Chairman would be in jeopardy. Fourth, the increasingly dynamic political atmosphere caused by various comments toward the discourse on coalition and opposition (*Kompas*, March 17, 2009).

With the certainty of JK's candidacy, the list of the 2009 presidential candidates was shortened to just three candidates. They were Megawati Sukarnoputri, Chairwoman of PDI-P, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the incumbent president and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Democrat Party, and Jusuf Kalla, the Chairman of Partai Golkar and the incumbent Vice-President.¹⁰³ Each candidate had his/her candidacy referred colloquially as Block M (Megawati), Block S (SBY) and Block J (Jusuf Kalla), respectively. Incessant coverage from various printed and electronic media toward their candidacies contributed in the increasingly dynamic national political atmosphere.

The dynamics fluctuated once more when Megawati Sukarnoputri, in her capacity as the Chairwoman of the PDI-P, held a meeting at her residence with JK, the Chairman of the *Partai Golkar* on March 12. As the result of the meeting, the two leaders of the biggest parties, as confirmed by the outcomes of 1999 and 2004 elections, agreed to build a strong government in the future.

In the statements followed thereafter, the agreement was elaborated into five objectives (*Republika*, March 16, 2009), namely: (1) to build a strong

¹⁰³ Before the list of the presidential candidates in 2009 narrowed down to three names, printed media had quite often named Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, Wiranto, Prabowo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Akbar Tandjung, Hidayat Nurwahid, Gus Dur, and Jusuf Kalla as potential contenders. After the 2009 legislative election, however, only three names remained, namely Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla. At this point, the contenders of the vice-presidential positions were still pretty much dynamic, and no certainty as to who would accompany the three presidential candidates because none of the presidential candidates had decided who would become their companion. However, Yudhoyono, had picked 19 names as his potential companion based on the five criteria he had proposed earlier.

government in hope to bring about progress and welfare in national level, (2) strengthen the presidential government as mandated by 1945 Constitution by having a solid foundation in the DPR, (3) fortify the economic system in order to implement sovereign and independent economic programs based on people's interests, (4) improve the political communication between PDI-P and Golkar as an accountability of the two largest political parties of 1999 and 2004 elections, and (5) participate in ensuring the implementation of the 2009 election to be conducted in a direct, general, free, confidential, honest, fair and dignified manner.¹⁰⁴

Due to the dwindling concordance between SBY and JK prior to 2009 general election, many anticipated a competitive presidential election. In general, both legislative and presidential elections were accompanied by the rising of political temperatures. One of such occasion was a friction between Golkar and Democrat Party's elites triggered by the Vice-Chairman of the Democrat Party, Ahmad Mubarok. He stated that Golkar's votes would fall to 2.5 per cent, of which many Golkar cadres took offense. (*Kompas*, February 23, 2009).

Mubarok's statement heavily offended Golkar, especially its Chairman, Jusuf Kalla, who was visiting the Netherlands and the United States on state's duty. In response to Mubarok's statement, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Democrat Party, immediately corrected his underling and apologized publicly. However, such conduct failed to prevent the friction from escalating, and as a result, the coalition between the two parties began to falter toward a split just before the 2009 presidential election.

¹⁰⁴ Besides receiving wide media coverage, the meeting of the two national political figures captured wide attention, especially from observers and politicians because it related to the desire of building a strong government to improve public welfare. The meeting signaled a sign that politics is indeed beyond the mere pursuit of power, but a tool for achieving the national ideals, such as improving the general welfare and the intellectual life of the nation, protecting the whole country of Indonesia, as well as participating in achieving global peace. In that context, the meeting called for a sovereign and independent populist economic system in general and a better communication between PDI-P and Golkar's elites in the DPR in particular.

The coalition between Golkar and Democrat Party hit a deadlock. The only thing that saved the government from being affected was the agreement in which President Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla had agreed to complete their state duties consequently, regardless of political situation, until their tenures ended on October 20, 2009. The coalition that had been built in the last four years, just shortly after the presidential election in 2004, began to crack. Things looked even gloomier when Democrat Party's "Team 9" regulated the criteria of vice-president candidates for SBY. One criterion stipulated that such candidate was not holding the position of political party's Chairman at the time of his nomination. The chance for both figures to reach a consensus became thinner. Therefore, Golkar decided to choose its own path by parting way from Democrat Party.¹⁰⁵ In Golkar's *Rapimnasus* (Extraordinary National Leadership Assembly) on October 28, 2008 attended by the entire DPP and DPD's leaders, it was decided to nominate Jusuf Kalla as presidential candidate and give him the authority to build whatever measures necessary with other parties concerning that matter. As the outcome of Kalla's maneuvers in the post-*rapimnasus*, the Chairman of Hanura, Wiranto was deemed as the perfect candidate as his running mate.¹⁰⁶

The political pressure on Golkar to nominate its own presidential candidate imposed by its entire ranks of Regional Executive Councils (DPD I) could not be separated from the self-belief that a party with Golkar's stature,

¹⁰⁵ In one of his campaign in front of the Golkar cadres at his South Sulawesi hometown, JK confided that he had met SBY three times to talk about the presidential election, to which SBY always replied, "Yes, later." He deducted such answer as the unwillingness of SBY to partner up with him. Therefore, JK did not propose for the same position and decided to step forward on his own as a presidential candidate from Golkar.

¹⁰⁶ Wiranto was a winner of the Golkar Party's Convention for the election of the presidential candidate in 2004, in which he bested Akbar Tandjung, Bakrie, Surya Paloh, Sultan HB X, and Prabowo altogether. Therefore, he was Golkar's official candidate in the 2004 presidential election, in which he teamed up with Solahuddin Wahid. Ended up in the third position, the pair was eliminated in the first round. After leaving active military service, Wiranto rivaled with Prabowo Subianto in the political sphere. Not only in the aforementioned Convention, both of them were competing in the National Consensus of Golkar, in December 2004 in Bali, for the position of Chairman of Golkar. In 2004, Jusuf Kalla was expelled from Golkar for refusing to support its official candidates (Wiranto-Solahudin Wahid) by collaborating with the Democrat Party and teaming up with Yudhoyono, with whom he emerged as the election winner. In preparation of the 2009 general election, Wiranto resigned from Golkar and founded Hanura as his new political vehicle. He teamed up with JK as vice-president candidate, but the pair was eliminated, ranked in the third after Mega-Prabowo. The pair of SBY-Boediono emerged as the winner in the 2009 presidential election.

as the winner of the 2004 general election, was worthy for the presidency. From this perspective, it was no longer a matter of winning or losing in the presidential election, but emerging as a pioneer in balancing the life of democracy in Indonesia. At that time, Golkar's position was no less dilemmatic than that during the hard times in 1999 general election or the period of condemnation prior to 2004 elections. In 2009, Golkar did not have strong political positioning because it was not entirely a ruling party nor an opposition party. Moreover, in the government, some Golkar's elites appeared to be mere extending political entities of Yudhoyono and Democrat Party (*Kompas*, February 23, 2009).

The friction between JK and Yudhoyono was deemed unfortunate by many circles, including the entrepreneurs, members of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN). This was especially true after the friction had developed into broken relationship between Yudhoyono and Kalla.¹⁰⁷ Those who regretted such condition, including those who came from Golkar and KADIN, deemed SBY-JK's partnership as the best partnership so far, judging from the results of their administration.

The two figures simply complemented each other. Borrowing an expression of Syafi'i Ma'arif, the former Chairman of Muhammadiyah, the coalition was just like a car, in which JK was the gas and SBY, the brake. The two complementary leaders were considered successful in managing their administration, which was expected to be more effective if the couple continued their partnership in the presidential election of 2009. However, not all of Golkar's elites shared such view; thereby creating sharp internal friction within Golkar. A part of Golkar's elites wanted JK to move forward as a presidential candidate because Golkar was the electoral title holder, while

¹⁰⁷ Obviously, from the requirements he had made, Yudhoyono did not want to team up with JK anymore. He preferred to be accompanied by a non-Chairman figure. Such decision might be due to the amount of votes the Democrat Party had received in the legislative election that surpassed the tally of other parties, including Golkar. Because SBY did not want to continue his partnership with JK, the latter eventually teamed up with Wiranto of Hanura. The pair declared their candidacies in front of Soekarno-Hatta's Proclamation Memorial Statue, ahead of SBY-Boediono and Mega-Prabowo.

other elites, such as Muladi, Fadel Muhammad, Aburizal Bakrie, and Agung Laksono preferred him to rejoin SBY as vice-president.¹⁰⁸

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Democrat Party, who intended to serve his second term, gave five criteria anyone intended to be his running mate needed to fulfill. First, the person had to have outstanding integrity, personality, moral characters, and political sense. Second, the person had the capacity and capability as a presidential aide in accordance with the 1945 Constitution. Third, the person had unquestionable loyalty to the government and was free from conflicts of interest. Fourth, he had to be supported by the people. Five, the pairing could strengthen and improve the efficiency of the coalition (*Kompas*, April 20, 2009). Apart from the criteria, it was mandatory that the person in discussion was not a chairperson of any political party.

Concerning this issue, Yudhoyono explained that the Democrat Party had formed Team 9 led by its Chairman, Hadi Utomo, with specific task to find suitable vice-presidential candidate fitting to the criteria. The team had set up numerous meetings with other parties to talk about alliance and coalition in the government and parliament for the period of 2009-2014. As part of its tasks, the Team 9 communicated and reported directly to Yudhoyono about recent political dynamics and the communications it had established with other parties.

Not only the Team 9, but Yudhoyono also established direct communication with other national figures, such as Amien Rais, the leader and founder of the National Mandate Party (PAN), whom he hosted at *Wisma Negara* in June 2009. In the meeting, Yudhoyono discussed about the possibility of forming a coalition with PAN, although he did not bring about the issue of vice-presidency. Democrat Party and PAN were keen to form a

¹⁰⁸ During Golkar's National Conference in Pekanbaru, Riau, 5-8 October, the opposing factions transformed into Bakrie's versus Surya Paloh's camps. Ical (Bakrie) and his group did not want to distance Golkar from the government, or in other words they wanted to make a coalition with SBY, while Surya Paloh's group wanted to part way with the government and became opposition. As it turned out, Ical's camp won the rivalry, which led to the coalition of Golkar with SBY's second administration. The members of Ical's camp, such as Agung Laksono, Fadel Muhammad, and MS Hidayat are currently serving as ministers in the United Indonesia II Cabinet.

government with strong and effective governance. In the meeting, Amien Rais was eager to entrust Hatta Rajasa to Yudhoyono's care in the preparation of the 2009 presidential election, implying his intention to make "Mr. Silver Hair" as SBY's running mate.

The President admitted that the coalition his party wanted to build would not be based on similar ideology of the parties involved. Regardless of its members' ideologies, the only compass for the coalition would be the platform and the direction of policies, which focused on the efforts to improve the economy, democracy, and justice in the state. According to Yudhoyono, a coalition unhindered by ideological barriers was more effective. The coalition he had in mind would hold fast on five commitments of (1) increasing people's welfare, (2) reforming bureaucracy and fighting corruption, (3) building a more constructive democracy, (4) upholding laws and regulations, and (5) conducting development justly and impartially.

Based on those points, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono finally announced his decision to choose Boediono, a non-party bureaucrat, the former Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and the Governor of Bank Indonesia as his running mate.¹⁰⁹ The vice-presidential candidate, Boediono¹¹⁰ was ready to answer public concerns about his alleged neoliberal economic

¹⁰⁹ Initially, Yudhoyono's choice of Boediono disappointed PKS and PAN. Rumor that PKS planned to leave the coalition in case Yudhoyono maintained his preference began circulating. For various reasons, student demonstrations also took place in several cities against Boediono's candidacy. PKS eventually eased up on its refusal after the intensive lobbying of Team 9, which was followed by SBY's own explanation prior to the declaration of SBY-Boediono's candidacy in Bandung. No objections came from other members of the coalition, such as PKB, PPP, and the Democrat Party, which had given full liberty to SBY to choose his running mate from the beginning. In his speech, SBY explained that he had thoroughly evaluated his choice of Boediono and discussed it with various prominent figures. He deemed Boediono as a perfect running mate because he was relatively free from inter-elites' conflicts and thereby could work optimally on duties at hand.

¹¹⁰ News of Boediono's appointment as a vice-presidential candidate started when President Yudhoyono summoned a number of economic ministers to his abode in *Puri Cikeas* in order to hold a closed meeting to discuss the economic and monetary situation in the state. Among the summoned ministers were the Governor of Central Bank (Bank Indonesia), Boediono, Minister of Finance and the acting Coordinating Minister of Economy, Sri Mulyani, State Secretary, Hatta Rajasa, Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Aburizal Bakrie, Cabinet Secretary, Sudi Silalahi, and Minister of Information, Moh. Nuh. In the meeting, Yudhoyono also discussed about the preparations of the World Ocean Conference in Manado and the presidential nomination. At that time, President Yudhoyono began to give hints toward his plan to make Boediono as his running mate and Hatta Rajasa, who had been a strong vice-presidential candidate himself, as chief minister in his administration and the head of SBY-Boediono's Campaign Team (*Tempo*, May 24, 2009).

view. Several things led many people to doubt Boediono's chances to be Vice-President, namely his alleged neoliberal view and comprador status; that he came from East Java, just as SBY did; or that he had never been active in politics. The public judged Boediono as a neoliberal economist who had been partial toward people's interest. Due to countless discourses that adorned various printed and electronic media, students' outbreaks took place in some cities, such as Surabaya, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Medan, Palembang, Bandung and Makassar. The protesters condemned Boediono as neoliberal and a comprador of foreign interests. The demonstrations continued long after the 2009 presidential election following the case of Century Bank, which had disturbed people's sense of justice by inflicting financial loss to the State to the tune of Rp. 6.7 trillion aside from deceiving thousands of clients. Some of the defrauded customers even committed suicide or attempted suicide in the aftermath of the scandal, because they could not handle the severe stress for losing their entire savings managed by Century Bank.

In the declaration speech of SBY-Boediono at *Sasana Budaya Ganesha (Sabuga)* Building in Bandung, the vice-presidential candidate Boediono answered all the allegations by asserting, "Indonesian economy cannot be entirely entrusted to the free market. Government's intervention is still required for providing clear and fair rules to support the economy." Therefore, "it calls for an effective implementation organizer. The state should not intervene in the economy because it will discourage business activities. The government must not stand idly either, hence the need for a clean and effective government."

He continued further, "a clean and effective government cannot be achieved only through rhetoric and discourse, but it begins with having an exemplary leader." Boediono also stressed that, "Indonesia needs a leader untainted by bribery, who would not trade his authority and confuse public interest with family business." The Chairman of the Democrat Party, Ahmad Mubarok, admitted that SBY-Boediono declaration was deliberately set very much alike with that of Barrack Obama-Joe Biden in the United States. Using Bandung among other cities as the location of such declaration was intended

to associate their administration with education, struggle, progress, and civilization for which the city have been famous. In the declaration, Yudhoyono said, "If the people give their mandate, SBY-Boediono will finish their duties and dedication in the year 2014," which was welcomed by uproarious applause of 3000 cadres of Democrat Party.

By choosing Boediono instead of picking his running mate out of the coalition parties, Yudhoyono seemed to have several things to say.¹¹¹ Although he did not speak it openly, SBY, who always cautious and taciturn in nature, seemed wanting to put one's quality and meticulousness above the importance of building a coalition. Worthy of note, such measure was conducted out of respect of meritocracy based on one's skills and abilities in the face of expensive political cost it could lead to. For example, in response to Boediono's candidacy, PKS almost withdrew itself from the coalition. At the same time, internal buzz took place within PAN, which almost cost Sutrisno Bachir his position as Chairman. Instead of supporting Yudhoyono's choice of Boediono, Bachir preferred to join hand with Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra to form presidential and vice-presidential candidacies which for one reason or another did not take place. Whatever his reason was, Yudhoyono's penchant to meritocracy seemed to be conducted sincerely (*Tempo*, May 24, 2009). On any account, with the convincing victory of Democrat Party in legislative election, he had every right to pick the person he wanted to team up with, without having any obligation to involve the coalition members. At that time, that person happened to be Boediono.

Meanwhile, outside the dynamics of the appointment of Boediono as a companion to Yudhoyono, PDI-P and Gerindra officially nominated Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto as the candidates of president and vice-

¹¹¹ In that regard, Goenawan Mohammad wrote an article praising Boediono in *Tempo* (May 24, 2009). In the article, he mentions that the assistant to SBY's presidency is an economist and a technocrat who has been working in Indonesia's economic management for a long time. He is neither a party leader nor a member of a political dynasty. Unlike commercials star, soap-opera star, or movie star in the entertainment media, he is not well-known outside his circle. He is not a reliable vote getter either. However, more importantly, Boediono is the one who has worked to improve the nation's economy, a bureaucrat and a simple person altogether, possessing a clean and honest image. By considering those aspects, it was only logical why Yudhoyono finally chose Boediono to become his running mate.

president, respectively, to compete in the presidential election on July 8. The party's elites from both PDI-P and Gerindra attended the preliminary announcement of the candidacies in Megawati's residence. On May 15, Megawati and Prabowo agreed to step forward as candidates of president and vice-president nominated by PDI-P, Gerindra¹¹² and several other minor parties.

Initially, the road leading to the coalition of Megawati-Prabowo was not an easy one because both Megawati and Prabowo had wanted the position of presidential candidate. Eventually an agreement was made, but not before both camps had a winding discussion at Bogor Palace. Finally, they declared their candidacies at the residence of Megawati. The pair intended to run their government based on populist economic system. According to the Secretary General of PDI-P, Pramono Anung, both leaders of PDI-P and Gerindra were the symbols of people's struggle.

After the long and tortuous process of the nomination, the declaration for their candidacies was held at Bantar Gebang landfill in Bekasi. In the declaration, the candidates pledged their vision of improving people's economy and restoring the glory of Indonesia. The elite ranks of both parties attended the declaration. From PDI-P's camp, Secretary General Pramono Anung, DPP's Chairman Tjahjo Kumolo and Puan Maharani were among the attendees, together with the Chairman of the Advisory Council Taufik Kiemas, Arif Wibowo, Arya Bima, Gayus Lumbuun, and other senior cadres. From Gerindra, Secretary General Ahmad Muzani, DPP's Chairman Fadli Zon and members of the Board of Trustees, Hasjim Djojohadikusumo and Halida Hatta also attended the declaration (*Kompas*, May 16, 2009).

By the end of candidates' registration on May 15, it had been ascertained that three pairs of president and vice-president candidates i.e. Mega-Prabowo, SBY-Boediono, and JK-Wiranto¹¹³ would compete in the

¹¹² No fewer than 81 cadres from both PDI-P and Gerindra were included as the core members of Megawati-Prabowo's Campaign Team headed by Theo Syafei'i. The Secretary General of Gerindra, Fadli Zon, held the position of the Secretary General of the National Campaign Team.

¹¹³ Similar to other pairs of candidates, JK-Wiranto also formed a campaign team (*tim sukses*) in the preparation of the 2009 presidential election. The campaign team of the pair Number 3

presidential election of 2009. While the Golkar-Hanura's coalition declared the nomination of their candidates at the Proclamation Memorial at Pegangsaan Street, Jakarta, and Mega-Prabowo declared theirs at the landfill of Bantar Gebang, Bekasi, SBY-Boediono declared their candidacies by holding a luxurious gala in Sabuga Building, Bandung.

On May 30, 2009, attended by the three pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the lot drawing of the candidates' numbers was conducted at the KPU's office. From the results, Megawati Sukarnoputri-Prabowo received the lot Number 1; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono got Number 2, and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto, Number 3. Once established as candidates of president and vice-president,¹¹⁴ the next question in line was

was somewhat rather hefty than that of the other pairs. According to the list it had submitted to the KPU, the team enlisted no fewer than 700 names. Naturally, the cadres of Golkar and Hanura dominated the success team. The campaign team was commanded by senior cadre of Golkar, Fahmi Idris, assisted by eight vice-chairpersons, namely Ary Mardjono, Syamsul Mu'arif, Abu Hartono, Alwi Hamu, Basri Sidehabi, Tutty Alawiyah, Burhanuddin Napitupulu, and Nico Daryanto. The position of Secretary General of the team was entrusted to Golkar's Deputy Secretary General, Iskandar Mandji, while the position of Treasurer was held by JK's youngest son, Solihin Kalla. The team was divided into a number of departments each of which was headed by a team coordinator. Chairman Harahap led the advocacy and law department whose members included a number of lawyers from Golkar and Hanura, such as Elza Syarief, Teguh Samudera, Nudirman Munir, Gusti Randa, Aziz Shamsuddin, Eggi Sudjana, Albert M Sagala, and Djasri Marin. The analytic department was led by Thomas Suyatno, assisted by Wahyu Dewanto and Harry Azhar Azis, whose members included Fadhil Hasan, Ferry Mursyidan Baldan and Ahmad Erani Yustika. The department of public image was headed by Iwan A Sudirwan, assisted by Indra J Piliang and Arie Coal, with members, such as Binny B. Buchori, Ichsan Loulembah, and Elprisdat. Public relations department was led by the Chairman of DPP-Hanura, Fuad Bawazier, and assisted by Poempida Hidayatullah and Samuel Koto. Priyo Budi Santoso, AS Hikam, Yuddy Chrisnandi, Nurul Arifin, Meutia Hafid, Jeffrie Geovanie, and Tantowi Yahya were members of this department. Meanwhile, Kalla's brother, Suhaeli Kalla, oversaw the logistics of the campaign. He led several people whose task was to provide logistics to the ten regional coordinators. Involving his family was one of Jusuf Kalla's strategies to win the pair of JK-Wiranto in the election (detik.com: July 30, 2009).

¹¹⁴ All pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates were accompanied by their respective success team in the lot drawing at the KPU head-office. Mega-Prabowo's success team led by Theo Syafei'i was bringing along the functionaries of PDI-P, Gerindra, PNI-Marhaen, and Partai Buruh, such as Pramono Anung Wibowo, Tjahyo Kumolo, Puan Maharani, Taufik Kiemas, Hasto Kristanto, Arif Wibowo, Aria Bima, Gaius Lumbuun, Fadli Zon, Halida Hatta, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Suhardi, Achmad Muzani, Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, Mochtar Pakpahan and so forth. SBY-Boediono's success team, led by the State Secretary, Hatta Rajasa, was bringing along the Chairman and Secretary General of the Democratic Party Hadi Utomo and Marzuki Ali, President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, Chairman of PPP, Suryadharma Ali, Chairman of PKB, Muhamimin Iskandar, Secretary General of PAN Zulkifli Hasan, Edi Baskhoro (Ibas), the Mallarangeng brothers, Andi, Rizal and Choel, and much more. JK-Wiranto's success team, led by the Minister of Industry, Fahmi Idris, was bringing along Burhanuddin Napitupulu, Priyo Budisantoso, Yudi Chrisnandi, Indra J. Piliang, Nurul

about which one of them would be elected as the President and the Vice-President for the period of 2009-2014.¹¹⁵

Other than PDI-P and Gerindra, Megawati-Prabowo were supported by several political parties, namely PNI-Marhaen, *Partai Buruh*, *Partai Pakar Pangan*, *Partai Merdeka*, *Partai Kedaulatan*, PPNU, and PSI. The pair gained the support of 20.60 per cent of votes equal to 21.61 percent of parliamentary seats.

No fewer than 24 political parties, namely Democrat Party, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, PBB, PDS, PKPB, PBR, PPRN, PKPI, PDP, PPI, Republican Party, Patriot Party, PNBKI, PMB, PPI, Pioneer Party, PKDI, PIS, PPIB, and PPDI gave their support to SBY-Boediono. In the election, SBY-Boediono received 56.07 per cent votes equal to 59.70 per cent of parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, three parties, namely the Partai Golkar, Hanura and PPDK supported JK-Wiranto. This pair gained a support of 18.28 per cent votes or 22.32 per cent of the parliamentary seats.

In the context of the 2009 presidential election, political parties did all the process of planning and implementation, hoping the people would buy it so they could move to their next plan. In that light, if the elected president and vice-president did not carry out the promises they had given in their campaigns, people would have difficulties to require and account them for that, because they were not the candidates of their choice in the first place, but rather the representatives of parties or coalition.

It is nothing short of ironic that the people who have voted their President and Vice-President do not have any bargaining power to help overcome the problems in the state. In addition, more often than not, an

Arifin, Meutia Hafid, Jeffrie Geovanie, Tantowi Yahya, Drajad Wibowo of the PAN, Ali Mochtar Ngabalin from PBB, Nico Daryanto, Fuad Bawazier, Yus Usman, Bambang W. Soeharto, and AS Hikam of Hanura. The largest success team belonged to JK-Wiranto, which consisted of 700 members, but a solid one was that of SBY-Boediono with 297 members comprising party leaders and former government officials. Meanwhile, the entire 81 members of Mega-Prabowo's success team were consisted of both PDI-P and Gerindra's selected cadres.

¹¹⁵ On May 29, 2009, KPU announced the net worth of the presidential and vice presidential candidates as follows: (1) Megawati Soekarnoputri: Rp. 256,447,223,594; (2) Prabowo Subianto: Rp. 1,579,376,223,359 and US\$ 7,572,916; (3) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: Rp 6,848,049,611 and US\$ 246.359; (4) Boediono: Rp. 22,067,815,019 and US\$ 15,000; (5) Muhammad Jusuf Kalla: Rp. 314,530,794,307 and US\$ 25.668; (6) Wiranto: Rp 81,748,591,938 and US\$ 378,625.

elected president and his vice-president often act for the interests of their parties, or the coalition of parties they represent, and only give insignificant efforts in solving the national problems, especially regarding public health, education, social justice, and people's welfare. Such tendency has been displayed in the slow rate of poverty and unemployment reductions in the last decade. Someone who has been elected as the leader of the state should submit to the will of the people, not the party, as suggested by the late Manuel L. Quezon in his saying, "My loyalty to my party ends where my loyalty to my country begins."

Such undesired condition happens whenever no political contract exists between the people and the candidates of president and vice-president carried by each party as in the case of Indonesia. People have always been used as a means to gain power and neglected thereafter. More than that, political parties have always believed that they have no obligation to hold responsibility to anyone. Politicians in general have regarded both power and authority as the last stop, so they all go berserk to achieve them, shoving away anyone who stands in their way. They have used the power as a means to gain money, luxuries, personal prestige, and other privileges. People have only made aware of the existence of the parties just prior to, or during the legislative and presidential elections, after which all the parties fall to deep slumber. Just as it has always been, in the end, people have to look after themselves. Their sufferings, which are abundant, only act to supply the headlines for the printed and electronic media.

One Round Race

All the winning parties would agree that the 2009 presidential election was an important and strategic instrument in democratic politics that had put certain significance upon the political image of Indonesia in international perspectives, based on the following arguments:

First, presidential election is a process that grants or renews political legitimacy as the basis of the administration of the elected candidate. A democratic presidential election will form a legitimate government supported

by the people. Whoever wins in such election, his or her legitimacy over the government will be protected, including from the offensive maneuvers of the opposition. Here, the position of the people as the holders of supreme sovereignty is more important than that of political parties.

Second, presidential election is a means of peaceful political transformation once in every five years. Therefore, political changes that follow should focus and be based on persuasion instead of anarchy. On any account, political struggles are associated with the trust and sympathy of a person or group of people toward the candidates of president and vice-president. All forms of conflicts should end through peaceful and dignified election. Therefore, the presidential election should not be tainted by any manipulation that can lead to conflict. Whomever the majority of people trust and elect as president should immediately carry out the programs he or she has promoted during the electoral campaign as promised. As for the losing candidates, there is no need to boycott the election results. There is enough time for each of them to make better programs and concoct better strategies for the next election in which he or she will probably be the victor.

Third, since the people represent the highest sovereignty, as political subjects, they hold higher position than the presidential and vice-presidential candidates do in a presidential election. In reality, this political status has often been denied, and sometimes by force as in the case of DPT debacles in the 2009 legislative election. Thereby, it is safe to assume that the 2009 presidential election has had similar DPT-related problems, intertwined as tangled threats with other election-related problems.

Fourth, general election is an open political arena in which every citizen qualified according to the stipulation of the Law has the same opportunity of suffrage and eligibility, and at the same time has the right to control the behavior of the government. Presidential election is a periodic event (once every five-year as a part of presidential system applied). Therefore, all political parties, either individually or as a coalition, can prepare their champion prior to every presidential election. Based on this, every presidential

election opens the opportunity for the succession of power conducted in constitutional way in accordance with the laws.

Taking above points into consideration, presidential election should not undermine the fundaments of democracy and people's wellbeing. It should be used as a milestone to cultivate the spirit of democracy as the basis of achieving the just, prosperous and thriving nation as aspired by the founding fathers.

The 2009 presidential election was held to elect the President and Vice-President for the period of 2009-2014. The vote casting took place simultaneously throughout the country on July 8, 2009. Under the Law No. 42/2008 on Presidential Election, the nomination of the candidates of president and vice-president was in the hand of political party or coalitions of political parties which had received at least 20 per cent of parliamentary seats or 25 per cent of the valid votes in national level in the legislative election. Each party nominating the presidential and vice-presidential candidates had to pass the parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent.

The 2009 electoral campaign that became one of the important parts of the presidential election was held from June 2 until July 4, 2009 in the form of public meetings and candidate debates. The vision, mission and programs of each pair of candidates were included in the campaign materials. The period for public meetings lasted for 24 days in three rounds, starting on June 11 until July 4, 2009. In each round, each pair of candidates was allocated eight general meetings in each province.¹¹⁶

For a pair of candidates to be elected in the election, they needed to secure more than 50 per cent of votes in national level and gain a minimum

¹¹⁶ A series of presidential and vice-presidential-related ads began to appear on TV screens ahead of the campaign period scheduled on June 2 to July 4, 2009. According to the KPU, those candidates could not be subjected to sanctions because at the time their ads began to appear, their status were nominees who had not been established as official candidates yet. As stipulated in the Law 42/2008 on the Presidential Election, only the nominees who had been declared as president and vice-president candidates were subjects to sanction if they campaigned beyond the schedule. The KPU established national identity as one of the main themes of the presidential debates. Such decision was expected to demonstrate the commitment of each candidate to uphold *Pancasila* in his/her administration should he/she be elected, in accordance with the nascent of the issue of national character building in other countries (*Kompas*, June 12, 2009).

of 20 per cent of votes in provincial level in half the total provinces in Indonesia. In case when no pair was able to meet such requirements, two pairs of candidates who had the most votes would be included to compete in the second round.

Similarly, in the case when two pairs of candidates received equal amount of popular votes, both pairs would compete in the second round voting. Meanwhile, when all three pairs shared equal amount of votes, the first and second rankings would be determined by the votes each pair had received in provincial level, whichever the highest. The same method, comparing the votes in provincial level, was used to determine the second-best candidates. Those were some rules applied in 2009 presidential election.

SBY-Boediono's victory in the 2009 presidential election seemed to repeat SBY's success in 2004. Even though the people had full power to choose the most competent presidential candidate to fix the nation's predicaments on their behalf, in the end, they tended to use their emotion predominantly when they casted their votes at the polling booth (TPS). Apparently, they did not use the results of debates, dialogues, and platform analyses— all the rational efforts offered by the Elections Commission and related institutions in dissecting the vision and mission of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates— as references in determining their choice (Arfanda Siregar, *Suara Karya*, July 16, 2009).

On any account, during the presidential campaign, JK-Wiranto was considered the most outgoing and popular candidates who stole the most of public attention. Their stature was boosted by their ability to elaborate their platform and program of action into concrete and realistic presentations to the public. If the ethnicities they represented were taken into consideration, JK-Wiranto perfectly endorsed the diversities of *Nusantara*. By any means, they had every potential to undermine the prospective supports of SBY-Boediono with whom they shared similar target voters, namely the urban and educated class. However, the fact said otherwise. The amount of votes they received did not amount as expected and surprisingly was below the combined votes of Golkar and Hanura in the legislative election.

The victory of SBY-Boediono actually repeated the success of SBY in the 2004 presidential election when he teamed up with JK. At that time, their rival pair, Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo, was the one that gained the most public sympathy. Not only because the image of Amien Rais as a professor of political study in the University of Gadjah Mada and one of the driving forces of the *reformasi*, the pair was also supported by two parties born from the womb of the Reformation, namely PAN and PKS. Nevertheless, in terms of votes, SBY-JK was more favorable than Amien-Siswono.

Such example gives us proof that although five years are long enough to change one's mindset, the characteristics of voters in the state have not changed. Seemingly, when it comes to election, well-constructed, realistic and applicable political platforms are never powerful enough to overcome the attraction of physical appearance and communication skills or the public image of the candidate. A dashing, tall, able to sing, and always smiling Presidential candidate e.g. Yudhoyono remained as favorite. The strong identification of the voters toward the stature and popularity of presidential and vice-presidential candidate has made the electoral campaign a mere "garnish" to the democratic process. The lure in form of changes and most realistic political programs has not succeeded in altering people's preference in both rural and urban areas.

The superiority of popularity over the mission, vision, platform, and the quality of the candidates did not happen overnight. President Yudhoyono, who already had a huge prestige and capital support he received during the 2004 general election, had even higher level of political image during his administration in the period of 2004-2009. During his first term, SBY was able to harness his power to improve his image in the public's eyes. The ads of the successful developments his administration had achieved were constantly featured in all television stations and printed media prior to the legislative and presidential election, adding to the numerous ads of his ministers. Judging from the result of the election, the performance of Fox Indonesia, a political consultant led by Choel Mallarangeng, which supported SBY-Boediono during

the whole process of election in the departments of logistics procurements and public imaging, was of tremendous importance.

The claimed successes of Yudhoyono's administration were all advertised nicely, so it did not matter whether the claims were true or just as hazy as dreams and illusions. One of them advertised about free education that supposedly, according to the commercial, could make a son of public transportation driver to become a pilot and a son of newspapers seller to be a journalist. Back to the reality, people have never experienced cheap education in this country, let alone free. His administration also bragged about the lowering of fuel prices it conducted three times in a row, which were unprecedented in the history of leadership in Indonesia. Such claims were nothing short of public's misleading. People were led to believe that the decreases of fuel price and the free education were the successes of the Yudhoyono's government, while in fact both cases were the consequences following the decrease of world oil prices and 20 per cent increase of the education budget in the state budget. Similarly, the success of self-sufficiency of rice, Aceh's peace treaty, reducing poverty and unemployment rates, the distribution of direct cash assistance, were all arguable and not necessarily prestigious achievements of the government.

Such was the paradox of people's choice when emotion prevailed over reason; everything was more a "mirage than reality." In brief, the boundary between the excessive use of political machine and the manipulation of meaning committed by the ruling authority is ever blurry. Both practices have the potential to lead to hegemony over meaning and truth with the absence of continuous control. It is obvious that to hand over authority using one's emotion is an unforgivable negligence. Therefore, the opposition forces become a necessary sparring partner for every popular president. Likewise, opposition forces have been expected to hold influential assessment over the policies of a president whose popularity even exceeded the joint-votes received by the coalition members that nominated him in 2009 general election.

Two roads opened before the parties that supported the candidacies of Mega-Prabowo and JK-Wiranto. Would they choose the difficult one by becoming the opposition in parliament, and thus abstaining from prestigious positions in the cabinet for five years? And what was interesting phenomenon of 2009 presidential election? Symbolic handshaking between Megawati with SBY or SBY with Wiranto and Prabowo displayed increasing political maturity of the political elites participating in the 2009 presidential election. If they were not mature enough, the relations between their respective supporters would have been prone to conflict.

The presidential and vice-presidential candidates, each with strong personalities: vocal, courageous and assertive, proficient in campaigning and presenting their vision and mission and programs, were the best sons and daughter of the nation. The three pairs of candidates entirely were composed of popular figures motivated by powerful vision and commitment to lead the nation.

The first pair was SBY-Boediono who had proved their capabilities in managing the government. While Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is a retired army general, bureaucrat and doctor of agricultural economics, Boediono is a doctor of monetary economy.

Meanwhile, the pair of JK-Wiranto, known as expressive individuals who do not like small talk, always speak frankly, outgoing, energetic, assertive and quick to act. The pair carried the motto "the sooner the better and one word in deed." Wiranto had served his military career to the highest level as TNI Commander-in-Chief.

No less significant was the pair of Megawati-Prabowo. Up to that point, Megawati, Soekarno's eldest daughter, had had very active involvement in national politics as the Chairwoman of the PDI-P, and had served as Indonesia's Vice-President and President in the period of 1999-2004. Meanwhile, Prabowo, who had served as the General Commander of Special Forces Command (Kopassus) and Commander of Army Strategic Command (Kostrad), would have been entrusted with the task of managing the national economy had they won the election. As a running mate, Prabowo was a

strong figure with his expressive, agile, decisive, courteous, and brave personalities. This pair was a serious contender with every potential to overcome its rival candidates.

The desire to win the elections often forced the success teams and supporters to do something inadmissible, accidentally or deliberately (*Suara Karya*, July 7, 2009). Such reality was commonly found during the legislative and presidential elections. The supervisory efforts during the presidential election were considerably lower than that of legislative election. The difference was due to the extent of each election. The legislative election involved a lot of political parties and even more numerous candidates—approximately tens of thousands of them, while the presidential election only involved three pairs of candidates. However, any violations in the presidential election could reduce the meaning of free and fair values it was supposed to uphold. Only an honest and fair election can give birth to a credible and legitimate winner.

However, to hold such an election is not an easy task. One major argument is that in the effort of gaining or maintaining power, people often justify any means, including by violating the rules. In acknowledgement of such argument and hence to counter such conduct, the institutions established to anticipate such violations have to perform adequately and thoroughly. Supervisory institutions should be courageous and given greater authority in processing the violations that occur. Similarly, the persons in charge of judging such cases should understand that every violation of the electoral law is a serious offense. Indonesia is a large nation that requires a leader with a noble spirit in promoting honesty and patriotism. This is a sign that politics and morality are two things that cannot be separated. Politics has to rely on moral principles. By any standard, politics is essentially to govern and to govern is essentially to do everything constitutionally. Therefore, the foundation of moral and ethical values must be well maintained.

After the whole processes had taken place, on August 18, 2009, the KPU confirmed the pair of SBY-Boediono as the winner of 2009 presidential election. Thus, the presidential election bringing the pair of SBY-Boediono as

the President and Vice-President for the period of 2009-2014 was conducted in one round only. Based on the official counting, SBY and his running mate won 73,874,562 votes equal to 60.80 per cent of total votes in national level, Megawati-Prabowo won 32,548,105 votes or 26.79 per cent, and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto obtained 15,081,814 votes or 12.41 per cent. From the 176,367,056 registered voters, total valid votes were 121,504,481 votes, while the invalid ones amounted to 6,479,174 votes.

The KPU immediately followed the verdict of the Constitutional Court by holding a plenary session to ascertain the elected presidential and vice-presidential candidates and to establish that the 2009 presidential election was conducted in one round. Based on KPU's votes counting, SBY-Boediono was established as elected President and Vice-president. The pair received more than 50 per cent of the votes that consisted of 20 per cent winnings in more than the required 17 provinces. In total, SBY-Boediono pair won 73,874,562 votes (60.80 per cent).

The decision of KPU's Plenary Meeting of Vote Recapitulation of 2009 Presidential Election¹¹⁷ established the one round's winning of SBY-Boediono. The pair, which was supported the 24 parties, swept 60.8 per cent of valid votes equal to 73,874,562 votes. Based on the same meeting dated July 23,

¹¹⁷ The success of SBY-Boediono in 2009 presidential election could not be separated from the hard work of its success team (*Kompas.com*, April 28, 2009). The SBY-Boediono's campaign team comprised no fewer than nine groups, namely: (1) Echo Team: It adopted the function of military territorial command to boost the votes in particular areas. The team was headed by one leader in each district/city. Former Armed Forces Commander, Air Marshal Djoko Suyanto, oversaw the team's whole operations; (2) Pro-SBY Movement, headed by Suratto Siswodihardjo and comprised former National Police Chief Sutanto, former Air Force Chief Air Marshal TNI (Ret.) Herman Prayitno, Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari, Minister of Forestry MS Kaban, former military KASUM Lieutenant General (Ret.) Suyono, and Armed Forces Lt. Gen. (ret) Agus Wijoyo; (3) *Sekoci* (lit: Lifeboat) Team, whose task was to help secure a minimum of 20 per cent of votes. This team listed public figures from various backgrounds, business, religious, women, farmers, and anglers, headed by the Commissioner of PT Indosat, Soeprapto and Irvan Edison; (4) Delta Team, which was responsible for the logistics of the campaign led by former Armed Forces Commander's Logistics Assistant, Major General (Ret.) Abikusno; (5) Romeo Team, led by Major General (Ret.) Sardan Marbun, which established communication with the people and socialized all of SBY's policies that had been successfully implemented; (6) Foxtrot Team, political consultant known as Bravo Media Center supervised by Choel Mallarangeng, the Director of Fox Indonesia; (7) *Barisan Indonesia*, a civil society organization initiated by Lt. Gen. M. Yasin, whose Chairman of the Board of Trustees was held by Akbar Tandjung; (8) *Jaringan Nusantara*, which was managed by former activists, such as Andi Arief, Harry Sebag, and Aam Sapulete; (9) SBY's *Dzikir Nurussalam* Foundation, founded by the former Private Secretary to the President, Kurdish Mustafa, Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi, and Habib Abdul Rahman M al-Habsyi.

2009, the pair of Megawati Sukarnoputri-Prabowo collected 32,548,105 votes or 26.79 per cent and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto collected 15,081,814 votes or 12.41 per cent. The voters who did not use their suffrage amounted to 49,212,158 people or 27.77 per cent.

Based on the KPU's official announcement on the plenary meeting the pairs of Mega-Prabowo and JK-Wiranto did not attend, SBY-Boediono was superior in 28 provinces, receiving more than 20 per cent of votes in each province.¹¹⁸ Mega-Prabowo only won in the province of Bali, while JK-Wiranto won in the provinces of South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and Gorontalo. In other words, except in the provinces of South Sulawesi, North Maluku, Gorontalo, and Bali, the other provinces were absolutely won by the pair of SBY-Boediono.

Based on the recapitulation, the pair of JK-Wiranto won 2,719,701 votes (64.41 per cent), while SBY-Boediono gained 1,335,115 votes (31.62 per cent), and Mega-Prabowo, 167,970 votes (3.98 per cent) in the Province of South Sulawesi. In Gorontalo, JK-Wiranto won 269,057 of the votes (49.32

¹¹⁸ After the Election Commission ratified the result of 2009 presidential election, Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto and Megawati-Prabowo separately filed objections to the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusional*) over the recapitulation results, numbered 108/PHPB-VII/2009 and 109/PHPB-VII/2009, respectively. Their points of objection, namely: (1) The erratic preparation and ratification of DPT, (2) the regrouping or the reducing of polling places, (3) the displaying of banners of the Election Commission, intended as vote casting's tutorial, but turned out to be beneficial for a particular pair of candidates; (5) the various administrative violations, which were counted as crimes; (6) the unexplained addition of votes to SBY-Boediono's tally and the reduction of that of Mega-Prabowo and JK-Wiranto. The respondents of their petitions were the National Elections Commission and the entire Regional Elections Commissions throughout Indonesia, while the *Bawaslu* as well as the pair of SBY-Boediono were positioned as accessories. The trials were conducted four times, started from the preliminary hearing on August 4, 2009, testimonials of the respondents, related parties, and witnesses on August 5, 2009 and evidentiary hearing on 6 to 7 August 2009. On August 12, 2009, the constitutional judges read the verdict in which they rejected the appeals. The entire constitutional judges took such decision unanimously without any dissenting opinion. The process of the 2009 legislative and presidential election did provide opportunities to make legal complaints. The Constitutional Court was willing to receive complaints concerning 2009 presidential election within 3 X 24 hours since the recapitulation had been announced. Concerning the disputes, two things were decided: First, the Constitutional Court declared the exceptions toward the respondent and related parties as proposed by the camps of Megawati-Prabowo and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto were unacceptable. Therefore, second, it overruled the petitions of Megawati-Prabowo and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto. Finally, backed by such decision, on October 20, 2009, the pair of SBY-Boediono was inaugurated as the new President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia.

per cent), while SBY-Boediono had 241,222 votes (44.22 per cent), and Mega-Prabowo, 35,225 votes (6.46 per cent).

JK-Wiranto also won in North Maluku with 224,583 votes or 40.721 per cent of the votes, which outnumbered the votes of SBY-Boediono that reached 214,757 votes or 38.94 percent and Megawati-Prabowo with 112,173 votes or 20.34 percent.

The pair of Megawati-Prabowo only won in Bali with the acquisition of 992,815 votes equal to 51.92 per cent, while the second position was achieved by SBY-Boediono with 822,951 votes or 43.03 per cent. Trailing behind was JK-Wiranto with 96,571 votes or 5.05 per cent.

EPILOGUE

Staring at the Future

As an endnote, it is worth taking a step back to contemplate the journey of general elections in Indonesia in the period of 1955-2009, from the era of Soekarno to Yudhoyono, as a continuous succession of political power. So, what the future will bring for the state and the nation? And how promising is the prospect of political life in the future of this Republic? For that, the people need to keep weaving their hopes while contemplating each of the general elections to learn every lesson therein, from the general election of the Old Order in 1955, to that of the New Order era (1971-1997) and the reform era (1999-2009).

In 1955, the Republic was barely 10 years old. Considering that the election is a prerequisite mechanism of democracy, was the 10 years period prior to 1955 not democratic at all? It is not as easy as it seems to answer the question. About three months after Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence on August 17, 1945, the government declared its intention to hold an election, scheduled to take place in 1946. It was included in Edict X of the Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, November 3, 1945, together with the one concerning the formation of political parties. The edict stipulated that the general election was going to be held in January 1946 to elect members of DPR and MPR. However, for some reasons, the planned election was not held until ten years later. Similarly, another long gap separated this first election with the next one held in 1971.

However, at variance with the provision of Edict X/1945, the vote casting of the 1955 general election was conducted twice. The first vote casting took place on September 29, 1955 to elect members of Parliament, and the second on December 15, 1955 to elect members of the Constitutional Assembly. As for the edict, it only mentioned the election was to be held in January 1946 to elect members of the DPR and MPR without provision concerning the Constitutional Assembly.

Notwithstanding with the provision of the Edict X, no election was held in January 1946 due to two things. First, the government was unprepared to stipulate the laws concerning the election, and second the threats on national stabilities caused by political feuds and the rising insurgencies in some areas i.e. the uprisings of DI/TII, PRRI/Permesta, PKI-Madiun, David Beureuh's rebellion in Aceh and so forth. Thus, the political elites were more preoccupied with political consolidation than electoral preparation.

In 1950, when Mohammad Natsir was holding the position of Prime Minister, the government decided to make the election as one the cabinet's programs. Since then, a committee led by Sahardjo from the Office of the Central Electoral Committee had conducted intensive discussions on the Draft Law of the Election before the draft proceeded to the parliament. At that time, Indonesia just readopted the unitary state from the union states system under the name of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*) it had assumed since 1949.

After the fall of Natsir's Cabinet, Wirjosandjojo Soekiman of Masyumi continued the discussion of the Draft Law of the Election in his administration. His administration tried to hold election in pursuant to the Article 57 of UUD-S 1950 which stated "The members of People's Representative Council shall be elected by the people through election according to provisions and regulations of the law." Nevertheless, his administration failed to conclude the session discussing the Draft Law of Election. It was not until 1953, under Wilopo's Cabinet, that the parliament finally finished the session on the draft, making it into Law No. 7/1953 on General Election. The Law became a constitutional basis for the implementation of 1955 general election whose implementation was stipulated to be direct, general, free and confidential. Thus, the Law No. 27 of 1948 on General Election (later converted to Law no. 12/1949) stipulating the election of the members of the DPR and DPRD to be conducted in indirect system became obsolete.

The 1955 general election has become something of a pride for Indonesians for its fair, honest and democratic implementation, for which various countries praised it as a truly democratic election. The election saw 30

parties and more than one hundred individuals competed democratically. The interesting parts about this first election were its fairness, the high awareness of the people for healthy competition, and their high enthusiasm to participate in it despite the young age of the Republic.

Unfortunately, those who participated in 1955 general election would not see another election until well in 1971. It remained as the only election ever held during the first 25 years of Indonesia's independence. Meanwhile, due to the adoption of multi-party system, political atmosphere eventually became too raucous and more prone to conflicts. Several years after the election, Vice-President Hatta¹¹⁹ resigned from office, leaving Soekarno whose administration soon lagged in developing the economy. Soekarno's downfall in 1966, which was preceded by the bloody tragedy of G-30-S/PKI 1965, gave rise to Soeharto as the new power holder.

Apart from the democratic implementation of 1955 general election, its contribution to the democratic development in Indonesia ended badly. Major problems arose due to the predicaments in the decision-making processes caused by the sheer numbers of political parties involved in the parliament and the failure of economic system that led to 650 per cent inflation and the drastic increase of poverty and unemployment rates. People were angry because the government failed to achieve the ideals of Proclamation that called for a just and prosperous society. Similar anger has been displayed in the last 65 years whenever injustice threatened to take away the prosperities they have been longing for. The only way to avoid such anger is to bring the society to a just, prosperous and peaceful condition in immediate fashion. To deny these dreams is to evoke their anger. The bloody upheavals of *Arab Springs* taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Jordan and other countries (December 2010-April 2011) were all triggered by

¹¹⁹ In 1955, Bung Hatta announced that after the Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly had been formed following the results of the 1955 general election, he would resign as Vice-President. He informed his intention to the Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Sartono and sent a copy of the letter to President Soekarno. After Soekarno inaugurated the Constitutional Assembly, Bung Hatta informed the Speaker of the Parliament that as per December 1, 1956 he resigned as Vice-President despite the objection from Soekarno. Until Soekarno's dismissal from office, the position of Vice-President remained vacant.

injustice and the greediness of the leaders which plunged their people to poverty.

Indonesia's political system changed completely after President Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959. By this decree, the President dissolved the Constitutional Assembly and reestablished the 1945 Constitution. The decree ended the regime of Liberal Democracy and marked the beginning of the Guided Democracy. During the latter, the ideological blends of Nationalism, Religion, and Communism, known as NASAKOM, were brought up and propagated extensively. The NASAKOM was a continuation of young Soekarno's thought (1926) about the three major political forces in the country, namely Nationalism, Islamism, and Marxism.

The influence of political parties plummeted even further when on June 4, 1960 President Soekarno dissolved the People's Representative Council elected in the 1955 general election for its refusal to the draft budget proposed by his administration. In exchange, Soekarno established Mutual-Cooperation Parliament (DPR-GR) and Provisional MPR (MPRS) whose members he appointed personally. Until Soekarno's dismissal in MPRS Special Session in March 1967, the government had not yet ready to hold any other election. General Soeharto, who was appointed in the same Special Session as the official acting president to replace Soekarno, also did not intend to hold an election immediately.

The MPRS Regulation No. XI/1966 mandated the election to be held in 1968. The discussion whether it was to adopt district or proportional electoral system triggered a fierce debate in the Second Army Seminar in 1966. Actually, the army as the new power holders preferred the district system, but the political parties, especially PNI, Murba, PSII, and NU, were not ready to adopt it and preferred the proportional system instead. On the advice of his political advisers, Soeharto changed the provision and decided that the election was going be held in 1971. Finally, about four years into his presidency, Soeharto's administration held the general election on July 5, 1971. With the Law no. 15 of 1969 as the constitutional basis, the election

was participated by ten political parties, namely Golkar, NU, Parmusi, PNI, PSII, Parkindo, *Partai Katholik*, Perti, IPKI, and *Murba*.

What distinguished the 1955 general election with that of the New Order was the level of participation of state officials. If in 1955 the government officials including the prime minister were allowed to participate in the election to represent their respective parties, in the period of 1971-1997, they were expected to remain neutral. However, in reality, during the entire New Order era, it was obligatory for all government officials to pledge their allegiance and loyalty to Golkar. The government even tried to create favorable conditions for Golkar, among others, by ordering all civil servants and their respective families to vote for it in every election.

Even though Golkar won the 1971 general election, in which it gained 236 parliamentary seats, but NU's votes had more quality than that of Golkar or PNI (the election winner of 1955). The key to Golkar's victory in 1971 general election was its effective monopoly over the hierarchical structure of the civilian and military's bureaucracy. Such monopoly gave two results in return. First, it gave clear hint toward the otherwise private political preference of the government officials, and second, it served as a mono-loyalty doctrine subjecting civil servants (PNS) to be loyal to the government, thereby rooting out civilian politicians from political parties. The 1971 general election also marked the beginning of Golkar's ascendancy to hegemonic power.

A certain psychological condition also worked in Golkar's favor in how people identified it as the agent of development (*Kompas*, July 21, 1971). At that time, the government began promoting the importance of national stability in order to avoid turmoil as had happened during the era of Parliamentary Democracy and Guided Democracy. The government used the stability of national security as the foundation of economic development. If in the era of Bung Karno, political development was everything, under Soeharto economic development became top priority. With such approach, Golkar was able to win in big cities and other developed regions. Not only that, Golkar

was also able to win the hearts of educated people with their entire pragmatic attitude.

Other parties, such as PNI, NU, Parmusi, PSII, Parkindo and *Partai Katholik* were powerless to counter the issue of development Golkar was promoting. "The issue of development seems to be the new ideology." Obediently, Golkar followed what the government had decided concerning the security stability, economic growth, and fair distribution of development results, a set of objectives known as the Trilogy of Development.

In 1971, PNI had to witness its own downfall. Once the ruling party in the era of Soekarno, PNI was defeated in the election. Indeed, since Soekarno's downfall in 1966, PNI had been powerless to withstand the new political wave. In the 1971 general election, PNI also faced a dilemma whether to become opposition party or to closing in to the center of power in an effort to obtain new political foothold. Unfortunately, that was the beginning of its destruction. The PNI made wrong decision and thereby digging its own grave by choosing to side with Soeharto.

Meanwhile, NU as the largest Islamic party took a firm line vis-à-vis the government and became the most unyielding political power in the early years of New Order under the leadership of its prominent figures, namely Subchan ZE, Jusuf Hasjim, Achmad Sjaichu, Chalid Mawardi, Chalid Ali, Mahbub Djunaedi, Imron Rosadi, Zainuddin Sukri, Moh. Munasir and Idham Chalid. If the low profile attitude shown by PNI proved detrimental to its achievement in the election, the tough stance of NU was instrumental in defending its tally similar to what it had received in 1955 general election.

One of many things that led to the destruction of political parties in the early years of the New Order was the broken structural relationship between civil servants and political parties caused by the Regulation of Minister of Home Affairs (*Permendagni*) No. 12, 1970, known as *Permen* 12. The regulation stipulated public servants to demonstrate their loyalty to the New Order government by submitting their supports to ensure Golkar's victory. As it was, the regulation marked the doom of political parties. Since then, Golkar had become a single majority and a hegemonic party throughout the New

Order era, severely marginalizing the PPP and PDI. As such, it also marked the beginning of the depoliticization and *departyization* period of the New Order era.

It was not until the 1992 general election that the New Order regime started to loosen its political control over the elections. Many political figures attested that 1992 general election had significant differences and improvement compared to the previous elections. For one thing, it was more competitive than the elections in 1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987, respectively. Political dynamics were lively, and people did feel the sense of political freedom. Sensing this, the other parties, especially PDI, tried not to hold back in competing Golkar in the campaign period. In fact, in every PDI's campaign, its enthusiastic supporters literally flooded the campaign arena, set it ablaze in red color with their shirts, flags and banners. The enthusiasm brought up the term of "metal" or *merah total* (total red), a movement of the lower class' societies later identified as PDI's loyal supporters.

In 1992, the Chairman of PDI, Soerjadi, even dared to nominate Guruh Soekarnoputra as a presidential candidate. The proposal to make the position of the Speaker of the DPR and that of MPR into two separate boards emerged, so did the proposals to limit the presidential tenure into two terms, increase the education budget into 20 per cent of the total state budget, and hold the election on holiday or special off day. The entire proposals have now been adopted in the post-reform era. While all reformist parties' seems eager to take credits on such achievements, the truth is such proposals were already proposed by both PDI and PPP during the 1992 general election and MPR's 1993 General Session.

In general, criticisms toward New Order's elections have revolved around how manipulative and deceitful their implementations were, and how they resembled more of mass mobilizations instead of free-active participations. Thus, for the people, their political right was more of political liability. This was due to the strong influence of paternalism culture in the society. Those in charge reaped the benefits out of people's supports, while

the *kawulo alit* (common people) got the economic benefit in return, thereby forming a relation that was arguably mutual.

In addition, the real champion during the New Order era was none other than Soeharto's administration itself. All election's participants, Golkar, PPP and PDI, in fact did not do any concrete action nor possessed comprehensive program of development with which they could have served the people more beneficially. What they did was simply following the government in whatever policies it had decided. They even mimicked the government's idea of development as their campaign materials. The reasons why the educated middle class was content in supporting Golkar were their pragmatism and the lure of profits which had nothing to do with idealism. Popular among the entrepreneurs at that time was a slogan, "all successful entrepreneurs certainly have passed through the dark hallway," referring to the practice of colluding with the rulers that has survived to the present days.

When Soeharto resigned from office on May 21, 1998, Indonesia entered the era of *reformasi*. During the reform era—discounting the implementation of regional autonomy and the direct election of legislative members and government officials—there has been no concrete concept of political development other than the success of toppling Soeharto, which hardly a concept at all, and the now overrated war on corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). Since the reform era, the elections have been held three times, in 1999, 2004, and 2009, respectively. In 2004 and 2009, in addition to the legislative elections, people also participated in presidential elections. With the adopted multi-party system, the three post-reform elections have involved numerous amounts of parties.

In 1999 general election, a total of 48 political parties became election participants. That amount was reduced to 24 in 2004 only to grow once again into no fewer than 38 political parties and 6 Aceh's local parties in 2009 legislative election. Along with the legislative and presidential election, each province also staged local elections for electing governor, regent, and mayor, including four non-party individuals to be seated as members of Regional

Representatives Council (DPD). Thus, in reform era, all public officials have been directly elected through above mechanisms

In 1999 general election, PDI-P emerged as the winner, followed respectively by Golkar, PPP, PKB, and PAN. In 2004 general election, it was Golkar's turn to emerge as the winner, followed by PDI-P, PPP, Democrat Party, PAN, PKB, and PKS. All those parties passed the 2.5 per cent parliamentary threshold. In 2009 legislative election, the trophy was passed to Democrat Party whose victory surprised many for it was able to defeat both PDI-P and Golkar, the winners of the two previous elections. In 2009, Golkar, PDI-P, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, Gerindra, and Hanura completed the list of nine parties that passed the parliamentary threshold and sauntered to Senayan. Unfortunately, the 2009 general election was also rated as the worst election in the history of elections in Indonesia, in which almost 49 million of people were denied the rights to vote due to inaccurate Fixed Voters List (DPT). Soon after President Yudhoyono was inaugurated on October 20, 2009, the President formed the Second United Indonesia Cabinet to assist him in governing the state on the matters of welfare, democracy, and justice.

In the reform era they are currently living, people still sense rooms for improvement. One such example is the government itself. Contrary to the adopted presidential system, the existence of numerous parties in DPR gives an appearance of parliamentary system. This in return, either directly or indirectly, has eluded the national leaderships from gaining momentum to make necessary improvements and accelerate the development process.

It is only natural that thoughts concerning political development and culture, especially in order to build democracy more substantively for future reference, need to be undertaken continuously. Ignas Kleden, (2009) in evaluating the political and cultural developments of the reform era, concludes, "Reforms that have taken place in this decade do not display effectiveness in exercising political power and undertaking political development, except when they assume the form of competition." Indeed, unlike water that flows to the lower places, human craves the higher places.

Problems bound to arise since there are only so many higher places i.e. positions, while those who crave for them bound to grow in numbers, leading them into political conflicts which sometimes even bloody. Such competition has driven the shifts of political power in each succession taken place in Indonesia, from the era of the Old Order under Soekarno's rule to the New Order regime under Soeharto and the reforms era under the leadership of BJ Habibie, KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, respectively.

From the perspective of macro politics, personal relations between politicians still hold massive influence over the course of Indonesia's politics. In broader sense, the government also tends to prioritize the interest of the state over that of the people in performing its duties. The decentralization policy that has been implemented according to the spirit of reform is merely a sharing of authority between the central and local governments, which has given little or no effects to people's welfare. At the low side, the reform era has given rise to two main sources of conflicts. First, the power struggles driven by conflict of interests, and second, none-too-subtle ideological tension between the Muslim groups, which propose for an Islamic state, and the proponents of nationalistic state. In the context of power struggle, the internal relations of political parties are quite essential, especially because the atmosphere of the reform era seems to endorse the existence of parties imperatively. Such tendency explains the 200 or so political parties that had been established between the 1999 and 2009 elections alone.

Arguably, the current government still carries around the legacy of the New Order's political culture by maintaining the interests of the state at the expense of that of the people. It still maintains the doctrine of national stability that focuses on the security and sovereignty of the state instead of those of the people. Such approach needs to be frowned upon especially because, unlike in the past, the threats toward the security and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia have smaller chance to occur compared to the dangers that threaten the independence and sovereignty of its people. To reverse such approach is needed, especially if Yudhoyono's administration

wants to silence the critics that have criticized his administration as an extended form of New Order instead of a government in line with the spirit of *reformasi* that brought him to the pinnacle of power in the first place.

Moreover, in the midst of a wave of democratization in various parts of the world, one consequence worth of note but only a few would notice and even fewer would administer is the growth of primordial-based politics. With the absence of flawless law enforcement and justice systems, education, and impartial social welfare, any efforts toward strengthening democracy and democratization will give rise to identity-driven political movements that strive for the well-being of ethnic groups, religions and social classes, instead of that of the whole nation. The Arab Springs' revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and other Middle East countries serve as the most recent example.

All movements that are driven by the interests of ethnics, religion, social class, and political parties often hide under the pretext of human rights and democracy in carrying their agendas. With its acute level of corruption, and the strong reciprocal politics of the ruling central government, and its autistic preoccupation toward itself, a young country like Indonesia is very prone to the threats of primordial movements that can undermine the democracy and the unity of the nation. Things can get worst when the transnational ideologies at odds with the underlying values of the Republic of Indonesia, Unity in Diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*), and the Five Principles (Pancasila) come into play. All political elites and national leaders need to monitor and anticipate any symptoms of such movements for the sake of the nation.

What have been mentioned above are test cases for Yudhoyono's government. Would the state insist to defend its rights, independence, and sovereignty at the expense of the rights of living of its citizens who live amidst political, legal and economic difficulties, born of injustices due to unilateral acts of certain groups, including the authorities and law enforcers?

If people's demand for justice and freedom of opinion is regarded as an act of defiance against the rulers as it has been, then the nation's utter

independence is indeed a long-term project yet to be accomplished. As it has always been, the independence of the state has not yet been accompanied by the freedom of its citizens, national stability has not yet been accompanied by social stability, and the sovereignty of national governments has not yet been complemented by the sovereignty of people. The teaching of Bung Karno that independence is a golden bridge has to be campaigned with more fervor. The tasks of such golden bridge are to interlink the country's independence with the freedom of its citizens; the government's sovereignty with the sovereignty of its people; and the national stability with the social stability. If the links are broken, not only the reform has failed, but more than that, the golden bridge has also turned into a useless, damaged bridge (Ignas Kleden: 2001; 279-280).

Apart from the injustice, democracy in its transitional form, as in the case of Indonesia, tends to give rise to other predicaments. To improve it, democracy needs to be understood not as mere matter of political institutions but that of culture and national wisdom. No matter how continuous the government has established democratic institutions and infrastructures, as long as democratic culture has not rooted deep within the society, the tasks of state's institutions to uphold democracy are bound to fail. By failing, it means that the government also fails to accomplish the ultimate goal of democracy, which is to improve people's quality of life and welfare. It should also be understood that although democracy has been running on the right track, it does not necessarily give direct effect on the mental attitude and behavior of the society. Such premise is evident in the attitude of parties' elites who are still fighting over seizing and retaining power, and thereby focusing less on improving the welfare of the people. After all, the whole process of democracy the political parties, government, and parliament have undertaken should be dedicated to the welfare of the people.

Therefore, the commitment of all political elites in accelerating the adoption of democracy in all aspects of civic live has always been in demand. The efforts they take in performing such task will imprint democracy ever clearer as an integral part of nation's rationale and code of conducts. Of

course, such task does not give instantaneous results and should not be taken for granted. The process is bound to take some time, and the duration of which is fully dependent on the political maturity of the elites holding positions in executive, legislative and judicial bodies.

With no less importance is the demand to achieve certain qualities of democracy that include equality, sense of justice, autonomy over public decision-making, and the freedom of the press. Each of them is an indicator of democracy as a part of political culture. The ongoing demand has largely focused on the improvement of procedural aspects of democracy as part of power management system, and has not touched the substantial democracy as a part of the nation's cultural plurality yet. The latter is of extreme importance, especially with the political objectives the nation has set for its future, namely to create democratic, just, civilized and prosperous society¹²⁰ that upholds the supremacy of the law and human rights. Combined, all of them represent something the nation has yet to see.

To achieve it, the following steps are necessary: First, the imperative reforming of political institutions to function as part of communal participation. The involvement of community is meant to provide opportunities for it to develop into civil society, a self-organizing society aware of the rights and obligations as citizens. In that relation, freedom and independence are the main keys.

Second, public empowerment toward emancipation and participation, so that the citizens have equal opportunities to participate in the making of public policies, including in the process of political engagement. The fulfillment of emancipation and participation has been hampered by the personal and unpredictable way the ruling elites use their power. As a result, participation is only limited to those who reside in the environment of the power controllers (ruling elites).

¹²⁰ In January 2009, as part of the effort to build future democracy, President Yudhoyono requested the Forum of Rectors to research and review various models of democracy in order to find one most appropriate to be adopted in Indonesia. The result model has to be based on national cultural characteristics capable to interlink the presidential with the multiparty system. By any account, it should provide political and economical stabilities for Indonesia in the future (*Kompas*, January 6, 2009).

The third is to embed the value of living in a civilized state to the people, which will lead to what the study of politics defines as cultural comprehension. In a democratic world, individuals or group of people should work in mutual assistance to meet their interests in the state. Thus, democracy can be understood as accumulative efforts to develop mutual understanding among fellow citizens. Therefore, political culture is so important a basis for political institutions to be more democratic and civilized. The leaders of the state should be aware that politics means to govern, and to govern means to govern constitutionally. Therefore, an individual who becomes a leader must be capable to safeguard the constitution of the state.

These efforts need to be constantly promoted so they become part of the mind-set of political elites in comprehending and practicing democracy. If done correctly, they will improve the quality of democracy and state management, and expand the involvement of community in the making of public-related policies. Gradually, involving all communities in the state management system will accelerate the completion of democracy and political system that cater to the cultural plurality of the nation.

The restructuring of the bureaucracy in both the central and local levels, using the spirit of bureaucratic reform that calls for honesty, openness, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, is of extreme importance. All the people of Indonesia must make corruption, collusion and nepotism as common enemies. That way, the democracy that has been built these far will contribute to the mind-set, sovereignty, and prosperity of the people. The Republic, with all of its components, must implement the national development wholeheartedly and continuously to create the just and prosperous society as mandated by the constitution and aspired by our founding fathers.

All of those have amounted to serious challenges for Indonesia in the next 20 years, starting with the 2014 general election. If the elections to come are going to be implemented in similar unsatisfactory qualities and undemocratic spirit, the outcomes will be very predictable. They will only generate greedy, covetous, clown politicians who pursue profit above

everything else, similar to what have happened during the 65 years of Indonesian independence.

APPENDICES DAN REFERENCES

Appendix 1: Indonesian Cabinets, 1945 – 2009 ¹²¹

Cabinets – Post-Independence

Name	Start	End	Cabinet's Head	Position	Members
Presidential	2 September 1945	14 November 1945	Ir. Soekarno	President	21 Ministers
Sjahrir I	14 November 1945	12 March 1946	Sutan Syahrir	Prime Minister	17 Ministers
Sjahrir II	12 March 1946	2 October 1946	Sutan Syahrir	Prime Minister	25 Ministers
Sjahrir III	2 October 1946	3 July 1947	Sutan Syahrir	Prime Minister	32 Ministers
Amir Sjarifuddin I	3 July 1947	11 November 1947	Amir Sjarifuddin	Prime Minister	34 Ministers
Amir Sjarifuddin II	11 November 1947	29 January 1948	Amir Sjarifuddin	Prime Minister	37 Ministers
Hatta I	29 January 1948	4 August 1949	Mohammad Hatta	Vice President	17 Ministers
Emergency	19 December 1948	13 July 1949	Sjafruddin Prawiranegara	Ketua	12 Ministers
Hatta II	4 August 1949	20 December 1949	Mohammad Hatta	Prime Minister	19 Ministers

¹²¹ The names of the Cabinets are taken from various sources: AMW Pranarka (1985); Deliar Noer (1987); Bung Hatta's Memoire (1979); Moh. Hatta (1960); J. Elisoe Rocamora (1991); Wilopo SH., (1978), *Wikipedia* (2007), and *Kompas*, 7 January 2010.

Cabinets of Parliamentary Democracy Era

Name	Start	End	Cabinet's Head	Position	Members
RIS	20 December 1949	6 September 1950	Mohammad Hatta	Prime Minister	17 Ministers
Susanto	20 December 1949	21 January 1950	Susanto Tirtoprodjo	Acting Prime Minister	10 Ministers
Halim	21 January 1950	6 September 1950	Abdul Halim	Prime Minister	15 Ministers
Natsir	6 September 1950	27 April 1951	Moh. Natsir	Prime Minister	18 Ministers
Sukiman-Suwirjo	27 April 1951	3 April 1952	Sukiman Wirjosandjojo	Prime Minister	20 Ministers
Wilopo	3 April 1952	30 July 1953	Wilopo	Prime Minister	18 Ministers
Ali Sastroamidjojo I	30 July 1953	12 August 1955	Ali Sastroamidjojo	Prime Minister	20 Ministers
Burhanuddin Harahap	12 August 1955	24 March 1956	Burhanuddin Harahap	Prime Minister	23 Ministers
Ali Sastroamidjojo	24 March 1956	14 March 1957	Ali Sastroamidjojo	Prime Minister	25 Ministers
Djuanda	9 April 1957	10 July 1959	Djuanda	Prime Minister	24 Ministers

Cabinets of Guided Democracy Era

Name	Start	End	Cabinet's Head	Position	Members
Kerja I	10 July 1959	18 February 1960	Ir. Soekarno	President	33 Ministers
Kerja II	18 February 1960	6 March 1962	Ir. Soekarno	President	40 Ministers
Kerja III	6 March 1962	13 December 1963	Ir. Soekarno	President	60 Ministers
Kerja IV	13 November 1963	27 August 1964	Ir. Soekarno	President	66 Ministers
Dwikora I	27 August 1964	22 February 1966	Ir. Soekarno	President	110 Ministers
Dwikora II	24 February 1966	28 March 1966	Ir. Soekarno	President	132 Ministers
Dwikora III	28 March 1966	25 July 1966	Ir. Soekarno	President	79 Ministers
Ampera I	25 July 1966	17 October 1967	Ir. Soekarno	President	31 Ministers
Ampera II	17 October 1967	6 June 1968	Gen. Soeharto	Acting President	24 Ministers

Cabinets of New Order Era

Name	Start	End	Cabinet's Head	Position	Members

Pembangunan I	6 June 1968	28 March 1973	Gen. Soeharto	President	23 Ministers
Pembangunan II	28 March 1973	29 March 1978	Gen. Soeharto	President	22 Ministers; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Pembangunan III	29 March 1978	19 March 1983	Soeharto	President	24 Ministers; 6 Undersecretaries; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Pembangunan IV	29 March 1983	19 March 1988	Soeharto	President	32 Ministers; 5 Undersecretaries; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Pembangunan V	23 March 1988	17 March 1993	Soeharto	President	33 Ministers; 5 Undersecretaries; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Pembangunan VI	17 March 1993	14 March 1998	Soeharto	President	38 Ministers; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Pembangunan VII	14 March 1998	21 May 1998	Soeharto	President	34 Ministers; 2 Ministerial-Level Officials

Cabinets of Reformation Era

Name	Start	End	Cabinet's Head	Position	Members
Reformasi Pembangunan	21 May 1998	26 October 1999	B.J. Habibie	President	36 Ministers; 1 Ministerial-Level Official

Persatuan Nasional	26 October 1999	9 August 2001	Abdurrahman Wahid	President	29 Ministers; 3 Ministerial-Level Officials
Gotong Royong	9 August 2001	20 October 2004	Megawati Soekarnoputri	President	30 Ministers; 2 Ministerial-Level Officials
Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu	21 October 2004	20 October 2009	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	President	34 Ministers; 1 Deputy Minister; 2 Ministerial-Level Officials; 7 Presidential Special Staffs
Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II	21 October 2009	20 October 2014	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	President	34 Ministers; 10 Deputy Ministers; 7 Ministerial-Level Officials; 10 Presidential Special Staffs

Appendix 2: Legislative Elections in 1955 – 2009 and Presidential Elections in 2004 and 2009¹²²

The Outcome of 1955 Legislative Election

No.	Parties/Registered Names	Votes	(%)	Seats
1.	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	8,434,653	22.32	57
2.	Masyumi	7,903,886	20.92	57
3.	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6,955,141	18.41	45
4.	Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6,179,914	16.36	39

¹²² The appendix for the outcome of legislative elections in 1955-2009 and presidential elections in 2004 and 2009 are taken from various sources, such as: General Election Committee (1999; 2004; 2009), General Election Body (1997), Wikipedia (2007), *Tempo Interaktif* (2005), Indonesian Media Transparency (1999), CSIS Clippings (1971; 1992; 1997); M. Sudibyo (1995); Affan Gaffar (1992); Alfian (1988); and Ali Moertopo (1974).

5.	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1,091,160	2.89	8
6.	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)	1,003,326	2.66	8
7.	Partai Katolik	770,740	2.04	6
8.	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	753,191	1.99	5
9.	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI)	541,306	1.43	4
10.	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)	483,014	1.28	4
11.	Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	242,125	0.64	2
12.	Partai Buruh	224,167	0.59	2
13.	Gerakan Pembela Panca Sila (GPPS)	219,985	0.58	2
14.	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)	206,161	0.55	2
15.	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi RI (P3RI)	200,419	0.53	2
16.	Murba	199,588	0.53	2
17.	Baperki	178,887	0.47	1
18.	Persatuan Indonesia Raya (PIR) Wongsonegoro	178,481	0.47	1
19.	Grinda	154,792	0.41	1
20.	Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai)	149,287	0.40	1
21.	Persatuan Daya (PD)	146,054	0.39	1
22.	PIR Hazairin	114,644	0.30	1
23.	Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (PPTI)	85,131	0.22	1
24.	AKUI	81,454	0.21	1
25.	Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD)	77,919	0.21	1
26.	Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka (PRIM)	72,523	0.19	1
27.	Angkatan Comunis Muda (Acoma)	64,514	0.17	1
28.	R.Soedjono Prawirisoedarso	53,306	0.14	1
29.	Lain-lain	1,022,433	2.71	-
Total		37,785,299	100.00	257

The Outcome of 1955 Constitutional Council Election

No.	Names of Parties or Individuals	Votes	(%)	Seats
1.	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)	9,070,218	23.97	119
2.	Masyumi	7,789,619	20.59	112
3.	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	6,989,333	18.47	91
4.	Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)	6,232,512	16.47	80

5.	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)	1,059,922	2.80	16
6.	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo)	988,810	2.61	16
7.	Partai Katolik	748,591	1.99	10
8.	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)	695,932	1.84	10
9.	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia	544,803	1.44	8
10.	Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)	465,359	1.23	7
11.	Partai Rakyat Nasional (PRN)	220,652	0.58	3
12.	Partai Buruh	332,047	0.88	5
13.	Gerakan Pembela Panca Sila (GPPS)	152,892	0.40	2
14.	Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI)	134,011	0.35	2
15.	Persatuan Pegawai Polisi RI (P3RI)	179,346	0.47	3
16.	Murba	248,633	0.66	4
17.	Baperki	160,456	0.42	2
18.	Persatuan Indoenesia Raya (PIR) Wongsonegoro	162,420	0.43	2
19.	Grinda	157,976	0.42	2
20.	Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai)	164,386	0.43	2
21.	Persatuan Daya (PD)	169,222	0.45	3
22.	PIR Hazairin	101,509	0.27	2
23.	Partai Politik Tarikat Islam (PPTI)	74,913	0.20	1
24.	AKUI	84,862	0.22	1
25.	Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD)	39,278	0.10	1
26.	Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka (PRIM)	143,907	0.38	2
27.	Angkatan Comunis Muda (Acoma)	55,844	0.15	1
28.	R.Soedjono Prawirisoedarso	38,356	0.10	1
29.	Gerakan Pilihan Sunda	35,035	0.09	1
30.	Partai Tani Indonesia	30,060	0.08	1
31.	Radja Keprabonan	33,660	0.09	1
32.	Gerakan Banteng Republik Indonesia	39,874	0.11	
33.	PIR NTB	33,823	0.09	1
34.	L.M.Idrus Effendi	31,988	0.08	1
	Others	426,856	1.13	
Total		37,837,105	100	514

The Outcome of 1971 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes	Percentage	Seats
1.	Golkar	34,348,673	62.82	236
2.	NU	10,213,650	18.68	58
3.	Parmusi	2,930,746	5.36	24
4.	PNI	3,793,266	6.93	20
5.	PSII	1,308,237	2.39	10
6.	Parkindo	733,359	1.34	7
7.	Katolik	603,740	1.10	3
8.	Perti	381,309	0.69	2
9.	IPKI	338,403	0.61	-
10.	Murba	48,126	0.08	-
Total		54,669,509	100.00	360

The Outcome of 1977 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes	Percentage 1977	Seats 1977	Percentage in 1971	Notes
1.	Golkar	39,750,096	62.11	232	62.80	- 0,69
2.	PPP	18,743,491	29.29	99	27.12*	+ 2,17
3.	PDI	5,504,757	8.60	29	10.08**	- 1,48
Total		63.998.344	100,00	360	100,00	

* PPP: fusion of NU, Parmusi, PSII, dan Perti.

** PDI: fusion of PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, IPKI dan Partai Murba.

The Outcome of 1982 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes 1982	(%) 1982	Seats 1982	(%) 1977	Notes
1.	Golkar	48,334,724	64.34	242	62.11	+ 2,23
2.	PPP	20,871,880	27.78	94	29.29	- 1,51
3.	PDI	5,919,702	7.88	24	8.60	- 0,72
Total		75,126,306	100.00	364	100.00	

The Outcome of 1987 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes 1987	(%) 1987	Seats 1987	(%) 1982	Notes
1.	Golkar	62,783,680	73.16	299	64.34	+ 8,82
2.	PPP	13,701,428	15.97	61	27.78	- 11,81
3.	PDI	9,384,708	10.87	40	7.88	+ 2,99
	Total	85,869,816	100,00	400	100.00	

The Outcome of 1992 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes 1992	(%) 1992	Seats 1992	(%) 1987	Notes
1.	Golkar	66,599,331	68.10	282	73.16	- 5,06
2.	PPP	16,624,647	17.01	62	15.97	+ 1,04
3.	PDI	14,565,556	14.89	56	10.87	+ 4.02
	Total	97,789,534	100	400	100.00	

The Outcome of 1997 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Votes 1997	(%) 1997	Seats 1997	(%) 1992	Notes
1.	Golkar	84,187,907	74.51	325	68.10	+ 6,41
2.	PPP	25,340,028	22.43	89	17.00	+ 5,43
3.	PDI	3,463,225	3.06	11	14.90	- 11,84
	Total	112,991,150	100.00	425	100.00	

The Outcome of 1999 Legislative Election

No.	Parties	Legislative Votes	Seats before <i>Stembusakkoord</i>	Seats After <i>Stembusakkoord</i>
1.	PDIP	35,689,073	153	154
2.	Partai Golkar	23,741,749	120	120
3.	PPP	11,329,905	58	59
4.	PKB	13,336,982	51	51
5.	PAN	7,528,956	34	35

6.	PBB	2,049,708	13	13
7.	Partai Keadilan	1,436,565	7	6
8.	PKP	1,065,686	4	6
9.	PNU	679,179	5	3
10.	PDKB	550,846	5	3
11.	PBI	364,291	1	3
12.	PDI	345,720	2	2
13.	PP	655,052	1	1
14.	PDR	427,854	1	1
15.	PSII	375,920	1	1
16.	PNI Front Marhaenis	365,176	1	1
17.	PNI Massa Marhaen	345,629	1	1
18.	IPKI	328,654	1	1
19.	PKU	300,064	1	1
20.	Masyumi	456,718	1	-
21.	PKD	216,675	1	-
22.	PNI Supeni	377,137	-	-
23	Krisna	369,719	-	-
24.	Partai KAMI	289,489	-	-
25.	PUI	269,309	-	-
26.	PAY	213,979	-	-
27.	Partai Republik	328,564	-	-
28.	Partai MKGR	204,204	-	-
29.	PIB	192,712	-	-
30.	Partai SUNI	180,167	-	-
31.	PCD	168,087	-	-
32.	PSII 1905	152,820	-	-
33.	Masyumi Baru	152,589	-	-
34.	PNBI	149,136	-	-
35.	PUDI	140,980	-	-
36.	PBN	140,980	-	-
37.	PKM	104,385	-	-
38.	PND	96,984	-	-

39.	PADI	85,838	-	-
40.	PRD	78,730	-	-
41.	PPI	63,934	-	-
42.	PID	62,901	-	-
43.	Murba	62,006	-	-
44.	SPSI	61,105	-	-
45.	PUMI	49,839	-	-
46.	PSP	49,807	-	-
47.	PARI	54,790	-	-
48.	PILAR	40,517	-	-
Total		105,786,661	462	462

Notes: In 1999 general election, five parties passed the electoral threshold, namely: PDI-P with 35,689,073 votes (33.74 per cent) equal to 153 seats of DPR. Next, Golkar with 23,741,758 votes (22.44 per cent) equal to 120 seats in DPR, a decrease from 205 seats it had received in previous election (1997). PKB received 13,336,982 (12.61 per cent) equal to 51 seats in DPR. PPP received 11,329,905 votes (10.71 per cent) equal to 58 seats in DPR, which meant that it lost 31 seats from the 89 seats it had received in 1997 general election. The last party, PAN, received 7,528,956 votes (7.12 per cent) equal to 34 seats in DPR. In this general election, 27 parties refused to ratify the official election results. They were Partai Keadilan (PK), PNU, PBI, PDI, Masyumi, PNI Supeni, Krisna, Partai KAMI, PKD, PAY, Partai MKGR, PIB, Partai SUNI, PNBI, PUDI, PBN, PKM, PND, PADI, PRD, PPI, PID, Partai Murba, SPPI, PUMI, PARI, dan PSP.

The Outcome of 2004 Legislative Election

Ordinal Numbers	Parties	Votes	(%)	Seats
1.	PNI Marhaenisme	923,159	0.81 %	1
2.	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat	636,397	0.56 %	0
3.	Partai Bulan Bintang	2,970,487	2.62 %	11
4.	Partai Merdeka	842,541	0.74 %	0
5.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan	9,248,764	8.15 %	58
6.	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan	1,313,654	1.16 %	5
7.	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru	672,952	0.59 %	0
8.	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan	1,230,455	1.08 %	1
9.	Partai Demokrat	8,455,225	7.45 %	57
10.	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia	1,424,240	1.26 %	1
11.	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia	855,811	0.75 %	1

12.	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia	895,610	0.79 %	0
13.	Partai Amanat Nasional	7,303,324	6.44 %	53
14.	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa	2,399,290	2.11 %	2
15.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa	11,989,564	10.57 %	52
16.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	8,325,020	7.34 %	45
17.	Partai Bintang Reformasi	2,764,998	2.44 %	13
18.	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan	21,026,629	18.53 %	109
19.	Partai Damai Sejahtera	2,414,254	2.13 %	12
20.	Partai Golongan Karya	24,480,757	21.58 %	128
21.	Partai Patriot Pancasila	1,073,139	0.95 %	0
22.	Partai Sarikat Indonesia	679,296	0.60 %	0
23.	Partai Persatuan Daerah	657,916	0.58 %	0
24.	Partai Pelopor	878,932	0.77 %	2
Total		113,462,414	100.00 %	550

Notes: Seven parties passed the electoral threshold in 2004 general election, namely Partai Golkar with 24,480,757 votes (21.58 per cent) equal to 128 seats in DPR; PDI-P with 21,026,629 votes (18.53 per cent) equal to 109 seats in DPR; PPP with 9,248,764 votes (8.15 per cent) equal to 58 seats in DPR, Partai Demokrat with 8,455,225 votes (7.45 per cent) equal to 57 seats in DPR, PKB with 11,989,564 votes (10.57 per cent) equal to 52 seats in DPR, PKS with 8,325,020 suara (7.34 per cent) equal to 45 seats in DPR; and PAN with 7,303,324 suara (6.44 per cent) equal to 52 seats in DPR.

The Outcome of First Round Presidential Election in 2004

Ordinal Numbers	President and Vice-President Candidates	Votes	Percentage
1.	H. Wiranto,SH. H. Salahuddin Wahid	26,286,788	22.15
2.	Megawati Soekarnoputri KH. Hasyim Muzadi	31,569,104	26.61
3.	HM Amien Rais Siswono Yudhoyono	17,392,931	14.66
4.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	39,838,184	33.57
5.	Hamzah Haz Agum Gumelar, M.Sc.	3,569,861	3.01
Valid Votes		119,656,868	100

Notes: The bold typed candidates continued to the Second Round Presidential Election

The Outcome of Second Round Presidential Election in 2004

Ordinal Numbers	President and Vice-President Candidates	Votes	Percentage
2.	Hj. Megawati Soekarnoputri KH. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi	44,990,704	39.38
4.	H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Drs. H. Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	69,266,350	60.62
Valid Votes		114,257,054	100.00

Notes: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Muhammad Jusuf Kalla won the Second Round.

The Outcome of 2009 Legislative Election

No	Parties and Ordinal Numbers	Votes	Percentage
1	Partai Demokrat (31)	21,703,137	20.85%
2	Partai Golkar (23)	15,037,757	14.45%
3	PDI-P (28)	14,600,091	14.03%
4	PKS (8)	8,206,955	7.88%
5	PAN (9)	6,254,580	6.01%
6	PPP (24)	5,533,214	5.32%
7	PKB (13)	5,146,122	4.94%
8	Gerindra (5)	4,646,406	4.46%
9	Hanura (1)	3,922,870	3.77%
10	PBB (27)	1,864,752	1.79%
11	PDS (25)	1,541,592	1.48%
12	PKNU (34)	1,527,593	1.47%
13	PKPB (2)	1,461,182	1.40%
14	PBR (29)	1,264,333	1.21%
15	PPRN (4)	1,260,794	1.21%
16	PKPI (7)	934,892	0.90%
17	PDP (16)	896,660	0.86%
18	Barnas (6)	761,086	0.73%
19	PPPI (3)	745,625	0.72%
20	PDK (20)	671,244	0.64%

21	RepublikaN (21)	630,780	0.61%
22	PPD (12)	550,581	0.53%
23	Patriot (30)	547,351	0.53%
24	PNBK (26)	468,696	0.45%
25	Kedaulatan (11)	437,121	0.42%
26	PMB (18)	414,750	0.40%
27	PPI (14)	414,043	0.40%
28	Pakar Pangan (17)	351,440	0.34%
29	Pelopor (22)	342,914	0.33%
30	PKDI (32)	324,553	0.31%
31	PIS (33)	320,665	0.31%
32	PNI Marhaen (15)	316,752	0.30%
33	Partai Buruh (44)	265,203	0.25%
34	PPIB (10)	197,371	0.19%
35	PPNU (42)	142,841	0.14%
36	PSI (43)	140,551	0.14%
37	PPDI (19)	137,727	0.13%
38	Merdeka (41)	111,623	0.11%
39	PDA (36)	0	0.00%
40	Partai SIRA (37)	0	0.00%
41	PRA (38)	0	0.00%
42	Partai Aceh (39)	0	0.00%
43	PBA (40)	0	0.00%
44	PAAS (35)	0	0.00%
	Total	104,095,847	100%

Notes: In 2009 legislative election, nine parties passed the 3 per cent parliamentary threshold, namely: Partai Demokrat, Partai Golkar, PDI Perjuangan, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, Partai Gerindra, and Partai Hanura. Two parties received increasing votes, namely Demokrat and PKS while five others decreased, namely PKB, PPP, PAN, Golkar, and PDI-P. As new-established parties, Gerindra and Hanura succeeded in securing seats in the DPR while some older parties, such as PBR, PDS, PBB, PPDI, PKD, PNBK, and other minor parties lost their positions. The following is the apportionment of the nine eligible parties that surpassed the threshold in 2009 election compared to that in the previous election (2004).

Seats Allocation: 2004 and 2009 Legislative Elections

Political Parties	Seats DPR 2004	Seats DPR 2009	Increase (+) / Decrease (-)	Percentage of Increase (+) / Decrease (-)
Demokrat	55	148	+ 93	+ 169
Golkar	128	106	- 22	- 17,2
PDIP	109	94	- 15	- 13,8
PKS	45	57	+ 12	+ 26,7
PAN	53	46	- 17	- 32,1
PPP	58	38	- 20	- 334,5
PKB	52	28	- 24	- 46,2
Gerindra	*	26	*	*
Hanura	*	17	*	*
PBB	11	0	-	-
PBR	14	0	-	-
PDS	13	0	-	-
Other parties	12	0	-	-
Total	550	560	*	*

Source: KPU 2009; *Kompas*, 16 October 2009

The Outcome of 2009 Presidential Election

Ordinal Numbers	President and Vice-President Candidates	Votes	Percentage
1.	Megawati Soekarnoputri - Prabowo Subianto	32,548,105	26.79
2.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Boediono	73,874,562	60.80
3.	M. Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto	15,081,814	12.41
Valid Votes		121,504,481	100.00

Notes: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono became the winner with 73,874,562 votes or 60.80 per cent, followed by Megawati Soekarnoputri-Prabowo Subianto with 32,548,105 votes or 26.79 per cent. Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto came in third place with 15,081,814 votes or 12.41 per cent. The result was based on 121,504,481 valid votes out of 176,367,056 registered voters. In the election, 6,479,174 ballots were regarded as invalid, while the unregistered legal voters reached 54,862,575 persons.

The Percentage of *Golput* in Legislative Elections (1955 – 2009)

Legislative Election	%
1955	12.33
1971	6.67
1977	8.40
1982	9.61
1987	8.39
1992	9.05
1997	10.07
1999	10.40
2004	23.34
2009	39.22

Presidential Election in 2004, First Round: 21.77 per cent

Presidential Election in 2004, Second Round: 23.37 per cent

Presidential Election in 2009: 27.40 per cent

(Source: *Jurnal Perempuan*, No. 63/2009)

Parliamentary Members Based on Gender, 1955-2009

Period	DPR Members	Female		Male	
		Amount	%	Amount	%
1950-1955*	245 members	9 members	3,70	236 members	96,30
1955-1960	289 members	17 members	5,90	272 members	94,10
1956- 1959**	513 members	25 members	4,90	488 members	95,10
1971-1977	496 members	36 members	7,30	460 members	92,70
1977-1982	489 members	29 members	5,90	460 members	94,10
1982-1987	499 members	39 members	7,80	460 members	92,20
1987-1992	565 members	65 members	11,50	500 members	88,50
1992-1997	562 members	62 members	11,00	500 members	89,00
1997-1999	554 members	54 members	9,70	500 members	90,30
1999-2004	546 members	46 members	8,40	500 members	91,60
2004-2009	550 members	63 members	11,50	487 members	88,50
2009-2014	560 members	101 members	18,04	459 members	81,96

Source: CETRO in Republika, 27 September 2008; *Jurnal Perempuan*, No 63/2009

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